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Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, and the Bhakti Movement
Anand Venkatkrishnan
This dissertation concerns the reception history of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (BhP), an 
influential Hindu scripture, among Sanskrit intellectuals who lived between the 13th and 18th 
centuries CE. The BhP is most widely recognized for its celebration of bhakti, or religious 
devotion to an embodied god, through its narrative, didactic, and philosophical treatment of the 
god Kṛṣṇa. Composed in Sanskrit, the BhP was also closely connected to popular traditions of 
vernacular poetry and song, collectively known as the “bhakti movement.” I study the rise to 
prominence of this text-tradition by examining its impact on two important systems of Sanskrit 
scriptural interpretation: Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta. I situate the shifting discursive registers 
of these hermeneutical traditions in particular social contexts, paying special attention to the lives 
and careers of scholars in the academic center of Banaras in early modern north India. I also 
investigate how Sanskrit discourse about the BhP reveals intersections between popular religious 
movements and elite scholarly pedagogy. The thesis contributes to a number of scholarly fields, 
each wider than the previous. First, it provides a fuller picture of how particular Sanskrit systems 
of knowledge experienced change in precolonial India. Second, it attempts to understand the 
challenges that bhakti, qua the public expression of personal devotion, posed to Sanskrit 
intellectuals. Third, it revisits certain binaries and narratives in the historiography of Indian 
religion and philosophy. Fourth, it incorporates the insights of intellectual and social history into 
the study of the premodern non-West. Finally, it helps make a space for intellectual history 
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Throughout my graduate career, I used to tell people that the acknowledgments section 
was the part of my dissertation I most looked forward to writing. In part, this was because I had 
no idea what the rest of the dissertation was supposed to look like. But mostly it was due to the 
profound grace I had received from a range of teachers, colleagues, friends, relatives, and 
community members, without whom I would not have reached this point. Gratitude is a 
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of obstacles, the Guru, who shows the way, and Sarasvatī, bestower of knowledge. I can think of 
no better exemplification of all three than my advisor, John Stratton Hawley. He has opened for 
me countless doors within academia, guided and commented on every piece I have written, and 
shared freely of his wisdom. The ability to instruct without didacticism; to insist on facts without 
pedantry; to encourage without flattery; to critique without denigration; to be generous without 
expectation; and above all, to be sincerely and enthusiastically kind—these are not just 
pedagogical but fundamentally human qualities, and in Jack they are present in abundance. I feel 
fortunate to have had his winds of learning at my back over the past few years, and to discover 
the many more ways in which my gratitude will grow.
I owe an indescribable debt to Sheldon Pollock, who has also supervised and encouraged 
my work from the moment I entered graduate school. When I was a senior in college, an 
“insurgent classicist” chafing under the strictures of Greek and Latin antiquity, I encountered two 
magnificent tomes: Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South Asia, and The 
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Language of the Gods in the World of Men. That I would have the chance to study with the 
editor/author of these groundbreaking volumes never crossed my mind; the breadth and depth of 
learning was too dazzling to belong to a single person. That I was not only able to do so, but was 
also welcomed into his intellectual circles, is a testament to his generosity and commitment to his 
students' advancement. I have benefited immeasurably from his guidance and support, and from 
the example of his scholarly dedication to and respect for the thought-worlds of premodern India.
The other members of my committee have also been consistently supportive and attentive 
in the course of my graduate studies: Rachel McDermott, Lawrence McCrea, and Wayne 
Proudfoot. From Rachel I have learned what a gracious, meticulous, and encouraging teacher 
looks like—one of the warmest human beings I have come to know. From Larry, a veritable 
sarvatantrasvatantra, I have learned what devotion to Sanskrit learning looks like. I was lucky to 
study Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta with him many summers ago, imbibing vicariously his own training 
with stalwarts of the disciplines who have now passed on. From Wayne I have received insight 
into how to define terms clearly both for a non-specialist audience, and for my own 
understanding. All of them have shaped my pedagogy and research.
I am grateful to Christopher Minkowski and Rosalind O'Hanlon at Oxford University for 
inviting me to participate in the last iteration of the “Early Modern South Asia” workshop, and 
providing me the opportunity to publish my first peer-reviewed article in the journal South Asian 
History and Culture. Conversations with them have led to an edited volume, Scholar  
Intellectuals in Early Modern India (Routledge, 2015), and to new avenues of research into the 
intersection of social and intellectual history in premodern India. I look forward to more such 
discussions during my postdoctoral term as a Junior Research Fellow of Balliol College. I owe 
iii
further thanks to Jim Benson and Alexis Sanderson at Oxford for their interest in my work, and, 
at the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, Rembert Lutjeharms, Jessica Frazier, and Gavin Flood. I 
am also grateful to Gillian Evison at the Oriental Institute Library for assistance with Sanskrit 
manuscripts at the Bodleian Library.
I cannot stress enough the importance of my colleagues and friends across departments at 
Columbia University to the success of my graduate career. Research and writing is often done in 
silent aloneness, but the very ability to engage in them is impossible without a cadre of warm, 
supportive, gifted, insightful, and courageous fellow-travelers. In no particular order, I am 
grateful to the following: Daniel del Nido (admittedly primus inter pares), Laura McTighe, Kali 
Handelman, Cara Rock-Singer, Jay Ramesh, Mark Balmforth, Simran Jeet Singh, Drew 
Thomases, Hamsa Stainton, Sajida Jalalzai, Todd Berzon, Liane Carlson, Yogi Trivedi, Udi 
Halperin, Patton Burchett, Jon Keune, Joel Bordeaux, Joel Lee, James Hare, Andrew Ollett, 
Tyler Williams, Dalpat Rajpurohit, Manpreet Kaur, Christine Marrewa Karwoski, Shiv 
Subramaniam, Amanda Culp, Arthur Dudney, Anand Vivek Taneja, Divya Cherian, Guy Leavitt, 
Audrey Truschke, Elaine Fisher, Owen Cornwall, Pasha Mohamad Khan, Krista Dalton, Rex 
Barnes, Andrew Jungclaus, Liz Dolfi, Elizabeth Tinsley, Yonatan Brafman, Joe Blankholm, and 
Zachary Ugolnik. I would also like to express solidarity with the Graduate Workers of Columbia 
University (GWC-UAW Local 2110), which as of writing seeks to gain the right for graduate 
student employees of the university to unionize. Organizing for the GWC has taught me the 
precarious, sometimes shockingly insufficient conditions under which intellectual labor is 
conducted, and that achieving a democratic society is as much a task for those within the 
university as those beyond its walls.
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both senior and junior scholars. I am grateful to Yigal Bronner, Ajay Rao, Parimal Patil, Gary 
Tubb, David Shulman, V. Narayana Rao, Christian Novetzke, Somadeva Vasudeva, Valerie 
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Francis X. Clooney, Kiyokazu Okita, Carla Bellamy, Teena Purohit, John Thatamanil, 
Sthaneshwar Timalsina, Robert Yelle, Michael Allen, Shankar Nair, Jason Schwartz, Eric 
Steinschneider, Arun Brahmbhatt, Patrick Cummins, Charles Preston, and Sonam Kachru. I also 
take this space to thank my various students at Columbia University, Rutgers University, and 
Stony Brook University, for teaching me to be a better teacher.
My current academic trajectory would have been impossible without the presence of 
mentors at my undergraduate institution. At Stanford I would like to thank Linda Hess, Aishwary 
Kumar, Maud Gleason, Bert Lain, Marsh McCall, Richard Martin, Fred Porta, Mark Gonnerman, 
Akiba Lerner, Paul Harrison, Azim Nanji, Andrea Lunsford, and Joshua Landy for their 
intellectual support, patient instruction, and lasting friendship.
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support for my entire educational career. They may not understand all the paths on which my 
interests have led me, but they have more faith in me than I do. I owe them more than I can say.
Finally, for S, a luminous source in a dark world. Thank you for the love, compassion, 
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For my first Sanskrit teacher,
Dr. Sarasvati Mohan
vīṇāṃ na dhatte kimu śubhravastraṃ
no rājahaṃse śayitā kadāpi |
vidyāpradāne tu na ko 'pi bhedaḥ
sarasvatī sā jagati prasiddhā ||
She never played
a fancy instrument,
dressed in all-white, or
reclined on a royal swan.
But when it came to
imparting knowledge,
she was just as good,





Let it go. What's the point of talking about the past now?
-Nārāyaṇa, Hitopadeśa, 1.3751
It may be the same flowers
wreathed around your head
time and time again,
but when strung together
in a way never seen before,
they spark new wonder.
-Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th C.), Nyāyamañjarī, v.52
A Quick Refresher
This dissertation is about the reception history of a popular Hindu scripture, the 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa (BhP), between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries CE. I show how the 
BhP challenged and refashioned scholastic writing in Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, two 
important systems of Sanskrit scriptural interpretation. I situate the shifting discursive registers 
of these hermeneutical traditions in particular social contexts, paying special attention to the lives 
and careers of scholars in the academic center of Banaras in early modern north India. I trace the 
movement and migration of the BhP through a variety of Hindu scholastic and sectarian 
communities,3 and examine how singers and storytellers, in both Sanskrit and the vernacular, 
mirrored and reproduced the BhP's legacy as a bridge between elite theological reflection and 
1 Judit Törszök, trans., Friendly Advice by Nārāyaṇa and King Vikrama's Adventures (New York: New York 
University Press; JJC Foundation, 2007), 174: yātu, kim idānīm atikrāntopavarṇanena?
2 Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. K.S. Varadacharya (Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969), 1:
tair eva kusumaiḥ pūrvam asakṛtkṛtaśekharāḥ |
apūrvaracane dāmni dadhaty eva kutūhalam ||
3 The vexed politics of using the term “sectarian” in the context of Hinduism have been summarized nicely in 
Elaine Fisher, “A New Public Theology: Sanskrit and Society in Seventeenth-century South India” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 2013), 1-19.
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everyday devotional poetry. Ultimately, I attempt to improve our understanding of the history of 
precolonial Sanskrit knowledge, to provide an account of the intersections between popular 
religious movements and scholarly pedagogy, and to help create a space for intellectual history 
within religious studies, and for religion among intellectual historians.
The Bhāgavata Purāṇa
Several of the foregoing terms require further explanation, beginning with the BhP. 
Composed in Sanskrit and probably completed around the tenth century CE, the BhP is a 
narrative, didactic, and philosophical treatment of the life of the god Kṛṣṇa. It was instrumental 
in exalting the place of “bhakti,” or religious devotion to an embodied god, above other paths to 
salvation or liberation—namely, “jñāna,” philosophical gnosis, and “karma,” ritual activity (or, 
simply, action). These three terms, karma, jñāna, and bhakti, are reflected in the title of this 
dissertation, to signify the shifting relationship among the text-traditions that represented them.4 
The BhP was subsequently translated, explicated, painted, and performed throughout the 
subcontinent and across religious communities, so as to become one of the most influential 
Hindu scriptures of modern times, perhaps only next to the Bhagavad Gītā and the Upaniṣads. 
The BhP more or less defined bhakti as the complete absorption in and devotion to Kṛṣṇa, often 
but not always considered an incarnation of Viṣṇu.5 It therefore became central to many Vaiṣṇava 
religious groups—that is, those who adopted Viṣṇu as the supreme God. Many of the vernacular, 
sometimes subaltern religious communities that dotted the subcontinent in the second 
4 On the concept of a text-tradition, and its usefulness to the study of Indian philosophy, see Lawrence McCrea 
and Parimal Patil, Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India: Jñānaśrīmitra on Exclusion (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 3-7.
5 See Edwin F. Bryant, “Krishna in the Tenth Book of the Bhagavata Purana,” in Krishna: A Sourcebook, ed. 
Edwin F. Bryant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 111-135.
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millennium, members of the so-called “bhakti movement,” were also dedicated to the celebration 
and poetic memory of Kṛṣṇa.6 Some of these communities saw fit to distance themselves from 
alternative theistic traditions: namely, those of the Śaivas and Śāktas, who organized their 
religious life around the gods Śiva and Śakti.7 Vaiṣṇava proponents of bhakti censured these 
groups either on sectarian religious grounds—that is, as being associated with degenerate Tantric 
practices—or on philosophical ones, accusing them of promulgating a nondualist monism.8 
However, the concept of bhakti itself was prominent in Śaiva writings, and it is possible that the 
BhP moved in Śaiva circles.9 The tensions and intersections between Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism, 
and between bhakti monotheism and nondualist monism, will be central to this study of the 
BhP's reception.
Mīmāṃsā
The next term is Mīmāṃsā. Around the turn of the first millennium CE, a set of 
aphorisms, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras by Jaimini, developed a hermeneutics of the Veda, the 
paradigmatic Brahmanical Hindu scripture. A desiderative noun formed from the Sanskrit verb 
“to think,” Mīmāṃsā literally means “investigation” or “inquiry.” The term “hermeneutics” 
usefully describes Mīmāṃsā as a tradition that attempted to understand a corpus of texts, the 
6 See John Stratton Hawley, A Storm of Songs: India and the Idea of the Bhakti Movement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).
7 See Alexis Sanderson, “The Śaiva Literature,” Journal of Indological Studies 24 & 25 (2012-2013): 1-113.
8 See, e.g., Patton Burchett, “Bhakti Religion and Tantric Magic in Mughal India: Kacchvahas, Ramanandis, and 
Naths, circa 1500-1750” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012). See also John Stratton Hawley, “The Four 
Sampradāys: Ordering the Religious Past in Mughal North India,” South Asian History and Culture 2.2 (2011): 
160-183.
9 See Hamsa Stainton, “Poetry and Prayer: Stotras in the Religious and Literary History of Kashmir” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 2013), 298ff.; Jason Schwartz, “Caught in the Net of Śāstra: Devotion and its Limits in an 
Evolving Śaiva Corpus,” Journal of Hindu Studies 5.2 (2012): 210-231; V. Raghavan, “The Sūta Saṃhitā,” 
Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 22 (1941): 250-251.
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Veda, by developing systematic interpretive principles. These principles both argued for the 
epistemological validity of the Veda, defined as distinct from competing scriptural traditions and 
possessing transcendental authority, and organized the Veda's internal components based on a 
hierarchy of meaningful language.10 Vedic Brahmins—and this was a fundamentally 
Brahmanical tradition predicated on a caste-and-class-bound system of ritual, social, and ethical 
norms (varṇāśrama dharma)—developed the discipline of Mīmāṃsā in reaction to two broad 
phenomena. First was the fact that the worldview of the Veda had already become archaic by the 
turn of the first millennium; it was, in other words, a denaturalized entity that nevertheless held 
sway over orthoprax Brahmanical life, and whose symbolic power would continue for centuries. 
The second phenomenon was the axiological critique of the Veda enunciated by the renouncer 
movements of the mid-first millennium BCE, such as Buddhism and Jainism, which rejected the 
Veda's authority entirely, and offered a vision of emancipation from the suffering of worldly life. 
Mīmāṃsā as a language of apologetics came into being as a response to these two trends. The 
Mīmāṃsā Sūtras were later elaborated upon by Śabara (5th C. CE) and his most famous 
commentator, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th C. CE).
The importance of Mīmāṃsā in the life of the BhP was twofold. First, Mīmāṃsakas, or 
practitioners of Mīmāṃsā, developed a hierarchy of Sanskrit scriptural genres, placing the 
unauthored, eternal Veda at the top, ranking some texts of human composition below them, like 
the epics and purāṇas, and ejecting some “divinely inspired” scriptures, like the Vaiṣṇava and 
Śaiva Āgamas, outside the pale of Vedic society altogether. This meant that a text like the BhP, a 
purāṇa (a “legend” or “ancient chronicle”), was to be considered subordinate to the Veda, 
10 Cf. Lawrence McCrea, “The Hierarchical Organization of Language  in Mīmāṃsā Interpretive Theory,” Journal  
of Indian Philosophy 28.5 (2000): 429-459.
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deriving its authority solely on account of its authors' purported preservation of the meaning of 
the Veda. However, some scholars in the second millennium began to challenge this hierarchical 
organization of scripture. The BhP would emerge as a prime player in this renegotiation.
Second, Mīmāṃsā was a classically atheist discipline. It argued vehemently against the 
existence of an omniscient creator-god, had no time for human pretensions to supernatural 
perception, and even asserted that the Vedic gods were nothing but linguistic constructs.11 The 
BhP, of course, placed God front and center and all around. The phenomenon of a theistic 
Mīmāṃsaka, which would have seemed laughable to someone like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, did become 
a reality at a particular historical moment, a moment that was at least partially a result of 
Mīmāṃsā's intersection with the BhP.
Vedānta
Another factor that contributed to the theistic turn in Mīmāṃsā was the rise of a Vedic 
hermeneutical tradition that called itself the “latter” or “Uttara” Mīmāṃsā. This was Vedānta, the 
third term I take up for explication. On one level, Vedānta simply signified the Upaniṣads, or the 
“end of the Veda,” exploiting the ambiguity in the word “end” to mean both sequential 
conclusion and final purport. In this dissertation, Vedānta is discussed as an intellectual tradition 
that attempted to extract a coherent philosophical theology from the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad 
Gītā, and the aphoristic Brahma Sūtras—a set of three departure points called the 
prasthānatraya. Vedānta was at turns continuous with and distinct from what it labeled its 
11 Cf. Francis X. Clooney, “Why the Veda Has No Author: Language as Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern 
Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55.4 (1987): 659-684; Francis X. Clooney, What's a 
god? The quest for the right understanding of devatā in Brāhmaṇical ritual theory (mīmāṃsā),” International  
Journal of Hindu Studies 1.2 (1997): 337-385; Lawrence McCrea, “'Just Like Us, Just Like Now': The Tactical 
Implications of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception,” in Yogic Perception, Meditation, and Altered  
States of Consciousness, ed. Eli Franco (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
2009), 55-70.
6
“prior” incarnation, or “Pūrva” Mīmāṃsā.12 If the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras held that the Veda was 
fundamentally about dharma, ritual action performed for a particular result, the Brahma Sūtras 
claimed that the Veda cohered around communicating the knowledge of Brahman, the ultimate 
reality, from which the whole universe came into being. The realization of Brahman, said the 
Brahma Sūtras, was the whole purpose of the Upaniṣads, and would grant liberation from the 
suffering of finite worldly existence. One of the basic differences between Mīmāṃsā and 
Vedānta was the former's emphasis on karma, on the proper maintenance and performance of 
Vedic ritual, and the latter's insistence that jñāna, knowledge, could release one from precisely 
those karmic bonds that kept the cycle of death and rebirth moving.
Several schools of Vedānta formed around the interpretation of the prasthānatraya. In 
this dissertation, I concentrate on Advaita Vedānta, the “nondualist” interpretation of Vedānta 
that is generally traced to the eighth-century philosopher Śaṅkara, or Śaṅkarācārya. In Śaṅkara's 
account, Vedānta tried to communicate the ultimate unity—the nonduality—between Ātman, the 
Self, and Brahman, the all-pervading reality. The way to liberation for a student of Vedānta, who 
desired release from the cycle of death and rebirth (saṃsāra), was to achieve an immediate 
knowledge (jñāna) of the true nature of the Ātman as nondifferent from Brahman. Any hint of 
plurality or differentiation in the world, according to Śaṅkara, was a superimposition, like a 
snake erroneously seen in place of a rope, inexplicable as being either wholly real or unreal. 
Famously, Śaṅkara called this everyday veiling of nondual reality an “illusion” (māyā), and his 
idealist leanings frequently led to accusations that he was a Buddhist in Brahmin clothing 
(pracchannabauddha).13 Śaṅkara's Advaitic reading of Vedānta left little room for a personal, 
12 See Johannes Bronkhorst, ed. Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta: Interaction and Continuity (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
2007).
13 This criticism was not entirely off the mark, since early Advaita owed significantly to Mahāyāna Buddhist forms 
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embodied god, possessed of attributes, who would be unsuited to the forbidding austerity of the 
formless, partless, undifferentiated Brahman. At best, God was a concept that belonged to the 
transactional, empirical world (vyavahāra), a being fully conscious of his identity with Brahman, 
capable of incarnating in such figures as Kṛṣṇa. From an ultimate perspective (paramārtha), 
however, God and the individual soul must be considered one and the same, for in Advaita, 
Ātman is Brahman. The BhP, however, both expressed sentiments very close to Advaita and 
celebrated the god Kṛṣṇa in full aesthetic glory, a juxtaposition that some have called “Advaitic 
theism.”14 The extent of the BhP's Advaita sensibilities, and its relationship with the Advaita 
Vedānta inaugurated by Śaṅkara, remains a topic of debate.
This is especially the case because Advaita Vedānta was not the only Vedānta on the 
block. Soon after Śaṅkara, several Vaiṣṇava philosophers, who were affiliated with temples, 
scriptures, ritual manuals, and devotional poetry that glorified the god Viṣṇu, offered competing 
theistic readings of Vedānta's core texts. Most influential were the South Indian philosophers 
Rāmānuja (11th C.), proponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, whose followers were known as 
Śrīvaiṣṇavas, and Madhva (13th C.), proponent of Dvaita (or Tattvavāda) Vedānta. Later centuries 
would see still more Vaiṣṇava Vedānta traditions further to the north that traced themselves to 
Nimbārka (13th C.?), Vallabha (15th-16th C.), and Caitanya (15th-16th C.). Though they did not 
always present a unified front, each individually resisted the monistic implications of Advaita 
Vedānta.15 Some of these Vedāntins also took direct inspiration from the BhP, emphasizing its 
of nondualism. See Richard King, Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism: The Mahayana Context of the  
Gaudapadiya-karika (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).
14 See Daniel P. Sheridan, The Advaitic Theism of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).
15 See Hawley, A Storm of Songs, 99-147, for an account of the “four-sampradāy” rubric, a genealogical narrative 
from the seventeenth century, in which the sectarian traditions of Rāmānand, Keśav Bhaṭṭ Kāśmīrī, Caitanya, and 
Vallabhācārya, found their ancestry in four Vaiṣṇava (i.e., non-Advaita) Vedānta counterparts in the south.
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exaltation of bhakti, rather than jñāna, as the highest spiritual attainment. The BhP became as 
much a source of contestation between these schools of Vedānta as their interpretations of the 
prasthānatraya.
Early Modernity
I have used the term “early modern” to refer to a periodization of Indian intellectual 
history within which part of my research takes place. My impetus for studying the shifting 
registers of discourse in Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta within this period—1550 CE-1750 CE—
comes from a collaborative research project called “Sanskrit Knowledge-Systems on the Eve of 
Colonialism.” In brief, the project has sought to understand the full effect of the purported 
epistemic rupture initiated by colonial technologies of rule on traditional modes of Sanskrit 
theoretical production,16 by studying the prolific output of such intellectual content in that early 
modern period. The group's work aims to examine seven knowledge-systems, or śāstras, in their 
bibliographical, prosopographical, and substantive dimensions, selected for their centrality to 
Sanskrit culture, comparative and historical value, and/or their new vitality in the early modern 
period. These disciplines are: vyākaraṇa (language analysis), mīmāṃsā (hermeneutics), nyāya 
(logic/epistemology), dharmaśāstra (moral/political philosophy), alaṃkāraśāstra (poetics), 
āyurveda (life-science), and jyotiḥśāstra (astrology).17
There are two ways in which my dissertation engages this project: first, by adding 
Advaita Vedānta to the disciplines studied, and second, by complicating the epistemic nature of 
16 See Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Sudden Death of Sanskrit Knowledge.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 33.1 (2005): 
119-124.
17 See Sheldon Pollock, “The Languages of Science in Early Modern India,” in Forms of Knowledge in Early  
Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 1500-1800, ed. Sheldon Pollock 
(Durham: Duke University Press), 20-21.
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the “early modern” periodization. Before offering my emendation to that periodization, I will 
summarize the reasoning behind it. As a first-order category, the early modern describes a global 
phenomenon, which, as the social historian John Richards argues, consists of six distinct but 
complementary large-scale processes: 1) The creation of global sea passages and an increasingly 
efficient transportation network; 2) The rise of a truly global world economy; 3) The 
unprecedented growth around the world of large, stable states; 4) The doubling of world 
population; 5) The intensified use of land to expand production; and 6) The diffusion of several 
new technologies and organizational responses to them.18 While there are objections to including 
South Asia in this world history,19 tracking these changes in the social history of the early modern 
world allows us an additional lens into the corresponding intellectual changes that have come to 
define the European sense of its own modernity, and which find remarkable though inexact 
parallels in India.
This intellectual “newness” in the context of early modern India was first laid out in a 
18 See John Richards, “Early Modern India and World History,” Journal of World History 8.2 (1997): 198-203.
19 For a more sober assessment of the difficulties with such periodization, in particular the many guises of 
“modernity” in sociological and historical writing, see Jack Goldstone, “The Problem of the 'Early Modern' 
World,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41.3 (1998): 249-284. For a critique of the 
“early modern” in India as being an imprecise marker of intellectual value, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The 
Muddle of Modernity,” American Historical Review 116.3 (2011): 663-675, esp. 674-675: “Turning specifically 
to the question of whether or not 'early modern' was an apt way of periodizing history in the Indian subcontinent, 
my question would be: Which Indian or South Asian thinkers from the precolonial period, then, must we still 
wrestle with in fabricating or thinking about democratic forms of public life? But historians can ask such 
questions only if they clarify to themselves and their readers what is at stake for them in debates about 
modernity. The word is not very useful if it is treated merely as a synonym for institutional or infrastructural 
change over time—that is to say, for modernization.” A partial response to Chakrabarty's critique, from the 
perspective of a social historian of precolonial Western India, has been offered by Rosalind O'Hanlon, 
“Contested Conjunctures: Brahman Communities and 'Early Modernity' in India,” American Historical Review 
118.3 (2013): 765-787. See Ibid., 787: “As long as this older history remains over the routine intellectual horizon 
of scholars engaged with colonial social change, whether of elites or 'subalterns,' it will continue to be difficult to 
grasp the nature of India’s colonial 'modernity.' While this is so, we risk reproducing a history very much in 
colonialism’s own self-image, in which all forms of modernity emanated from its transforming presence.”
10
2001 essay by Sheldon Pollock.20 The essay identifies a set of innovations in the conceptions and 
discursive protocols of early modern Sanskrit intellectuals, as well as the structure and substance 
of the new sense of historicality according to which their scholarly work began to be organized. 
But when the intellectual production of early modern India is juxtaposed with comparable 
developments in Europe, the divergence in historical trajectory could not be more stark.21 In 
Europe, early modernity saw changes across intellectual disciplines: in literary culture, the 
“quarrel between the ancients and moderns”; in philosophy, the shift away from scholastic 
writing and theological concerns; and at the nexus of language and power, the displacement of 
Latin by vernacular languages as the primary medium of intellectual and pedagogical activity. In 
India, however, these changes were similar but different. Sanskrit intellectuals also possessed a 
new sense of historicity, of distance from their predecessors, but articulated it in ways that 
seemed to urge a sense of continuity with the past rather than a radical break. Philosophy 
remained a primarily scholastic endeavor, though different genres of writing flourished, 
especially introductory primers and doxographies. They also resisted, with varying degrees of 
success, the use of vernaculars as primary languages of knowledge-production. While this 
divergence led to normative colonial-era judgments regarding the stultifying, essentially stagnant 
nature of premodern India, Pollock does make the provocative claim that “In the face of 
European modernity, Indian systems of thought, or rather Sanskrit systems, simply vanished as a 
significant force in Indian history.”22
20 Sheldon Pollock, “New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-Century India.” The Indian Economic and Social History  




This declaration regarding the “death” of Sanskrit knowledge—not causally but co-evally 
linked to the imposition of colonial modernity—has been contested by several parties, who 
generally point to the continuity of Sanskrit as a vital language of public disputation in the 
colonial period.23 Pollock himself has moved away from characterizing the Sanskrit scholarly 
trend to apply the new subtleties of argumentation to the analysis of ancient categories as simply 
another instance of arrested development. What we must resist, he asserts, is conceptual 
symmetry; what we require instead is historical synchronicity.24 If this new intellectuality of 
early modernity did not transform into a condition of the secular modern, then the fault lies not 
with the text traditions themselves, but with our expectation in hindsight of some inevitable 
developmental goal.25 For as Richard Eaton comments in a different context, to study this 
moment as one of failure, as a non-event, would be to commit the historical fallacy of attempting 
to explain a counter-factual proposition.26
While the ability to think comparatively about European and Indian intellectuality is an 
attractive proposition and a salutary accomplishment, as with all macro-narratives it is bound to 
provoke dissent from particular corners. Parimal Patil has taken up the case of Nyāya, the 
science of logic/epistemology, which does not exactly fit the model articulated above.27 From 
23 Notably, see Brian A. Hatcher, “Sanskrit and the morning after: the metaphorics and theory of intellectual 
change,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 44.3 (2007): 333-361.
24 Sheldon Pollock, “Introduction,” in Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: Explorations in the Intellectual  
History of India and Tibet, 1500-1800, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 4.
25 Ibid., 2.
26 Richard Eaton, “(Re)imag(in)ing Other²ness: a Postmortem for the Postmodern in India,” Journal of World  
History 11.1 (2001): 61.
27 Parimal Patil, “The Historical Rhythms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Knowledge-System,” in Yogic Perception,  
Meditation, and Altered States of Consciousness, ed. Eli Franco (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 2009), 91-126.
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Udayana's reconfiguration of Nyāya in the eleventh century, to Gaṅgeśa's inauguration of “new” 
(Navya) Nyāya in thirteenth-century Mithilā, to Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's introduction of the 
discipline into fifteenth-century Bengal, to Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana's participation in multiple 
epistemic worlds in eighteenth-century Calcutta,28 Nyāya has both experienced several moments 
of “newness” dispersed across the second millennium and remained a continuous discipline well 
into the colonial period. A similar case could be made for Advaita Vedānta. Although there is a 
marked increase in literary activity in the early modern period, and new genres enter the 
discursive world, many philosophical and hermeneutical innovations can be traced to the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—eras for which and preceding which we have little by way of 
historical contextualization.29 This is especially the case for the relationship between bhakti and 
Advaita, one of the topics in this dissertation. Moreover, Advaita Vedānta flourished not only 
throughout the early modern subcontinent, but well into its colonial modernity, of which it 
became partly constitutive.
Even though we need not adopt a thoroughgoing skepticism of the politics of time that 
28 Jagannātha wrote a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi and was enlisted by the famous Orientalist 
William Jones to be the chief paṇḍit overseeing the composition of the Vivādabhaṅgārṇava, a compilation of 
juridical opinions from a collection of Hindu scholars. This was the sourcebook for H.T. Colebrooke's Digest of  
Hindu Law, a translation that he completed in 1796. See Rosane Rocher, “Weaving Knowledge: Sir William 
Jones and Indian Pandits,” in Objects of Inquiry: The Life, Contributions, and Influences of Sir William Jones, 
eds. Garland Cannon and Kevin R. Brine, (New York: New York University Press. 1995), 62. Cf. Rosane Rocher, 
The Making of Western Indology: Henry Thomas Colebrooke and the East India Company (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 34-38.
29 Christopher Minkowski has undertaken thus far the most rigorous genealogical work required for a working 
social history of Advaita in early modern India. See Christopher Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern 
History,” South Asian History and Culture 2.2 (2011): 205-231. Although he engages with Randall Collins' 
sociology of world philosophies, Minkowski himself refrains from offering a theory of intellectual change in 
early modern Advaita. Cf. Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual  
Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
On “medieval” Advaita teachers, see Srikantha Sastri, “Advaitācāryas of the 12th and 13th Centuries,” Indian 
Historical Quarterly XIV (1938): 401-408. Cf. T.M.P. Mahadevan, ed. Preceptors of Advaita (Secunderabad: Sri 
Kanchi Kamakoti Sankara Mandir, 1968).
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governs the act of periodization,30 the concept of the “early modern” as a period of intellectual 
change needs to be particularized for each Sanskrit knowledge-system, taking account of both its 
intellectual history prior to the sixteenth century, and its resilience in the face of colonial 
encounter. If we do not begin from the proposition that the early modern is a unique epistemic 
period applicable across Sanskrit disciplines, we may be more attentive to alternative historical 
possibilities, without necessarily losing sight of the profound social changes that characterized 
the early modern world.
Intellectual History
What, exactly, is “Indian” about Indian intellectual history?31 Who are the historical 
intellectuals of intellectual history?32 What is intellectual history, now and yet to come?33 The 
history of ideas, to put it in barest terms, was for most of the twentieth century a Euro-American 
exercise in understanding intellectual shifts in their historical context. Although its initial 
practitioners, such as R.G. Collingwood, were heir to a Hegelian idealism that viewed all history 
as the history of ideas, members of the so-called “Cambridge School” from the 1960s shifted 
their attention to the more contingent operations of language in the world. Influenced in 
particular by the philosopher of language J.L. Austin, and to a degree by the later Wittgenstein, 
30 See Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the  
Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
31 See Sheldon Pollock, “Is There an Indian Intellectual History? Introduction to 'Theory and Method in Indian 
Intellectual History,'” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36.5 (2008): 533-542.
32 See Christopher Minkowski et al., eds., Scholar Intellectuals in Early Modern India (London: Routledge, 2015).
33 See Annabel Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?”, in What is History Now?, ed. David Cannadine 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 113-131.
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historians such as Quentin Skinner34 and J.G.A. Pocock35 understood texts as active expressions 
of language, or speech acts. Texts, as speech acts, did not merely have the capacity for providing 
information, but also had performative, or illocutionary dimensions. They made interventions in 
a broader discourse or milieu within which they participated. Turning to the issue of agency, 
Skinner insisted that understanding what an author was doing in writing a text was indispensable 
to understanding its meaning. In other words, meaning and understanding were not simply the 
result of elucidating a text's content, but just as crucially, of understanding a text's context.36
Skinner, Pocock, and the German historian Reinhart Koselleck, proponent of a 
methodologically eclectic “history of concepts” (Begriffsgeschichte),37 were historians of 
philosophy and political theory in modern and early modern Europe. The “New Historicists” of 
subsequent decades, many inspired by the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, sought to 
move their analysis from texts to broader cultural representations, an act that could be viewed 
either as stretching what could be read as a “text” or as increasing the range of what counts as a 
significant cultural artifact.38 Recent volumes have sought to expand the scope of the discipline 
34 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
35 J.G.A. Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
36 Cf. Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?”, 116: “Identification or recovery of a particular utterance as a 
particular illocutionary act depends on an awareness of its particular speech situation or context. We can only 
know what an author was doing in writing a particular text if we know the circumstances of that doing. The 
result was a method which argues that to understand texts for the specific speech acts that they are, we need to 
understand the historical context in which they were uttered.”
37 See Reinhart Koselleck, “Social History and Conceptual History,” in The Practice of Conceptual History:  
Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 20-37. Cf. Melvin Richter, The 
History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 1-25; Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2012).
38 See Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000). Cf. Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?”, 125-126.
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still further, particularly in order to think about more global possibilities.39 It has made a fairly 
seamless transition into the study of modern, or colonial and postcolonial, Indian intellectual 
history.40 Historians of precolonial India, however, have offered reflections on the theoretical and 
methodological challenges of studying the history of ideas in Sanskrit systems of knowledge. 
Sheldon Pollock, for example, remarks:
What has characterized, indeed virtually defined, Euro-American intellectual history 
over the past five decades, certainly from the rise of the Cambridge School in the 1960s, 
and which the New Historicism of the 1980s and 1990s served to reinforce, is the 
commitment to deep contextualism: for many of its practitioners in the European 
tradition, intellectual history is entirely a question of charting the production of and 
intention behind ideas in specific times and places. In India, however, a mix of peculiar 
cultural-political and environmental factors make this dimension of historical practice 
very difficult. The non-textualization of life-events (birth, marriage, death); the absence 
of a political absolutism whose cruel documentary invigilation over its own subjects 
was, in some small measure, compensated for by the archival richness left to posterity; a 
climate that destroyed whatever was not recopied every few generations; and, for the 
Sanskrit intellectual milieu, a constitutional disinclination to time-space localization and 
a cultural proscription of self-advertisement—these factors and others have conspired to 
leave the social record of Sanskrit intellectuals a virtual blank.41
Recent developments in the study of early modern India have begun to address these 
problems in different ways. We find one such development in the work of Jonardon Ganeri.42 
Ganeri suggests that Skinner's conception of the text in context is at once too rich and too poor 
for the study of Indian intellectual history. It is too rich because we possess little knowledge of 
39 Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013). Cf. Shruti Kapila, “Global Intellectual History and the Indian Political,” in Rethinking Modern European 
Intellectual History, eds. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 253-274.
40 See Shruti Kapila, ed., An Intellectual History for India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Shruti 
Kapila and Faisal Devji, eds., Political Thought in Action: The Bhagavad Gita in Modern India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
41 Pollock, “Is There an Indian Intellectual History?”, 537.
42 Jonardon Ganeri, “Contextualism in the Study of Indian Intellectual Cultures,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 
36.5 (2008): 551-562.
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the circumstances of composition of the texts of Indian intellectuals, and too poor because we 
might instead read Indian texts in what Ganeri calls their “intertextual” contexts.43 In its literary 
and intellectual context, the Indian (read: Sanskrit) text may be understood as a kind of 
“intrasystemic intervention.” In other words, when the intellectual “context” is a knowledge-
system itself, we may read Sanskrit texts as “proleptic speech interventions intentionally directed 
towards future audiences.”44 It is debatable whether or not Ganeri's revision of Skinner can 
simply be regarded an extension of his method. Another approach suggests that, at least for the 
early modern period, we might benefit from incorporating social history into the study of Indian 
intellectual cultures.45 This would mean both moving beyond the focus on Sanskrit as an 
exclusive, self-contained font of intellectual life, and paying attention to particular figures who 
were at once rooted in regional cultures and involved in a wider ecumene:
There is, in fact, more biographical information about individual intellectuals than is 
commonly supposed, particularly when vernacular as well as Sanskrit documentary 
sources are examined in parallel. We can, furthermore, often gain an understanding of the 
more immediate as well as the broader social and political circumstances within which 
scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries worked. These circumstances included 
political shifts bringing royal courts, temples, and sectarian monasteries into closer 
connection and challenges from emergent forms of devotional religion. […] Situating 
scholars and intellectuals ‘in context’ therefore means attending to their reach across 
disciplinary boundaries, linguistic and intellectual traditions, geographical regions, social 
locations, historical periods, and commercial networks – in short, the features that mark 
what some historians call the ‘global conjunctures’ of the early modern world.46
43 Ibid., 553-554.
44 Ibid., 555-556.
45 See Christopher Minkowski et al., “Social History in the Study of Indian Intellectual Cultures?”, South Asian 
History and Culture 6.1 (2015): 1-9. This approach also takes inspiration from the work of Christopher Bayly. 
Ajay Skaria observes that “For Bayly, the social function that defines intellectuals is not only that they have 
access to ‘culture goods’, but that they participate, at whatever level, in the production of knowledge and 
information. Now, intellectual history becomes integrally part of social and cultural history.” See Ajay Skaria, 
“'Can the Dalit articulate a universal position?' the intellectual, the social, and the writing of history,” Social  
History 39.3 (2014): 353.
46 Minkowski et al., “Social History in the Study of Indian Intellectual Cultures?”, 2, 7.
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In my dissertation, I respond to the imperatives of intellectual history in two ways. First, 
while I fully adopt the Skinnerian contextual method, and exploit its potential to critique 
histories of Indian philosophy that consign historical considerations to the margins, I resist the 
implication that contextualism exhausts the possibilities of meaning within a text-tradition. My 
point of departure (prasthāna) is Peter Gordon's pithy observation, articulated in a critical essay 
on the topic, that “situated thinking exceeds its own situation.”47 By studying the texts in this 
dissertation as intellectual interventions rather than exclusively for their philosophical content, 
and by emphasizing the local, contingent character of text-traditions often valorized for their 
universality, I do not mean to close off the potential for their critical reappropriation in the 
present.48 On the contrary, it is precisely by tracking the many and divergent historical lives that 
these text-traditions possessed that I show the dynamic possibilities within them.49
Second, I follow the recent recommendations from historians of religion both to employ 
the methods of intellectual history in the study of religion, and to make religious ideas a 
47 Peter E. Gordon, “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas,” in Rethinking Modern European 
Intellectual History, eds. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 51. A similar critique of the limitations of Skinner's method comes from Skaria, “'Can the Dalit articulate 
a universal position?'”, 352: “In a pure contextualization, if such a thing were possible, universality is treated as 
only a pervasive error, one that can be avoided once it has been identified. Thus, while the power of Skinner’s 
intervention lies in its effort to eschew both the historicist and generalizing narratives, in the process that 
intervention leaves itself without the means to comprehend the immense power of claims to universality.”
48 The Nietzschean view of the matter is well-known from his famous essay “On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 59-123. Less well-known is Gandhi's “activist reading” of the past, admirably reconstructed by Simona 
Sawhney, “Allegory and Violence: Gandhi's Reading of the Bhagavad Gītā,” in The Modernity of Sanskrit 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 86-124.
49 Cf. Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?”, 127: “We might add that doing intellectual history can itself be 
understood as poetic in that sense, for intellectual history does not merely unravel the structure of what we have 
inherited but can also unearth what we have lost: ways of speaking and ways of seeing the world, once current, 
now exotic and (perhaps) full of possibility.”
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constitutive topic of intellectual history.50 They rightly point to the relative lack of attention to 
religion among intellectual historians. Intellectual history most closely affiliates itself with the 
fields of philosophy, political theory, cultural history, and sociology. Religion, if at all discussed, 
is generally epiphenomenal to the historians listed above, not always out of any particular 
ideological commitment, but as a general function of the fields in which they work. How does 
this neglect play out in the Indian context, or does it?
It has become a truism, perhaps not without a whiff of Orientalism, to assert that in India, 
the rift between religion and philosophy was much less pronounced, or much less influenced by 
the baggage of Enlightenment polemics, than in Europe. Certainly there have been histories and 
studies of Indian philosophy that tried to downplay religious concerns, but even “Hindu 
theology” has arguably become an appropriate analytical category for Indian intellectual 
traditions like Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.51 Still, there remain divides. For example, as thorough a 
research agenda as the Sanskrit Knowledge-Systems project possessed, the religious sciences 
received comparatively little attention, and Vedānta was missing altogether. Recent scholarship 
on the relationship of Sanskrit with vernacular languages rejects older assertions that religion 
was instrumental to the initial development of vernaculars, suggesting instead that religious 
movements employed local languages in reaction to the high register of the cosmopolitan 
50 See John Coffey and Alister Chapman, “Introduction: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion,” in Seeing 
Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion, eds. Alister Chapman, John Coffey, and Brad 
S. Gregory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 1-23. At times this call for attention to the 
“return” of religion—as if it ever went away—seems like the intellectual project of aggrieved Catholic 
theologians. Gregory in particular has taken a broad Catholic axe to social-scientific theses of secularization. See 
Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012).
51 See Francis X. Clooney, “Restoring 'Hindu Theology' as a Category in Indian Intellectual Discourse,” in The 
Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, ed. Gavin Flood (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 447-477.
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vernacular.52 Parts of my dissertation suggest that religious motivations did have an impact on 
scholarly output, especially in the reactions of Sanskrit intellectuals to vernacular language-use. 
Religious commitments even prompted some scholars to shift the terms of the otherwise neutral 
intellectual disciplines in which they worked. At the end of the day, however, I do not attempt to 
account for historical change in Sanskrit knowledge-systems through the rubric of intentionality 
or motivation. Instead I provide a wider range of contexts within which that change occurred. 
Ours not to reason why. Ours but to peer and pry.
The End-Game
“So what?” Miles Davis might ask. Or, in Vedāntic terms, what is the prayojana, the end-
game, of this undertaking? This project began as an investigation into the history of Advaita 
Vedānta in its late incarnations—that is, a period long after the composition of its foundational 
texts. It seems hardly necessary to make a case for the historical significance of Advaita Vedānta 
to the study of Indian religion and philosophy, at least in modern times. From Orientalist scholars 
and Christian missionaries to nationalist reformers and New Age gurus, Advaita Vedānta 
dominated a variety of discourses in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India.53 For some, it 
played the role of a universalist, non-sectarian philosophy that defined the spiritual core of a 
nascent nation. For others, it was an amoral, unworldly monism that reflected the pre-political, 
unchanging character of a subject people. And for still others, it represented a nondualist 
52 See Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in  
Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 423-436. For a dissenting voice, “troubled by 
Pollock’s overall treatment of religion as a kind of constant and largely irrelevant factor that is somehow 
untouched by power and has no consequences for it[,]” see Yigal Bronner, “A Road Map for Future Studies: The 
Language of the Gods in the World of Scholars,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 
31.2 (2011): 542.
53 See Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, and the 'Mystic East' (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 119-142.
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alternative to inherited modes of Western thought; at turns mystical and thoroughly rational, it 
could attract comparative philosophers and spiritual seekers alike.
Not only is Advaita Vedānta one of the most influential schools of Indian philosophy, it is 
also one of the most studied. Some argue that it has in fact been over-studied, and attempt to 
counter “the hegemonic narrative...of Advaita Vedānta as the essence and culmination of Indian 
philosophical systems [...]”54 To say that something has been studied much, however, is not 
necessarily to say it has been studied thoroughly and well. Scholars have yet to provide even a 
rudimentary, let alone comprehensive account of the history of Advaita Vedānta in the centuries 
leading up to the colonial period, though this history is precisely what set the stage for its modern 
reception. In other words, our understanding of Advaita Vedānta in the thousand-year period 
between the writings of Śaṅkara, widely considered the foundational figure of the tradition, and 
the lectures of Swami Vivekananda, one of the first spokespeople for a modern Hinduism, 
remains largely incomplete. As Michael Allen suggests, a wider perspective on Advaita's rise to 
prominence would require looking beyond the “classical” Sanskrit philosophical works 
belonging to Śaṅkara's school, and include all those Advaitic works outside that canon, which 
Allen calls “Greater Advaita Vedānta.”55 Allen's own work, for example, addresses the 
54 See Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 15.
55 See Michael Allen, “The Ocean of Inquiry: A Neglected Classic of Late Advaita Vedānta” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2013), 6: “I suspect that in order fully to understand Advaita’s rise to prominence—not just in 
Banaras now, but across the subcontinent—we will have to look outside the received canon of Sanskrit 
philosophical works. Scholarly treatments of Advaita Vedānta do not usually include, for example, the popular 
Maharashtrian saint Jñāneśvar (13th c.), though his works clearly bear the stamp of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. Or 
consider the widely read and adapted Adhyātma-rāmāyaṇa (ca. late 15th c.)—another work seldom included in 
surveys of Vedāntic literature—which synthesizes non-dualist metaphysics with Rāma-bhakti, and which was 
one of the main sources for Tulsīdās’s Rāmcaritmānas. The Tripurā-rahasya, to take an example from a very 
different milieu, is a work of South India Tantra, yet its jñāna-khaṇḍa is deeply indebted to Advaita Vedānta. 
From more recent times, take the popular saint Sai Baba of Shirdi (d. 1918), who is not considered an Advaita 
Vedāntin, but who often quoted from and recommended Advaitic works such as the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha. These are just 
a handful of examples, from very different periods and milieus, of the dissemination of Advaita Vedānta—or at 
least of teachings inspired by Advaita—outside the received canon of Sanskrit philosophical works, a 
phenomenon that might be referred to as 'Greater Advaita Vedānta.'”
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popularization and dissemination of vernacular Advaita through the Hindi writings of the 
Dādūpanthī Niścaldās. Forthcoming work by Shankar Nair studies the cross-cultural scope of 
Advaita in early modern North India, focusing on the formation of a “Persian Sufi Vedānta” 
under the Mughal aegis.56 Elaine Fisher directs our attention to the South and the fusion of an 
ascendant Smārta Advaita with Tantric Śaiva and Śākta traditions, affiliated with the monastic 
center of Kāñcīpuram and the Nāyaka courts of Tamilnadu.57 These examples of historically 
sensitive scholarship on Advaita Vedānta carry a great deal of promise for its future.
In this dissertation, I study the impact of another “greater” Advaita text, the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa, on scholars affiliated with the “classical” Advaita tradition. Sometimes that relationship 
is fraught; sometimes it is symbiotic. Either way, a more historically thorough understanding of 
that relationship shines a light on how it has been narrativized—say, with binaries such as 
monism vs. monotheism, jñāna vs. bhakti, or scholars vs. devotees. Quentin Skinner has the 
following to say about what intellectual history offers to thinking about the present.
[O]ne of the uses of the past arises from the fact that we are prone to fall under the spell 
of our own intellectual heritage. As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it 
is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them 
bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of 
thinking about them. Given this situation, one of the contributions that historians can 
make is to offer us a kind of exorcism. If we approach the past with a willingness to 
listen, with a commitment to trying to see things their way, we can hope to prevent 
ourselves from becoming too readily bewitched. An understanding of the past can help 
us to appreciate how far the values embodied in our present way of life, and our present 
ways of thinking about those values, reflect a series of choices made at different times 
between different possible worlds.58
56 See Shankar Nair, “Philosophy in Any Language: Interaction Between Arabic, Sanskrit, and Persian Intellectual 
Cultures in Mughal South Asia” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2014).
57 See Fisher, “A New Public Theology.”
58 Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1, 6.
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First of all, I find this sentiment beautiful—and aesthetics guide our intellectual choices 
as much as our rational acceptance of them. What it means to me is that to be concerned with the 
historiography of religion and philosophy is itself a philosophical endeavor. Skinner's invocation 
of “different possible worlds” is one that derives from the discipline of historical study itself. 
This is not to diminish the philosophical value of his subject matter, but to subject it to the 
exigencies of what Wilfred Cantwell Smith would have called “critical corporate self-
consciousness,” the acknowledgment of our collective participation in assigning as well as 
receiving value from our intellectual progenitors.59 One of the intellectual heritages I engage with 
in this dissertation is how histories of Indian philosophy have marginalized the study of historical 
change.60 As I will show in the case of Advaita Vedānta, many of these changes turn out not to be 
“philosophical” at all, in the sense of promulgating new doctrine, but rather hermeneutical. In 
other words, it is the shifting registers of scholastic discourse that betray distinct historical 
tensions, to which intellectuals attempted to respond in illocutionary fashion. Such innovations 
were part of the fabric of Sanskrit intellectual life in early modern India, perhaps nowhere more 
so than in and across Vedānta traditions. Yet this later history is frequently subsumed under the 
modern encyclopedic effort to delineate the “real spirit” of Indian philosophy, neatly packageable 
into discrete doctrines, stripped of their historical specificity.61 The way in which the past acts 
59 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief: The Difference Between Them (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 
1998), 148.
60 Cf. Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 11: “Books titled 'The History of Indian Philosophy' rarely deal with history. 
The 'historical' portion of such books is generally limited to a few sentences at the beginning of each section 
listing the philosopher's dates and (optionally) in which part of India he lived.”
61 See, e.g., the criticisms of the historian Surendranath Dasgupta, who assessed literary activity in early modern 
Advaita as being “syncretistic,” “lacking in originality,” and “philosophically uninteresting.” See Minkowski, 
“Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern History,” 206, 212. In his study of Sanskrit bitextual (śleṣa) poetry, Yigal 
Bronner criticizes the Romantic notion, pervasive among many twentieth-century historians of Sanskrit 
literature, that the earliest expressions of poetic or philosophical thought are its unalterable essence, and that all 
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upon us, the anxiety of influence, and the reading and writing practices in which we as scholars 
participate—in other words, history—were no less the concerns of the thinkers so often studied 
as “philosophers.” Yet it is precisely access to history that we are reluctant to allow these Indian 
intellectuals, or at best subordinate to their supposedly more salient philosophical concerns.
For example, a recently classic work on postcolonial thought bemoans the fact that Indian 
social scientists have no reason to engage with the thought-worlds of premodern philosophers 
like Bhartṛhari, Gaṅgeśa, or Abhinavagupta.62 They are not at all considered contemporaries in 
the way that, say, Hegel or Marx has become indispensable to thinking about modern democratic 
politics. Some have responded by advocating for the inclusion of premodern Indian philosophers 
within the genre of intellectual history, precisely so that they may become “participants in 
twenty-first-century philosophical conversations.”63 But what if this whole desire to 
contemporize misses the point? As Skinner says above, one of the benefits of intellectual history 
is in the vision it provides of alternative historical worlds that, regardless of whether they look 
different or similar to our own, are in and of themselves salutary reminders of how historically 
contingent the present is.
In my dissertation, for example, I study the academic careers of the Devas of early 
modern Banaras, a family of Brahmin scholars who moved from Maharashtra in the sixteenth 
century. They ended up becoming quite successful, but some things about Banarasi academic 
culture rubbed them the wrong way. The Devas found themselves reacting to its almost secular, 
later developments are symptoms of decay or degeneracy. See Yigal Bronner, Extreme Poetry: The South Asian  
Movement of Simultaneous Narration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 17.
62 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 5.
63 See Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 22.
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this-worldly intellectual hegemony with their own form of religious rhetoric. Their writings 
reflect an unease not with the lack of academic freedom, but with scholarly liberti(n)es they felt 
were multiplying too fast. As I show in my chapter on them, the Devas would probably seem 
awfully familiar to members of that modern society of paṇḍits: Western academia. Like present-
day academics who have private religious lives, they too dealt with the tension between scholarly 
success and personal piety. Like members of any academic family, they wanted both to honor 
their heritage and to stake out their own positions, to disagree without disrespect. And like many 
immigrants in search of new economic opportunities, they tried to maintain a sense of continuity 
with the culture of their origin.
This sense of familiarity with the present raises the question: Why do we need to situate 
the Devas in relationship to their European contemporaries? Why are the questions we ask about 
them determined by the teleology of the modern West?64 Why does time have to be linear when it 
comes to the history of ideas? After all, in many ways the historical contexts of early modern 
Europe and India were completely reversed. Consider the following contrasts from just the 
seventeenth century:
• In Europe there prevailed a religious orthodoxy against which secular voices struggled to 
find representation, while in India, largely secular political structures allowed intra- and 
inter-religious exchange.65
• In Europe, a theological intolerance of religious pluralism made virtually all textual 
criticism revolve around a single monolithic text, the Bible, while in India, a plurality of 
texts and traditions circulated in a world in which religious pluralism was the norm rather 
than the exception.66
64 Cf. Pollock, “Introduction,” 1-4.
65 Even apart from Akbar's famous interreligious salons, the ascendancy of Mughal rule in general benefited the 
fortunes of Sanskrit philosophers. See Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern India,” 220-222. 
66 This contrast can be highlighted through the example of the French Oratorian Richard Simon, who had, in his 
Critical History of the Old Testament (1678), revived old questions about the integrity of the biblical text. Simon 
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• In Europe, a widespread political absolutism sought to silence intellectual freedom 
through increasingly repressive forms of invigilation, while in India, scholars like the 
Devas possessed relative intellectual freedom and patronage from Hindu and Muslim 
rulers alike.67
This is not to go so far as to say that “there is no shame in premodernity,”68 or that the Sanskrit 
domination of science in early modern India represented a kind of “civilizational achievement.”69 
I think there is plenty of scope for the ethical criticism of dominant traditions, premodern and 
modern alike.70 All I suggest is that before proclaiming who has been relegated to the “waiting 
room of history,” maybe we should take a look at our fellow passengers first.71
went on to demonstrate the additions and changes made to the Bible over its historical course, claiming that 
Moses could not have been the author of everything attributed to him. It should be emphasized that Simon was 
no Spinoza. He considered the transformations of the text to be effects of divine Providence, which preserved the 
purity of doctrine and not the consistency of text. Faith for him could subsist without Scripture, since its true 
meaning was possessed by the Church. Nevertheless, the book was seized upon publication, banned by the 
King's Council, and burned publicly. Needless to say, Simon was immediately expelled from the Oratory. See 
Maurice Olender, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion and Philology in the Nineteenth Century, tr. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 22-28. Cf. Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment:  
Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 447-456.
Practices of text-editing were legion in the premodern Sanskrit world, and sometimes, though not always, 
involved issues of sectarian identity and scriptural authenticity. Yet they never provoked nearly the same level of 
repression from on high or internecine violence. See Elaine Fisher, “The Sources of Sectarian Debate: The Extra-
Textual Life of Sanskrit Philology in Seventeenth Century South India” (paper presented at South Asia Graduate 
Student Conference, University of Chicago, April 5, 2012). Cf. Sheldon Pollock, “What Was Philology in 
Sanskrit?” in World Philology, eds. Sheldon Pollock, Benjamin A. Elman, and Ku-ming Kevin Chang 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 114-136.
67 See Sheldon Pollock, The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of 
Arts and Sciences), 85-87.
68 Sheldon Pollock, “Pretextures of Time,” History and Theory 46.3 (2007): 381.
69 Pollock, “The Languages of Science,” 38.
70 Cf. Pollock, “Is There An Indian Intellectual History?”, 541: “[T]he Indian case reconnects with a problem 
shared by all other national or civilizational traditions of intellectual history, namely the fact that by definition 
they study the textualized thoughts of the elite, unlike social history’s study of 'mentalities,' the thought worlds of 
ordinary people (which are somehow more real than others). But while Walter Benjamin’s oft-quoted thesis VII 
on the philosophy of history may well be true, that 'no document of civilization...is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism,' it by no means follows that study of the documents of civilization cannot contribute, 
through a commitment to both understanding and critique, toward an emancipatory, or at least humanizing, 
humanities.”
71 See Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 8.
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Chapter Outline
In Chapter 2, I attempt to account for the chronological gap between the composition of 
the BhP and its first exegetical treatments, some three to four centuries later. I track the 
movement of the BhP between the tenth and the fifteenth centuries, from the Tamil South to 
Orissa, Maharashtra, and Kerala, by studying the inscriptional, philosophical, and literary culture 
of these regions. I situate the BhP at the nexus of a number of intellectual, religious, and artistic 
currents: competing traditions of Vedānta, exchange between Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava communities, 
and the rise of Sanskrit praise-poetry together with an aesthetics of bhakti, or “bhaktirasa.” I 
devote particular attention to the Orissan exegete Śrīdhara Svāmin, the Yādavas of Maharashtra, 
Hemādri and Vopadeva, and the Keralite poet and commentator Pūrṇasarasvatī.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of the BhP on Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta through the 
intellectual history of a single text, the Bhagavannāmakaumudī (BNK), or “Moonlight of God's 
Name.” Written by Lakṣmīdhara, a later contemporary of Śrīdhara, around the turn of the 
fifteenth century, the BNK argues in the language of Mīmāṃsā that the genre of purāṇa should 
be accorded Vedic status. Particular attention is given to justifying the BhP's claims that singing 
God's name dissolves all sins—a stark rejection of the normative expiatory practices of 
dharmaśāstra, a discourse that grounds itself in the metalegal framework provided by Mīmāṃsā 
and its socialization of the ritual world.72 Much of this controversy centers around the canonicity 
of the BhP, indeed the entire genre of purāṇa: to be precise, how the authority of the purāṇa 
should relate to the textual hierarchy of śruti and smṛti established by Mīmāṃsā. This debate not 
only illustrates the logical conclusion of the shifting notions of legitimation between early and 
72 See Sheldon Pollock, “From Discourse of Ritual to Discourse of Power in Sanskrit Culture,” Journal of Ritual  
Studies 4.2 (1990): 315-345.
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late-classical Mīmāṃsā, by which time the relative degrees of authority between śruti and smṛti 
had become notably less defined, but also highlights the difference between Lakṣmīdhara and his 
predecessors in terms of how they viewed the purāṇa and the authority of the BhP.
I also contextualize the BNK in the wider world of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta traditions, including 
but not limited to Advaita Vedānta. Lakṣmīdhara is attributed a separate work on Advaita called 
the Advaitamakaranda, but in the BNK he responds critically to Advaitic interpretations of the 
BhP. The later history of the BNK, which comprises the second half of the chapter, poses still 
further problems of philosophical belonging. At roughly contemporaneous moments in the 
sixteenth-century Doab, both Advaita Vedāntins and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas—generally depicted in 
hagiographical literature as intractably opposed—laid claim to the BNK as a source of 
theological inspiration. Only a century or so later, the BNK made its way down to South India, 
where the musical-performative tradition popularly known as the bhajana sampradāya began to 
take shape during the rule of the Thanjavur Marathas. According to the patrons and performers of 
this tradition of purāṇic storytelling (harikathā) and devotional singing (nāmasaṃkīrtana), the 
BNK was a foundational text for the sampradāya. And finally, modern manuscript catalogues 
and editions of the BNK differ widely on how they categorize it: some as a work of Viśiṣṭādvaita 
Vedānta, some as Caitanya Vedānta, and still others as Dvaita Vedānta. Ultimately, I suggest that 
these plural histories point to the local, fragmentary character of a text-tradition often valorized 
for its universality.
Chapter 4 picks up one genealogical strand of the BNK in early modern Banaras. In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Banaras became a site of significant social and intellectual 
contestation whose outcomes exerted their influence well into Indian modernity. Recent 
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scholarship has demonstrated that Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta seem to have been favored by 
that city's intellectual elite, many of whom emigrated from the Deccan and South India. 
However, much work needs to be done in order to contextualize this claim within the social and 
intellectual history of both traditions. This chapter concentrates on a particular problematic: the 
relationship between popular religious movements and the rarefied air of scholarly pedagogy. 
What sort of challenge did the public expression of personal devotion pose to early modern 
Sanskrit intellectuals? How did the growth of theistic traditions influence intellectual writing 
across Sanskrit knowledge-systems? More particularly, what space might bhakti have found 
among the intellectuals of Banaras, jostling for attention with well-established disciplines 
expounding karma and jñāna—that is, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta? And how might we situate these 
shifting registers of intellectual discourse against the social changes of the early modern world? 
In this chapter, I address these questions by focusing on the intellectual corpus of the Deva 
family of Maharashtrian Brahmins, in order to discern the tensions between their philosophical 
interest in scriptural study (jñāna), their pedagogical commitment to ritual hermeneutics (karma), 
and their religious devotion to an embodied god (bhakti).
Chapter 5 engages with historiographical accounts of the intersection between bhakti and 
Advaita Vedānta, which have tended to concentrate on their philosophical compatibility. One of 
the major figures at this junction is the Advaitin Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, most of whose oeuvre 
has been studied quite thoroughly. I offer a reading of a relatively neglected work, 
Madhusūdana's commentary on the first three verses of the BhP, which provides an interesting 
view of the diverse communities of interpretation around the BhP. Next I take up another work 
on the margins of the classical, Śāṇḍilya's Bhakti Sūtras (SBS), or the “Aphorisms on Bhakti.” 
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The SBS set the very idea of bhakti as an object of theoretical inquiry in opposition to jñāna and 
karma. Although it is quite plain that the SBS model themselves on their Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta 
predecessors, there have been surprisingly few studies of their intellectual history. I will argue 
that because the SBS were virtually unknown until the seventeenth century, their composition 
should be located in the new intellectual economy of early modern India.
Not surprisingly, scholarly discussion of the exegetical tradition is even more scant than 
of the aphorisms themselves. The works of the seventeenth-century Advaitin Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha 
present us with an opportunity to study the links between Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, and bhakti 
with the greatest level of historical specificity. I discuss the logic of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's 
commentary on the SBS, the Bhakticandrikā, or “Moonlight of Bhakti.” Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha was a 
protégé of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, but appears to have gone farther than his predecessor in 
supporting the SBS' assertion that Vedānta study should be subordinate to attaining bhakti. I 
make special note of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's remarkable incorporation of non-Advaita Vedānta 
writings into his commentary. I also follow his attempts to make bhakti a constitutive part of 
Yoga practice in his commentary on the Yoga Sūtras, the Yogasiddhāntacandrikā. Finally, I 
demonstrate how the SBS made a surprising cameo in the works of an eighteenth-century 
Śaiva/Śākta intellectual of the Tamil South, Bhāskararāya. In the end, I suggest that we should 
revisit the relationship between bhakti and Advaita by paying attention not only to a wider range 
of texts, but to the historical interventions they attempted to make.
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Chapter 2: The Darkness at Dusk
We'd set out to travel on Advaita Road
initiates at the throne of our inner bliss,
when a trickster forced us to be his slaves,
the one making love to the farmers' wives.
-Līlāśuka Bilvamaṅgala, Bilvamaṅgalastava 2.273
The BhP in Transit:  Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas, Advaita Vedāntins  
The Bhāgavata Purāṇa (BhP), one of the most influential Hindu scriptures of the second 
millennium, is believed to have found its final textual form around the tenth century CE in South 
India. Its first extant scholastic treatments, however, date from a full three to four centuries later, 
in regions to the north: Maharashtra and Orissa. This gap has gone largely unaccounted for in 
scholarship on the reception history of the BhP. While the popularity of the BhP among religious 
elites and humbler poet-saints has formed the subject of decades of scholarship on the “bhakti 
movement,” the early centuries of the BhP's dissemination remain insufficiently studied. The 
question of this chapter is simple: If the BhP does not have a significant afterlife in the Tamil 
South, but it does elsewhere a few centuries later, how does it get there? Answers, however, are 
much less readily forthcoming. In this chapter, I situate the BhP's entry into the Sanskrit 
intellectual world against the backdrop of contemporary transitions and transactions between 
Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava religious communities. I revisit the chronology and geography of the BhP in 
an attempt to explain the relative silence surrounding the BhP in several southern intellectual 
traditions. I offer some thoughts on the problem of philosophical belonging: Who really cared 
73 See The Bilvamaṅgalastava, ed. Frances Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 88 (my trans.):
advaitavīthīpathikāḥ pravṛttāḥ
svānandasiṃhāsanalabdhadīkṣāḥ |
śaṭhena kenāpi vayaṃ haṭhena
dāsīkṛtā gopavadhūviṭena ||
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about the BhP? I make the case that, counterintuitive as it may seem, the BhP flourished in 
communities that offered a version of Advaita, or nondualist Vedānta. And I reflect on the 
development of an aesthetics of religious devotion (bhaktirasa) as it moved between Śaiva poets 
and Vaiṣṇava exegetes of the BhP. What follows is a necessarily fragmentary attempt to 
reconstruct some of the possible contexts for the medieval transmission of the BhP and its ideas 
of bhakti. In one sense this is an argument from silence, but it is also an argument from loud 
whispers. Whether those whispers lead us to greater truth, or are simply nefarious sirens, they are 
insistent and compel us to listen.
What are the sources for assigning the BhP to the tenth-century south? In a famous 
passage from around the turn of the eighteenth century about the glory of the BhP, the 
Bhāgavata Māhātmya, a personified bhakti describes her travels from south to north: “I was born 
in Dravida, grew up in Karnataka, went here and there in Maharashtra, and became old and worn 
in Gujarat.” Finally, upon reaching Brindavan, the land of the god Kṛṣṇa's exploits, her beauty is 
restored, just like new.74 Scholars such as Friedhelm Hardy and D. Dennis Hudson sought to 
demonstrate that the BhP was embedded and embodied in the Tamil South. In his book on the 
roots of emotional devotion to Kṛṣṇa, Viraha-Bhakti, Hardy argued that “the character of 
intellectual bhakti was completely transformed under the influence of a regional, vernacular 
tradition.”75 That tradition belonged to the Tamil Ālvārs, whose songs and narratives found 
Sanskrit expression in the BhP, the text that exemplified the attempt to harmonize the complex 
74 See John Stratton Hawley, “The Bhāgavata-Māhātmya in Context,” in Patronage and Popularisation,  
Pilgrimage and Procession, ed. Heidi Pauwels (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2009), 82.
75 Friedhelm Hardy, Viraha-Bhakti: The early history of Kṛṣṇa devotion in South India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), 44.
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encounters between Tamil and Sanskritic Hinduism.76 Hudson supported this claim with a 
sophisticated reading of the multiple layers of the BhP alongside the architectural projects of the 
Pallava kings. Assigning different dates to different chapters, Hudson argued that the final layer 
was closely identified with, in fact replicated in, the sculptural program of the Vaikuntha Perumal 
temple in Kāñcīpuram.77 Taken together, their arguments locate a significant part of the 
composition of the BhP in the Tamil South around the turn of the first millennium. Edwin 
Bryant, however, has offered considered disagreements with both the date and the provenance of 
the BhP.78 The temple architecture only proves the terminus ante quem of the text, he argues, and 
the Ālvārs may well have been influenced by the BhP rather than the other way around.79 
Moreover, the narrative of migration in the Bhāgavata Māhātmya was likely an invented 
tradition, a case of the north looking back to the south as the source of archaic wisdom and 
authority.80 Whether or not the BhP did in fact originate in the south, or was completed there, 
these debates over the provenance of the text do not in themselves account for the virtual absence 
of intellectual engagement with the BhP for several centuries. Nor do they satisfactorily explain 
how the BhP was popularized and transmitted after its composition, wherever and whenever it 
may have been. The Māhātmya account, for all of its invention, remains a guiding metaphor in 
76 Ibid., 489.
77 D. Dennis Hudson, Krishna's Mandala: Bhagavata Religion and Beyond, ed. John Stratton Hawley (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 125-140.
78 See Edwin F. Bryant, “The Date and Provenance of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Vaikuntha Perumal Temple,” 
Journal of Vaishnava Studies 11.1 (2002): 51-80. 
79 Ibid., 66-69.
80 See John Stratton Hawley, A Storm of Songs: India and the Idea of the Bhakti Movement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 73: “I think the author of the Māhātmya belonged to a community of north Indian 
Vaiṣṇava Brahmins who felt beseiged by a profusion of Bhāgavata Purāṇa performance practices that they no 
longer controlled, and who therefore turned to the south to shore up their authority as purveyors of the 
Bhāgavata's special power.”
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this chapter for the movement and migration of the text.
No doubt, there is a vernacular story to be told here. The editors of a recent volume of 
essays on the BhP agree that “a detailed account of the Bhāgavata's vernacularization is a much 
needed chapter in the story of the Bhāgavata's life in the world.”81 Sheldon Pollock notes that the 
BhP emerged as a focal text for the literarization of many vernacular languages; texts such as 
Potana's Bhāgavatamu in Telugu (15th C.) and the Gadyarāja of Hayagrīva in Marathi (1320 CE) 
were versions of the BhP in the high cosmopolitan register, while in the sixteenth century Eknāth 
and Nanddās composed versions in more regional Marathi and Braj Bhasha.82 The BhP moved 
between social locations as well. The first recognizable work of Bengali belles lettres, as Jesse 
Knutson has shown, was the Śrīkṛṣṇakīrttana of Baḍu Caṇḍīdās (14th-15th C.), “an incompletely 
literary work, a text of the dust and dirt of the rural outdoors,” that did the double duty of 
“speaking to a legacy of cosmopolitan poetry and yet still marking itself as...rural and 
provincial[.]”83
But even if these works had precedessors, they too appeared some centuries after the 
BhP's composition. So who really cared about this text that would become so widespread as the 
source par excellence of Vaiṣṇava devotional religion?84 On the Sanskrit scholastic level, the 
81 Ravi Gupta and Kenneth Valpey, “Introduction: Churning the Ocean of Līlā,” in The Bhāgavata Purāṇa: Sacred 
Text and Living Tradition, eds. Ravi Gupta and Kenneth Valpey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 
13.
82 Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern  
India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 310-312, 351, n.44, 382.
83 Jesse Knutson, Into the Twilight of Sanskrit Court Poetry: The Sena Salon and Beyond (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2014), 93-95, 100.
84 Together with, of course, a host of other epic and purāṇic sources that formed a continuum: namely, the 
Bhagavad Gītā, Harivaṃśa and Nārāyaṇīya sections of the Mahābhārata, as well as the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the 
Viṣṇudharma. On the last of these, see Reinhold Grunendahl, ed., Viṣṇudharmāḥ: Precepts for the Worship of  
Viṣṇu, Vols. 1-3 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1983).
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ostensible place to begin this investigation would be the writings of Rāmānuja (11th C.) and 
Madhva (13th C.), the famous Vaiṣṇava founders of the Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita schools of 
Vedānta. Both Rāmānuja and Madhva had ties to temple traditions centered on the ritual worship 
of Viṣṇu. Rāmānuja's Śrīvaiṣṇava precedessors and successors, moreover, were inspired by the 
same Ālvār poetry that Hardy situates at the heart of the BhP. However, the BhP does not seem to 
have played a major role in the development of their theologies. In Rāmānuja's case, the Viṣṇu 
Purāṇa was of much more fundamental importance to his theological enterprise.85 It is the Viṣṇu 
Purāṇa alone, he writes in his Vedārthasaṃgraha, that “has been accepted without dissension, by 
all the educated in the East, North, South, and the West because it alone is adequate in the 
decision on all observances and all reality.”86 Even his illustrious follower Vedānta Deśika (13th 
C.), who wrote in Sanskrit, Tamil, and Maṇipravāla, cared less about the BhP and more about 
theorizing and exemplifying specifically Śrīvaiṣṇava forms of devotion. For example, Vedānta 
Deśika's Sanskrit praise-poem, the Mahāvīravaibhava, though inspired by Tamil panegyric used 
by the Ālvārs, was dedicated to Rāma in a spirit of respectful devotion, far from the erotic mood 
of Kṛṣṇa-centered bhakti preferred by the BhP.87
As for Madhva, his Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya, “Understanding the Purport of the BhP,” 
is perhaps the first extant work of Vedānta which approaches the BhP as an independent 
theological source-text.88 True to Madhva's inimitable inventiveness, however, this text is less a 
85 See Sucharita Adluri, Textual Authority in Classical Indian Thought: Rāmānuja and the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (New 
York: Routledge, 2015).
86 Quoted in Sucharita Adluri, “Śruti and Smṛti in Rāmānuja's Vedānta,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 15.1 (2006): 
209. Cf. Johannes van Buitenen, Rāmānuja's Vedārthasamgraha: Introduction, Critical Edition, and Annotated  
Translation (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1956), 140.
87 Ajay Rao, Refiguring the Rāmāyaṇa as Theology: A History of Reception in Premodern India (London: 
Routledge, 2015), 110.
88 Bhāgavata-Tātparya-Nirṇaya, ed. Bannanje Govindacharya (Udupi: Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahā Mandala 
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work of exegesis than a series of extracted verses deployed to support his maverick theological 
vision. Madhva comments with extreme brevity on selected verses from each chapter of the BhP, 
and follows these glosses with long quotations from several sources, many of which were 
famously “unknown” to his other Vedānta contemporaries.89 If the Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya 
had any impact on the Sanskrit intellectual world, it did not reach far beyond his own community 
until perhaps the synthesizing efforts of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologian Jīva Gosvāmin in the 
sixteenth century.90
Conspicuously missing from this account, however, is attention to the role that Advaita 
Vedānta may have played in the transmission of the BhP. There are a few reasons why this may 
be the case. First, the traditions of Vedānta that affiliated themselves with Vaiṣṇava theology 
were historically hostile to Advaita, from those of Rāmānuja and Madhva above to Vallabha and 
Caitanya in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who were more directly influenced by the BhP. 
These traditions and the texts they valued, according to the logic of histories of Indian 
philosophy, were properly theistic in nature, in contradistinction to the necessarily non-theistic 
implications of nondual Advaita Vedānta: a classic and insurmountable distinction between 
monotheism and monism.91  Andrew Nicholson sums up this line of thinking:
Publications, 1980).
89 See Roque Mesquita, Madhva's Unknown Literary Sources: Some Observations (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 
2000).
90 See Tattvasandarbha 28, trans. in Stuart Mark Elkman, Jiva Gosvamin's Tattvasandarbha: A Study on the  
Philosophical and Sectarian Development of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Movement (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1986), 121: “And here, the authoritative words of Śruti, the Purāṇas, etc. will be quoted just as I have seen 
them; . . . In some cases, I have been unable to personally see certain verses, and so have taken them from the 
Bhāgavatatātparya, Bhāratatātparya, and Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, etc. of the venerable Madhvācārya...”
91 Many such modern histories of Indian philosophy separate the reconstruction of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta thought from 
Advaita Vedānta on these grounds. See, e.g., Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961); R. Balasubramanian, ed., Theistic Vedānta (New Delhi: Centre 
for Studies in Civilizations, 2003).
36
[A]s Dasgupta has pointed out,92 the Vedāntic teachings presented in the Purāṇas are 
generally not compatible with the teachings of Śaṅkara and, instead, have more in 
common with Rāmānuja and Vijñānabhikṣu....It should therefore not be surprising that 
Advaita Vedāntins less frequently quote the Purāṇas. For Vedāntins of other affiliations, 
however, the Purāṇas stand side-by-side with the Bhagavad Gītā as the most important 
smṛti texts.93
A second reason is less philosophical than sectarian. From the fourteenth century onward 
in the south, philosophical differences between Advaitins and their opponents also came to be 
structured around Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava religious identities. As Matthew Clark has recently shown, 
the early history of the Vijayanagara empire—its founding under the Saṅgama kings Harihara 
and Bukka (ca. 1350 CE), their patronage of the Vedic commentators Sāyaṇa and Mādhava, and 
their reverence for Vidyāraṇya, the ascetic pontiff of the Śṛṅgerī monastery—demonstrates how a 
new Brahmanical form of Advaita was fashioned to fit a Śaiva political regime and monastic 
project.94 The enshrining of Advaita orthodoxy in fourteenth-century Vijayanagara, and its 
subsequent displacement by the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita preferences of the Sāluva, 
Tuluva, and Aravīḍu dynasties, would set the stage for social and philosophical disputation in 
South India for the next few centuries.95 Among non-Brahmanical traditions, the Śaiva affinity of 
Nāth Yogic and Siddha traditions that shared a language, if not always a social space, with 
nondualist thought, further strengthened the perceived ties between Śaivism and Advaita. 
92 Cf. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1952), 496.
93 Andrew Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 75.
94 Matthew Clark, The Daśanāmī-Saṁnyāsīs: The Integration of Ascetic Lineages into an Order (Leiden: Brill, 
2006), 177-226. Important historiographical revisions made by Clark include the dissociation of Mādhava from 
Vidyāraṇya (Ibid., 208-214) and the suggestion that Vidyāraṇya's appellation “Kriyāśakti” indicates that he may 
have been a Kālāmukha Śaiva prior to his ascension of the Śṛṅgerī gaddī (208).
95 See Valerie Stoker, “Polemics and Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Vijayanagara: Vyāsatīrtha and the Dynamics 
of Hindu Sectarian Relations,” History of Religions 51.2 (2011): 129-155.
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Scholarly attempts to study Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism together either proclaim Advaita 
Vedānta as inherently non-sectarian, downplaying its own social contexts, or seek common 
philosophical ground between two identities defined as historically contradictory.96
But what are we talking about when we talk about Advaita Vedānta? Most immediately it 
is that exegetical theology systematized by the eighth-century philosopher Śaṅkarācārya. In his 
commentaries on the Brahma Sūtras, some of the Upaniṣads, and the Bhagavad Gītā, and his 
prose work Upadeśasāhasrī, Śaṅkara attempted to develop a coherent exposition of absolute 
nondualism. An older contemporary of Śaṅkara was Maṇḍana Miśra, frequently (though 
erroneously) identified with Śaṅkara's disciple Sureśvara.97 Soon after Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and 
Padmapāda, another of Śaṅkara's disciples, wrote important works building on his exposition of 
Advaita, the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and Pañcapādikā, respectively.
The history of Advaita after Śaṅkara, however, is a series of stops and starts, and is by no 
means cohesive or indicative of any continuous lines of transmission. Approximately one 
hundred years passed before the emergence of the polymath Vācaspati Miśra (850 CE, Mithilā), 
who attempted to reconcile Maṇḍana with Śaṅkara in his commentary on the latter. It was 
actually Maṇḍana who represented the main exponent of Advaita Vedānta to its initial detractors 
96 More on this in Chapter 5, but for the former, see T.M.P. Mahadevan, ed., Preceptors of Advaita (Secunderabad: 
Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Sankara Mandir, 1968); Krishna Sharma, Bhakti and the Bhakti Movement: A New 
Perspective (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1987). For the latter, see Bradley Malkovsky, The 
Role of Divine Grace in the Soteriology of Śaṃkarācārya (Boston: Brill, 2001); Lance Nelson, “Theological 
Politics and Paradoxical Spirituality in the Life of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 15.2 
(2007): 19-34.
97 In his introduction to Maṇḍana Mīśra's Brahmasiddhi, S. Kuppuswami Sastri provided the most authoritative 
refutation of the identity of Maṇḍana and Sureśvara, citing the inconsistency between the hagiographical 
tradition and the evidence internal to the texts. Though Sastri was himself quite the committed Advaitin, his 
frank and philologically sound dismissal of the hagiographies caused quite a ripple in South Indian scholarly 
circles, prompting even the author of the foreword to his edition to question Sastri's conclusion. See 
Brahmasiddhi, ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri (Madras: Government Press, 1937), v-ix, xxi-lxxv.
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from other philosophical schools, which took little notice of it in general; Buddhists, Jains, 
Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas seemed quite content to debate amongst themselves until at least 
the turn of the first millennium.98 At around this time, another full century after Vācaspati Miśra, 
influential works were written by Prakāśātman (ca. 1000 CE, Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa), 
Vimuktātman (ca. 975 CE, Iṣṭasiddhi), and Sarvajñātman (1027 CE, Saṃkṣepaśārīraka). Other 
than the correspondence of their names (ending in -ātman), we know virtually nothing about 
them. After the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta interventions of Rāmānuja and Madhva, a new wave of 
Advaita literary activity characterized the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, including works by 
Ānandabodha, Ānandānubhava, Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, and Akhaṇḍānanda. Still, we know very 
little about the historical context of these authors and their works, or whether they took any 
notice of the alternative Vedāntas on offer. Some think that Ānandagiri (13th C.), commentator on 
Śaṅkara's canonical works, was the head of the Dvārakā monastery in Gujarat, but more probably 
he was a native of Orissa.99 Some signs put Citsukha (13th C.) in Bengal, but he could have lived 
in the Deccan.100 We know that Śrīharṣa (12th C.), author of the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, lived in 
Kanauj, and that Kṛṣṇa Miśra (11th C.), author of the Prabodhacandrodaya, was at the Candella 
court in central India, but have no clue how they received their ideas, or indeed if they had any 
ties to Śaṅkara. The social history of teaching lineages and textual transmission in medieval 
98 See Daya Krishna, “Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by 
the Historiography of Indian Philosophy,” Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 13 (1996): 
201-207.
99 Ānandagiri’s first work, composed under Anubhūtisvarūpācārya's guidance, was written under the rule of 
Nṛsiṃhadeva, the king of Kaliṅga, who ruled from 1238-1264 CE. For the claim that he was from Gujarat, see 
Tarkasaṃgraha, ed. T.M. Tripathi (Baroda: Central Library, 1917), vii-xi.
100 Citsukha studied with one Jñānottama, whom he styles as the preceptor of the King of Gauḍa, but his pupil 
Sukhaprakāśa in turn instructed Amalānanda, who clearly identifies his patronage from the Yādava king 
Kṛṣṇadeva. See Mahadevan, ed., Preceptors of Advaita, 64.
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Advaita remains a desideratum, as does a thorough investigation of these texts in context.
What this scattered transmission of Advaita points to for our purposes is that Advaita 
Vedānta was a shifting, splintered tradition, a sprawling banyan tree with a mesh of roots, 
sometimes intersecting, sometimes leading nowhere, sometimes of indiscernible origin. To single 
out a branch or doctrine or text as representative of the whole is to take the tradition, and its 
opponents, at their own word. Even if we exclude other forms of non-Vedic nondualist thought, 
such as Kashmiri Śaivism, the act of restricting Advaita to “Śaṅkara's Advaita,” or using his as 
the model against which all else is to be measured, reduces other texts and interpreters that 
exhibit Advaita affinities to bit players in Advaita history—or to players who are not following 
the rules.101 To the more specific problem of Advaita and Vaiṣṇavism, Paul Hacker demonstrated 
that Śaṅkara himself probably belonged to a Vaiṣṇava milieu, “either by origin, environment, or 
circumstance.”102 It was only in the sixteenth century and beyond that Śaṅkara himself was 
101 The Kashmiri Śaiva nondualists, who drew upon a completely independent Āgamic scriptural tradition, viewed 
themselves as quite distinct from, and quite superior to, followers of a Brahmanical Advaita Vedānta grounded in 
the Vedic Upaniṣads. But there was certainly exchange between the two, and some were more accommodating 
than others. In his opening comment on the tenth aphorism of his Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya, the eleventh-century 
Śaiva Kṣemarāja says: ‘‘Here we see the only thing that distinguishes Śaiva nondualism from the Vedāntins...that 
the Lord who consists of consciousness is constantly performing the Five Actions.’’ See Pratyabhijñahṛdaya of 
Kṣemarāja, ed. J.C. Chatterji. KSTS No. 3. (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1911), 22-23: iha 
īśvarādvayadarśanasya brahmavādibhyaḥ ayam eva viśeṣaḥ, yat...sadā pañcavidhakṛtyakāritvaṃ cidātmano 
bhagavataḥ. Cf. Whitney Cox, “A South Indian Śākta Cosmogony: An Annotated Translation of Selections from 
Maheśvarānanda’s Mahārthamañjarīparimala, gāthās 19 and 20,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 40.2 (2012): 
208, n.20.
The line of influence went the other way in the work of Vidyāraṇya (14th C.), or whoever was the author of the 
Jīvanmuktiviveka, who co-opted the unaffiliated nondualism of the Yogavāsiṣṭha into his version of “Yogic 
Advaita.” See Walter Slaje, “On Changing Others' Ideas: The Case of Vidyāraṇya and the Yogavāsiṣṭha,” Indo-
Iranian Journal 41.2 (1998): 103-124. Cf. Andrew Fort, Jīvanmukti in Transformation: Embodied Liberation in  
Advaita and Neo-Vedānta (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 97-113. Rarely, however, does the act of synthesis with 
this distinct Advaitic tradition elicit scholarly doubts about the authenticity of the Advaita Vedānta in question—
certainly not in the same way as with the BhP. See Ibid., 97-98: “The significant differences in emphasis and 
focus between Vidyāraṇya's (and the LYV's) Yogic Advaita and Śaṅkara's mainstream 'Vedāntic' Advaita rarely 
lead to direct opposition or contradiction—thus it is still Advaita.”
102 Paul Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiṣṇavism,” in Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on 
Traditional and Modern Vedanta, ed. Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 35.
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hagiographically appropriated as a Śaiva representative of Advaita Vedānta, and retrojected onto 
the foundational moment of the Vijayanagara empire. Hacker concluded:
The fact that radical Advaitism was cultivated in Vaiṣṇava circles is borne out also by the 
existence of texts that expressly profess Vaiṣṇavism and teach radical Advaitism at the 
same time. To this category belong certain passages of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (which may 
date from a time not far distant from Śaṅkara's lifetime) and of the Paramārthasāra 
ascribed to Ādiśeṣa...103
Obviously what concerns us here is Hacker's mention of the BhP. By now it is old news that the 
BhP exhibits what Daniel Sheridan has called “Advaitic theism.”104 That it is different from 
“Śaṅkara's Advaita” is fairly clear, and the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins who eventually laid claim to the 
text made sure to emphasize that difference. But the persistent presence of Advaitins who both 
directly linked themselves to Śaṅkara, and found inspiration in the BhP, will surface repeatedly 
in this dissertation and later in this chapter.
The fact that Vaiṣṇavas like Rāmānuja and Madhva were contending with Advaita in the 
first place, even in their purāṇic exegeses, makes one wonder to whom they were responding. 
Rāmānuja consistently used the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (VP) to counter Advaita interpretations not just of 
Vedānta, but of the VP itself. Sucharita Adluri comments that in Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya, his 
commentary on the Brahma Sūtras:
Rāmānuja has the objector (Advaitin) quote generously from the VP as well, in order to 
establish the non-dual (Advaita) point of view....Such use of the VP to support the 
objector's point of view is not evident in Rāmānuja's other commentaries. There is a sense 
of a deliberate re-reading, reclaiming of the VP as a Viśiṣṭādvaita text that is not seen in 
his other commentaries. This suggests that perhaps the VP was also an important text for 
the Advaitins or that Rāmānuja has the Advaitin utilize the VP for rhetorical purposes.105
103 Ibid., 39.
104 Daniel P. Sheridan, The Advaitic Theism of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).
105 Adluri, Textual Authority in Classical Indian Thought, 11.
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The same goes for Madhva and the Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya. In his historical review of Dvaita 
literature, B.N.K. Sharma claims that “[Madhva] was contending with powerfully established 
Advaita commentaries on the Purāṇa.”106 Madhva pays greatest attention to those passages in the 
tenth and eleventh cantos of the BhP, “which strike a strong note of Transcendentalism, verging 
on a Monism....particularly tinged with monistic phraseology and ideas, which have been fully 
exploited by monistic commentators.”107 Sharma refers to Jīva Gosvāmin's Tattvasandarbha (16th 
C.), which mentions commentaries by the Advaitins Citsukha and Puṇyāraṇya. There is no extant 
evidence for the existence of these commentaries, and I am inclined to think that they never did 
exist.108 That is not to say, however, that the BhP did not have a history of being important to 
Advaitins—just not the Advaitins one might easily recognize.
It is at this juncture that we find Śrīdhara Svāmin (ca. 1350-1450 CE), native of Orissa 
and author of the first extant commentary on the BhP.109 For someone with such a wide-ranging 
106 B.N.K. Sharma, History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1961), 
128.
107 Ibid., 129-130.
108 Nothing is extant, at least, in the official manuscript record. Cf. Julius Eggeling, Catalogue of Sanskrit  
Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office (London: Secretary of State of India in Council, 1887), 1264b. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise. Shrivatsa Goswami of Sri Caitanya Prema Samsthana, Vrindavan, has 
informed me and others that he has a copy of the Citsukhī commentary on the tenth skandha of the BhP. Cf. 
Lance Nelson, “Bhakti Preempted: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on Devotion for the Advaitin Renouncer,” Journal of  
Vaishnava Studies 6.1 (1998): 71, n.5. With due deference to Shrivatsaji's resources, I have to see it to believe it. 
Seventeenth-century Advaitin polemicists like Rāmāśrama also claimed that not only Citsukha but Śaṅkara 
himself had authored commentaries on the BhP, but their counterparts pointed to the lack of contemporary proof 
for the existence of these commentaries. See Christopher Minkowski, “I'll Wash Out Your Mouth With My Boot: 
A Guide to Philological Argument in Mughal-era Banaras,” in Epic and Argument: Essays in Honor of Robert P.  
Goldman, ed. Sheldon Pollock (New Delhi: Manohar, 2010), 123-124.
109 B.N.K. Sharma (History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature, 129) claims that Śrīdhara was 
influenced by some degree to Madhva, based on a few citations we find shared between the two. It is not 
impossible, given that both Mādhva tradition and inscriptional evidence suggest that one Narahari Tīrtha, a 
Dvaitin, was minister at the Kalinga court in the 13th-14th century (Ibid., 226-228). But the textual evidence is 
admittedly thin. More explicit and extensive links between Madhva and Śrīdhara remain to be excavated.
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impact on later exegetes of the BhP, we know very little about Śrīdhara's historical milieu.110 The 
dissertation on Śrīdhara himself is still waiting to be written: Was he an abbot at a supposed 
Advaita monastery at Puri? Whom did he directly influence and how? From where did his 
exegesis emerge in the first place, indebted to but detracting from Śaṅkara's Advaita? 
Preliminary attempts at understanding Śrīdhara's contribution have been made by Daniel 
Sheridan and Ravi Gupta.111 Sheridan calls for further study of Śrīdhara and the BhP in their own 
contexts, in order to establish the difference between the BhP's Advaita and Śaṅkara's Advaita, to 
clarify Śrīdhara's place in the history of Vaiṣṇavism and Vedānta, and to understand his impact 
on later schools of BhP interpretation, especially the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas.112 Gupta picks up on the 
last of these exhortations, and carefully reads Jīva Gosvāmin's use of Śrīdhara as he develops his 
distinctive “inconceivable difference-and-non-difference” (acintyabhedābheda) philosophy. Both 
Sheridan and Gupta are concerned to distance Śrīdhara from Śaṅkara's Advaita; his theological 
position is instead “halfway to the metaphysical nuances of acintyabhedābheda.”113 There are 
two points important to distinguish here. One is Śrīdhara's own version of Advaita, which is 
demonstrably different from Śaṅkara's Advaita—at least, in its refusal to engage with theories of 
ignorance (avidyā) and illusion (māyā), which are held to be definitive of “pure” scholastic 
Advaita Vedānta.114 The other, however, is the implicit teleology in these accounts: If Advaita is 
110 See P.K. Gode, “Date of Śrīdharasvāmin, Author of the Commentaries on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and Other 
Works – Between c. A.D. 1350 and 1450,” in Studies in Indian Literary History, Vol. II. (Bombay: Bhāratīya 
Vidyā Bhavan, 1954), 169-175.
111 Daniel P. Sheridan, “Śrīdhara and His Commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 2.3 
(1994): 45-66; Ravi M. Gupta, The Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of Jīva Gosvāmī (London: Routledge, 2007), 65-
84.
112 Sheridan, “Śrīdhara and His Commentary,” 47.
113 Ibid., 58.
114 See Gupta, The Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of Jīva Gosvāmī, 70: “As such, he makes no attempt to go beyond 
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one thing (Śaṅkara, māyā, non-theism) and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism quite another (Caitanya, 
bhedābheda, bhakti), then Śrīdhara must have belonged to a world that moved away from 
classical Advaita and tried to bring others into the properly Vaiṣṇava fold.115
My point is not that Śrīdhara was or was not an Advaitin, or that he belonged to one 
faction over another. I have already suggested that Śaṅkara's Advaita was not the only one 
around, and the spectrum of Advaitins in Vaiṣṇava milieus may well have extended from Śaṅkara 
through to Śrīdhara. All I would add to this discussion is that who Śrīdhara was cannot be 
determined retroactively, and without a wider perspective on the BhP's rise to prominence. A 
proper study of Śrīdhara's own writings, on the BhP, VP, and Bhagavad Gītā, is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. However, we might be able to get a sense of how someone like Śrīdhara came 
about in the first place. If we zoom out from the internal debates of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, we find an 
intersecting circle that may also have contained the BhP, and accompanied its transmission.
I am referring in particular to the world of Śaivism, that famously adaptable system of 
political theology that so dominated the religious landscape of early and medieval India.116 
Recent studies have shown how the BhP's concept of bhakti overlapped significantly with Śaiva 
literature, in particular the Śivadharma corpus.117 Specifically, the emotional elements of bhakti 
the text of the Bhāgavata to articulate a theory of ignorance in Advaitic terms. Indeed, Śrīdhara was perhaps 
closer to the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava view of śakti than he was to Advaitic concepts of māyā.”
Cf. Nelson, “Bhakti Preempted,” 71, n.5: “Śrīdhara Swāmin (ca. 1350-1450)—nominally an Advaitin but 
sympathetic to devotion, was sufficiently influenced by Vaiṣṇavism to accept a plurality of souls and a more 
realistic interpretation of śakti than Śaṅkara. He therefore cannot be considered a true non-dualist.”
115 See Sheridan, “Śrīdhara and His Commentary,” 65: “[I]t may not be far off the mark when Jīva Gosvāmin 
contends that Śrīdhara has adopted the non-dualism of Śaṅkara in order to lure Advaitins into the faith of 
Vaiṣṇava bhakti.”
116 See Alexis Sanderson, “The Śaiva Age: The Rise and Dominance of Śaivism During the Early Medieval Period,” 
in Genesis and Development of Tantrism, ed. Shingo Einoo (Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Culture, 2009), 41-350.
117 Jason Schwartz, “Caught in the Net of Śāstra: Devotion and its Limits in an Evolving Śaiva Corpus,” Journal of  
Hindu Studies 5.2 (2012): 210-231.
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that Friedhelm Hardy and others felt were unique to the BhP—hairs raising on end, tears of bliss, 
the ecstatic experience of divine presence—were part of a shared language of bhakti between 
Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava traditions.118 The extent to which this overlap explains the background to 
Śrīdhara's own work is difficult to determine merely from the textual record. In the opening to 
his commentary on the BhP, Śrīdhara invokes both “the Lord of Umā (Śiva) and Mādhava 
(Viṣṇu), who comprise each other's selves and love to praise each other.”119 And across his 
works, Śrīdhara makes repeated reference to Nṛsiṃha, the god who marks the transition of 
Orissa's dominant political theology from Śaiva to Vaiṣṇava.120 But the general historical 
understanding that Orissa was a site of fluidity between Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava boundaries is seldom 
otherwise reflected in Śrīdhara's intellectual corpus.
Perhaps we can look to the inscriptional record, that archivist's dream and humanist's 
nightmare, for more solid connections between Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism in pre-Śrīdhara Orissa. 
A recent publication of copper-plate inscriptions from Orissa offers three revealing pieces of 
evidence for the claim that it was fertile territory for the BhP to flourish: 1) Rent-free land grants 
to Vedic Brahmins with Vaiṣṇava names; 2) Non-sectarian political patrons; and 3) Massive 
migration to the East from the West, Midwest, and South.121 The inscriptions show that between 
118 Ibid., 214-216.
119 Bhāgavata Purāṇa of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa With Sanskrit Commentary Bhāvārthabodhinī of Śrīdhara  
Svāmin, ed. J.L. Shastri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 13:
mādhavomādhavāv īśau sarvasiddhividhāyinau |
vande parasparātmānau parasparanutipriyau || 3 ||
120 See Sara M. Adams, “From Narasimha to Jagannātha: The Long Journey from Forest to Temple,” Journal of  
Vaishnava Studies 17.1 (2008): 5-28; Anncharlott Eschmann et al., “The Formation of the Jagannātha Triad,” in 
The Cult of Jagannāth and the Regional Tradition of Orissa, eds. Anncharlott Eschmann et al. (New Delhi: 
Manohar Publications, 1978), 167-196.
121 Subrata Kumar Acharya, Copper-Plate Inscriptions of Odisha (New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 2014).
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the eighth and twelfth centuries CE, several kings in Orissa set up tax-free land grants to a 
variety of Brahmin donees. Many of these Brahmins possessed Vaiṣṇava names, the kind 
associated with later interpreters of the BhP: Śrīdharasvāmi, Vallabhasvāmi, Madhusūdanasvāmi, 
Puruṣottamasvāmi, Viṣṇusvāmi, and so forth.122 They tell us that they were trained in different 
recensions of the Veda and versed in smṛti literature; that they sometimes functioned as purāṇic 
storytellers; that they were poets and philosophers and ministers; and that they were allowed to 
live unmolested (sarvopadravavarjita), free of any oppression (sarvapīḍāvarjita), and exempt 
from military interference (abhaṭapraveśa).123 Some were even given priestly responsibilities that 
included arranging dance and music in the temple of their deity.124 Thus we have a concentrated 
community of scholarly Brahmins, mostly devoted to Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa, who were familiar with 
traditions of musical performance. It is not clear if they had an affinity for Advaita Vedānta in 
particular, but they are most certainly possible predecessors for the Śrīdhara Svāmin. The BhP 
could have been redacted or preserved in these Brahmin settlements (agrahāra) to provide the 
groundwork for someone like Śrīdhara to come along: namely, a community that continued the 
sort of Vaiṣṇava Advaita that Hardy and others recognized was at the heart of the BhP. Further 
corroboration would require renewed attention to those layers of the BhP which Hudson studied 
so carefully, and the different exegetical emphases they are given by Śrīdhara.
Who were the political patrons of these land grants? A majority of the donors identified 
122 The examples span centuries, from the regimes of Śubhākaradeva (8th C.), a Buddhist king of the Bhaumakara 
dynasty who assumed the title paramasaugata, to Gayāḍatuṅga (10th C.), a Śaiva māheśvara of the Tuṅga family, 
to Narasiṃhadeva II (14th C.), a thoroughly Vaiṣṇava ruler. See, e.g., Ibid., 191-193 , 393, 497.
123 The examples are numerous, but see especially Ibid., 347: “The donee is described as well-versed in Tarka, 
Vedānta, and the Vedas. He was a poet, an upaśani and a good minister (śrīmānpātraṃ sa uttamaṃ, l.14). His 




themselves as paramamāheśvaras, or “Great followers of the Great God (Śiva),” further 
demonstrating the non-sectarian nature of Śaiva political practice. The Bhaumakaras of the 
eighth century were Buddhists (paramasaugata, paramatathāgata), and made donations to 
Vaiṣṇava Vedic brahmins for the increase of religious merit.125 The tenth-century Somavaṃśī 
rulers of Utkala, in northern Orissa, identified themselves as paramavaiṣṇavas, and yet 
maintained ties to local Tantric gods and goddesses.126 The twelfth-century imperial Gaṅgas, 
however, completely blurred these boundaries, calling themselves both paramamāheśvara and 
paramavaiṣṇava.127 These Coḍas from the Telugu and Tamil country also encouraged a vigorous 
and open immigration policy that brought people from Madhyadeśa (the Midwest), Dakṣiṇa 
regions (South), and Mahārāṣṭra (West).128 That many of the Gaṅgas' inscriptions were written in 
Telugu-Kannada script testifies to their interest in maintaining a cosmopolitan public image (and 
imperial legitimacy) among their new immigrant citizens.129 Taken together, these inscriptions 
reveal significant material evidence for the Śaiva-Vaiṣṇava political, religious, and geographical 
continuum that I believe forms part of the reception history of the BhP in Orissa.
Some fragmentary clues point to a similar continuum in medieval Maharashtra as well. 
As R.C. Dhere has shown, the Marathi poet-saints of the Vārkari tradition interwove the exploits 
of Viṭṭhal, originally a local deity who straddled the lines between Śiva and Viṣṇu, with that of 
125 Ibid., 191.
126 Ibid., 291ff. One Rāṇaka Raṇabhañjadeva, for example, is described as having received the blessings of the 
Goddess Stambheśvarī (Ibid., 300, 303).
127 Ibid., 421ff.
128 Ibid., 279, 373, 422.
129 The copper-plate grants of Anantavarman Coḍagaṅgadeva (1077-1147 CE) were written in different scripts at 
different times during his reign. The early plates were in old Nāgarī and proto-Odia, while the later ones were 
written in Telugu-Canarese with a long genealogical account of imperial Gaṅga history. Ibid., 460, n.49.
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the BhP's beloved Krishna.130 Dhere also proposed tantalizing connections between Viṭṭhal of 
Paṇḍharpūr and Jagannāth of Puri in Orissa, but unfortunately did not go on to publish his 
findings.131 The BhP also became a source of inspiration for two prominent intellectuals at the 
court of the Yādavas of Maharashtra: Vopadeva and Hemādri (fl. 1275 CE), authors of the 
Bhāgavatamuktāphala and Kaivalyadīpikā commentary on it, respectively.132 Vopadeva is more 
famous for his grammatical work, the Mugdhabodha,133 while Hemādri is well-known for his 
voluminous work on Brahmanical jurisprudence (dharmaśāstra), the Caturvargacintāmaṇi.134 
The Muktāphala is more or less a compilation of verses from the BhP interspersed with 
explanatory notes, and organized into four sections, which address the object of religious 
affection, the exalted status of bhakti itself, the material practices of worship, and the 
characteristics of the devotee. The work is perhaps the first of its kind to offer a typology of 
bhakti and its practitioner, specifically dedicated to Viṣṇu and directly adapted from the BhP. 
There is also an important tradition of premodern philological dispute, recognized from the 
130 Ramchandra Chintaman Dhere, Rise of a Folk God: Vitthal of Pandharpur, tr. Anne Feldhaus (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
131 See Dhere, Rise of a Folk God, 11: “In the third stage, I plan to present a comparison of how the three folk 
deities Viṭṭhal, Veṅkaṭeś, and Jagannāth fashioned the regional cultures of Maharashtra, Andhra, and Orissa, 
respectively.” Although this quote does not directly suggest that the three were connected, I infer that Dhere 
wanted to prove their mutuality, for later in the book he brilliantly links Viṭṭhal with Veṅkaṭeś by discussing the 
extraordinary importance given to tamarind trees in both devotional cults (Ibid., 49ff.). There might be a 
tamarind connection between all three. During the annual search for the neem tree from which the wooden idols 
of the Jagannāth temple are (re-)carved, the so-called Navakalevara ceremony, one of the criteria is that there 
must be a tamarind tree in the vicinity. Cf. Albertina Nugteren, “Weaving Nature into Myth: Continuing 
Narratives of Wood, Trees, and Forests in the Ritual Fabric around the God Jagannath in Puri,” Journal for the  
Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 4.2 (2010): 159-172.
132 Muktāphala of Vopadeva with Kaivalyadīpikā of Hemādri, ed. Durgamohan Bhattacarya (Calcutta: Calcutta 
Oriental Press, 1944).
133 See V. Raghavan, “Bopadeva,” in Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Bhagavata Writers, ed. V. Raghavan (New 
Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1978), 122-134.
134 The fifth section of Hemādri's text, the Muktikhaṇḍa, is no longer extant. This is unfortunate, since it would 
probably tell us a great deal about Hemādri's Vedāntic affinities.
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earliest scholarship on the BhP, that considered Vopadeva, and not the “compiler” Vyāsa, to have 
been the author of the BhP itself.135 Whatever the motivations behind these accusations, the 
memory that the BhP first took shape in Maharashtra reflects a renewed emphasis on the text at 
this time.
Like Śrīdhara, Vopadeva and Hemādri were Advaitins of a sort, if not “confirmed” in the 
sense that the famous Sanskrit scholar V. Raghavan desired.136 Hemādri quotes Śaṅkara 
approvingly in his Kaivalyadīpikā, and in general exhibits a knowledge of Advaita language 
appropriate to both the BhP and Śaṅkara.137 In Muktāphala 6.43, Vopadeva cites a verse from the 
BhP which reads: “Bhakti, experience of God, and detachment from other things—all three 
appear at the same time.”138 Hemādri comments:
When bhakti of this sort comes about, after one worships the embodied God (saguṇa), 
and one has the direct experience [of truth], manifesting as one's own self, there comes 
into being an unlimited love, the removal of the veiling power of ignorance, and self-
fulfillment. That is what is expressed in the verse. From bhakti...comes the experience of 
the Self as Brahman. Since that is nothing but supreme bliss, one has a distaste for 
everything else.”139
This is fairly close to the BhP's own theology, though the mention of the veiling power of 
ignorance (avidyā) borders on being classically Advaitic. However, while commenting on 
135 See Minkowski, “I'll Wash Out Your Mouth With My Boot.”
136 Raghavan, “Bopadeva,” 125: “Bopadeva was a confirmed Advaitin. And so was Madhusudana Sarasvati 
associated with him. There was a strong tradition of Advaita-cum-Bhakti that had grown, whose seeds can be 
traced to Śaṅkara himself.”
137 Muktāphala...with Kaivalyadīpikā, 77: tad uktaṃ śrīśaṅkarācāryaiḥ – jñānajñeyavihīno 'pi sadājña iti | Ibid., 
130: taduktaṃ śaṅkarācāryaiḥ – yo 'sau so 'haṃ so 'smy aham eveti vidur yam iti |
138 BhP 11.2.42ab: bhaktiḥ pareśānubhavo viraktir anyatra caiṣa trika ekakālaḥ |
139 Muktāphala...with Kaivalyadīpikā, 109: yadā caivaṃ bhaktir jāyate ata eva saguṇopāsanām upāsya sākṣātkāre 
sati tasyātmatayā sphuraṇāt tatraivānupādhiḥ premā avidyāyāś cāvarakatvanivṛttir ātmakāmatā ca bhavatīty āha 
“bhaktir” iti | bhaktiḥ premātmikā...tata ātmano brahmatvānubhavaḥ | tasya ca paramānandarūpatayā anyatra 
viraktir aruci |
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Muktāphala 19.26, which cites BhP 10.51.56,140 Hemādri takes full advantage of the Advaita 
vocabulary of the verse:
Why is he free of qualities (nirguṇa)? Because he is free of any taint (nirañjana). Taint 
is the veiling of consciousness called māyā. For anything with attributes (saguṇa) is 
connected with māyā. Hence he is nondual (advaya), since it is only in connection with 
māyā that duality is possible. Why is he nondual? Because he is “mere consciousness” 
(jñaptimātra). The idea is that māyā is inexplicable as being existent or non-existent.141
Similar language emerges in his commentary on Muktāphala 17.3, a citation in which the sage 
Nārada exclaims to Vyāsa that his firm consciousness of the beloved Kṛṣṇa allows him to “see 
that my own delusion has constructed the idea of this very body upon my true self that is 
Brahman.”142 Hemādri says that “construction” really means
superimposition, like the snake on the rope....The use of two different words for “this” 
indicates that superimposing a [not-]really existent snake on a rope does not quite 
match with saying that a really existent body is superimposed on Brahman. Instead, the 
text says “this very body.” The point is that it is inexplicable (anirvācya).143
The opacity of this explanation (not to mention the textual transmission) aside, Hemādri is 
familiar with the buzzwords and metaphors of classical Advaita Vedānta: superimposition, 
140 tasmād visṛjyāśiṣa īśa sarvaśo
rajastamaḥsattvaguṇānubandhanāḥ |
nirañjanaṃ nirguṇam advayaṃ paraṃ
tvāṃ jñaptimātraṃ puruṣaṃ vrajāmy aham ||
141 Muktāphala...with Kaivalyadīpikā, 311: nirguṇaḥ kutaḥ | yato nirañjanaḥ | añjanaṃ prakāśāvaraṇaṃ māyākhyam 
| saguṇo hi māyāsambandhāt | ato 'dvayaḥ | māyāsambandhe hi sati dvitīyatvaṃ syāt | kuto 'dvayaḥ | yato 
jñaptimātraḥ | māyāyāḥ sattāsattābhyām anirvācyatvād ityarthaḥ |
142 BhP 1.5.27:
tasmiṃs tadā labdharater mahāmune
priyaśravasy askhalitā matir mama |
yayāham etat sadasat svamāyayā
paśye mayi brahmaṇi kalpitaṃ tv idam ||
143 Muktāphala...with Kaivalyadīpikā, 269: mamaiva māyayā mayy eva brahmarūpe kalpitam āropitam 
rajjubhujaṅgavat | […] etad idam iti padadvayena yathā 'nyatra [a?]satyo bhujaṅgo rajjvām āropito na tathā 
'nyatra satyaṃ rūpadvayaṃ brahmaṇy āropitam kintv idam eva ity uktam | anirvācyam ityarthaḥ |
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inexplicability, snake-and-rope. Śrīdhara is less forthcoming about his Advaitic sensibilities in 
this regard, even in commenting on the same verse.144 It is not apparent from these examples 
whether or not Hemādri and Śrīdhara emerged from a similar milieu. Other possible links 
between their writings, approximately a century apart, would require a cross-referential study 
outside the scope of this chapter.
What about the possible shared backdrop of Śaivism? For that we may turn from 
philosophical to literary culture. As is well known, the BhP came to serve as one of the most 
important sources for the theory of bhaktirasa, the special category of religious aesthetics 
introduced rather late into the domain of Sanskrit poetics (alaṃkāraśāstra). Developed most 
fully by the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas in the sixteenth century, the theory finds precursors in none other 
than Vopadeva's Muktāphala, and was elaborated by Hemādri in the Kaivalyadīpikā.145 The 
fourth section of the Muktāphala, extending from chapters 11 to 19, details how bhakti should be 
understood not just as another rasa, but as the paradigmatic rasa, experienced through the nine 
canonical ones: the erotic (śṛṅgāra), comic (hāsya), tragic (karuṇa), violent (raudra), heroic 
(vīra), frightening (bhayānaka), disgusting (bībhatsa), wondrous (adbhuta), and quiescent 
(śānta). Each of these, according to Vopadeva and Hemādri, could be found in the BhP, and 
contributed in their own way to the aesthetic experience of bhakti, “the delectation produced 
through listening, etc., to the story of the Devotees which embody the nine rasas...”146 Hemādri 
was clearly familiar with the broader discourse of Sanskrit poetics. He quoted frequently from 
144 Cf. Bhāgavata Purāṇa....With Bhāvārthabodhinī, 24. Śrīdhara has a different reading of the final pāda, 
substituting the word pare for tv idam, thus sidestepping Hemādri's interpretive problem altogether.
145 See Neal Delmonico, “Sacred Rapture: A Study of the Religious Aesthetic of Rupa Gosvamin” (PhD diss., 
University of Chicago, 1990), 164-175.
146 Raghavan, “Bopadeva,” 133.
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famous works such as Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana (12th C.), Bhoja's Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 
(11th C.), Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa (11th C.), and Dhanañjaya's Daśarūpaka (10th C.), and most 
contentiously, the Kashmiri Śaiva Abhinavagupta (11th C.).147 Hamsa Stainton has shown that 
concepts of bhaktirasa seem to be incipient in the praise-poetry of the Śaivas of Kashmir.148 
Although not directly linked to Sanskrit aesthetics in its early forms, the use of the term 
bhaktirasa in Śaiva praise-poetry was ambiguous enough that Abhinavagupta felt compelled to 
argue against its inclusion among the canonical rasas, instead subordinating it to śānta.149 And it 
is precisely Abhinavagupta's position that Hemādri resists in the Muktāphala.150
This conjuncture leads to provocative questions about the relationship between a Śaiva 
and Vaiṣṇava poetics of devotion mediated through the BhP. There is an old claim that 
Abhinavagupta was the first to cite the BhP, on the strength of a quotation found in his 
commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā (14.8). However, R.C. Hazra pointed out that the quotation 
was scribbled in the margins of an old Śāradā manuscript of the commentary, and may not have 
147 Delmonico, “Sacred Rapture,” 167.
148 Hamsa Stainton, “Poetry and Prayer: Stotras in the Religious and Literary History of Kashmir” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 2012), 175-205, 313-327.
149 “It is for that very reason that bhakti and faith, which have to do with surrender to God, are accessories to 
[śāntarasa] in a manner other than [transitory emotions like] memory, resolve, fortitude, perseverance, et al. 
Thus they are not counted as distinct rasas.”
See Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni with the Commentary Abhinavabhāratī by Abhinavaguptācārya, Vol. 1, rev. ed. 
K. Krishnamoorthy (Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1992), 334: ata eveśvarapraṇidhānaviṣaye bhaktiśraddhe 
smṛtimatidhṛtyutsāhādyanupraviṣṭebhyo ’nyathaivā(syaivā)ṅgamiti na tayoḥ pṛthagrasatvena gaṇanam |
150 See Delmonico, “Sacred Rapture,” 168-169. Admittedly the discourse of aesthetics was non-sectarian, as Bhoja 
famously put it in the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (sāhityasya sarvapārṣadatvāt). See Sheldon Pollock, “Sanskrit Literary 
Culture from the Inside Out,” in Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South Asia, ed. Sheldon 
Pollock (Berkeley: University of California, 2003), 70, n.68. Hemādri criticizes both Abhinavagupta, a Śaiva, 
and Hemacandra, a Jain, indiscriminately, and only on the grounds that they did not accept bhakti as a rasa. Then 
again, Hemacandra was merely reproducing the original discussion about additional rasas from the 
Abhinavabhāratī in his Kāvyānuśāsana.
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been Abhinavagupta's own.151 Nor is the BhP listed as an authority cited in any of his other 
works, and it does not appear to have been especially popular among the Śaivas of Kashmir.152 
Moreover, it is difficult to link the Muktāphala to any Śaiva line of thinking about bhaktirasa. 
Beyond offering the first systematic argument in favor of bhaktirasa, Hemādri and Vopadeva just 
do their own thing, seemingly unprecedented.153 But there is an alternative genealogy of the 
nexus between bhakti, aesthetics, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, and Advaita Vedānta. For that we turn to 
the poet and commentator from Kerala, Pūrṇasarasvatī, who lived between the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries CE.
Three things in particular draw our attention to Pūrṇasarasvatī: First, his Vaiṣṇava 
inclinations as a Śaiva initiate; second, his interest in devotional praise-poetry as both a locus for 
bhaktirasa and a resource for Advaitic meditation; and third, his own addition to the genre of 
Sanskrit messenger-lyric, the Haṃsasandeśa. Better known in the history of Sanskrit literature 
for his commentaries on exemplary works such as Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, Bhavabhūti's 
Mālatīmādhava, and Murāri's Anargharāghava, Pūrṇasarasvatī was also very familiar with 
Kashmiri schools of Śaivism and the philosophical tradition of Advaita Vedānta.154 He was an 
151 R.C. Hazra, “The Bhāgavata-Purāṇa,” New Indian Antiquary 1 (1938): 524.
152 Hardy, Viraha-Bhakti, 487, n.20.
153 Śrīdhara Svāmin too offers an abbreviated understanding of bhaktirasa in his commentary on BhP 10.43.17. See 
Gupta, The Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of Jīva Gosvāmī, 73, n.12: “The Lord, who is the embodiment of the 
multitude of all rasas beginning with amorous love, appeared in accordance with the wishes of each person 
there, and not in his fullness to everyone....The rasas which were manifest in the wrestlers, etc., are delineated in 
order by this verse, '(The rasas are) wrath, wonder, amorous love, mirth, heroism, compassion, terror, disgust, 
tranquility, and devotion (bhakti) imbued with love (prema).'” It is not clear just from this section whether or not 
Śrīdhara knew of Vopadeva and Hemādri's writings on the topic, but the idea of bhaktirasa clearly had purchase 
in a wider intellectual sphere, as his untraced verse demonstrates. Later Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava commentators such as 
Sanātana Gosvāmī and Jīva Gosvāmī picked up on this passage, in tandem with the Muktāphala's more elaborate 
system of classification, to develop their theory of bhaktirasa.
154 N.V.P. Unithiri, Pūrṇasarasvatī (Calicut: Calicut University Press, 2004), 322-328.
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unusual figure in the history of Sanskrit literary interpretation. In his reading of Bhavabhūti's 
secular play Mālatīmādhava, each character becomes an allegorical representative of a divine 
being or a philosophical concept, much as in the classic Vedāntic allegorical drama, the 
Prabodhacandrodaya.155 He extended this allegory to the author of the play himself. In his 
commentary on the third benedictory verse of the Mālatīmādhava, Pūrṇasarasvatī believed that 
Bhavabhūti, “that moon among poets, who knows both sides of the ocean that is Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga, and is the very stage on which the actresses called Upaniṣads sing and dance,” was 
communicating the secrets of Tantric yoga practice that one should properly receive from one's 
guru, and would ultimately lead to liberation.156 He even saw Bhavabhūti as a paramahaṃsa, a 
liberated saint of the highest renunciate order, whose doctrine was that of Advaita Vedānta.157 
155 Ibid., 155-156. His own drama, the Kamalinīrājahaṃsa, can be read as an allegory expressing the philosophies 
of Śaiva and Śākta Tantrism. The play itself begins by invoking the androgynous form of Śiva, Ardhanārīśvara. 
See Ibid., 55-61. Pūrnasarasvatī quotes the Prabodhacandrodaya a handful of times across his works (Ibid., 
339).
156 See Malatimadhavam: Sripurnasarasvativiracitaya Rasamanjaryakhyaya vyakhyayopetam, ed. K.S. Mahādeva 
Śāstrī (Anantaśayana: Rājakīyamudraṇālaya, 1953), 9-10: atra cāyam akhilopaniṣadaṅganāraṅgamaṇḍapena 
sāṃkhyayogapārāvārīṇena kavikulendunā gurumukhaikagamyo 'tirahasyo 'rthaḥ sūtrito 'nusandheyaḥ |
The specific yogic terminology is scattered through the rest of the interpretation, but here is one example: “The 
compound in the third quarter of the verse—'[Śiva's third eye] whose corner is cooled by the flow of nectar 
dripping from the moon atop his crest that is heated with fire'—really signifies the corner that has been refreshed 
by the abundant shower of supreme ambrosia that drips from the lotus-moon of the aperture atop the head 
(brahmarandhra), liquefied by the inner flame of the one who courses along the stream of the central arterial 
channel (suṣumnā).”
Ibid, 10: arcir iti sauṣumnasaraṇiviharaṇarasikanijaśikhādrāvitāt brahmarandhrāravindacandrān niṣyanditena 
paramāmṛtavṛṣṭipūreṇa sātkāriprāntam ityarthaḥ |
157 See Jason Schwartz, “Parabrahman among the Yogins,” International Journal of Hindu Studies, forthcoming, 30. 
Schwartz (Ibid., 31-33) describes how Pūrṇasarasvatī recognized and elaborated on the philosophical language 
playfully embedded in the Mālatīmādhava, in the process seeking to “reconcile the two systems” of Advaita 
Vedānta and the Pratyabhijñā theology of Kashmiri Śaivas. That Bhavabhūti toyed with Advaita concepts in his 
broader literature is quite clear. Take, for example, his Uttararāmacarita 1.39, which conflates nonduality with 
true love (my trans.):
“To be not-two in both joy and sorrow, and together in every situation; where the heart finds peace and feelings 
never age; which stays firm when time removes all veils and affection ripens; if you’re lucky, you might get to 
experience it—once.”
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Pūrṇasarasvatī was probably trained in a Śaiva monastery in central Kerala, or at least studied 
with a Śaiva teacher, given his Tantric textual repertoire.158 Nevertheless, in keeping with the 
non-sectarian quality of this form of Śaiva religiosity, he was devoted to Viṣṇu.159 At the opening 
to his commentary on the Mālatīmādhava, after invoking the form of Śiva known as 
Dakṣiṇāmūrti, he imagined his own teacher, Pūrṇajyoti, as a manifestation of the Kṛṣṇa of the 
Bhagavad Gītā, containing within himself the universal cosmic form.160 Moreover, he wrote a 
See The Uttararāmacharita of Bhavabhūti with the commentary of Vīrarāghava, eds. T.R. Ratnam Aiyar and 
Kāśīnātha Pāṇḍurang Parab (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1903), 41:
advaitaṃ sukhaduḥkhayor anugataṃ sarvāsv avasthāsu yad
viśrāmo hṛdayasya yatra jarasā yasminn ahāryo rasaḥ |
kālenāvaraṇātyayāt pariṇate yat snehasāre sthitaṃ
bhadraṃ tasya sumānuṣasya katham apy ekaṃ hi tat prāpyate ||
158 N.V.P. Unithiri (Pūrṇasarasvatī, 17) suggests that Pūrṇasarasvatī was associated with Mallappaṭṭam near 
Taḷiparamba in Kannur district. This geography could explain the juxtaposition of Śiva and Viṣṇu in his 
benedictory and devotional writings. The Rājarājeśvara temple in Taḷiparamba features none other than 
Dakṣiṇāmūrti, invoked below, on the southern side. It is adjacent to the Trichambaram Kṛṣṇa temple, whose 
deity is brought to the Rājarājeśvara temple during festivals such as Śivarātri.
159 Unithiri (Pūrṇasarasvatī, 37-44) claims that before becoming a renunciate at the Śaiva monastery, 
Pūrṇasarasvatī was actually known as Viṣṇu, the same Viṣṇu who wrote the Pañcikā commentary on Murāri's 
Anargharāghava. His elder brother, Divākara, described Viṣṇu in his Amogharāghava as one who adorned the 
family name with his pious deeds, the very personification of Vedic rites, who desired the joy of serving Śiva. 
Ibid., 43, n.12, quoted in Ullur S. Paramesvara Iyer, Keralasāhityacaritram, Vol. 1 (Thiruvananthapuram: 
University of Kerala, 1990), 188-190:
tasyātmajo viṣṇur alaṅkariṣṇuḥ
kulaṃ pavitrair amalaṃ caritraiḥ |
bhūteśasevāsukham āptukāmaḥ
śrauto vidhir mūrta ivāvir āsīt ||
160 See Malatimadhavam: Sripurnasarasvativiracitaya Rasamanjaryakhyaya vyakhyayopetam, 1-2:
śirasa iva galantīm antarabhyudgirantī
surasaritam udārāṃ vākchalād ānanena |
dahatu bhavabhayaṃ sā mūrtir aiśī munīnāṃ
daharakuharalīlādakṣiṇā dakṣiṇā vaḥ || 3 ||
yadgītārthaśravaṇarasato dhvastamohāndhakāraḥ
kṛṣṇānandī trijagati naro jiṣṇubhūyaṃ jihīte |
svasminn eva prakaṭitamahāviśvarūpaṃ tad ekaṃ
pūrṇajyotiḥ sphuratu hṛdi me puṇdarīkāyatākṣam || 4 ||
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commentary on the hymn called the Viṣṇupādādikeśastotra, a genre of praise-poetry (stotra) that 
describes a deity, in this case Viṣṇu, from foot to head.161 
Interestingly, Pūrṇasarasvatī assigns authorship of the hymn to the Advaita philosopher 
Śaṅkarācārya.162 The stotra itself was probably composed much later, given the many references 
to post-Śaṅkara texts.163 But Pūrṇasarasvatī's attribution, like all apocrypha, is still historically 
meaningful. It shows not only that there was a vibrant memory of Śaṅkara in his purported land 
of origin, but also a historically identifiable attempt to link that memory to a particular kind of 
bhakti.164 Pūrnasarasvatī’s commentary, called the Bhaktimandākinī, begins with an elaborate 
account of the Advaitic reasoning behind Śaṅkara's composition, worth reproducing in full:
First of all, among the three practices prescribed for realizing the Self in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad 2.4.5—namely, hearing (śravaṇa), contemplating (manana), and meditating 
(nididhyāsana) on the teachings about the Self—the place of primacy goes to meditation, 
which is the mother of the absorption (samādhi) that is nothing but the experience of 
one's unity with Supreme God, produced by the six limbs [of yoga], restraint and so 
161 N.V.P. Unithiri et al., eds., The Bhaktimandākinī: An Elaborate Fourteenth-Century Commentary by  
Pūrṇasarasvatī on the Viṣṇupādādikeśastotra Attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. École française d’Extrême-Orient, 
Collection Indologie 118 (Pondicherry: Institut français de Pondichéry, 2011).
162 Bhaktimandākinī, 7:
śrīmacchaṅkarapūjyapādaracitaṃ pādādikeśāvadhi-
stotraṃ dātram aghasya netram amalaṃ gātraṃ hareḥ prekṣitum |
vyācikhyāsati mayy aho sati satām eṣā vidhā hāsituṃ
vyaktā bhaktir athāpi viṣṇupadayoḥ puṣṇāti me dhṛṣṇutām ||
163 Fred Smith, “REVIEWS: The Bhaktimandākinī,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 76.3 
(2013): 524.
164 Cf. Stainton, “Poetry and Prayer,” 43-44: “The list of stotras attributed to Śaṅkara goes on and on. This group of 
texts raises many of the same challenges hindering the study of stotras and their history: uncertain authorship 
and provenance, the accretion of frame stories (many of which are hagiographical), the complex and shifting 
textual record of these compositions, and their sheer number and diversity. To be blunt, the stotras attributed to 
Śaṅkara represent a significant weakness in the scholarly understanding of India’s religious history. 
Unfortunately, the tangled origins of these compositions have prevented many scholars from asking more 
interesting questions, such how they have been interpreted over time and how they have shaped perceptions of 
Śaṅkarācārya and Advaita Vedānta. Overall, the ascription of such a diverse range of hymns to this one author, 
along with their great popularity, remains a fascinating and understudied feature of stotra literature.”
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forth.165 [This is supported with a variety of purāṇic quotations...]166
Meditation fixes the mind upon that precious form (of the Supreme Lord): the celestial 
tree that removes the fatigue of those helplessly wandering on the roads of the desert 
called saṃsāra, scorched by the rays of the sun that is the three afflictions; the fire that 
burns up the entire mass of one's ill deeds; the bestower of everything auspicious; the 
singular essence of Existence-Consciousness-Bliss called Viṣṇu, the apparent 
modification of the Supreme Brahman, like the congealed form of ghee; the root of every 
divine incarnation; the repository of all powers; the pure reality-principle, totally free of 
dependence on the cycle of action, unlike minor deities, who has assumed a form in 
order to bless devotees.
The mind, moreover, extremely fine and subtle as it is, should be yoked to this particular 
form of the Supreme Lord in this fashion, and can be fixed upon him who has 
demonstrably sweet mannerisms, by being withdrawn, together with the senses, from 
anything other than him—specifically, with practice and detachment from other objects, 
as the Bhagavad Gītā (6.35) teaches.
In order to shower his grace on those virtuous people who want both enjoyment and 
liberation, the venerable author of the commentary on the Brahma Sūtras 
(śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyakāra), a partial incarnation of the Supreme Lord himself, his 
heart submerged in compassion, began this hymn that depicts that form of Lord 
Puruṣottama from toe to head. In that way, he also felt he could teach the principles of all 
the Vedas, dharmaśāstra texts, purāṇas, epics, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya.167
165 Schwartz (“Parabrahman Among the Yogins,” 28) suggests that in this passage, “Pūrṇasarasvatī ascribes to 
Śaṅkara’s Vedānta a doctrinal privileging of nididhyāsana essentially alien to the system (and indeed more akin 
to rival interpretations offered by Vācaspatimiśra and Bhāskara).” In the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa of Prakāśātman 
(1000 CE), the place of primacy is accorded to śravaṇa, accompanied by manana and nididhyāsana as auxiliary 
elements. By privileging nididhyāsana, says Schwartz, Pūrṇasarasvatī participated in a broader process of 
reframing Advaita Vedānta to fit Yoga doctrine—one which began with Anubhūtisvarūpācārya in the thirteenth 
century. Pūrṇasarasvatī quotes Ānandabodha and Citsukha in his Rasamañjarī commentary on the 
Mālatīmādhava, which Schwartz takes as evidence that he knew the genealogy of thinking that influenced this 
shift. (Ibid., 30-31, n.60).
166 Viṣṇu Purāṇa 6.7.91-2, 6.7.74-6.
167 Bhaktimandākinī, 7-10: tatra tāvat “ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ” iti svavihitasyātmadarśanasya sādhanatayā śrutyā 
“śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ” iti pratipāditānāṃ śravaṇamanananididhyāsanānāṃ madhye, 
yamādiṣaḍaṅganiṣpādyasya parameśvaraikyānubhavarūpasamādhimātur nididhyāsanasya prādhānyam […] 
ityādivacanāt karmayonitvenāśuddhān devādīn apāsya karmapāratantryarahite bhaktānugrahāya kṛtaparigrahe 
viśuddhatattvātmake samastaśaktyādhāre sarvāvatārabījabhūte ghṛtakāṭhinyavat parabrahmaṇo viṣṇvākhye 
vivarte saccidānandaikarase sakalamaṅgalaprasotari samagraduritatūlajālaploṣajātavedasi, 
tāpatrayataraṇikiraṇataptasaṃsaraṇamarudharaṇisaraṇisaṃcaraṇavidhurajanapariśramaharaṇasuraviṭapini, 
vigraharatne manaḥsthirīkaraṇātmakatvāt,
manasaś ca taralatarasvabhāvasya parameśvaravigraha evaṃprakāraviśiṣṭatayānusandheya iti 
pradarśitamadhuraprakāre tasmiṃs taditaraviṣayapratyāhṛtasya bāhyendriyasahitasya “abhyāsena tu kaunteya 
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There is no doubt as to Pūrṇasarasvatī's Advaita affinities here—by Śaṅkarācārya, he 
means the Śaṅkarācārya, identified as the author of the commentary on the Brahma Sūtras. He 
uses technical Advaitic terms to describe God as the “apparent transformation” (vivarta) of the 
Supreme Brahman, defined as Existence-Consciousness-Bliss (saccidānanda). And he 
subordinates the entire purpose of visualizing God to the traditional Advaitic practice of 
“listening, reflection, and meditation” (śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana).168 But Pūrṇasarasvatī's 
understanding of bhakti was derived not only from the classical tradition of Advaita Vedānta, 
which subordinated it to a lesser preparatory role, but also precisely from those texts that were 
contested between Vedānta traditions, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. He quotes the 
former no less than fifty-two times and the latter seventy-five times in the Bhaktimandākinī.169 
He also draws a connection between bhakti and rasa within the praise-poem, not so much in the 
systematic fashion of Hemādri, but instead echoing the Kashmiri Śaiva purveyors of the stotra 
genre. Beyond his casual mentions of the term bhaktirasa,170 Pūrṇasarasvatī justifies the whole 
vairāgyeṇa ca gṛhyate” iti bhagavadvacanād, abhyāsena viṣayāntaraviraktyā ca sthirīkāryatvāt,
bhuktimuktyabhilāṣukasukṛtijanānugrahārthaṃ paramakaruṇāparādhīnacetāḥ parameśvarāvatārabhedabhūto 
bhagavān śrimacchārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyakāraḥ, tadvigrahaprakāśanāya bhagavataḥ puruṣottamasya 
pādādikeśāntavigrahavarṇanarūpaṃ stotram ārabhamāṇaḥ, taddvārā 
sakalavedadharmaśāstrapurāṇetihāsamīmāṃsānyāyādyarthāṃś ca prasaṅgato vyutpipādayiṣuḥ […]
168 I have discussed the general intellectual history of the “injunction” (vidhi) implied in the Upaniṣadic statement 
quoted by Pūrṇasarasvatī: “One should see, hear, reflect, and meditate on the Self” (ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ 
śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ) in Anand Venkatkrishnan, “Hum Hain Naye, Andaz Kyun Ho Purana? 
Hermeneutical Innovations in Advaita Vedānta Intellectual History” (paper presented at the South Asia Graduate 
Student Conference, University of Chicago, April 5-6, 2012).
169 Unithiri, Pūrṇasarasvatī, 324, 326-327.
170 In the first instance, Pūrṇasarasvatī defends the use of different verbs to express praise in no particular order, in 
the process referring to the author of the Kāma Sūtra (2.2.31): “Here, the use of particular verbs at different 
times, like 'May he protect us' or 'I worship' or 'I bow down' should be understood as a result of the agitation on 
the part of the composer, whose heart is out of control in its attachment to the Lord, swayed to and fro by 
bhaktirasa. In such circumstances, the absence of grammatical order is in fact an aesthetic virtue, since it causes 
the sensitive listener to respond with amazement. As Vatsyāyana says: 'Manuals are only useful insofar as people 
lack rasa. But when the wheel of love gets underway, there is neither manual nor sequence.'”
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enterprise of composing stotras on account of its widespread appeal as a method of instruction, 
that requires a degree of aesthetic sensitivity to appreciate. When an opponent objects that God's 
physical features have been amply described in the purāṇas, and need no further representation 
in hymn form, Pūrṇasarasvatī responds that different people have different capacities to receive 
meaning, and some prefer certain methods to others.171 He berates the opponent for his naïveté 
and his total lack of poetic comprehension:
It is based on the differences between people in need of instruction that such a wide range 
of technical treatises are laid out for study. Otherwise, if everyone could understand the 
truth that was to be communicated in just a few words, what would be the use of these 
voluminous tomes, tangled with all sorts of opinions, arguments, and concepts? If a single 
mantra could get us everything we wanted, what is the purpose of this merry-go-round of 
all manner of mantras and techniques and ritual formulae? Anyway, enough of this sort of 
circumlocutory mode of explanation, uninformed by the principles [of poetry?], rasas, 
aesthetic emotions, and poetic devices. It is well-established that this undertaking of the 
blessed teacher, ocean of boundless knowledge, whose every act is exclusively dedicated 
Bhaktimandākinī, 47: atra ca, kadācit pāyān na iti, kadācit vande iti, kadācit praṇaumītyādikriyāviśeṣaprayogo 
bhaktirasāvedhena bhagavadanusandhāne paravaśahṛdayasya prayoktuḥ sambhramavaśād iti mantavyaḥ | 
evaṃvidhe ca sthale, prakramabhedaḥ pratyuta sahṛdayacamatkārakārīti guṇa eva, “śāstrāṇāṃ viṣayas tāvad 
yāvan mandarasā narāḥ | raticakre pravṛtte tu naiva śāstraṃ na ca kramaḥ ||” iti vātsyāyanoktatvāt |
Another comes comes in the course of explaining the term “with a playful mind” (kelibuddhyā) in verse 23. “By 
this [the poet] expresses a prayer for the most superior bhaktirasa, by means of detachment from sensual 
enjoyments, as described in the verse (Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1.20.19): 'The abiding love that the indiscriminating have 
for objects of the world—let that same love never leave my heart as I remember you.'”
Bhaktimandākinī, 79: anena ca “yā prītir avivekānāṃ viṣayeṣv anapāyinī | tvām anusmarataḥ sā me hṛdayān 
māpasarpatu ||” ity uktarītyā bhogyaviṣayaviraktyā sātiśayabhaktirasaprārthanāṃ dyotayati |
Finally, he refers to “relishing the ambrosia that is bhaktirasa” (bhaktirasāmṛtāsvāda) in his commentary on 
verse 25. See Bhaktimandākinī, 87.
171 He quotes the Kashmiri Śaiva Utpaladeva's Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā (2.33) in support of this idea. Trans. 
Isabelle Ratié, “'A Five-Trunked, Four-Tusked Elephant is Running in the Sky': How Free is Imagination 
According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta?” Asiatische Studien 64.2 (2010): 359, n.47: “In an object that is 
one (eka), [because it is] established through a synthesis (anusaṃdhāna), an [elementary] phenomenon (ābhāsa) 
can also be distinguished according to [the subject’s] free will (ruci), a [particular] desire (arthitva), [or] 
according to education (vyutpatti).”
yathāruci yathārthitvaṃ yathāvyutpatti bhidyate |
ābhāso 'py artha ekasminn anusaṃdhānasādhite ||
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to giving grace to others, is manifestly meaningful—so that those who have become 
infused with rasa, with their tender and artless minds, may alight upon this extremely 
deep subject matter.172
The Bhaktimandākinī thus envisions bhakti as a combination of several factors: yogic 
visualization, Vedāntic allegorization, and aesthetic appreciation. In doing so, it encourages a 
devotional experience that Steven Hopkins calls “extravagant beholding, that holds in tension 
together ideal visionary forms with the concrete, material reality of the individual object of 
love.”173 Hopkins discusses extravagant beholding primarily through Śrīvaiṣṇava examples of the 
pādādikeśa genre (not to mention a dazzling comparative study of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
literatures). As Fred Smith notes, the Viṣṇupādādikeśastotra was probably used “as a meditative 
text among certain circles of South Indian Vaiṣṇavas.”174 The word “certain” here bespeaks a 
spectrum that must have included, or even foregrounded, people like Pūrṇasarasvatī, Śaiva-
Vaiṣṇavas with Advaitic affinities. For Pūrṇasarasvatī did not emerge in a vacuum, least of all in 
the rich literary world of medieval Kerala.
Perhaps the most famous Vaiṣṇava stotra produced in Kerala was the Mukundamālā of 
King Kulaśekhara, traditionally considered to be one of the Tamil Ālvārs from the ninth century, 
but there is some debate over his identity and date.175 He was certainly known to Pūrṇasarasvatī, 
172 Bhaktimandākinī, 12: vyutpādyabhedāpekṣayā hi śāstrāṇi vicitrāṇi vistīryante | anyathā parimitākṣaropadeśyena 
tattvena sarveṣāṃ caritārthatvāt kimartha eṣa vividhavikalpajalpakalpanājaṭilo granthaskandhātibhāranibandhaḥ? 
ekenaiva mantreṇābhimatasakalārthasiddhau kiṃprayojanā ceyaṃ bahuvidhamantratantrapāratantryayantraṇā? 
ity alam atattvarasabhāvālaṃkārataraṅgitabhaṅgipratipādanena | sarasatām āpādya, mṛdulasaralamatīnām 
atigahane 'sminn arthe 'vataraṇārthaṃ sārthaka eva parānugrahaikasakalavyāpārāṇām apārajñānapārāvārāṇāṃ 
bhagavatām ācāryāṇām ayam ārambha iti sthitam |
173 Steven P. Hopkins, “Extravagant Beholding: Love, Ideal Bodies, and Particularity,” History of Religions 47.1 
(2007): 8.
174 Smith, “REVIEWS: The Bhaktimandākinī,” 524-525.
175 See Siegfried Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry: Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1984), 
143. Bhandarkar placed him in the first half of the twelfth century. See R.G. Bhandarkar, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism 
and Minor Religious Systems (Strassburg: Trübner, 1913), 50.
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who not only quotes the Mukundamālā frequently but also calls Kulaśekhara a 
paramabhāgavata, an imperial title adopted by Vaiṣṇava kings all the way from the Gupta 
period.176 Immensely popular in Kerala, the Mukundamālā was commented upon by an Advaitin 
contemporary of Pūrṇasarasvatī named Rāghavānanda.177 Rāghavānanda's autobiographical notes 
at the end of his Kṛṣṇapadī, an Advaitic commentary on the BhP, suggest a similar affiliation 
with Śaiva teachers and specifically the Trichambaram Kṛṣṇa temple which Pūrṇasarasvatī 
frequented.178 He opens his Tātparyadīpikā commentary on the Mukundamālā with verses from 
the eleventh canto of the BhP that exalt bhakti above all other means to liberation, then launches 
into a summary of classical Advaita teaching about the unity between Ātman and Brahman, and 
the illusory nature of duality, before quoting from the Sāmbapañcāśikā (v.15), a Śaiva hymn 
from eighth-century Kashmir, to express the non-difference between the act of praise, the one 
who praises, and the object of praise.179 Still later in the Tātparyadīpikā, Rāghavānanda goes so 
far as to say that bhakti and liberation (mukti) are basically the same thing, once again making no 
secret about his inspiration from the Kashmiri Śaivas, this time referring directly to the 
philosopher and poet Utpaladeva:
176 Bhaktimandākinī, 50, 88, 161 (paramabhāgavataśrīkulaśekharamahārāja). On the Guptas styling themselves as 
paramabhāgavatas, see Bhandarkar, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems, 43.
177 Śrīmukundamālā with Tātparyadīpikā of Rāghavānanda, ed. K. Rama Pisharoti (Annamalainagar: Annamalai 
University, 1933). Pisharoti assigned Rāghavānanda to the seventeenth century, but Kunjunni Raja disputes this 
date, questioning the identification of Rāghavānanda's teacher, Kṛṣṇānanda, with the seventeenth-century author 
of the Siddhāntasiddhāñjana. See K. Kunjunni Raja, The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature (Madras: 
University of Madras, 1980), 8.
178 Kunjunni Raja, The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature, 7, n.34.
179 Śrīmukundamālā with Tātparyadīpikā of Rāghavānanda, 1-3. On the Sāmbapañcāśikā, see Stainton, “Poetry and 
Prayer,” 210ff., 216-217 for the verse in question. Rāghavānanda also wrote a commentary on the BhP from an 
explicitly Advaita perspective. Like Śrīdhara above, commenting on BhP 10.43.17, he also described how the 
verse implied that Kṛṣṇa was the locus of all rasas, but unlike Śrīdhara, he did not make any mention of 
“bhaktirasa.” See Sreemad Bhagavatam 10th Skandha Part I, With the Commentary of Raghavananda Muni, ed. 
M.B. Sankaranarayana Sastri (Trichur: The Mangalodayam Press, 1949), 398-399.
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Here we must posit the following: Mukti is the direct, unmediated awareness of Brahman 
as pure inner consciousness—Brahman that has the form of the singular essence that is 
Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, characterized as being the cause of the creation, 
preservation, and dissolution of the world. This awareness has as its source the great 
statements [of the Upaniṣads], such as “That you are.” Bhakti, for its part, is a certain 
unprecedented vision, a splendorous joy in the mind, which manifests through such signs 
as hairs standing on end, tears falling, and staring with mouth agape. It appears at the 
exact same time as when both one's unsurpassed veneration and faith in God as well as 
one's unsurpassed love grounded in the Self culminate in the undivided [unity of] Ātman 
and Brahman. There is thus a mutual recursion of the manifestation of eternal, 
unsurpassed love. And for that very reason—since they have the same cause, occur at the 
same time, operate in the same locus, and have the same object—[bhakti and mukti] are, 
from the perspective of absolute truth (vastutaḥ), one and the same, but different in 
empirical experience (vyavahārataḥ). Therefore it is appropriate to say that the choice of 
one or the other is just a matter of desire, because when one is achieved the other is 
inevitable. So we have a purāṇic quote—a very Upaniṣad (BhP 11.2.42): “Bhakti, 
experience of God, and disdain for other things—all three appear at the same time.” And 
it is with this in view that the revered author of the [Śiva]stotrāvalī proclaimed (1.7, 
20.11): “Lord! You alone are the Self of all, and everyone loves themselves, so people 
will really flourish if they realize that bhakti for you is spontaneous—within their own 
nature. Those who prosper with the wealth of bhakti, what else can they pray for? Those 
who are impoverished without it, what else can they pray for?”180
Another source of praise-poetry at the nexus of Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, and Advaita 
180 Śrīmukundamālā with Tātparyadīpikā of Rāghavānanda, 14: atraitad avadheyam – muktir nāma 
viśvotpattisthitisaṃhārahetutvopalakṣitasya saccidānandaikarasamūrter brahmaṇas 
tattvamasyādimahāvākyapramāṇakaḥ pratyakcinmātratāsākṣādbodhaḥ, bhaktiḥ punar 
īśvaraniṣṭhaniratiśayabahumānaviśvāsayor ātmaniṣṭhaniratiśayapremṇaḥ cākhaṇḍabrahmātmaparyavasitatayā 
tatsamasamayābhivyajyamāno romaharṣāśrupātamukhavikāsādiliṅgakaḥ kaścanāpūrvadarśano mānasollāso yo 
'sau nityaniratiśayaprītyāvirbhāvāparaparyāyo bhavatīty ato 'nayor ekanimittatvāt ekakālatvād ekādhikaraṇatvād 
ekaviṣayatvāc ca vastuta aikarūpyaṃ vyavahārataś ca bhedaḥ, tenātrecchāvikalpo yuktataraḥ anyatarasiddhāv 
aparasyāvaśyaṃbhāvād iti | tathā ca purāṇopaniṣat - “bhaktiḥ pareśānubhavo viraktir anyatra caitat trika 
ekakālam” ity etad abhisandhāya ca śrīmān stotrāvalīkāraḥ prāvocat -
tvamevātmeśa sarvasya sarvaś cātmani rāgavān |
iti svabhāvasiddhāṃ tvadbhaktiṃ jānañ jayej janaḥ ||
bhaktilakṣmīsamṛddhānāṃ kim anyad upayācitam |
enayā vā daridrāṇāṃ kim anyad upayācitam || iti |
Cf. The Sivastotravali of Utpaladevāchārya with the Sanskrit commentary of Kṣemarāja, ed. Rājānaka Lakṣmaṇa 
(Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1964), 6, 346. On Utpaladeva's Śivastotrāvalī, and the 
commentarial tradition thereon, as addressing the nature of bhakti in the context of nondualist theology, see 
Stainton, “Poetry and Prayer,” 188-210, esp. 210: “For both Utpaladeva and Kṣemarāja, poetry and aesthetics are 
ways of moving beyond the normal, dualistic language and understandings to cultivate an extraordinary 
experience for their audiences grounded in a radical theology of non-dualism.”
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Vedānta was the fourteenth-century poet Līlāśuka Bilvamaṅgala.181 His two stotras, the 
Bilvamaṅgalastava and Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛta, quickly spread through the south, and by the early 
decades of the sixteenth century found their way north to Caitanya and the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas.182 
The epigraph to this chapter, taken from the Bilvamaṅgalastava, suggests Līlāśuka's Advaita 
background. That he was also a Śaiva can reasonably be inferred from his confession in 
Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛta 2.24:
I'm a Śaiva for sure, there's no doubt about it,
devoted to chanting the five-letter name,
and yet my heart dwells on the farmer's wife's boy
whose smiling face blooms like the atasī flower.183
On the vernacular side of things, the poet Ceruśśerī composed his Kṛṣṇagāthā in the fifteenth 
century, “the most extreme example of the medium of Malayalam and the poetics of Sanskrit 
cohabiting the same genre.”184 The Kṛṣṇagāthā was ostensibly an adaptation of the BhP, but 
included the idioms and themes of Malayalam courtesan literature, fusing bhakti with a secular 
eroticism.185 No doubt, when taken together, it was works such as these that set the stage for the 
181 On the date, see Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry, 145. For a more detailed discussion, see Frances Wilson, 
The Love of Krishna: The Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛta of Līlāśuka Bilvamaṅgala (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1975).
182 See Hawley, A Storm of Songs, 210-211.
183 śaivā vayaṃ na khalu tatra vicāraṇīyaṃ
pañcākṣarījapaparā nitarāṃ tathā 'pi |
ceto madīyam atasīkusumāvabhāsaṃ
smerānanaṃ smarati gopavadhūkiśoram ||
Frances Wilson (The Bilvamaṅgalastava, 4-6) suggests that the verses to Śiva in the Bilvamaṅgalastava are part 
of the original collection. In the Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛta, Bilvamaṅgala also invokes his guru Somagiri (1.1) and 
Īśānadeva (1.110), both plainly Śaiva names.
184 Rich Freeman, “Genre and Society: The Literary Culture of Premodern Kerala,” in Literary Cultures in History:  
Reconstructions from South Asia, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 469.
185 Ibid., 469: “This interweaving of bhakti with erotics, encountered readily in the early Manipravalam works but 
notionally not in Pattu or in mainstream late Manipravalam, continues to invite apologies or condemnation from 
contemporary critics. When condemned, the erotics are linked up with the Brahmanical decadence of medieval 
Kerala as a blight in an otherwise fine work. But since the erotic in this case has invaded the heart of Pattu in an 
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more famous Advaitic versions of the BhP in Kerala—most recognizable among which was the 
Nārāyaṇīya by Melputtūr Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in the late sixteenth century.186 Pūrṇasarasvatī's bhakti 
was thus at once northern and southern. If the stotra genre took off in the far reaches of Śaiva 
Kashmir, after its Buddhist and Jain predecessors, it was followed by a profusion of works from 
the south that drew upon their own local resources: Vaiṣṇava neighbors, Vedāntic philosophy, 
and the BhP.
A final insight into the transit of the BhP comes from Pūrṇasarasvatī's own poetry. If the 
Bhaktimandākinī took a relatively sedate, philosophical view of bhakti, Pūrṇasarasvatī exploited 
the erotic motifs of bhakti in his Haṃsasandeśa, a lyric poem in the messenger-genre 
(sandeśakāvya).187 In the Haṃsasandeśa, a lovelorn woman enlists a goose to take a message to 
her faraway lover. Already we see an inversion of the classic sandeśakāvya. Unlike his 
predecessors Kālidāsa (Meghasandeśa) and Vedānta Deśika (Haṃsasandeśa),188 Pūrṇasarasvatī 
overtly devotional work of high stature, other attempts to reconcile the dilemma emerge. A recent analysis, for 
instance, attempts to posit that the erotics are allegorical and bent to the higher and more encompassing purposes 
of bhakti.”
186 The intersection of bhakti and Advaita in Kerala is a topic that would require another chapter entirely, but we 
may make note of two figures close to Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, one a contemporary and the other inspired by his work. 
The first, Devanārāyaṇa, wrote the Vedāntaratnamālā, an Advaita commentary on the first verse of the BhP, and 
the second, Rāmapāṇivāda (18th C.), wrote the Viṣṇuvilāsa, a Sanskrit kāvya with its share of Advaita doctrine 
sprinkled throughout. See S. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, “Vedāntaratnamālā of Devanārāyaṇa,” Journal of the 
Travancore University Oriental Manuscripts Library 4.1 (1948): 1-6. See also Viṣṇuvilāsa of Rāmapāṇivāda, ed. 
P.K. Narayana Pillai (Trivandrum: S.V.G. Press, 1951). On the complex social context of bhakti literature in 
Kerala, expressed differently across caste communities and linguistic registers, see Freeman, “Genre and 
Society,” 479-484. Of particular interest is Pūntānam Nampūtiri, a Brahmin who translated the Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛta 
into Malayalam at the behest of his non-Brahmin friend, and whose Jñānappāna was “an independent treatise 
that casts an advaita and bhakti fusion into the simple song-form of the pāna chant” (Ibid., 483-484).
187 The Hamsasandeśa, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī (Trivandrum: Superintendent, Government Press, 1937). On the 
genre of sandeśakāvya in Kerala, see Freeman, “Genre and Society,” 469-475.
188 Cf. Yigal Bronner and David Shulman, “'A Cloud Turned Goose': Sanskrit in the Vernacular Millennium,” The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review 43.1 (2006): 1-30.
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chooses a female narrator.189 At first we only know that she is longing anxiously 
(raṇaraṇakataḥ)190 for a certain hardhearted faraway lover,191 but in the tenth verse we discover 
that he is none other than Kṛṣṇa, scion of the Vṛṣṇis. The forlorn woman, a typical representative 
of Friedhelm Hardy's viraha-bhakti, love-in-separation, then guides the goose through “all of the 
places my lover has loved.”192 The route begins in Kāñcīpuram, which, according to Dennis 
Hudson, was the home of the BhP. The goose then glides over several Tamil Vaiṣṇava hotspots: 
Śrīraṅgam, site of the famous Raṅganātha temple, the Kāverī and Tāmraparṇī rivers, and even 
Ālvār Tirunagari, home of the poet-saint Nammālvār. Here, Pūrṇasarasvatī invokes the memory 
of Nammālvār and his Tiruvāymoli:
189 This may be a result of the courtesan-centered Manipravalam literature of Kerala. See Freeman, “Genre and 
Society,” 470-471: “In certain formal properties, the two surviving Manipravalam messenger-poems seem 
clearly to aspire to the established Sanskrit prototype....In much of their thematic matter and its treatment, 
however, they might just as readily appear as a further development of the accicaritams. These, it will be 
recalled, are the earliest metrically mixed works (campu) in Manipravalam and, like the Kerala sandeśakāvyas, 
are ostensibly in praise of courtesan-dancers. The accicaritams’ mode of setting out a kind of amorous traveler’s 
descriptive account anticipates in many particulars the principal thematics of the Manipravalam messenger-
poem: roving over the landscape and social locales of markets, palaces, and temples to eventually arrive at the 
heroine’s house; the subsequent description of the heroine, her attributes, and abode; as well as the erotic 
sentiments that saturate these descriptions.”
190 Pūrṇasarasvatī seems to have drawn this relatively rare term directly from his favorite Bhavabhūti. We encounter 
it in both Mālatīmādhava 1.44c (raṇaraṇakavivṛddhiṃ bibhrad āvartamānam) and in the prose before 
Uttararāmacarita 1.39 (seyam eva raṇaraṇakadāyinī...virahabhāvanā). See The Mālatīmādhava of Bhavabhūti, 
ed. M.R. Telang, rev. ed. V.L.S. Pansikar (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1936), 47. See also The Uttararāmacharita 
of Bhavabhūti, 41.
191 The Hamsasandeśa, 1:
kācit kāntā virahaśikhinā kāminī kāmataptā
nirdhyāyantī kam api dayitaṃ nirdayaṃ dūrasaṃstham |
bhūyo bhūyo raṇaraṇakataḥ puṣpavāṭīṃ bhramantī
līlāvāpīkamalapathikaṃ rājahaṃsaṃ dadarśa || 1 ||
192 Ibid., 3:
prāṇāḥ prācāṃ nigamavacasāṃ prāṇanātho ramāyās
trāṇāyoccais tapasi caratāṃ vṛṣṇivaṃśe 'vatīrṇaḥ |
yasmin yasmin sa khalu ramate vallabho me pradeśe
taṃ taṃ citte varaguṇa mayā kathyamānaṃ nidadhyāḥ || 10 ||
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Bow down your head to
that image of Murāri—
we call him Śaṭhakopan—
who made manifest scripture's sense,
that water we delight in,
by wreathing it in words
that belong to Tamil lands,
and who here relieves
for all his lovers
the pain of life-experience.193
After a considerable detour through Kerala, during which he visits the temples at 
Trivandrum and Trichambaram, the goose goes directly to his final destination, none other than 
Brindavan. The message he delivers to Kṛṣṇa locates the distress of his mistress in that particular 
narrative landscape created by the BhP. It brings up the BhP's favorite stories: the felling of the 
two Arjuna trees, the lifting of Mount Govardhana, and Kṛṣṇa's dalliances with the young 
women of the village Braj. At this point, in the goose's telling, the heroine daydreams that her 
divine lover briefly appears and tries to go in for an embrace, only to find her arms firmly 
crossed over her breasts, and her eyes crimson, rimmed with tears. “Your chest is splashed with 
saffron from all those gopīs' breasts,” she admonishes him. “Don't let it get pale by rubbing up 
against mine.”194 The tone of intimacy, withdrawal, and intense longing that charaterizes bhakti 
poetry for Kṛṣṇa in all languages comes to a stirring conclusion:
193 Ibid., 5:
āviścakre nigamavacasām artham ānandatīrthaṃ
yā saṃgranthya dramiḍadharaṇībhāṣayā bhūṣayeva |
tāṃ bhaktānāṃ bhavapariṇataṃ tāpam atroddharantīṃ
mūrtiṃ mūrdhnā vinama śaṭhakopābhidhānāṃ murāreḥ || 22 ||
194 Ibid., 16:
saṃkalpais tvāṃ kṣaṇam upagataṃ satvarāśleṣalolaṃ
raktāpāṅgī stanakṛtabhujasvastikā sāsram āha |
gopastrīṇāṃ kucaparicitaiḥ kuṅkumair aṅkitaṃ te
vakṣo mā bhūt kucaviluṭhanair luptaśobhaṃ mameti || 85 ||
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You know how when dark Draupadī,
dragged about by dastardly devils
in that great hall, called out in duress:
“Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa, KṚṢṆA!!”
it reached your ears so far away—
Well I find it strange that
you can't seem to hear
the cries of this woman
when you're sitting in her heart.195
And so we end up where we began, from the Tamil Ālvārs to the Sanskrit BhP, and from 
the South to Brindavan, but through a very different route from the one we generally take. On 
this less-traveled road we find strange, many-headed creatures: Śaiva Vaiṣṇavas, Advaitic 
devotees, easterners from the west and southerners from the north. If they seem fantastic and 
mysterious and inexplicable, perhaps it's because we've been asking the wrong questions, 
looking in the wrong places. For all of his considerable erudition, Friedhelm Hardy was 
disappointingly general when it came to the medieval history of the BhP. Except for one brilliant 
article on the ascetic Mādhavendra Purī, a possible link between South Indian bhakti and Bengali 
Vaiṣṇavism,196 Hardy repeated what has become a conventional understanding of the bhakti 
movement, associating the proliferation of Vaiṣṇava traditions of Vedānta with structural 
similarities between vernacular bhakti poets.197 He was creative enough to imagine that the initial 
shift of bhakti from north to south could have been inaugurated by “bards narrating to local 
195 Ibid., 19:
kṛtsnadviṣṭaiḥ kurubhir adhamaiḥ kṛṣyamāṇā sabhāyāṃ
kṛcchrasthā yad vyalapad abalā kṛṣṇa kṛṣṇeti kṛṣṇā |
tat te dūrāṃ śravaṇapadavīṃ yātam etat tu citraṃ
cittastho 'pi pralapitagiraṃ yan na tasyāḥ śṛṇoṣi || 98 ||
196 Friedhelm Hardy, “Mādhavendra Purī: A Link Between Bengal Vaiṣṇavism and South Indian Bhakti,” Journal of  
the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britian and Ireland 1 (1974): 23-41.
197 Hardy, Viraha-Bhakti, 556ff.
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chieftains the exploits of Kṛṣṇa, travellers bringing back with them some poems about the gopīs, 
or Vaiṣṇava brahmins practising [sic] in their agrahāra...the bhakti-yoga of the Gītā.”198 If he had 
spent the time (or, alas, lived long enough) to follow bhakti's movement from south to north, he 
might have come to similar insights. But his absence, like the afterlife of the BhP, leaves a gap in 
history that is difficult to fill.
In this chapter, I have tried to situate the BhP at the crossroads of a number of intellectual 
currents that are often at odds in the historiography of Indian religion and philosophy: Śaivism 
and Vaiṣṇavism, bhakti and Advaita Vedānta. I offer a brief overview of the material, literary, and 
philosophical cultures of particular regions that may illuminate the path of the BhP after the time 
of its initial composition. But how did particular systematic forms of Sanskrit thought, the 
knowledge-systems of Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, at their core hostile to the very idea of 
devotion to an embodied god, come to reconcile themselves to it? How did the BhP become 
instrumental to this process? Who were the agents that carried it out? Were they more interested 
in reconciliation or revolution? The following chapter studies the BhP's meteoric rise to 
prominence through the intellectual history of a single text, the Bhagavannāmakaumudī, that 
changed the way premodern scholars would come to think about the authority and power of the 
BhP. That the Bhagavannāmakaumudī also influenced a wide range of scholarly and religious 
communities, who did not always intersect or indeed see eye-to-eye, further highlights the need 
to study the BhP and its text traditions from unlikely angles. Therein lies the promise of writing 
histories in the plural.
198 Ibid., 119.
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Chapter 3: Mīmāṃsā in the Moonlight
Not everything is good just because it's “purāṇa.”
-Kālidāsa, Mālavikāgnimitra, 1.2a199
O mind, praise the name of Rāma.
-T. Shankara Iyer, rāma nāmame tudi
The  Bhagavannāmakaumudī   in Context 
In the previous chapter, we explored some possible explanations for the relative silence 
surrounding the transmission of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (BhP) in the few centuries after its 
composition. We also tried to chart the geography of its initial effloresence, in the commentarial 
work of Śrīdhara Svāmin in Orissa and in the writings of Hemādri and Vopadeva in Maharashtra. 
One of the BhP's most enduring legacies was its relationship with devotional bhakti poetry in 
both Sanskrit and vernacular languages. In addition to a common set of narrative episodes, many 
of these poems and songs shared a constant refrain: The name of God is all-powerful.200 Scholars 
such as V. Raghavan, writing in the heyday of Indian independence, suggested that the presence 
of this motif across Sanskrit praise-poetry, Marathi abhangs, Hindi pads, and Telugu Carnatic 
music proved that the “bhakti movement” was a cultural phenomenon that presciently mapped 
the nascent nation-state.201 In a famous essay delivered as the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel memorial 
lecture in 1966, Raghavan described bhakti saints and singers as the “great integrators” of India, 
199 The Mālavikāgnimitra of Kālidāsa, ed. Kāśīnāth Pāṇḍurang Parab, rev. V.L.S. Paṇśīkar (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 
1924), 3: purāṇam ity eva na sādhu sarvaṃ
200 An entire volume of the Journal of Vaishnava Studies (2.2, 1994) was dedicated to studies on the name across 
Indian religious and philosophical traditions.
201 See John Stratton Hawley, A Storm of Songs: India and the Idea of the Bhakti Movement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 19-28.
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who bridged the gap between elite theology and popular religion. And in other complementary 
essays, he developed the idea of a Nāmasiddhānta, an India-wide tradition of scholarship and 
song which fused the theory and practice of singing the name of God.202 Raghavan thought that 
the Nāmasiddhānta was inherently capacious, mirroring the Indian nation-state itself, with room 
for every scholarly antinomy: abstract philosophy and popular practice, Sanskrit and the 
vernacular, jñāna and bhakti. No doubt he overreached, and suppressed the caste- and class-
bound character of the traditions he believed to be universal.203 Raghavan was, in the end, a 
creative participant in a living tradition, steeped in those Smārta sensibilities that profess to 
include even when they implicitly exclude.
This chapter revisits the idea of the Nāmasiddhānta by exploring the plural histories of 
one of its earliest expositions: The Bhagavannāmakaumudī (BNK), or “Moonlight of God's 
Name.”204 The BNK has thus far been studied only piecemeal. Scholars have briefly discussed its 
incipient formulations of the aesthetic theory of bhaktirasa,205 its impact on Gauḍīya (Bengali) 
Vaiṣṇavism,206 and its legacy in the Tamil South.207 I will also elaborate on these insights in this 
chapter. Largely ignored, however, is the text's own primary concern: to defend the ultimate 
202 See V. Raghavan, The Power of the Sacred Name (Bloomington: World Wisdom Press, 2011).
203 See Davesh Soneji, “The Powers of Polyglossia: Marathi Kīrtan, Multilingualism, and the Making of a South 
Indian Devotional Tradition,” International Journal of Hindu Studies 17.3 (2014): 342: “In other words, what 
most Smārta Brahmin practitioners of bhajana, and certainly Singer and Raghavan, would see as the ingenuity of 
Tamil Brahmins as 'preservers' of pan-Indian traditions, I would argue, cannot be disassociated from the 
historical roles offered to local Smārtas, but also to others, at the Tanjore court as intellectuals, musicians, and 
performers of drama and dance in a culture of public multilingualism.”
204 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, ed. Gosvāmī Dāmodar Śāstrī (Kāśī: Acyutagranthamālā, 1927).
205 Neal Delmonico, “Sacred Rapture: A Study of the Religious Aesthetic of Rupa Gosvamin” (PhD diss., University 
of Chicago, 1990), 176-183.
206 Mans Broo, “The Vrindāvan Gosvāmins on Kīrtana,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 17.2 (2009): 63-64.
207 Raghavan, The Power of the Sacred Name, 49-55.
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validity of purāṇic utterances in the official language of Sanskrit scriptural hermeneutics, or 
Mīmāṃsā. The BNK represents a serious scholastic attempt to accord the genre of purāṇa—
specifically, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa—a superlative place in the hierarchy of Sanskrit scripture. In 
itself, the BNK thus makes an extremely important yet unrecognized intervention in Sanskrit 
intellectual history. Its reception history is no less significant. At roughly contemporaneous 
moments in the sixteenth-century Doab, both Advaita Vedāntins and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, 
generally depicted in hagiographical literature as intractably opposed, laid claim to the BNK as a 
source of theological inspiration. And only a century or so later, the BNK made its way back 
down to South India, where the musical-performative tradition known as the bhajana 
sampradāya began to take shape during the rule of the Thanjavur Marathas. In the latter part of 
this chapter, I look at the diverse reception history of the BNK for what it may reveal about the 
local, fragmented character of a text tradition valorized for its universality.
The identity of Lakṣmīdhara, author of the BNK, is still an open question.208 The best 
historical guess places him around the turn of the fifteenth century, assuming that he is also the 
author of the Advaitamakaranda, a popular work that expresses the classical doctrines of Advaita 
Vedānta in twenty-eight verses.209 The Advaitamakaranda was quoted by Brahmānanda Bhāratī, 
who probably lived toward the end of the fifteenth century, in his commentary on Bhāratītīrtha's 
Dṛgdṛśyaviveka. Both the Advaitamakaranda and Bhagavannāmakaumudī also make reference 
to Lakṣmīdhara's teacher, Anantānanda.210 There is also a verse in a manuscript of the BNK in the 
208 See T.M.P. Mahadevan, ed., Preceptors of Advaita (Secunderabad: Sri Kanchi Kamakoti Sankara Mandir, 1968), 
201-205; Srikantha Sastri, “Advaitācāryas of the 12th and 13th Centuries,” Indian Historical Quarterly XIV 
(1938): 401-405.
209 Advaitamakaranda, ed. R. Krishnaswami Sastri (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1926). 
210 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 2:
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Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library (probably added later) which claims that Lakṣmīdhara was 
author of three works: the BNK, the Advaitamakaranda, and the Amṛtataraṅgiṇī, an incomplete 
and still-unedited commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.211
Geographically speaking, Lakṣmīdhara was probably a native of Orissa.212 There exists in 
the Śaṅkara maṭha at Puri an unpublished commentary on the Advaitamakaranda by Vāsudeva 
Sārvabhauma,213 a famous scholar of Navya Nyāya who was later claimed by Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava 
hagiographers as a convert to Caitanya's movement.214 Moreover, it seems clear that Lakṣmīdhara 
yatpādapdmanakhakāntitaraṅgajīryaj-
jambālajāṅghikadhiyāṃ na dhiyām abhūmiḥ |
niḥsīmasaukhyajaladhir jayatād anantaḥ
so 'smadgurur jagadanugrahajāgarūkaḥ ||6||
Ibid., 6-7, where Lakṣmīdhara equates his teacher, Anantānanda “Raghunātha,” with Rāma the “Lord of 
Raghus,” absorption in whose name is the purpose of the inquiry conducted in the BNK: asya vicārasya 
sakalaśrutismṛtītihāsapurāṇāgamārthasatattvasandehasandohalatālavitracaraṇanakhacandrikā'ñcalasya 
śrīmadanantānandaraghunāthasya karuṇākādambinīmuktasūktisudhoddhārāsāraiḥ 
smṛtipurāṇavacanavirodhābhāsabhāvitanitāntamasṛṇaśaṅkāpaṅkaprakṣālanena tasyaiva raghurājaśiromaṇeḥ 
sarvataḥ prasṛmaraparamakāruṇyasudhā'rṇavasya niraṅkuśamahimadhāmani śrīrāmanāmani svacetasaḥ 
samādhānam eva prayojanaṃ |
Cf. Advaitamakaranda, 2:
kaṭākṣakiraṇācāntanamanmohābdhaye namaḥ |
anantānandakṛṣṇāya jaganmaṅgalamūrtaye || 1 ||
211 See Mahadevan, Preceptors of Advaita, 201.
212 In the opening verse of the BNK, Lakṣmīdhara invokes the god who is “beloved of Puṇḍarīka” (puṇḍarīkapriya). 
At first I believed this was a reference to the Puṇḍalīk remembered as the devotee of Vitthal. However, R.C. 
Dhere showed that the name “Puṇḍarīk” or “Puṇḍalīk” occurs frequently in lists of Viṣṇu devotees in the 
purāṇas. See R.C. Dhere, Rise of a Folk God: Vitthal of Pandharpur, trans. Anne Feldhaus (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 151. One such Puṇḍarīka shows up in the “Glory of Jagannāth” section of the Skanda 
Purāṇa, in which he and his friend Ambarīṣa lead dissolute lives until they reach Jagannāth at Puri, sing the 
names of Viṣṇu, and attain liberation there. Dhere (Ibid., 156) comments: “No matter how far someone has 
fallen...still he can be saved just by repeating the name of Viṣṇu: this is the truth that the Māhātmya reveals 
through this story of the salvation of Puṇḍarīk and Ambarīṣ.” The all-purifying power of God's name is the most 
central claim of Lakṣmīdhara's BNK.
213 See Rajendralal Mitra, Notices of Sanskrit Mss. Vol. VIII. (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1886), 291-292.
214 See D.C. Bhattacharya, “Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma,” Indian Historical Quarterly XVI (1940): 58-69; S.K. De, 
Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961), 
xxiii-xxv, 85-90; Edward Dimock and Tony K. Stewart, The Caitanya Caritāmṛta of Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 16; Jonardon Ganeri, The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in  
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bore some relationship to Śrīdhara Svāmin, the equally elusive author of the Bhāvārthadīpikā 
commentary on the BhP. First, much of the first chapter of the BNK can be considered an 
elaboration of Śrīdhara's brief and scattered comments on the power of the divine name into a 
full-fledged theology. Second, whether or not the two are cut from the same cloth, their 
intellectual engagement with Advaita Vedānta is clearly mediated by the BhP, whose 
philosophical connection to “classical” scholastic Advaita, as I explained the previous chapter, is 
still tenuous. And finally, both Śrīdhara and Lakṣmīdhara make repeated reference to the god 
Nṛsiṃha, whose transition into the deity Jagannāth of Puri has been well-documented.215
 Lakṣmīdhara's autobiographical notes also suggest the specter of Śaivism. Although his 
devotion largely centers on the Kṛṣṇa of the BhP, like Śrīdhara he does not exhibit sectarian 
preferences. In a verse at the end of the BNK, Lakṣmīdhara describes his teacher as a 
representative of the unity between Śiva and Viṣṇu:
He who, diving into the oceanic glory
of the water spraying from
his own lotus feet,
then himself placed it atop his head:
he is my guru, my family deity.216
The image here is of the river Gaṅgā, who flows from the feet of Viṣṇu onto the head of the 
waiting Śiva. Only the two are a single entity, the author's family deity (kuladaivata), recalling 
Early Modern India 1450-1700 CE (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 42-44.
215 See Anncharlott Eschmann et al., “The Formation of the Jagannātha Triad,” in The Cult of Jagannāth and the  
Regional Tradition of Orissa, eds. Annemarie Eschmann et al. (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1978), 167-
196. Also see Sara Adams, “From Narasiṃha to Jagannātha,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 17.1 (2008): 5-28.
216 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 135:
svapādapaṅkeruhasīkarasya
nimajya māhātmyamahārṇave yaḥ |
dadhau punas taṃ svayam eva maulau
sa no gurus tat kuladaivataṃ naḥ ||
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the Śaiva-Vaiṣṇava continuum of the previous chapter. Elsewhere in the BNK, Lakṣmīdhara 
quotes a verse from the Śivadharmottara (1.40), an influential text of Śaiva teaching 
(śivaśāsana), in support of a claim that one must have “faith” (śraddhā) in the words of scripture 
for it to be effective.217 Furthermore, Lakṣmīdhara takes great pains in the BNK to emphasize the 
equivalence of the two gods. In one passage on the aesthetics of religious devotion (bhaktirasa), 
he uses the technical language of Sanskrit poetics to suggest that the “foundational” and 
“stimulant” factors (ālambana- and uddīpanavibhāva) of a devotee's rasa could be either Viṣṇu 
or Śiva.218 The use of the language of Sanskrit aesthetics here obviously puts one in mind of the 
previous chapter's theorists of the intersection between bhakti and rasa: Hemādri, Śrīdhara 
Svāmin (partly), and Pūrṇasarasvatī. It appears that Pūrṇasarasvatī knew of the Amṛtataraṅgiṇī 
commentary on the BhP (11.3.11) attributed to Lakṣmīdhara.219 Whether it is the same work is 
nearly impossible to determine, since surviving manuscripts only contain the commentary up to 
the third canto. In two such manuscripts, however, the author has a Śaiva renunciate name 
reminiscent of Pūrṇasarasvatī's—Jñānapūrṇa Yati, whose family guru, Anantānanda, is the same 
as Lakṣmīdhara's.220 Further corroboration of the identity of Lakṣmīdhara with Jñānapūrṇa awaits 
217 See Ibid., 72: iti śraddhāhīnasya sarvatrānadhikāraṃ darśayati | śivadharmottare 'pi […] iti 
guṇavādanirākaraṇena śivaśāsaneṣu śraddhām utpādayan śraddhāvato 'dhikāraṃ darśayati |
218 Ibid., 80: tasya ca ālambanavibhāvo […] bhagavān ananto vā manāgavalokanakharvīkṛtamadanagarvo 
mugdhamṛgalāñchanaśekharaḥ śaṅkaro vā […] Cf. Delmonico, “Sacred Rapture,” 176-183.
219 See N.V.P. Unithiri et al., eds., The Bhaktimandākinī: An Elaborate Fourteenth-Century Commentary by  
Pūrṇasarasvatī on the Viṣṇupādādikeśastotra Attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. École française d’Extrême-Orient, 
Collection Indologie 118 (Pondicherry: Institut français de Pondichéry, 2011), 26: “dhārābhir hastihastābhiḥ” ity 
atra, amṛtataraṅgiṇīkārais tathā vyākhyātatvāt |
220 See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, ed. A Triennial Catalogue of Manuscripts Collected for the Government Oriental  
Manuscripts Library, Madras, Vol. 3C (Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1922), 4009. See also S.S. 
Saith, ed., Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Panjab University Library, Lahore: Vol. II (Lahore: 
University of the Panjab, 1941), 139.
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the collation of the four surviving partial manuscripts of the Amṛtataraṅgiṇī.221
Not all Śaivas, however, took part so readily in the pluralistic ethos offered in the BNK. 
Take, for example, the polemic of Lakṣmīdhara's rough contemporary Gopīnātha, a 
Maharashtrian scholar of dharmaśāstra, who had clear affinities for Śaiva theology.222 As 
Rosalind O'Hanlon has recently discussed, in his influential Jātiviveka, a discourse on classifying 
caste communities, Gopīnātha speaks contemptuously of those who practice precisely the sort of 
bhakti which Lakṣmīdhara advocates in the BNK:
Gopīnātha also demonstrated marked hostility to bhakti religion, ascribing menial 
parentages to ‘Vaiṣṇavas’. [...] Such ‘Vaiṣṇavas’ were lower than Śūdras. [...] They 
deluded themselves that repeating the name of God was the summit of virtue and a 
substitute for following their own prescribed place in the social order. Citing the 
Viṣṇupurāṇa, he asserted: ‘Those who abandon their karma and just recite “Kṛṣṇa, 
Kṛṣṇa!” are sinners in the eyes of Hari. The birth of Hari is for the sake of dharma. If you 
follow your varṇa, āśrama, and the prescribed conduct, you actually worship Viṣṇu, the 
Highest Man. There is no other way to satiate Him’.223
In this passage, Gopīnātha was probably responding to the popularity of Vārkari devotion to 
Viṭṭhal in the Maratha country, primarily the prerogative of subaltern caste groups. But it is also 
possible that Gopīnātha knew of Lakṣmīdhara's own writing on the topic of religious practices 
that emphasized the repetition of God's name. Whatever their relationship may have been, the 
discrepancy between their attitudes to bhakti shows that there was a wide spectrum of Śaivas in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some who rejected and some who accommodated the texts 
221 See V. Raghavan, ed., New Catalogus Catalogorum, Volume 1, Revised Edition (Madras: University of Madras, 
1968), 347.
222 See Rosalind O'Hanlon, et al., “Discourses of Caste over the Longue Durée: Gopīnātha and Social Classification 
in India, ca. 1400-1900,” South Asian History and Culture 6.1 (2015): 103: “He was a traditional Smārta 
Brahman, from a Śaivite scholar family, in which Kashmiri Śaivite influences were strong. In Sanderson’s terms, 
Gopīnātha seems not to have been an initiate into a particular Śaivite sect, but rather to have worshipped Śiva 
within a broad framework of Vedic ritual and Smārta attachment to the principles of varṇāśramadharma, the 
orders of castes and life-stages.”
223 Ibid., 111.
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and practices of Vaiṣṇava devotional groups (divided by caste and class) in the name of 
Vaiṣṇavism itself.
Perhaps more interesting than the philosophical or theological impulses “behind” 
Lakṣmīdhara's work is what he is doing in writing the BNK. Most importantly, he places the BhP 
firmly within the canon of Sanskrit scripture, using the language of Vedic ritual and 
philosophical hermeneutics to privilege the BhP more strongly than his predecessors. And in the 
very same motion, he opens a space for non-Vedic, non-Sanskrit, popular devotional practices, to 
puncture the forbidding world of scriptural exegesis. He writes approvingly of lyrics (gāthā) that 
are composed in Prakrit (prākṛtabhāṣā)224 and suggests that one might fulfill the goals of human 
life by praising God with “Vedic, Tantric, or Purāṇic mantras, or ones of human composition” 
(śrautais tāntrikaiḥ paurāṇikaiḥ pauruṣeyair vā...mantraiḥ); there is no rule, he says, that defines 
how one should praise God.225 It is quite likely the BNK's location at these multiple intersections
—the elite and the everyday, the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava—that contributed to its later impact on a 
224 Cf. Sheldon Pollock, “Sanskrit Literary Culture from the Inside Out,” in Literary Cultures in History:  
Reconstructions from South Asia, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 63: “The 
word itself, according to the standard interpretation, refers to the 'common' or 'natural' dialect(s) of which 
Sanskrit represents the grammatically disciplined variety. But in fact it typically connotes a literary language and 
only very rarely is used to mean spoken vernaculars (the usual term for these was bhāṣā, speech).”
225 See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 101, commenting on BhP 6.3.27: pavitrabhūtā gāthā yeṣāṃ lakṣaṇāpetam api 
yannāmāṅkitaṃ padyaṃ vā prākṛtabhāṣāracitaṃ vā teṣāṃ pūtatve katamaḥ sandeha iti |
See Ibid., 124, commenting on Ṛg Veda 1.156.3: stotāraḥ śrautais tāntrikaiḥ paurāṇikaiḥ pauruṣeyair vā 
studhvam iti vipariṇāmaḥ | vipariṇāmaḥ, na caivam eva stotavyam iti kaścid asti niyamaḥ, yathā vida yathā 
jānītha tathā studhvaṃ mantraiḥ studhvam iti bhāvaḥ |
Cf. R.C. Hazra, “The Śiva-dharmottara,” Purāṇa 27.1 (1985): 186: “The Śiva-dharmottara allows the Śaiva 
teachers to use Sanskrit, Prakrit or any of the local dialects as a medium of religious instruction.” See Ibid., 186, 
n.13:
saṃskṛtair prākṛtair vākyair yaḥ śiṣyam anurūpataḥ |
deśabhāṣādyupāyaiś ca bodhayet sa guruḥ smṛtaḥ ||
He is a guru who instructs his student accordingly
by means of Sanskrit or Prakrit or local languages.
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diverse group of scholars and sermonizers. Before attending to its reception history, however, I 
will elaborate on the BNK's intervention in the world of Sanskrit scriptural hermeneutics. In 
order to do so, I reconstruct the relevant hermeneutical concepts of the BNK's primary 
intellectual language: Mīmāṃsā.
A Tale of Two  Smṛtis  
Among all the schools of Brahmanical thought, Mīmāṃsā instituted some of the strictest 
criteria for what scripture could be accepted as normative. This was because the problem of 
scriptural proliferation—that is, the vast array of Indic text traditions that presented themselves 
as valid sources of authoritative knowledge—bore directly on the unique authority of the Veda as 
the source of religious knowledge and practice. The Mīmāṃsā argument for a scripture's ultimate 
validity (prāmāṇya) runs briefly as follows: First, a text cannot have an author, human or divine, 
for embodied beings lie all the time, and there is no such thing as omniscience or supernatural 
perception;226 second, the text cannot refer to historical realities, for that would imply personal 
authorship; and third, it cannot have a discernible beginning, for that would imply historical 
contingency.227 By this account, only the directly perceived, eternal, unauthored Veda (śruti) 
qualifies as authoritative. All other texts in the Brahmanical corpus can only possess, at best, a 
derivative authority. Even the genre of smṛti, from which most Brahmanical cultural practices 
226 On the Mīmāṃsā rejection of yogic perception, see Lawrence McCrea, “'Just Like Us, Just Like Now': The 
Tactical Implications of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception,” in Yogic Perception, Meditation, and 
Altered States of Consciousness, ed. Eli Franco (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 2009), 55-70.
227 Ibid., 61, n.9: “Eternal texts, the Mīmāṃsakas argue, cannot refer to particular historical persons or events. Those 
passages in eternal texts which appear to refer to such persons and events must be understood as figuratively 
praising or otherwise referring to elements of the (eternally recurrent) Vedic sacrifice—what the Mīmāṃsakas 
call arthavāda. Hence, any apparent reference in a purportedly eternal text to the omniscience of a particular 
scripture-author would either have to be an arthavāda passage (and accordingly be interpreted figuratively), or, 
as a historical reference, would show that the text is not in fact eternal.”
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were drawn, is usually allocated a place below śruti in the Mīmāṃsā hierarchy of Sanskrit 
scripture. The genre of smṛti was generally comprised of the epics (itihāsa), treatises on ethics 
and law (dharmaśāstra), and ancient myths and legends (purāṇa). For many early Mīmāṃsakas, 
the epics and purāṇas were understood to form a single unit, called “itihāsapurāṇa.” Sheldon 
Pollock has demonstrated the “transcendent legitimacy” constructed around the smṛti by the 
Mīmāṃsā tradition, such that smṛti, qua “remembered Veda” (smaryamāṇa-veda), was accorded 
a level of authority almost equivalent to that of śruti, qua “recited Veda” (paṭhyamāna-veda).228 
Nevertheless, Mīmāṃsakas disqualified most texts—especially those that belonged to Buddhists, 
Jains, and Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava sectarian groups—from occupying the same level of normative 
validity.229 However, the entry of the genre of purāṇa—in particular, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa—into 
this exegetical fray prompted a radical re-appraisal within Mīmāṃsā circles of the śruti-smṛti 
continuum. In order to fully appreciate the break effected by the BNK here, it is worth reviewing 
the history of how Mīmāṃsakas prior to Lakṣmīdhara understood the purāṇa in general.
The earliest extant Mīmāṃsā writers, Jaimini and Śabara, do not appear particularly 
interested in the subject. In Jaimini's aphoristic Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (MS), and Śabara's prose 
commentary (Bhāṣya) thereon, the primary concern is with delimiting the boundary of śruti 
against smṛti. They assert that we may infer the authority of the cultural practices of smṛti only 
insofar as they: a) have the Veda as their root (śabdamūla), and b) are performed by the same 
agents as those who perform Vedic acts (kartṛsāmānya).230 Neither makes mention of the 
228 See Sheldon Pollock, “The Revelation of Tradition: śruti, smṛti, and the Sanskrit Discourse of Power,” in 
Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South Asia, ed. Federico Squarcini (London: Anthem 
Press, 2011), 41-61.
229 See Andrew Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 170.
230 The so-called smṛtyadhikaraṇa of MS 1.3 is analyzed in Pollock, “The Revelation of Tradition,” 47ff. Pollock 
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purāṇas at all, perhaps because of their relative unimportance (or indeed absence) at the time of 
the composition of the MS and Śabara's Bhāṣya. Sheldon Pollock shows that the seventh-century 
commentator Kumārila Bhaṭṭa expands the scope and power of smṛti so as to virtually eliminate 
any possible limiting conditions that might hinder its authority.231 One of these possible 
conditions, the potentially infinite enlargment of the canon of texts that one could reasonably 
infer to be authoritative, leads Kumārila to reflect on the genre of itihāsapurāṇa.232
In his Tantravārttika commentary on MS 1.3.7, Kumārila engages with an opponent who 
asks why Buddhist or Jain teachings about compassion, charity, or the practice of meditation, 
which appear unobjectionable to the learned of the three upper caste-classes (śiṣṭākopa), should 
be considered contradictory to Vedic authority. Kumārila responds by defining those texts that 
have been “accepted by the learned” (śiṣṭaiḥ parigṛhītāni) as the fourteen or eighteen 
“strongholds of knowledge” (vidyāsthānāni), among which the itihāsapurāṇa feature, but not 
Buddhist or Jain scriptures.233 Kumārila explains further that the itihāsapurāṇa, although of 
human authorship (kṛtrima), are mentioned in the Veda itself as a source of knowledge 
(Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.1). The Upaniṣad's mention of itihāsapurāṇa as the “fifth” Veda means 
provides the following clarifying note on the concept of kartṛsāmānya: “Insofar as the same people who perform 
the acts of dharma required by the Veda also perform acts of dharma 'not based on sacred word', we must 
assume that the authority for these other actions is conferred, not by directly perceptible Vedic texts, but by texts 
inferentially proven to exist” (Ibid., 48).
231 Ibid., 53ff.
232 Kumārila probably did not have any specific purāṇa in mind, given that the formula encompasses a whole range 
of texts from fictitious prose to royal genealogies to didactic discourses. P.V. Kane notes that his remarks across 
the Tantravārttika suggest that some of the extant Purāṇas existed in his day and “were looked upon by him as 
authoritative in the province of Dharma equally with the Smrtis of Manu, Gautama and others.” See P.V. Kane, 
“The Tantravārtika and the Dharmaśāstra Literature,” Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 
(N.S.) Vol. 1 (1925): 102. 
233 Cf. Cezary Galewicz, “Fourteen Strongholds of Knowledge: On Scholarly Commentaries, Authority, and Power 
in XIV Century India,” in Texts of Power, The Power of the Text: Readings in Textual Authority Across History  
and Cultures, ed. Cezary Galewicz (Krakow: Homini, 2006), 141-164.
79
only that they serve as auxiliary means of arriving at the knowledge of dharma. Moreover, this is 
possible for the purāṇas and other vidyāsthānas only because their authors are the very sages 
named in the Veda, who are not historical figures but recur eternally with each historical cycle.234 
In other words, the purāṇas are not independent with respect to dharma, but are accepted as 
canonical only inasmuch as they support Vedic commands. In these and other passages, Kumārila 
does not appear to consider the genre to be especially different from smṛti. His commentary on 
MS 1.3.2 suggests that the injunctive and explanatory portions of the itihāsapurāṇa work in the 
same way as those of smṛti. Those that have a bearing on dharma originate in the Veda; those 
that do not, and, say, serve some worldly purpose, originate in everyday experience.235 Either 
way, they are derivative of and subordinate to the Veda.
Kumārila's only other discussion of the purpose of purāṇas appears, tellingly, in his 
commentary on MS 1.2.7. This section deliberates on the difference between linguistic 
components of the Veda—in particular, between the vidhi, an independently authoritative 
injunction, and arthavāda, a particular kind of sentence, possessing a narrative or descriptive 
form, which is purposeful only in a subordinate position to the overall Vedic ritual context, 
insofar as it serves to enhance or commend a vidhi. Since they are not direct exhortations, 
arthavādas, or “descriptions of the purpose,” are considered supplementary sources of praise or 
234 Mīmāṃsādarśana Vol. 1B, ed. V.G. Apte (Pune: Anandashrama Press, 1929), 202, ll.21-26:
itihāsapurāṇaṃ ca kṛtrimatvena niścite |
tathā 'py akṛtrime vede tadvidyātvena sammatam ||
evaṃ hy upaniṣatsūktam: “ṛgvedaṃ bhagavo 'dhyemi yajurvedaṃ sāmavedam atharvavedaṃ caturtham 
itihāsapurāṇaṃ ca pañcamam” iti | tena 
pratikalpamanvantarayuganiyatanityarṣināmābhidheyakṛtrimavidyāsthānakārā ye vede 'pi mantrārthavādeṣu 
śrūyante tatpraṇītāny eva vidyāsthānāni dharmajñānāṅgatvena saṃmatāni |
235 Ganganath Jha, trans., Tantravārttika (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1983), 119.
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deprecation of the content of injunctions and prohibitions, respectively. Quite simply, they ensure 
that the listener will be encouraged, or incited, or prompted (prarocita) to perform or desist from 
the action specified by the injunction or prohibition. In Śabara's Bhāṣya, an opponent argues that 
the vidhi could serve quite well in and of itself to incite the agent to action, making the function 
of arthavādas irrelevant. Śabara agrees, in principle, and essentially responds that we must 
somehow account for such supplementary passages, since they exist in abundance, after all.236 If 
this was a problem for the Veda, which Mīmāṃsakas already held to possess inherent validity, so 
much more so the itihāsapurāṇa, which are comprised almost entirely of narrative passages. 
Kumārila takes this opportunity to apply the same logic of hierarchical organization to their 
language.237 It is clear that even though he analogizes the work of Vedic and purāṇic injunctions, 
he views them as the result of very different compositional and intentional processes. The 
passage is worth quoting in full:
This is the way the statements of the Mahābhārata, etc., should be interpreted. They too, 
falling in line with such injunctions as “One should instruct the four caste-classes,” seek 
236 Mīmāṃsādarśana Vol. 1B, 118, ll.1-4:
tadabhāve 'pi pūrvavidhinaiva prarocayiṣyata iti | satyaṃ, vināpi tena sidhyet prarocanam | asti tu tat, tasmin 
vidyamāne yo 'rtho vākyasya so 'vagamyate stutiḥ prayojanaṃ tayoḥ | tasminn avidyamāne vidhinā prarocanam |
Kumārila suggests, quite sarcastically, that such an objection should have been directed at the purported author 
of the Veda, who could be grilled on why he made sentences so long, when the purpose could have been 
accomplished with much less verbiage. In the absence of such an author, there is no scope for such an objection. 
Ibid., ll.14-15:
yo nāma vedasya kartā syāt sa evaṃ paryanuyujyeta laghunopāyena siddhe kiṃ mahāvākyam āśrayasīti | 
tadabhāvān na paryanuyogaḥ |
237 Cf. Lawrence McCrea, “The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mīmāṃsā Interpretive Theory,” Journal  
of Indian Philosophy 28.5 (2000): 429-459. The thirteenth-century commentator Someśvara Bhaṭṭa perceptively 
notes that this extension of intra-Vedic interpretive principles into the realm of itihāsapurāṇa is closely 
connected to the discussion of the authority of the vidyāsthānas in MS 1.3. See Nyāyasudhā, ed. Pandit Mukunda 
Shastri (Benares: Vidya Vilasa Press, 1901), 40: evaṃ vaidikārthavādopayogaṃ vyutpādya 
smṛtyadhikaraṇavakṣyamāṇaprāmāṇyavidyāsthānāntaragateṣu arthavādeṣu tam eva nyāyam atidiśati “evaṃ ca” 
iti | itihāsapurāṇayor arthavādabahutvād “bhāratādi” ity uktam |
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to accomplish certain goals of human life.238 Their result is not contained in the recitation 
itself, but in the understanding of the means to achieve dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa, 
and to avoid their opposites. And even in these works, such as the teachings on charity 
(dānadharma), kingship (rājadharma), and liberation (mokṣadharma), there are some 
direct injunctions (sākṣād vidhayaḥ), whereas some passages are arthavādas—narrative 
accounts of the deeds of others, and old legends. If we had to derive literal meaning from 
every single tale, it would obviate the injunction to “instruct the four caste-classes,” so we 
understand some implication of praise or condemnation therein. And since their exclusive 
purpose is either praise or deprecation, one shouldn't spend too much time paying 
attention to the truth-claims of such stories.
After all, Vālmīki, Vyāsa, and others composed their own works in accordance with their 
study of the Veda. And since those whom they chose to instruct were of varying 
intellectual capacities, this makes perfect sense. In one context, some people learn from 
mere injunctions; others learn from injunctions mixed with arthavādas, some minor and 
some longer. The authors began composing with the desire to attract the minds of 
anyone and everyone.
Now in such works, some injunctions and prohibitions have the Veda as their root 
(śrutimūlāḥ), while some are derived from worldly experience, and have to do with 
[acquiring] wealth and happiness. Similarly, some arthavādas are Vedic in character, 
some are just worldly, and some [the authors] simply composed on their own in poetic 
fashion. All of them are authoritative inasmuch as their role is one of praise.239
238 The analogy here, Someśvara points out, is to the Vedic meta-injunction “One should study one's [recension of] 
the Veda” (svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ), which commands other injunctions to command agents. In this way, the so-
called adhyayanavidhi is the take-off point for the entire process of Vedic ritual. Similarly, the “injunction to 
instruct” (śrāvaṇavidhi) encompasses itihāsapurāṇa literature, such that its language entirely subserves the 
purpose of attaining the caturvarga, the goals of dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa.
See Nyāyasudhā, 40: nanv adhyayanavidhibodhitapuruṣārthānubandhitvabalena vaidikārthavādānāṃ 
śrautārthātikrameṇa lākṣaṇikastutinindāparatvam avadhāritam atra tu katham ity āśaṅkyātrāpy 
adhyayanavidhisthānīyaṃ vidhiṃ darśayati |
On the adhyayanavidhi as “meta-injunction,” see Kei Kataoka, “Scripture, Men and Heaven: Causal structure in 
Kumārila's action-theory of bhāvanā,” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 49.2 (2001): 12-13.
239 Mīmāṃsādarśana Vol. 1B, 116, ll.6-16:
evaṃ ca bhāratādivākyāni vyākhyeyāni | teṣām api hi “śrāvayec caturo varṇān” ity evamādividhyanusāreṇa 
puruṣārthatvānveṣaṇād akṣarādi vyatikramya 
dharmārthakāmamokṣādharmānarthaduḥkhasaṃsārasādhyasādhanapratipattir upādānaparityāgāṅgabhūtā phalam 
| tatrāpi tu dānarājamokṣadharmādiṣu kecit sākṣād vidhayaḥ kecit punaḥ parakṛtipurākalparūpeṇārthavādāḥ | 
sarvopākhyāneṣu tātparye sati “śrāvayed” iti vidher ānarthakyāt kathaṃcid gamyamānastutinindāparigrahaḥ | 
tatparatvāc ca nātīvopākhyāneṣu tattvābhiniveśaḥ kāryaḥ | vedaprasthānābhyāsena hi 
vālmīkidvaipāyanaprabhṛtibhis tathaiva svavākyāni praṇītāni | pratipādyānāṃ ca vicitrabuddhitvād yuktam 
evaitat | iha kecid vidhimātreṇa pratipadyante | apare sārthavādenāpare 'lpenārthavādenāpare mahatā | sarveṣāṃ 
ca cittaṃ grahītavyam ity evam ārambhaḥ | tatra tu kecid vidhipratiṣedhāḥ śrutimūlāḥ kecid arthasukhādiṣu 
lokamūlās tathārthavādāḥ kecid vaidikā eva kecil laukikā eva kecit tu svayam eva kāvyanyāyena racitāḥ | sarve 
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Two points emerge from this reflection on the genre of itihāsapurāṇa that will become 
relevant for the BNK. First, Kumārila is quite firm in assigning the itihāsapurāṇa literature a 
subordinate role. It is quite certainly of human origin (pauruṣeya), though its authors, unlike the 
Buddha, had based their writings on their study of the Veda. But even within their compositions, 
there is a hierarchical organization of language; only those direct injunctions which appear to 
have the Veda as their root are purposeful. The vast majority of the literature is either 
supplementary (arthavāda) or composed with poetic fancy (kāvyanyāya). The second point is 
closely linked to this judgment. Kumārila seems rather uninterested in the literature as a whole. 
The purāṇas may contain some useful accounts of royal genealogies, pretty hymns to deities 
(which he judges to have an “invisible” [i.e., non-instrumental] purpose), and a certain overall 
listening pleasure, but as he admonishes at the end of the first paragraph above, one should not 
be too attracted to their truth-value (tattvābhiniveśaḥ). They are, after all, intended for everyone 
and make concessions to people's diverse intellectual capacities (vicitrabuddhi). The scope of the 
Veda, however, is emphatically restricted. Kumārila suggests that you may dabble in the 
itihāsapurāṇa if you wish, but urges you not to think they will help you in any substantive way.
Ganganath Jha calls Kumārila's view on the authority of purāṇas a “liberal” one.240 When 
compared to the eleventh-century Mīmāṃsaka Pārthasārathi Miśra, Kumārila does come off as 
rather broad-minded. In the opening chapter of his Śāstradīpikā (1.1.1), Pārthasārathi engages in 
fierce polemic against several philosophical schools on issues of epistemology, saving particular 
rancor for Advaita Vedānta. In one of these diatribes, he castigates Vedāntins for their excessive 
ca stutyarthena pramāṇam |
240 Ganganath Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources (Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1942), 215.
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reliance on texts that they have utterly misunderstood, and that themselves provoke confusion:
This Advaita doctrine has been promulgated by people who have put zero effort into 
logical reasoning, who do not comprehend the purport of textual statements, and who are 
deluded by: a) the Upaniṣadic discourses that figuratively discuss the unreality of the 
world (given its instability) and actually praise Brahman, and b) the itihāsapurāṇa that 
conform to them. Therefore, it is a madman's chatter that should be totally disregarded.241
The fundamental interpretive disagreement here between Pārthasārathi and his Vedāntin 
interlocutor is one of the value of the Upaniṣads. For Mīmāṃsakas, the Upaniṣads fell under the 
category of arthavāda. Since they do not instruct us in the performance of ritual action, by the 
logic of MS 1.2 previously discussed, they must be subordinate to the overall ritual context of the 
Veda. Mīmāṃsakas urged that the Upaniṣads do not actually tell us about really existing things. 
Their teachings about the Self, the Ātman, only reinforce the common-sense notion that a 
sacrificer must have a non-corporeal, permanent self, to perform his ritual actions and enjoy their 
fruits in another world. All their talk about the unreality of the world is only a figurative way to 
discuss its inconstancy; Mīmāṃsakas were, after all, ontological realists. As arthavādas, 
Pārthasārathi says, the Upaniṣads function just like the itihāsapurāṇa, which contain many 
teachings that build on Upaniṣadic speculations. Pārthasārathi criticizes Vedāntin reading 
practices here more than the texts on which they rely. Nevertheless, he is clear about the role of 
those texts: the Upaniṣads, here lumped together with the purāṇas, must not exceed the scope 
given to them by appropriate Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory.
For Vedāntins, however, the Upaniṣads were independently meaningful, and 
communicated knowledge of Brahman qua supreme truth. Not only were the Upaniṣads not 
241 Śāstradīpikā, ed. Dr. Kiśoradāsa Svāmī (Vārāṇasī: Sādhuvelā Saṃskṛta Mahāvidyālaya, 1977), 65: tasmād 
brahmaṇaḥ praśaṃsārthair asthāyitvena prapañcasyāsattvam upacaradbhir aupaniṣadair vādais tadanusāribhiś ca 
itihāsapurāṇair bhrāntānāṃ vākyatātparyam ajānānāṃ nyāyābhiyogaśūnyānāṃ pralāpo 'yam advaitavāda ity 
upekṣaṇīyaḥ |
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“merely” arthavādas, argued Vedāntins, they worked as sources of valid knowledge because the 
ritual portion of the Veda (karmakāṇḍa) did not exhaust its communicative scope. The Vedas 
were to be understood as offering information and not just injunction. From this perspective, the 
Upaniṣads were more meaningful precisely because they allowed one to be released from the 
onerous burdens of ritual activity. It is well known how Vedāntins overturned the Mīmāṃsā 
hierarchy of meaningful Vedic language in order to support the authority of the Upaniṣads.242 But 
early Vedāntins like Śaṅkara also expressed a desire to limit scriptural proliferation.
For Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣads alone, being nothing but the revealed word of the Veda, could 
effect liberation on the part of its listeners. Around the turn of the first millennium, however, 
philosophers who accepted the authority of Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava religious scriptures argued for 
their validity. One such argument was put forward by the Kashmiri Śaiva Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his 
Nyāyamañjarī (9th C.). Jayanta distinguished types of Āgamas, or non-Vedic scriptures, 
differentiating between those that did or did not explicitly contradict the Veda. He argued that the 
Śaiva Āgamas were just as valid as the Veda, but not for the reasons that Mīmāṃsakas offered. 
As a proponent of Nyāya philosophy, Jayanta believed that the authority of scripture rested in its 
having been composed by a reliable author, namely God (īśvara). According to Jayanta, both the 
Śaiva Āgamas and the Veda were composed by God, and found mainstream acceptance within a 
respectable public (mahājanasamūha). In appealing to both divine and human authorities, 
Jayanta at once extended and limited the scope of authoritative scripture, including the Śaiva 
Āgamas but excluding Buddhist scriptures that directly contradicted the Veda.243
242 See Wilhelm Halbfass, “Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita Vedānta,” in Tradition and Reflection:  
Explorations in Indian Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 148ff.
243 Cf. Jonathan Duquette, “Tradition, Identity, and Scriptural Authority: Religious Inclusivism in the Writings of an 
Early Modern Sanskrit Intellectual” (paper delivered at Sanskrit Traditions in the Modern World Conference, 
University of Manchester, May 29, 2015), 4-5.
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Another serious attempt to expand the canon of Sanskrit scripture was the 
Āgamaprāmāṇya of Yāmuna (11th C.), forerunner of the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition of Vedānta.244 In 
this book, on the “Authority of the Āgamas,” Yāmuna put forth two main arguments for why the 
Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra Āgamas, scriptural texts which technically fall outside the Vedic canon, 
should be considered valid sources of knowledge. First, he stated that the Āgamas are the direct 
utterances of the Supreme Lord Viṣṇu, and therefore supremely authoritative. Second, he claimed 
that they achieve Vedic status by being derived from a lost recension of the White Yajurveda, the 
Ekāyana Śākhā. While the former approach strays into broader theistic modes of argument, the 
latter more closely mirrors the Mīmāṃsā defense of smṛti as “remembered Veda.” According to 
his commentator Vedānta Deśika (13th C.), in his Nyāyapariśuddhi, it was quite possible that, like 
the smṛti, the Āgamas had as their basis Vedic texts (śrutimūla) that are now lost to us. We may 
thus infer the authority for practices not validated by extant Vedic texts. If there was 
contradiction between śruti and smṛti, as Mīmāṃsakas had previously discussed, one must 
differentially situate them according to their relative weight (balābalavyavasthā). But if there 
was contradiction between the Āgama (bhagavaddharmaśāstra) and the Veda, either may be 
appropriate (vikalpa) given that differences can be chalked up to particular contexts of time, 
place, and eligible agents (deśakālādhikāryavasthā). Vedānta Deśika is more circumspect than 
Yāmuna here in toeing the Mīmāṃsā line.245 He is content to draw parallels with the śrutimūla 
244 Among Śrīvaiṣṇavas, of course, the Tiruvāymoli of Nammālvār was believed to be a “Tamil Veda” that 
paralleled, not just imitated or derived from, the Sanskrit Veda. See John Carman and Vasudha Narayanan, The 
Tamil Veda: Piḷḷān's Interpretation of the Tiruvāymoli (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
245 However, see the opening to Vedānta Deśika's Pāñcarātrarakṣā for the unambiguous claim that the Āgamas are 
valid because they are God's infallible word. See Śrī Pāñcarātrarakṣā of Śrī Vedānta Deśika, ed. M. Duraiswami 
Aiyangar and T. Venugopalacharya (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1967), 2: 
bhagavanmukhodgatasya śāstrasya kāraṇadoṣādyabhāvena kvacid apy aprāmāṇyaṃ na śaṅkanīyam.
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argument, that the Āgamas have the Veda as their root, and to give them an extra edge over smṛti 
with the passing remark that they are also “directly grounded in the compassion of the Lord” 
(sākṣād īśvaradayāmūlatvāt). In both cases, however, authority is derivative. The smṛti and the 
Āgama occupy the same place on the podium, even if one is stretching its neck a little higher for 
the photographers.246
This state of affairs changed with the advent of the iconoclastic exegete Madhva, who 
opened the scriptural canon to “all sacred lore” (sarvavidyā). As Valerie Stoker has discussed, 
Madhva refashioned the vedamūla doctrine to mean that any text which illuminates the meaning 
of the Veda, and is therefore “rooted” in it, is independently valid.247 This includes not only 
Pāñcarātra Āgamas, but the Mahābhārata, purāṇas, and all of those “unknown sources” which 
Madhva is infamous for quoting.248 In Madhva's account, these authored sources manifested 
simultaneously with the eternal Veda, since both were transmitted by the god Viṣṇu through a 
series of hierarchically ordered sages.249 Thus no one text-tradition is given a privileged place; 
each informs the other in a symbiotic relationship.250
246 See Nyayaparishuddhi by Sri Venkatnath Sri Vedāntāchārya, ed. Vidyabhūshan Lakshmanāchārya (Benares: 
Vidya Vilas Press, 1918), 474-475. See also M. Narasimhachary, “Introductory Study,” in Āgamaprāmāṇya of  
Yāmuna, ed. M. Narasimhachary (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1976), 11-12.
247 See Valerie Stoker, “Conceiving the Canon in Dvaita Vedānta: Madhva's Doctrine of 'All Sacred Lore,'” Numen 
51.1 (2004): 55ff.
248 See Roque Mesquita, Madhva's Unknown Literary Sources: Some Observations (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 
2000).
249 See Stoker, “Conceiving the Canon,” 60: “If we understand śruti to mean 'that which was heard by the ancient 
ṛṣis [or 'seers'] as part of a primordial cognition in the beginning of creation,' then Madhva's assertion in his 
[Ṛgbhāṣya] that Viṣṇu reveals the Vedic corpus together with certain Vedamūla traditions effectively incorporates 
these pauruṣeya traditions into the primordial cognition and thus, into the category of śruti.”
250 Ibid., 59: “Madhva's understanding of the Vedamūlatva principle is vindicated by a Vedic text itself, and he does 
not need to measure the Bhāgavata Purāṇa against the [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad] because the two can be 
consulted interchangeably to illuminate suprasensible reality.”
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The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, however, had its own ideas about scriptural hierarchy. Although 
purāṇas were generally classified by Mīmāṃsakas as smṛti, they themselves were concerned 
with appropriating the status of śruti, as the “fifth Veda.” As Barbara Holdrege has demonstrated, 
the BhP is distinctive in its claims to be the quintessential scripture, the fruit and the culmination, 
of the entire Brahmanical canon.251 This would have posed a significant problem to 
Mīmāṃsakas, had the very genre of purāṇa not been so irrelevant to the figures we have studied. 
But when it emerged from the narrative into the scholastic world, the BhP had a much bigger 
impact than any previous reworking of Mīmāṃsā. Mīmāṃsakas had developed a clear ranking 
system of textual genres that mirrored the internal hierarchies of language within the Veda. By 
claiming Vedic status for itself, the BhP challenged that hierarchy. If, in the Mīmāṃsā taxonomy, 
the BhP as purāṇa was on a par with smṛti, it certainly acted like śruti. It believed that its 
language was just as powerful, just as capable of effecting action and communicating knowledge, 
as that of the Veda, and that it was the best and brightest of all the purāṇas.252 This claim 
bolstered the BhP's overall strategy to exalt religious devotion to Kṛṣṇa (bhakti) above 
meaningless ritual (karma) and dry philosophy (jñāna). But that strategy remained a rhetorical 
one, inasmuch as it was confined to the language of scripture and not of scriptural interpretation. 
251 See Barbara Holdrege, “From Purāṇa-Veda to Kārṣṇa-Veda: The Bhāgavata Purāṇa as Consummate Śruti and 
Smṛti Incarnate,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 15.1 (2006): 31-70.
252 Ibid., 52: “In both of these statements—concerning its superior status among the Purāṇas and Itihāsas, 
respectively—the Bhāgavata Purāṇa invokes the authority of the Vedas as one of the means of establishing its 
superiority: the Bhāgavata is superior to the other Purāṇas in part because of its special status as the essence of 
all the Upaniṣads (sarva-vedānta-sāra); it is superior to the Itihāsas because it is not only the essence (sāra) of 
the Itihāsas but also that of the Vedas. The Bhāgavata reserves for itself the special status of the purāṇaguhya,  
the Purāṇa that contains the deepest mysteries, because it alone is the concentrated essence of the entire śruti  
literature (akhila-śruti-sāra)—not only the Upaniṣads, but also the Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, and Āraṇyakas. This 
śruti pertaining to Kṛṣṇa also proclaims itself the fruit (phala) of the wishyielding tree of Veda (nigama-kalpa-
taru) and ultimately asserts that it is equal to the Veda (brahma-sammita, veda-sammita). Finally, the Bhāgavata 
goes even further and declares itself the quintessential scripture that represents the concentrated essence (sāra) of 
all the sacred texts—śruti and smṛti.”
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It is here that Lakṣmīdhara's intervention in BNK became so crucial. The BNK posed a 
scholastic and not merely rhetorical challenge to the Mīmāṃsā discourse of scriptural orthodoxy, 
by using the language of Mīmāṃsā both to legitimize the authority of the genre of purāṇa, and to 
rank it above the genre of smṛti. I believe that the BNK's attempt to expand and, in fact, supplant 
parts of the Sanskrit scriptural canon reflects one of the first systematic scholastic elaborations of 
the BhP's own claims to being a “purāṇa that is Veda” (purāṇaveda).253
What immediately distinguishes the BNK's treatment of the place of purāṇa from earlier 
discourse on the topic is that the stakes are significantly higher. It is not simply concerned with 
the “validity” of purāṇic utterances, such that they could be considered authoritative sources of 
knowledge, and may be both juxtaposed with smṛti and corroborate śruti. Instead, the BhP's self-
aggrandizing language forces Lakṣmīdhara to reckon with the superiority of its truth-claims, and, 
importantly, its social practices. The BNK systematically develops one of these claims: Singing 
God's name (nāmasaṃkīrtana) removes all sins, and fulfills the goals of human life (puruṣārtha). 
The BNK is strewn with quotations from several purāṇas, but especially the BhP, that support 
the all-purifying power of singing God's name.254 Among the many ritual, ethical, and social 
norms that the genre of smṛti represented, the BNK selected for particular criticism the 
253 See Ibid., 53: “[B]y identifying Kṛṣṇa with the Veda, the Bhāgavata overcomes the problem posed by the lack of 
reference to Kṛṣṇa in the Vedic Saṃhitās: Kṛṣṇa is not mentioned in the Vedas because he himself is the Veda on 
an ontological level. Kṛṣṇa is the ultimate reality who is celebrated in the Upaniṣads as Brahman, whose inner 
essence is Veda, knowledge, and whose outer form is constituted by the Vedic mantras. His Self is the threefold 
Veda (trayī-vidyātman), his very substance is Veda (sarvaveda-maya), and his body is composed of the ṛcs, 
yajuses, sāmans, and atharvans. Realization of the supreme reality of Krsna, which is the goal of the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa's devotional teachings, is understood in this context to be tantamount to realization of the eternal Veda.”
Cf. Fred Smith, “Purāṇaveda,” in Authority, Anxiety, and Canon: Essays in Vedic Interpretation, ed. Laurie L. 
Patton (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 97-138.
254 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 70: śrībhāgavate tu śṛṅgagrāhikayaiva mahāpātakāny anukramya saṅkīrtanenaiva 
tannivṛttir abhihitā [...]
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normative practices of expiation prescribed by dharmaśāstra. In these traditional sources of 
Brahmanical jurisprudence, each transgression has its own corresponding penance. The 
intricacies of these smārta practices, so-called because they belonged to the smṛti, formed the 
subject of centuries of Sanskrit scholarship on dharmaśāstra. The BhP, however, dispenses with 
all such practices in a single verse:
For all sinners whosoever,
this single thing serves as atonement:
To recite the name of Viṣṇu,
for [God's] mind has turned to him.255
The first three chapters of the BhP's sixth canto feature repeatedly in the BNK. They tell 
the story of Ajāmila, a dissolute Brahmin who calls out to his son, Nārāyaṇa, with his dying 
breath. Because he dies with God's name on his lips, he is taken to heaven despite protestations 
from the messengers of Yama, the god of death. God's heavenly messengers insist that Ajāmila 
was saved from all his sins merely by uttering God's name, albeit inadvertently, out of control 
(vivaśa).256 Such claims about the power of the name are part of the BhP's narrative strategy of 
exalting Kṛṣṇa as the ultimate God, but only comprise a minor section of the text as a whole. 
Lakṣmīdhara, however, extracts from this story an entire theology of the divine name. In doing 
so, he builds on Śrīdhara Svāmin's attempt to discuss this text using the hermeneutical techniques 
previously allocated to Vedic scripture. In his commentary on this section of the BhP, Śrīdhara 
offers some brief remarks that bear close resemblance to Lakṣmīdhara's more elaborate defense 
255 BhP 6.2.10:
sarveṣām apy aghavatām idam eva suniṣkṛtam |
nāmavyāharaṇaṃ viṣṇor yatas tadviṣayā matiḥ ||
256 BhP 6.2.7:
ayaṃ hi kṛtanirveśo janmakoṭyaṃhasām api |
yad vyājahāra vivaśo nāmasvastyayanam hareḥ ||
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of the purāṇa's injunctive power in the first chapter of the BNK. Commenting on BhP 6.2.8, 
which reaffirms that Ajāmila was released of all his sins by calling out the four-syllable name, 
Nārāyaṇa,257 Śrīdhara says the following:
This verse responds to the following potential query: “Surely God's name only makes 
one's actions excellent, as one source has it: 'By remembering him and uttering his name, 
what little one does in terms of penance, rituals, or sacrifices becomes fully perfected. I 
bow to that Acyuta every day.' How could God's name remove sins all by itself?” […] 
This is the idea: Even when God's name is an element of performing ritual actions, it can 
serve as the ultimate expiation, because the logic of “distinctness of connection,” which 
suggests that the same thing can be used differently in two cases, applies here just as in 
the case of khādira wood.258 So we have thousands of cases in the purāṇas where the 
name functions independently [such as Viṣṇu Purāṇa 6.8.19]: “Even when his name is 
uttered inadvertently, a person's sins instantly scatter, like so many deer scared off by a 
lion.” And one shouldn't think that these are arthavādas, because they are not subordinate 
to any vidhi. Nor should the lack of an explicit vidhi prompt one to imagine that [these 
sentences] must be subordinate to something else; especially not when we have indicative 
sentences in the Veda that serve as vidhis, inasmuch as they communicate something that 
is not a given, accessible by any other means of knowledge. There are Vedic mantras, too 
(Ṛg Veda 8.11.9; 1.156.3), from which we glean that the name is more powerful than all 
other acts, including austerity and charity. And as it is, the discourse on MS 9.1 
(devatādhikaraṇa) shows that mantras and arthavādas are authoritative with respect to 
their own subject matter.259 Therefore, all one's sins can be removed simply by the mere 
257 BhP 6.2.8:
etenaiva hy aghono 'sya kṛtaṃ syād aghaniṣkṛtam |
yadā nārāyaṇāyeti jagāda caturakṣaram ||
 
258 MS 4.3.5 says that in a case where one and the same thing is both obligatory as well as contingent, or optional, 
there is “distinctness of connection” (saṃyogapṛthaktva), such that the same thing can be used in two cases. In 
his Bhāṣya, Śabara gives the example of two Vedic sentences that enjoin the use of khādira wood—one for the 
purpose of the ritual act (kratvartha), and the other for obtaining a general human result (puruṣārtha). Here, 
Śrīdhara analogizes the work of the khādira to that of God's name; in one instance, it supports the acts of 
performing activities such as penance, sacrifice, etc., but in another context, it can remove all sins.
259 This is a rather disingenuous claim, if Śrīdhara is indeed referring to the classical Mīmāṃsā take on MS 9.1, the 
so-called devatādhikaraṇa. As Francis Clooney has shown, Mīmāṃsakas argued that the deities (devatā) 
mentioned as recipients of a sacrificial offering cannot be considered the purpose for which the sacrificial act is 
performed. In his commentary on MS 9.1.6-10, Śabara insists that not only are deities subordinate to the ritual 
act itself, there is no evidence at all that they have physical corporeality, no matter what popular smṛti texts, 
mantras, and arthavādas might say. Vedāntins such as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja respond that the gods are in fact 
embodied beings, capable of engaging in meditative practice. They support this by referring to precisely the 
mantras, arthavādas, itihāsas, and purāṇas that Mīmāṃakas tried to avoid. See Francis X. Clooney, 
“Devatādhikaraṇa: A Theological Debate in the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta Tradition,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 
16.3 (1988): 277-298.
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semblance of Nārāyaṇa's name.260
In this paragraph, which probably sets the stage for much of the following discussion, 
Śrīdhara effectively says this: There are sentences in the purāṇa that tell us about the power of 
God's name; they are not arthavādas, because there are no vidhis around to which they could be 
subordinated; although they are in the indicative mood, they possess injunctive potency; there are 
also Vedic mantras that extol the power of God's name; mantras and arthavādas are just as 
instructive as vidhis; so purāṇic utterances function more or less like Vedic injunctions, 
authoritatively and effectively. This is an argument admirable for its brevity and self-assurance, 
but does not engage thoroughly with Mīmāṃsā's opposition to the purāṇa's independent 
authority. Nor does it deal with the problem of how to evaluate the purāṇa's claims against those 
At best, Śrīdhara may be drawing on the Vedānta interpretation of the same section, articulated in several 
Vedānta commentaries on Brahma Sūtra 1.3. In the Advaitin Śaṅkara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra 1.3.33, “he 
insists that even an arthavāda can be the vehicle of genuine, fully authoritative revelation, provided that it is a 
vidyamānārthavāda, that is, neither a mere repetition (anuvāda) of what is already known otherwise, nor a 
guṇavāda, which has to be explained metaphorically, since its literal would contradict obvious facts.” See 
Halbfass, “Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita Vedānta,” 150.
Even if Śrīdhara was referring to the Vedānta discussion, he attempts to put mantras and arthavādas on par with 
Vedic injunctions (vidhi), inasmuch as they are authoritative “with regard to their own subject matter” (svārthe)
—that is, not subservient to some external injunction. Lakṣmīdhara builds on this below. However, most 
Vedāntins were not concerned with injunctions at all, but with the Upaniṣads that were precisely not about 
enjoining ritual activity. As Halbfass continues (Ibid., 150): “In general, however, Śaṅkara leaves no doubt that 
in his view the concept of arthavāda cannot do justice to the Upaniṣads, this culmination of the Veda (vedānta). 
On the other hand, the central statements of the Upaniṣads cannot be interpreted in terms of cognitive or 
meditational injunctions, the truth concerning ātman/brahman is nothing 'to be done' or 'enacted' (kārya).”
260 See Bhāgavata Purāṇa...With Sanskrit Commentary Bhāvārthabodhinī of Śrīdhara Svāmin, ed. J.L. Shastri 
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 282: nanu karmasādguṇyakaraṃ harer nāmeti yuktam, “yasya smṛtyā ca 
nāmoktyā tapoyajñakriyādiṣu | nyūnaṃ sampūrṇatāṃ yāti sadyo vande tam acyutam ||” ityādivacanāt, 
svātantryeṇa tv aghanivartakaṃ harer nāma kathaṃ syāt tatrāhuḥ – etenaiveti | […] ayaṃ bhāvaḥ – karmāṅgatve 
'pi harināmnaḥ khādiratvādivat saṃyogapṛthaktvena sarvaprāyaścittārthatvaṃ yuktam eva | tathā hi - “avaśenāpi 
yannāmni kīrtite sarvapātakaiḥ | pumān vimucyate sadyaḥ siṃhatrastair mṛgair iva ||” ityādibhiḥ purāṇe tāvat 
sahasraśo nāmnaḥ svātantryam avagamyate | na caite arthavādā iti śaṅkanīyam, vidhiśeṣatvābhāvāt | na ca 
vidhyaśravaṇād anyaśeṣatā kalpanīyā yadā “āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālo bhavati” ityādivad aprāptārthatvena 
vidhikalpanopapatteḥ | mantreṣu ca “martā amartyasya te bhūri nāma manāmahe | viprāso jātavedasaḥ”, “āsya 
jānanto nāma cidviviktana” ityādiṣu nāmnas tapodānādisarvadharmādhikyam avagamyate | upapāditaṃ ca 
mantrārthavādānām api svārthe prāmāṇyaṃ devatādhikaraṇe | tasmāc chrīnārāyaṇanāmābhāsamātreṇaiva 
sarvāghaniṣkṛtaṃ syād iti |
92
of smṛti, given that the methods of expiation they prescribe are incommensurate.261
Lakṣmīdhara is much more detailed in this and other respects. In the third chapter of the 
BNK, Lakṣmīdhara directly takes on the problem of purāṇa versus smṛti.262 He offers two 
possibilities when it comes to negotiating the disparity between purāṇic and smārta practices of 
expiation. One is vyavasthā, “differential situation,” and the other vikalpa, or “option theory.” 
These terms were first used in Mīmāṃsā to resolve conflicts between ritual injunctions, and were 
later adopted by authors of dharmaśāstra.263 According to the principle of vyavasthā, the 
261 Even in those few instances where Śrīdhara does bring up this conflict, he softens the BhP's critique of smṛti 
authors. In BhP 6.3.24, for example, the god of death Yama says that “In general, great men do not know this 
[bhāgavata dharma]—ah, their minds are plenty confused by Goddess Illusion. Their thoughts dulled by the 
Three Vedas, with their sweet, flowery language, they engage in massive sacrificial activities.” (Cf. Bhagavad 
Gītā 2.42).
prāyeṇa veda tad idaṃ na mahājano 'yaṃ
devyā vimohitamatir bata māyayālam |
trayyāṃ jaḍīkṛtamatir madhupuṣpitāyāṃ
vaitānike mahati karmaṇi yujyamānaḥ ||
Śrīdhara comments: “This is the idea: Just as doctors who do not know of the immortal sañjīvanī herb prescribe 
extremely bitter leaves, etc., to cure diseases, so also do great men, unaware of this great secret—with the 
exception of the twelve authorities mentioned in BhP 6.3.20 (Svayaṃbhū, Nārada, Śambhu, Kumāra, Kapila, 
Manu, Prahlāda, Janaka, Bhīṣma, Bali, Śuka, and Yama, the speaker)—prescribe penances like the twelve-year 
vow. To say that their minds have been 'dulled' by the sweet and attractive arthavādas of the Vedas really means 
that they are 'absorbed' in them. That is why they engage in super-extensive rituals and not minor ones. For we 
see that everyday people have faith in great big mantras, but not in short ones. Therefore these authors did not 
actually say that there was no scope for accepting this [bhāgavata dharma].”
See Bhāgavata Purāṇa...With Bhāvārthabodhinī of Śrīdhara Svāmin, 286: ayam bhāvaḥ – 
yathāmṛtasaṃjīvanauṣadham ajānanto vaidyā roganirharaṇāya trikaṭukanimbādīni smaranti tathā 
svayaṃbhūśaṃbhupramukhadvādaśavyatirekeṇāyaṃ mahājano 'tiguhyam idam ajñātvā dvādaśābdādikaṃ 
smaratīti | kiṃ ca māyayā devyā alaṃ vimohitamatir ayaṃ jano madhu madhuraṃ yathā bhavaty evaṃ 
puṣpitāyāṃ puṣpasthānīyair arthavādair manoharāyāṃ trayyāṃ jaḍīkṛtā abhiniviṣṭā matir yasya | ato mahaty 
eva karmaṇi śraddhayā yujyamāno nālpe pravartate | dṛśyate hi prākṛtasya lokasya mahati mantrādau śraddhā 
alpe cāśraddhā | tasmād asya grāhako nāstīti tair noktam |
262 See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 60ff.
263 See Patrick Olivelle, The Āśrama System: The History and Hermeneutics of a Religious Institution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 134-136. On the changing nature of the division of scholastic labor between 
Mīmāṃsakas and dharmaśāstrīs from classical to early modern India, see Lawrence McCrea, “Hindu 
Jurisprudence and Scriptural Hermeneutics,” in Hinduism and Law: An Introduction, ed. Timothy Lubin et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 123-137.
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alternatives opened up by a conflict between injunctions are restricted to definite groups of 
people.264 In the BNK, a prima-facie objector invokes this principle, to suggest that in the matter 
of choosing between either singing God's name or performing normative practices of expiation, 
the people involved must be differentially qualified. Only those who sing with “faith” (śraddhā), 
among other qualities, can achieve its result; others, however, must undertake smārta 
penances.265 Lakṣmīdhara himself supports the vikalpa, which permits the practitioner an open 
option between injunctions that are of equal authority.266 Since the purāṇa and smṛti are on equal 
264 See Olivelle, The Āśrama System, 136.
265 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 70-74. The mention of śraddhā here merits a brief comment. According to the 
argument reconstructed by Lakṣmīdhara, the proper relationship (sambandha) between an injunction (vidhi) and 
its performer (puruṣa), whether interpreted in Bhāṭṭa terms (qua iṣṭasādhana) or Prābhākara ones (niyoga), is 
impossible without “śraddhā.” He argues that both the ritual- (karmakāṇḍa) and knowledge-oriented 
(jñānakāṇḍa) portions of the Veda justify the notion that śraddhā is indispensable to one's eligibility to perform 
[a ritual act] or realize [the truth of the Upaniṣads]. He cites examples from the Veda, such as Ṛg Veda 10.151.1: 
“With śraddhā is the fire kindled; with śraddhā is the oblation offered” and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.23: 
“Having become one endowed with śraddhā, one may see the self within one's own self.”
All this talk of śraddhā appears to be a significant deviation from classical Mīmāṃsā, which does not care about 
the word at all. I can only speculate that its origins lie in Śaiva or broadly Āgamic teaching, as does perhaps the 
whole issue of the injunctive quality of purāṇic language. For example, Lakṣmīdhara further marshals evidence 
from the Śivadharmottara (1.40), a Śaiva purāṇa:
vidhivākyam idaṃ śaivaṃ nārthavādaḥ śivātmakaḥ |
lokānugrahakartā yaḥ sa mṛṣā 'rthaṃ kathaṃ vadet ||
Śiva's words are injunctive, not simply explanatory.
How could the merciful one say anything false?
Although the full text of the Śivadharmottara has yet to be critically edited, hints as to the relevant context may 
be gleaned from R.C. Hazra, “The Śiva-dharmottara,” 198, n.57, on the fivefold progression of śraddhā:
bhaktir bhāvaparā prītiḥ śivadharmaikatānatā |
pratipattir iti jñeyaṃ śraddhāparyāyapañcakam ||
The precise meaning of each word in this citation eludes me, but I believe the Śivadharma corpus in general 
contains valuable clues to the introduction of bhakti and purāṇa into the sphere of Sanskrit scholastic discourse. 
Cf. Schwartz, “Caught in the Net of Śāstra,” 210-213.
266 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 130-131. Lakṣmīdhara assures his worried opponent that there is still a scope for smṛti, 
at the end of the day, and analogizes the choice (vikalpa) in question to that of choosing between types of 
medication from a doctor—some are easy to swallow and others are painful. Some people, he says, are 
inherently averse to the “easier” medication, so they are given a different one. Similarly, since people are 
generally divorced from the Supreme God, their hearts being engulfed with bad habits (vāsanās) that are difficult 
94
footing, one may therefore choose freely between them. But in the middle of this debate, 
Lakṣmīdhara offers a fascinating and radically new claim about how one should think about the 
purāṇa:
Therefore, we may comfortably say that no scriptural citation conflicts with any other 
one. It is only in order to settle the minds of qualified aspirants of middling faith that we 
imagine this path of non-contradiction. But there is another, far truer way of thinking 
(pāramārthikaḥ), which runs as follows: In matters of contradiction between smṛti and 
purāṇa, none of these methods of differentiation really enters into it. For there does exist 
a hierarchy of authority between them. Smṛtis, of course, are the utterances of great sages, 
composed in different words, once they had understood meaning directly from the Veda. 
But  purāṇa  s are Veda itself  . 
As it says in the Mānava Dharmaśāstra and the Mahābhārata (1.12.4ab), “One should 
corroborate the Veda with itihāsapurāṇa.” There is also the etymology: X is called a 
“purāṇa” because it “fills out” [some other Vedic text] (pūraṇāt). And it isn't as though it 
is possible to expand the Veda with something that is other-than-Veda (avedena). After 
all, you can't complete an unfinished golden bracelet with tin. You may object: “If the 
word 'Veda' includes both itihāsa and purāṇa, then we must find something else for 
'purāṇa' to signify. And if it doesn't, then there cannot be complete identification between 
Veda and itihāsapurāṇa.” Our reply is that even if there is no difference among the 
cluster of words which present a coherent, distinct meaning, inasmuch as they are all 
unauthored (apauruṣeya), we still specify their difference on account of distinctions in 
systems of accentuation and recitation (svarakramabheda).267
In this crucial passage, Lakṣmīdhara goes further than any of his predecessors in Indian 
intellectual history in evaluating the place of purāṇa in the hierarchy of Sanskrit scripture. Not 
to restrain, they are given alternative methods of expiation.
 Ibid., 130: nanv evaṃ purāṇārthe parigṛhyamāṇe smṛtīnām atyantabādha eva syād ? […] astyevāvakāśaḥ 
smṛtīnāṃ, dṛśyate ca sukaraduṣkarayor vikalpo vaidyakeṣu, tatra ca kiṃcit sukaram api kasmaicit svabhāvād eva 
na rocate, atas tadarthaṃ duṣkaram api cikitsāntaraṃ vidhīyate; tadvad ihāpi durvāradurvāsanāvāsitacetasaḥ 
prāyeṇa parāṅmukhā eva puruṣottamāt puruṣāḥ, tadarthaṃ prāyaścittāntaravidhānam |
 
267 Ibid., 91: tasmān na kenacit kiṃcid virudhyata iti sarvaṃ sustham | evaṃ madhyamaśraddhānām adhikāriṇāṃ 
manāṃsi samādhātum utprekṣate panthānam avirodhasya | anya eva punaḥ panthāḥ pāramārthikaḥ, tathā hi 
smṛtipurāṇavirodhe vyavasthā['']dayo naiva niviśante, viṣamaṃ hi prāmāṇyam anayoḥ, vedād avagate 'rthe 
padāntarair upanibaddhāni mahaṛṣivākyāni khalu sṃrtayaḥ, purāṇāni punar vedā eva śrīmahābhārate mānavīye 
ca - “itihāsapurāṇābhyāṃ vedaṃ samupabṛṃhayet”  iti vacanāt, pūraṇāt purāṇam iti vyutpatteś ca, na ca atra 
avedena vedasya bṛṃhaṇaṃ saṃbhavati, na hy aparipūrṇasya kanakavalayasya trapuṇā pūraṇaṃ saṃbhavati | 
nanu yadi vedaśabdaḥ purāṇam itihāsaṃ ca upādatte tarhi purāṇam anyad eva anveṣaṇīyaṃ; yadi tu na, na tarhi 
itihāsa-purāṇayor abhedo vedena? ucyate – viśiṣṭaikārthapratipādakasya padakadambakasya apauruṣeyatvād 
abhede 'pi svarakramabhedād bhedanirdeśo 'py upapadyate […]
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only does purāṇa take precedence over smṛti, it does so because purāṇa is Veda. They are only 
separated by the exigencies of language, modes of intonation, recitational order. The purāṇa here 
is not even considered to be a separate genre. It is nothing but Veda, only articulated in slightly 
different, unaccented language. Barbara Holdrege points out that the BhP accords itself Vedic 
status to represent itself as the revelation of Kṛṣṇa himself, in turn identified with the Vedic 
revelation.268 Lakṣmīdhara is perhaps the first to give the BhP's claim such an elaborate 
hermeneutical defense. Śrīdhara does not provide this kind of argument for the authority of the 
purāṇa. In fact, quite to the contrary, in the opening his commentary on the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, he 
sticks with the traditional explanation that the purāṇas are authoritative and purposeful because 
they are vedamūla, the recorded memories of their human authors.269 Not only does 
Lakṣmīdhara's argument contradict Mīmāṃsā orthodoxy, it gives the genre of purāṇa a 
superlative sheen.
The language of upabṛṃhaṇa (“corroboration” or “expansion”) in this passage does 
contain exegetical precedents in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. Sucharita Adluri has demonstrated 
Rāmānuja's use of the concept to bolster the authority of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, not only in order to 
interpret the canonical texts of Vedānta, but actually to read into them theological concepts from 
268 Holdrege, “From Purāṇa-Veda to Kāṛṣṇa-Veda,” 56: “Kṛṣṇa, who is Veda incarnate, is embodied in the 
Bhāgavata, which is therefore Kṛṣṇa incarnate and, by extension, Veda incarnate. In the final analysis, then, the 
Bhāgavata's declarations that it is brahma-sammita are assertions of its identity with that totality which is 
simultaneously Brahman, Kṛṣṇa, and Veda. The Bhāgavata, as Śabdabrahman and bhagavad-rūpa and śruti  
incarnate, is Brahman embodied in the Word, Kṛṣṇa embodied in sound.”
269 See Viṣṇupurāṇa with Sanskrit Commentary of Sridharacharya, Vol. I, ed. Thanesh Chandra Upreti (Delhi: 
Parimal Publications, 1986), 1: iha khalu purāṇānām īśvaraniśvasitasvarūpatvena vedamūlatvena idānīntanānāṃ 
vyāsavasiṣṭhaparāśarādīnāṃ smṛtirūpatvena ca pramāṇatvaṃ prayojanavattvañ ca durapahṛtam eva | The 
language here is a little more complicated. Śrīdhara offers another possibility for the purāṇas' authority—that it 
is of the nature of “God's own breath,” a term classically used by Vedāntins from Śaṅkara onward to describe the 
Veda as eternally co-existent with Brahman. But he does not elaborate, and is content to say that the purāṇas are 
authoritative on account of their being like smṛti.
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the purāṇa itself.270 But for Rāmānuja, the authority of the purāṇas is predicated on its divine 
authorship, not its Vedic status. The Viṣṇu Purāṇa is privileged because it is composed by an 
embodied being, the creator Brahmā, in his most lucid state (sattva).271 The BNK, however, does 
away with this gap between śruti and purāṇa entirely, and it insists that because this is so, the 
claim that smṛti has any degree of priority is totally vitiated. If there is any conflict between śruti 
and purāṇa, the latter loses out only because it comes later in the order of recitation, where 
meanings tend to shift around; when it comes to smṛti, however, the purāṇa is always better.272
An opponent, rather shocked by this wholesale overturning of scriptural hierarchy, 
follows the argument to its logical extent. In his response, Lakṣmīdhara doubles down:
Objection: In that case, wouldn't these purāṇic statements, having cast off all fetters (viz. 
all limits on their textual authority), each communicating their own subject as they desire, 
render the smṛtis empty of meaning entirely, insofar as the latter find themselves stripped 
of the barest scope [for purposeful instruction]?
Reply: So be it! How could anyone deny the directness of the purāṇas and introduce [the 
possibility that] they are differentially situated (vyavasthāpana)? After all, as [Śiva says 
to Pārvatī] in the Nāradīya Purāṇa (2.24.17):
“Oh beautiful faced one! I consider the meaning of the purāṇas to be greater than the 
meaning of the Vedas! Dear goddess, the Veda is established within the purāṇa. There is 
no doubt on this matter.”
[…] and in the Skanda Purāṇa (untraced):
“The śruti and smṛti are the two eyes, the purāṇa is considered the heart. Without the 
śruti and smṛti, one is blind, and would be one-eyed without one or the other. But it is 
better to be one-eyed or blind than without one's heart—without the purāṇa.”273
270 Sucharita Adluri, Textual Authority in Classical Indian Thought: Rāmānuja and the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (New York: 
Routledge, 2015).
271 Sucharita Adluri, “Scriptural Innovation in Medieval South India: The Śrīvaiṣṇava Articulation of Vedānta” (PhD 
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2009), 56ff.
272 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 92: ata eva śrutipurāṇavirodhe purāṇadaurbalyam ānupūrvībhedāt kadācid artho 'py 
anyathā syād iti, smṛtipurāṇavirodhe punaḥ purāṇāny eva balīyāṃsi |
273 Ibid., 92-93: evaṃ samullaṅghitasakalaśṛṅkhaleṣu yathāsvam eva svaṃ svam artham abhidadhāneṣu 
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The claim seems tautological, no doubt: the purāṇas are śruti because they tell us that they are. It 
makes sense, however, given the Mīmāṃsā background to the argument. Like Śrīdhara on BhP 
6.2.8, Lakṣmīdhara extends to the purāṇa the Mīmāṃsā concept that Vedic utterances are self-
validating. The entire first chapter of the BNK seeks to disprove the claim that purāṇic 
statements do not carry their own meaningful weight—that is, that they must be subordinate to a 
Vedic injunction. In this chapter, Lakṣmīdhara argues against the “scaremongering of those 
ignorant of Mīmāṃsā discourse” (aviditamīmāṃsāvṛttāntānāṃ vibhīṣikā) who say that purāṇic 
language is merely arthavāda—an ironic accusation, to say the least, because virtually every 
Mīmāṃsaka in history had said precisely that.274 The specific opponent to whom Lakṣmīdhara is 
responding remains unclear, but given my reconstruction of prior Mīmāṃsā discussions of the 
purāṇa, one can imagine the resistance to his efforts. In arguing that the purāṇa is nothing but 
Veda, Lakṣmīdhara opens the possibility for its utterances to be equivalent to Vedic injunctions. 
purāṇavacaneṣu manāg api kvacid ekam avakāśam alabhamānānāṃ smṛtīnāṃ yadi nāma viṣayasarvasvāpahāraḥ 
prasajyeta | prasajyatāṃ nāma, kathaṃ nu purāṇānām āñjasyam upamṛdya vyavasthāpanaprastāvaḥ | uktaṃ hi 
nāradīye –
vedārthād adhikaṃ manye purāṇārthaṃ varānane |
vedaḥ pratiṣṭhito devi purāṇe nātra saṃśayaḥ ||
[…] skānde ca –
śrutismṛtī hi netre dve purāṇaṃ hṛdayaṃ smṛtam |
śrutismṛtibhyāṃ hīno 'ndhaḥ kāṇaḥ syād ekayā vinā ||
purāṇahīnād hṛcchūnyāt kāṇāndhāv api tau varau |
274 The critique that the purāṇas were nothing but arthavāda was felt closely enough in the world of purāṇic 
interpretation to merit a response in the Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa (1.61), quoted by R.C. Hazra, Studies in the  
Upapurāṇas, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1958), 312, n.115 (my trans.):
purāṇeṣu dvijaśreṣṭhāḥ sarvadharmapravaktṛṣu |
pravadanty arthavādatvaṃ ye te narakabhājanāḥ ||
“O best of Brahmins, those who proclaim that purāṇas, which discuss the entire dharma, are arthavāda, are 
going straight to hell.”
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In the context of the first chapter, the problem of an utterance's being able to express 
exactly what it intends (vivakṣitārtha), and not be subordinate to some other purpose, hinges on 
its injunctive capacity, and, consequently, its ability to effect practical action. Lakṣmīdhara's 
opponent attempts to foreclose that possibility, suggesting that the purāṇa's valorization of 
singing the name of God simply falls under the category of praise (stāvakatva), the sole 
prerogative of the arthavāda.275 Lakṣmīdhara responds by applying a Vedāntic hermeneutical 
principle to the purāṇa. Just as the Veda has the authority to instruct us with respect to both ritual 
action (kārya) and already existent entities (siddha), he says, the purāṇa can do the exact same 
thing.276 It bears repeating that Lakṣmīdhara's entire line of argument builds up to the idea that 
there is no essential difference between purāṇa and Veda. It becomes possible, then, to use the 
same hermeneutical tools previously applied to the Veda, a strategy that becomes amply clear in 
this final example. Here, Lakṣmīdhara uses a famous Mīmāṃsā analogy to explicate a verse from 
the Viṣṇu Purāṇa that sums up the claim of the entire BNK: “There is only one form of penance 
for the affliction that attaches to a person when he has committed a sin: simply remember God's 
name.”277 Lakṣmīdhara argues that just like Vedic injunctions, this statement does not describe 
the prerequisite for the eligible agent of a ritual action but rather the result of that action:
For one afflicted by a particular thing, benefit lies in the removal of that thing. In this 
instance, to say that singing is the means to benefit one afflicted by sin is effectively to 
say that it is a means to removing sin. The word “simply” (para) is a synonym for 
275 Recall Kumārila's comment: “All of them are authoritative inasmuch as their role is one of praising [an external 
injunction]” (sarve stutyarthena pramāṇam).
276 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 12: yasmād vākyād yo 'rthaḥ svarasato 'vagamyate siddhaḥ kāryo vā tatra tatpramāṇam 
eva purāṇavacanam |
277 Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.6.40:
kṛte pāpe 'nutāpo vai yasya puṃsaḥ prajāyate |
prāyaścittaṃ tu tasyaikaṃ harisaṃsmaraṇaṃ param ||
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“exclusively” (kevala); the idea is that singing is a self-sufficient means. The word “one” 
means “once” (sakṛt), and “remembering” is an explanatory repetition [of the initial 
action prescribed by the injunction] (anuvāda), since it recalls the entire practice of 
singing God's name. It has as its result a provocation (prarocana) in the form “This 
fits together.”278 [In injunctions like “one desirous of heaven should perform a sacrifice”] 
the term “desirous of heaven” describes not a person, but the particular desired object 
which is first required by the injunction defined by that object (viz. heaven). Only in a 
second-order sense does the term “desirous of heaven” signify the actual eligible ritual 
participant. This is the conclusion of those who understand the heart of Mīmāṃsā.279
Lakṣmīdhara insists that the ability of singing God's name to remove sins does not rest on 
the agent. He does not have to be afflicted, or desire release from that affliction (anutāpa), in 
order for singing God's name to work. It just so happens that the act of singing does that already. 
Just as the Vedic injunction to perform a sacrifice to attain heaven does not depend on the agent's 
desire to attain heaven, the purāṇic statement that singing—here recalled to the mind by the 
mention of “remembering” God's name—is enough to expiate one's sins does not depend on any 
qualification on the part of the singer. The statement he cites here is not an injunction per se, but 
by offering an “encouragement” (prarocana), it functions as an arthavāda that recalls previous 
purāṇic injunctions to sing God's name. Thus the language of the entire purāṇic corpus can be 
treated Mīmāṃsically, if we will, as if it were the language of the Veda—because it is.
I have spent this much time concentrating on these properly Mīmāṃsā topics because the 
majority of the BNK turns on just such increasingly fine debates. The author is familiar with 
278 Anantadeva comments: “The thought-process behind this 'provocation' is that this act of singing will remove 
saṃsāra because it has as its result the remembrance of God.” See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 113, ll.21-22 
(Prakāśa comm.): etatkīrtanaṃ saṃsāranivartakaṃ harismaraṇaphalakatvād iti bhāvaḥ |
279 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 110: yo hi yasmād anutaptas tasya tannivṛttir eva hitaṃ tataś ca pāpād anutaptasya 
kīrtanaṃ hitasādhanam ityukte pāpakṣayasādhanam ityuktaṃ bhakvati, paraśabdaś ca kevalaśabdaparyāyaḥ, 
kīrtanam eva puṣkalaṃ sādhanam ityarthaḥ | ekam api sakṛd iti ca harikīrtanasya sarvasyaiva smārakatvāt 
saṃsmaraṇam ityanuvādaḥ, sa ca prarocanaphalaḥ; samīcīnaṃ hy etad iti, svargakāmādipadam api 
samīhitalakṣaṇasya vidheḥ prathamāpekṣitasamīhitaviśeṣaṇasamarpaṇaparam eva na puruṣaparam, arthatas tu 
svargakāmo 'adhikārīti mīmāṃsāhṛdayavedināṃ nirṇayaḥ |
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Nyāya as well, paraphrasing Udayana's Ātmatattvaviveka,280 but its presence is negligible 
compared with the overwhelming Mīmāṃsā emphasis of the text. And no wonder: for the 
purāṇa as a genre to be officially reckoned among the canon of Sanskrit scripture would have 
required engaging with the norms of the pre-eminent discourse on the topic.281 The BNK 
demonstrates a shift in the way intellectuals trained in Mīmāṃsā perceived the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa: not merely as a supplementary source, but as an independently authoritative scripture.
The BNK in the World of Vedānta
If the BNK's relationship with Pūrva Mīmāṃsā was fractious, what about the latter, 
Uttara Mīmāṃsā? As I suggested in the previous chapter, Lakṣmīdhara's probable predecessor 
Śrīdhara Svāmin belonged to a class of Vedāntins concentrated in Orissa who sought to re-
envision their relationship to “classical” Advaita Vedānta. Even on that classical side, beginning 
with Ānandagiri and Anubhūtisvarūpācārya in the thirteenth century, Advaita Vedāntins in Orissa 
embarked on a project of canonizing Śaṅkara's works, while distancing themselves from the 
competing Advaita of his contemporary Maṇḍana Miśra.282 Lakṣmīdhara invokes a different set 
of sources for his bhakti-infused Vedānta. These include not only a wide range of both Śaiva and 
280 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 96: sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpaka upādhir ity asminn udayananaye yujyata 
evopādhitvam | Cf. The Ātmatattvaviveka of Śrī Udayanāchārya, ed. Dhundiraja Sastri (Benares: Chowkhamba 
Sanskrit Series, 1940), 403 (Īśvarasiddhiprakaraṇa 4.5): kaḥ punar upādhiḥ, sādhyaprayojakaṃ nimittāntaram | 
kim asya lakṣaṇam, sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam |
281 Annabel Brett's comments on the strategies which authors must use in order to make intellectual interventions 
are particularly germane to Lakṣmīdhara's efforts in the BNK: “Any prospective agent is limited not only in what 
he or she can conceive, but also in what he or she can legitimate or justify, by the shared horizons of expectation 
implicit in a particular language. Because of the link between public discourse and public action, an agent 
proposing an innovative course of action would necessarily also need to engage in one of several possible 
linguistic strategies (the most common of which is attempting to redescribe the proposed action within the 
normative terminology of the prevailing discourse).” See Annabel Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?”, in 
What is History Now?, ed. David Cannadine (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 119.
282 See note 99 above. Anubhūtisvarūpācārya famously denounced the ninth-century commentator Vācaspati Miśra 
as “Maṇḍana's piggyback rider” (maṇḍanapṛṣṭhasevī).
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Vaiṣṇava purāṇic sources, especially the Viṣṇudharma, but also sectarian Āgamas, and late 
Upaniṣads like the Nṛsiṃhatāpanīya. The theology of liberation within the BNK does not in and 
of itself allow us to categorize Lakṣmīdhara as one kind of Vedāntin or another, even though his 
Advaitamakaranda leaves little doubt. If he did inhabit the Advaita world, however, he did so at 
an oblique angle.
For example, in the following passage from the third chapter of the BNK, an opponent 
suggests that the author's talk about “singing” (kīrtana) or “remembering” (anusmaraṇa) the 
name of Kṛṣṇa actually stands for something more important: the Advaitic realization of the Self 
within all. He argues that one should interpret references to a personal god and devotional 
practice in a language appropriate to Advaita Vedānta:
Objection: Well, who wouldn't say that “remembering Kṛṣṇa” can remove all sins, from 
the most heinous to the miscellaneous? After all, that is nothing but knowledge of 
Brahman (brahmavidyā). You see, the word “Kṛṣṇa” breaks down like this: either a) the 
one who ploughs up (kṛṣati)—that is, tears up or splits apart—the forest of saṃsāra; or b) 
the one who attracts (karṣati)—that is, brings under control—all ignorance. In other 
words, Kṛṣṇa is the Supreme Self (paramātmā) in the form of eternal bliss. […] To think 
on that most excellent eternal bliss, the Self of all, over and over again is in fact 
meditation (nididhyāsana), characterized either by repeated concentration on a single 
concept or by the complete removal of heterogeneous thoughts. Nididhyāsana serves as 
an auxiliary to achieving the result of “hearing [the Upaniṣads]” (śravaṇa), which leads to 
the direct perception of the Self as truth (ātmasatattvasākṣātkāra), by removing doubts 
about its impossibility. In the same way, destroying the sins that prevent that same 
liberating knowledge also becomes a means to achieving it.283
From the vantage point of “classical” Advaita, this sort of interpretation would have 
seemed quite sensible. The opponent invokes the common Vedāntic triad of śravaṇa, manana, 
283 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 62-63: nanu ko nāma na brūte kṛṣṇānusmaraṇaṃ 
mahāpātakādiprakīrṇāntasarvāghasaṃharaṇam iti, sā hi brahmavidyā, tathā hi kṛṣati vilikhati vidārayati 
saṃsārāṭavīm iti vā karṣati ākarṣati ātmasātkaroti vā 'jñānam iti vā kṛṣṇaḥ paramātmā sadānandarūpo vā [...] 
tasmān niravadyasya sarveṣām ātmabhūtasya sadānandasyānusmaraṇaṃ punaḥ punaś cintanaṃ 
sajātīyapratyayāvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ vijātīyapratyayanirodhalakṣaṇaṃ vā nididhyāsanam iha upādīyate tasya ca 
ātmasatattvasākṣātkārakāraṇabhūtaṃ śravaṇaṃ prati phalopakāryaṅgabhūtasya asambhāvanānirāsavat 
tatpratibandhakapātakapradhvaṃso 'pi dvārakāryaṃ bhavaty eva […]
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and nididhyāsana, a kind of program of scriptural study that culminates in self-knowledge. He 
offers an Advaitic metaphysics for the word “Kṛṣṇa,” which merely refers to the Supreme Self: 
all-pervading, free of attributes, undifferentiated. He also offers an etymology for the word that is 
not too farfetched. In fact, we might speculate that this sort of reading of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa 
was prevalent in the milieu into which Lakṣmīdhara made his intellectual intervention. His 
response is quite unambiguous:
Reply: This line of reasoning is unbecoming. First of all, the word “Kṛṣṇa” means 
conventionally that Brahman whose skin is dark as the Tamāla tree, and who suckled at 
Yaśodā's breast. And as the maxim goes, the conventional meaning trumps the 
etymological. But even if it were derivative, the term still refers in every way to that 
crest-jewel among cowherds, whose eternal bliss sparkles through his own perpetual 
glory, having completely cast aside the fog of ignorance—that one who bestows the 
unfettered joy of liberation to everyone from the women of Gokula, who transgressed all 
boundaries while caught in the irresistible clutches of love; to enemies like Pūtanā, whose 
entire behavior was unrestrained, out of control, possessed by an extremely volatile 
wrath; to the birds, animals, and snakes along the Yamunā River, whose consciousness 
was totally diverted [from him]; and even to the trees, bushes, creepers, and herbs of 
Vṛndāvana, whose sense-faculties were wrapped in the dense veils of delusion. He is the 
one we understand [as Kṛṣna], not the attributeless Brahman, since it is the most common 
referent of the word and most immediately intuitive.284
According to Lakṣmīdhara, “Kṛṣṇa” does not stand in for any higher reality; he is 
uniquely himself. This explicit claim to the distinctiveness of a personal Kṛṣṇa over the 
impersonal Brahman is more than a question of metaphysics. It also displays a clear preference 
for the practical alternative of bhakti. The character of liberation is the same—immediate 
apprehension of the Self—but it is accessible to a wider, much less austere range of beings.  
284 Ibid., 64: idam asundaram, kṛṣṇaśabdasya tamālaśyāmalatviṣi yaśodāstanandhaye brahmaṇi rūḍḥatvād, rūḍhir 
yogam apaharati iti nyāyāt | yaugikatve vā durvāramadanamahāgrahagṛhītatayā samullaṅghitasakalasetūnāṃ 
gokulakāminīnām, ativiṣamaroṣāveśavivaśaviśṛṅkhalasakalakaraṇavṛttīnāṃ pūtanāprabhṛtīnām aratīnām, 
atyantaparācīnacetasāṃ yamunāvanapaśupakṣisarīsṛpāṇām, atibahalamohapaṭalīpinaddhasarvendriyāṇāṃ 
vṛndāvanatarugulmalatāvīrudhām api muktisukham anivāritaṃ vitarato nityanirastanīhāratayā 
nirantarasvamahimasamullasadanantānandasya gopālaśiromaṇeḥ sarvaprakāro 'pi yogo 'syaiva iti tasyaiva iha 
grahaṇaṃ na nirguṇasya brahmaṇaḥ prayogaprācuryāt tatraiva prathamapratīter udayāt |
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But that this debate takes place within and not outside the realm of Advaita Vedānta is made clear 
later in the third chapter. Here, an opponent challenges Lakṣmīdhara to explain how the act of 
singing (kīrtana), being an activity, can lead to liberation. As all Vedāntins know, it is knowledge 
(jñāna) and not action (karma) that leads to liberation:
Objection: Surely kīrtana is an activity, and activities cannot result in liberation. Great 
teachers have explained through the reasoning of śruti, smṛti, itihāsapurāṇa, and āgama, 
that knowledge is the sole means to that [viz. liberation]. 
Reply: Only as a means to knowledge is [kīrtana] a means to liberation. It is for this very 
reason that meditation (samādhi) is enjoined with respect to [producing an] effect, for 
neither is samādhi a means to liberation. If you ask what it is, it is nothing but a means to 
knowledge—moreover, not directly, like “hearing [the Upaniṣads]” (śravaṇa), but rather 
by way of eradicating obstructions. So too is the case with kīrtana.285
In the Advaita Vedānta triad of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, or hearing, 
reflecting, and meditating on the teachings of the Upaniṣads, only the first is supposed to lead 
directly to liberation. This is because the object of that liberating knowledge—Brahman—is not 
in fact an object, but constitutes one's own Self, Ātman. Thus it cannot be achieved or attained by 
some activity; it is not “out there” for one to get, it can only be known. In other words, hearing 
the Upaniṣadic statement that you are Brahman should be enough to make you realize that you 
are Brahman. Because that patently does not happen, early Advaitins interpreted manana and 
nididhyāsana (here called samādhi) as auxiliary disciplines that help effect the result of 
śravaṇa.286 Here Lakṣmīdhara analogizes the work of kīrtana to that of samādhi; it is not 
285 Ibid., 120: nanu kīrtanaṃ kriyā, na ca kriyāsādhano mokṣaḥ, tasya śrutismṛtītihāsapurāṇāgamayuktibhir 
jñānaikopāyatvenācāryair avadhāritatvād jñānasādhanatvam eva tasya mokṣasādhanatvam, ata eva samādheḥ 
kārye vidhānaṃ, na hi samādhir api mokṣasādhanaṃ, kiṃ tarhi ? jñānasādhanam eva, tad api na sākṣāt 
śravaṇavad, api tu pratibandhanirāsadvāreṇa, evaṃ kīrtanam api |
286 This whole process remains inscrutable to many philosophers and scholars of Advaita Vedānta. It clearly also 
bothered Advaitins themselves, who, at some historical juncture, began to privilege meditation and similar yogic 
practices, eventually making a Yogic Advaita commonplace. This is the subject of a forthcoming essay by Jason 
Schwartz, “Parabrahman Among the Yogins,” International Journal of Hindu Studies, forthcoming.
On problems with the actual mechanics of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, see John Taber, “Review: 
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enjoined as a direct means to liberation, for it is an activity, but only mediately, as a means to 
knowledge, the same liberating knowledge offered by the Upaniṣads. Despite his riveting 
exposition of an intimately personal God, and commitment to embodied practices of worship, 
Lakṣmīdhara does not assign ultimate value to his subject matter. Singing the name of God 
emerges as an independent but intermediary step in a much more complex hierarchy that 
Lakṣmīdhara attributes to the BhP itself:
Here is the sequence: 1) From kīrtana comes the dissolution of sins. 2) Its repetition leads 
to the accumulation of appropriate latent tendencies (vāsanās) and the removal of sinful 
vāsanās. 3) Then comes uninterrupted engagement in the service of God's devotees. 4) 
From that comes an unwavering blessed bhakti toward the Supreme God whose glory is 
described by [those devotees]. 5) Then the total erasure of sorrow and so forth. 6) From 
that comes a super-abundance of purity. 7) Then the direct experience of the truth 
(tattvasākṣātkāra). 8) Then liberation (mukti). This has been explicated in the Bhāgavata 
in great detail. [...]
Now say that one who has heard the settled doctrine of the Upaniṣads 
(śrutiśiraḥsiddhānta), on account of some obstruction, finds that access to the knowledge 
Freedom Through Inner Renunciation: Śaṅkara's Philosophy in a New Light,” Journal of the American Oriental  
Society 123.3 (2003): 695: “When all is said and done...we still have a very poor understanding of how Śaṅkara 
thought liberation is supposed to come about. The picture we are presented with is roughly the following: 
liberation results from a full comprehension of the identity of the self with Brahman, which is achieved through 
the 'discipline of knowledge,' namely, the hearing, reflecting, and meditating upon crucial Vedanta texts, which in 
turn is somehow supported by the purification of the mind brought about by the observance of prescribed rituals 
as well as the practices of yoga. How do the immediate and remote means of liberation really work? Are the 
reflection and meditation on the word that lead directly to realization, for example, akin to puzzling over a math 
problem? We have some notion of what Śaṅkara means by manana: the progressive as-certainment of the 
meaning of the Upaniṣad statements and the successive removal, through independent reflection, of 
misconceptions about the self. But what is nididhyāsana? Is it merely the continuous flow of attention on the 
truth once realized, as some texts (e.g., BAUBh 1.4.7) suggest, or is it a repetition of the mediate, discursive 
knowledge of the self acquired from the Upaniṣads until a vivid, direct experience of reality is attained? To be 
sure, Śaṅkara rejects the latter...as an enjoined means of liberation, yet he also allows that if hearing the 
mahāvākya once does not produce realization, it must be repeated. How, if it doesn't work the first time, can it 
work later? Here, perhaps, 'purity of mind' is crucial, which Śaṅkara mentions in various places as conducive to 
the direct realization of the meaning of the Vedānta passages. But what is that and how does it function? Is it like 
the clarity of mind one has upon awakening from a good night's sleep, which enables one to see the solution to 
the math problem one couldn't see the night before? Śaṅkara nowhere discusses it. In general, what is the change 
that takes place that converts a mediate knowledge of the self—the mere intellectual understanding 'I am 
Brahman,' which makes no difference in my life—into a direct, life-transforming realization, and how do the 
various practices that Śaṅkara mentions throughout his works but never really explains or connects together, 
contribute to it? This, I would maintain, is what we, as scholars outside the tradition, do not yet, and indeed may 
never, understand.”
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of truth (tattvajñāna) has been closed, as it were. For such a person, bhakti for God 
opens up that knowledge of truth by removing the obstruction in the fashion described 
above. However, if someone has not heard the doctrine of Vedānta at all, he may repeat 
ad infinitum the names of Lord Nṛsiṃha, alias the great Viṣṇu seated on a throne as the 
lord of the ambrosial river that is Prahlāda's heart, the sole controller of the world, the 
great ocean of uninhibited compassion. When he leaves his body, the Lord himself will 
instruct him in the knowledge of the self (ātmajñāna) that saves him from saṃsāra.287
Two points from this passage merit further comment. First, Lakṣmīdhara does not 
essentially disagree with the Advaita Vedānta principle that self-knowledge is the source of 
liberation, and that liberation is the ultimate goal of human life. He does, however, offer an 
alternative route to how one might achieve self-knowledge outside the bounds of the Upaniṣads, 
just as he does in the previous passage about bhakti to Kṛṣṇa. The second point concerns 
Lakṣmīdhara's invocation of the deity Nṛsiṃha. As I suggested toward the beginning of this 
chapter, Nṛsiṃha was clearly central to the religious world that Śrīdhara and Lakṣmīdhara 
inhabited.288 In his learned study of the legend of Prahlāda, Paul Hacker pointed out that the 
287 Ibid., 120-121: tatrāyaṃ kramaḥ - kīrtanāt pāpakṣayaḥ, tadāvṛttyā tadviṣayāṇāṃ vāsanānāṃ pracayaḥ; apacayaś 
ca pāpavāsanānāṃ, tato bhagavajjanasevāsātatyaṃ, tatas tadupavarṇitamahimani bhagavati puṇyaślokeśvare 
bhāgavatī naiṣṭhikī bhaktiḥ, tataḥ śokādīnām atyantocchedaḥ, tataḥ sattvasya paramotkarṣaḥ, tatas 
tattvasākṣātkāraḥ, tato muktir iti, ayam arthaḥ śrībhāgavate savistaram upavarṇitaḥ | […] tatra 
śrutiśiraḥsiddhāntaṃ yasya śrutavato 'pi kutaścit pratibandhāt tattvajñānam utpannam api nimīlitam iva tasya 
bhagavadbhaktir uktayā rītyā pratibandhaṃ nirudhya tattvajñānam unmīlayati, yaḥ punar aśrutavedāntasiddhānta 
eva jagadekaniyantur niryantraṇadayā'mṛtamahārṇavasya mahāviṣṇoḥ 
prahlādahṛdayasudhāsaritpatiparyaṅkaśāyinaḥ śrīnṛsiṃhasya nāmāni nirantaram āvartayati; tasya bhagavān 
svayam eva dehāvasānasamaye saṃsāratārakam ātmajñanam anugṛṇāti |
288 The very first verse of Śrīdhara's commentary on the BhP invokes Nṛsiṃha (my trans.):
vāgīśā yasya vadane lakṣmīr yasya ca vakṣasi |
yasyāste hṛdaye saṃvit taṃ nṛsiṃham ahaṃ bhaje ||
“On whose tongue is the goddess of speech; and on whose chest is Lakṣmī; in whose heart consciousness abides
—that Nṛsiṃha do I worship.”
Christopher Minkowski points out that Śrīdhara devotes special attention to the Vedastuti section of the BhP 
(10.87): “At the end of the commentary to each verse he supplies an ornate verse of his own creation that 
summarizes the commentary, under the same conceit as the Vedastuti itself, in the form of a praise to his 
preferred deity, Narahari.” See Christopher Minkowski, “The Vedastuti and Vedic Studies: Nīlakāṇṭha on 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa X.87,” in The Vedas: Texts, Langauge, Ritual, edited by Arlo Griffiths and Jan E.M. Houben 
(Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2004), 130.
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Narasiṃha Purāṇa engenders devotion to the divine name of Viṣṇu, combined with the visually 
entrancing emotional bhakti we find characteristic of the BhP and the BNK.289 He also 
demonstrated that Prahlāda was a figure of Advaitic importance in the BhP—much more so there 
than in any other Vedānta circles, but resistant to being easily categorized within one school or 
another.290 The figure of Nṛsiṃha here is not merely indicative of the author's geographical 
provenance, but also his religious and philosophical sensibilities. In the passage immediately 
following the one quoted above, Lakṣmīdhara elaborates on a section from the Nṛsiṃhatāpanīya 
Upaniṣad, as proof of his claim that praise (stuti) of God ultimately results in the revelation of 
self-knowledge, since when God is pleased by that praise, he himself bestows self-knowledge.291 
He follows with an etymologically creative reading of a mantra from the Ṛg Veda (1.156.3),292 
which for him prefigures the claim that singing the name of Viṣṇu results, eventually, in the 
realization of Brahman.293 Attempts to find Viṣṇu as the Supreme God in the Veda was a common 
289 Gerhard Oberhammer, “Review: Prahlāda: Werden und Wandlungen einer Idealgestalt,” Oriens 17 (1964): 269.
290 See Friedhelm Hardy, Viraha-Bhakti: the early history of Kṛṣṇa devotion in South India (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 538: “Hacker has said of the Prahlāda-episode in the BhP that 'its philosophical teaching 
agrees with the monistic Vedānta to a great extent […] but although it shows an unmistakable leaning towards 
the philosophy of the advaita school, yet it does not appear to be simply identical with any branch of this 
school.'”
291 Nṛsiṃhatāpanīya Upaniṣad 4.4: prajāpatir abravīd etair mantrair nityaṃ devaṃ stuvadhvam | tato devaḥ prīto 
bhavati svātmānaṃ darśayati tasmād ya etair mantrair nityaṃ devaṃ stauti sa devaṃ paśyati so 'mṛtatvaṃ ca 
gacchati ya evaṃ vedeti mahopaniṣat |
292 tam u stotāraḥ pūrvyaṃ yathā vida
ṛtasya garbhaṃ januṣā pipartana |
āsya jānanto nāma cidviviktana
mahas te viṣṇo sumatiṃ bhajāmahe ||
“Hymners, propitiate of your own accord that ancient Vishnu, since you know him as the germ of sacrifice; 
cognizant of his greatness, celebrate his name: may we, Vishnu, enjoy thy favour.”
See H.H. Wilson, trans., Ṛig-Veda Sanhitā: A Collection of Ancient Hindu Hymns, Constituting the Second  
Ashṭaka, or Book, of the Ṛig-Veda (London: W.H. Allen & Co, 1854), 98.
293 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 124: bhajāmaha iti brahmavidyām āśāsānāḥ kīrtayatetyarthaḥ, tataś 
cāpavargaphalakajñānasādhanatvam evāpavargasādhanatvaṃ kīrtanasya |
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practice among promulgators of the Śrīvaiṣṇava and Mādhva traditions of Vedānta.294 However, 
neither Sāyaṇa295 nor Madhva,296 two prior commentators on the Ṛg Veda, reads the verse this 
way, supporting the notion that Lakṣmīdhara's interpretations are the product of a unique local 
intellectual milieu.297
It is important to be clear about the degree of difference between the BNK and previous 
Vedānta traditions in this regard. Prior to Lakṣmīdhara, theologians of the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition 
engaged in their own way with texts that promoted bhakti to God's name. In the twelfth century, 
Rāmānuja's younger contemporary Parāśara Bhaṭṭar wrote a Sanskrit commentary on the 
Viṣṇusahasranāma, the “Thousand Names of Viṣṇu.”298 This text from the Anuśāsana Parvan of 
294 See Valerie Stoker, “Vedic Language and Vaiṣṇava Theology: Madhva's Use of Nirukta in his Ṛgbhāṣya,” 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 35.2 (2007): 169-199.
295 See Max Müller, ed., Rig-Veda-Sanhita with the Commentary of Sayanacharya, Volume II (London: W.H. Allen 
& Co, 1854), 200.
296 See Ṛgbhāṣyam & Khaṇḍārthanirṇaya, ed. Bannaje Govindacharya (Udipi: Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahā 
Mandala Publication, 1973).
297 Perhaps not coincidentally, Śrīdhara cites Ṛg Veda 1.156.3 briefly in his commentary on BhP 6.2.8, which I have 
translated above. Although I do not have the space to develop the point, Lakṣmīdhara's understanding of mantras 
in the course of this interpretation is rather strange in the light of earlier Mīmāṃsā discourse. In support of the 
claim that mantras can be injunctive, Lakṣmīdhara cites a verse from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Tantravārttika 2.1.31 
(See Mīmāṃsādarśana Vol. 1B, 432):
vidhiśaktir niyogena na mantrasyopanīyate |
tato vidhāsyati hy eṣa niyogāt smārayiṣyati ||
This is a curious citation, since the verse forms part of the pūrvapakṣa to the mantrāvidhāyakatvādhikaraṇa (MS 
2.1.8.30-31) which answers the question as to whether or not the injunctive words occurring in mantras, 
inasmuch as they are the same as those occurring in corresponding Brāhmaṇa passages, have injunctive potency. 
This pūrvapakṣa is met by the siddhānta which says that mantras are injunctive only insofar as they recall to the 
mind that which has been enjoined by the Brāhmaṇa. In the verse cited above, the pūrvapakṣin concedes that 
mantras can serve to recall the enjoined Brāhmaṇa passage, yet insists that this does not vitiate the possibility 
that mantras may have their own injunctive potency. It is the pūrvapakṣin who further cites a mantra (Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa 13.5.1[13]) to prove his point that there are verbs in mantras which serve the purpose of injunction, 
and conversely, that there are verbs in the Brāhmaṇas which do not have injunctive power. Cf. Jha, 
Tantravārttika, 565-569. Why Lakṣmīdhara so blatantly mobilizes a prima facie position, an act that also goes 
completely unrecognized by his commentator Anantadeva, is unclear to me.
298 See Vasudha Narayanan, “Singing the Glory of the Divine Name: Parāśara Bhaṭṭar's Commentary on the Viṣṇu 
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the epic Mahābhārata became extremely popular in many cultures of recitation across southern 
India. In the introductory portion of his commentary, Parāśara Bhaṭṭar quotes many of the same 
authorities as Lakṣmīdhara (especially the Viṣṇudharma and Viṣṇu Purāṇa) in support of the 
claim that merely uttering the name of God relieves one from suffering.299 In keeping with 
Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition, he asserts that this path of bhakti is open to members of all caste-classes, in 
whatever state they find themselves. There is no prohibition with respect to taking the name of 
God, who is the most intimate friend, as compassionate as a mother to her son.300 Moreover, he 
assures us that none of these statements should be considered arthavāda, since they express no 
exaggeration.301
So far it seems that Parāśara Bhaṭṭar has anticipated Lakṣmīdhara, but the differences 
should give us pause. First, although he quotes several purāṇas in his commentary, Parāśara 
Bhaṭṭar explicitly ranks the itihāsa over the purāṇa as a source of authority.302 Second, he is 
hardly concerned with Mīmāṃsā responses to his claims, and goes so far as to concede that, 
although we should not consider statements about the name of God to be arthavāda, if one did 
happen to do so, they would be sufficient authorities in their own right, so long as they were not 
superseded.303 Third, in direct contrast to Lakṣmīdhara's relative ecumenicism, Parāśara Bhaṭṭar 
Sahasranāma,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 2.2 (1994): 85-98.
299 See A. Srinivasa Raghavan, trans., Sri Visnusahasranama with the Bhashya of Sri Parasara Bhattar (Madras: Sri 
Visishtadvaita Pracharini Sabha, 1983), 47-48.
300 Ibid., 50: yuktaś caiṣaḥ sarvāvasthenāpi puruṣeṇa mātur iva putreṇa paramavatsalasya sarvabandhoḥ 
nisargasuhṛdaś ca bhagavato nāmagrahaṇādāv apratiṣedhaḥ |
301 Ibid., 56: na ca eteṣām arthavādatvaṃ śakyaśaṅkam anativāditvāt |
302 Ibid., 4, 8: purāṇebhya itihāsotkarṣe vivakṣite […]; purāṇebhyo balavattaraṃ bahavo buddhiśālino 'dhyavasasuḥ |
303 Ibid., 58: kiṃ ca prabalapramāṇavirodhābhāve arthavādapadānām api svataḥ prāmāṇyataḥ svārthaparityāgaś ca 
sāhasam anyāyyatvāt |
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is emphatic that Viṣṇu alone, not Brahmā or Śiva, is the Lord spoken of by every scripture 
imaginable.304 The BhP, moreover, hardly features at all in Śrīvaiṣṇava writing, and when it does, 
its reputation is generally negative. When Vedānta Deśika writes his Rahasyatrayasāra in the 
thirteenth century, he places significant limits on the power of God's name to purify one's sins. 
After quoting a series of verses from the BhP (6.2.14, 6.3.24, 7.1.32) that we also find in the 
BNK extolling the liberating power of God's name, Vedānta Deśika warns that these passages 
should not be taken as literally true:
They only mean that, if the man has no hatred for Bhagavan, the mention of Bhagavan's 
name is extremely purificatory […] Certainly it does not mean that derisive speech 
concerning Bhagavan and the like would destroy sins […] It is said in the Bhagavatam 
that...in some way or other, those who are associated with Sri Krishna will obtain 
redemption, provided they have done good deeds in the past […] These...ślokas refer to 
individuals who had a special competency owing to good deeds done in past lives.305
It is certainly possible that the Śrīvaiṣṇavas influenced the concerns of the BNK. For 
example, on occasion Lakṣmīdhara mentions the aṣṭākṣarabrahmavidyā,306 referring to the eight-
syllable mantra “Om Namo Nārāyaṇāya,” which forms a subject of discussion in Vedānta 
Deśika's Rahasyatrayasāra, where it is also known in Tamil as the Tirumantra.307 Moreover, 
Lakṣmīdhara gave a place of privilege to the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas. Even when not quoting them 
304 Ibid., 75-76: tathā hi upaniṣadādiṣu paratattvasya...vidhihariśivādiviśeṣaparyavasitākāṅkṣāyām “nārāyaṇa paraṃ 
brahma tattvaṃ nārāyaṇdaḥ paraḥ” […] ityādibhiḥ […] khalu bhagavato niraṅkuśaiśvaryaṃ taditaraniṣkarṣaś ca |
305 See M.R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, trans., Srimad Rahasyatrayasāra (Kumbakonam: Agnihothram Ramanuja 
Thathachariar), 340-341.
306 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 87: āvṛttiśravaṇād eva pāpatāratamyād āvṛttitāratamyaṃ kalpyate, śrūyate ca tad 
aṣṭākṣarabrahmavidyāyāṃ [Untraced] - “gomūtrayāvakāhāro brahmahā māsikair japaiḥ | pūyate tata evārvāṅ 
mahāpātakino'pare ||” ityādi |
Ibid., 112: “gomūtrayāvakāhāro brahmahā māsikair japaiḥ |” ityādāvapi mokṣasādhanatvād 
aṣṭākṣarabrahmavidyāyāḥ...
307 Srimad Rahasyatrayasāra, 346ff. Vedānta Deśika refers here to the mantra's origin in the Nāradīya Kalpa, which 
may have been Lakṣmīdhara's source as well.
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directly, he placed them in a continuum with the śruti and the purāṇa.308 In places, Lakṣmīdhara 
also seems to have paraphrased the commentary on the Viṣṇu Purāṇa by the Śrīvaiṣṇava 
Viṣṇucitta.309 Nevertheless, Lakṣmīdhara was also comfortable quoting positively the 
Naiṣkarmyasiddhi by Sureśvara, that most uncompromising of Advaitins.310 And given his 
authorship of the Advaitamakaranda, which would become a classic of Advaita Vedānta 
literature,311 as well as his responses to Advaitic interpretations of the BhP, he was probably 
steeped in an Advaita climate. So what kind of Vedānta was this?
One way to approach this question is to understand the BNK's varied reception history. 
Although Śrīdhara Svāmin's commentary on the BhP spread widely throughout the subcontinent 
308 See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 79, where Lakṣmīdhara defines bhakti as the God-consciousness of people engaged 
in the activities prescribed by śruti, purāṇas, and the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas: 
śrutipurāṇavaiṣṇavāgamavihitaśravaṇādikarmapravaṇānām indriyāṇām...bhāgavatī vṛttir bhaktir iti |
309 Lakṣmīdhara's comments regarding the “easiness” of singing God's name verses the “difficulty” of smārta 
practices such as the twelve-year vow of expiation may have been influenced by Viṣṇucitta's commentary on 
Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.6.45. See Śrīviṣṇupurāṇam śrīviṣṇucittīyākhyayā vyākhyayā sametam, ed. Aṇṇaṅgarācārya 
(Kāñcīpuram: Granthamālā Kāryālaya, 1972), 135: 
na caivaṃ sukare nāmakīrtanādau sati duṣkare dvādaśavārṣikādau puruṣāṇām apravṛtter manvādivākyānām 
ananuṣṭhānalakṣaṇo bādha iti śaṅkanīyam | bhagavatparāṅmukhānāṃ guruṣu prāyaścitteṣu saśraddhānāṃ 
pravṛtteḥ |
Similar sentiments are expressed in Śrīdhara's commentary on the same verse, where interestingly he refers to his 
Bhāvārthadīpikā for more details, establishing a chronology of their composition. See Viṣṇupurāṇa with Sanskrit  
Commentary of Sridharacharya, 220:
etad uktaṃ bhavati – dvādaśābdādikaṃ hi deśakālādhikāriniyamādyapekṣaṃ yathāvadanuṣṭhitaṃ kālāntare 
pāpakṣayahetuḥ, idaṃ (harisaṃsmaraṇaṃ) tu na tathā [...] na caivaṃ sati dvādaśābdādismṛter ānarthakyaṃ 
śaṅkanīyaṃ nāmādau śraddhāśūnyānāṃ tatraiva pravṛtteḥ | vispaṣṭañ caitad bhāgavatabhāvārthadīpikāyāṃ 
prapañcitam ity uparamyate |
310 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 108: naiṣkarmyasiddhikārair api “upāyān prāptihānārthān śāstraṃ bhāsayate 'rkavat” 
iti | Cf. The Naishkarmyasiddhi of Sureśvaracharya with the Chandrika of Jnanottama, ed. Col. G.A. Jacob 
(Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, 1891), 21:
hitaṃ saṃprepsatāṃ mohād ahitaṃ ca jihāsatām |
upāyān prāptihanārthān śāstraṃ bhāsayate 'rkavat || 1.29 ||
311 See Christopher Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern History,” South Asian History and Culture 2.2 
(2011): 210.
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soon after its composition, its unique brand of Advaitic theism may have been transported to 
Bengal in particular by one Mādhavendra Purī.312 In his celebrated essay on the subject, 
Friedhelm Hardy proposed that elements of Ālvār bhakti entered the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism of 
Caitanya and his followers through the figure of Mādhavendra. After offering a schematic 
illustration of the historical connections between Śrīdhara Svāmin, Mādhavendra and Viṣṇu Purī, 
and Caitanya himself, Hardy was forced to direct his attention to a stylistic analysis of 
Mādhavendra's poetry in comparison with South Indian texts. He also ruefully conceded:
That Mādhavendra was a Śāṅkarite monk rather compounds than answers the question; 
that he can be connected with a whole stream of religious attitudes within advaita does 
not help either, since this trend is not explained either. At the most one can say that it 
centres around the Bhāgavata-purāṇa.313
After our investigations in the previous chapter, and our study of the BNK, we are in a position 
to understand this process better. We now have a wider set of texts and contexts for a form of 
Advaita Vedānta burgeoning in medieval Orissa, connected in some way to Śaṅkara but 
departing from him in very identifiable ways.
What is more difficult to explain, however, is the ambivalence with which this heritage 
was treated by participants in Caitanya's movement. However much it may have unnerved later 
Gauḍīya hagiographers, the positive presence of Advaita Vedānta in the early Caitanya tradition 
is quite well-known; Caitanya is supposed to have been formally initiated into the Daśanāmī 
monastic order of Advaita ascetics.314 On the other hand, it is also clear from the narrative 
tradition that Caitanya was engaged in polemical activity against Advaitins, both at home (as in 
312 See Hardy, “Mādhavendra Purī: A Link between Bengal Vaiṣṇavism and South Indian Bhakti,” Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1 (1974): 23-41.
313 Ibid., 37.
314 See De, Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal, 15-20.
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the purported conversion of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma),315 as well as in the Advaita stronghold of 
Banaras. Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's Caitanyacaritāmṛta gives us alternately rueful and bullish 
accounts of Caitanya's activities in that city. In Chapter 17 of the Madhya Līlā, Caitanya is more 
or less laughed out of town by the Advaitin Prakāśānanda and his cohorts, while in Chapter 25 
the famous renunciate is made to recant his ways, and acknowledge Caitanya's greatness.316 The 
tension between an Advaita that was acceptable to (indeed, revered by) Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, in 
contrast with its contemporary degeneration and decadence, was present in narrative and 
philosophy alike. Ravi Gupta has discussed the efforts by Jīva Gosvāmin (fl. 1560 CE) to 
construct a solid foundation of philosophical argument and understanding for the devotional 
edifice of Caitanya's Vaiṣṇavism. Gupta shows how Jīva worked creatively with the resources 
available to him from multiple Vedānta traditions—selecting freely from Rāmānuja, Śrīdhara 
Svāmin, Madhva, and even Śaṅkara—to carve out a space for his acintyabhedābheda 
philosophy.317 Jīva's debt to Śrīdhara, however, is acknowledged in a curious fashion in his 
Tattvasandarbha, worth quoting here:
Our interpretation (vyākhyā) [of the BhP], however, representing a kind of commentary 
(bhāṣya), will be written in accordance with the views of the great Vaiṣṇava, the revered 
Śrīdhara Svāmin, only insofar as they conform to proper Vaiṣṇava teaching, [since] his 
writings were interspersed with the doctrines of Advaita, no doubt in order that he might 
persuade Advaita ideologues—who nowadays pervade the central regions (madhyadeśa)
—to become absorbed in the greatness of the Lord.318
315 This instructor of some of the foremost early modern exponents of Navya Nyāya is also said to have written a 
commentary on Lakṣmīdhara's own Advaitamakaranda. This appears to be the only extant commentary on the 
Advaitamakaranda prior to Svayaṃprakāśa's Rasābhivyañjikā all the way in the seventeenth century.
316 Dimock and Stewart, The Caitanya Caritamrta, 586-590 and 761-763, respectively. Prakāśānanda would have 
been a prime candidate for anti-Advaita polemic, given the popularity of his radical form of illusionism—the 
dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda—after the composition of his Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī around the turn of the 16th century. See 
Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern History,” 213.
317 See Ravi Gupta, The Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of Jīva Gosvāmin (London: Routledge, 2007), 63-91.
318 Cf. Stuart Mark Elkman, Jiva Gosvamin's Tattvasandarbha: A Study on the Philosophical and Sectarian  
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Moreover, Śaṅkara himself, Jīva claimed, realized that the BhP was far superior to his own 
doctrines, and only taught Advaita because God told him to, in order that the BhP may remain 
hidden.319 Jīva's mention of the “midland regions”320 in the quote above raises at once a 
geographical and a historical question: From his vantage point of sixteenth-century Brindavan, 
could these have been the Advaitins of Banaras who so famously rejected Caitanya's brand of 
“sentimentalist” devotion?321
Whatever the case, it is clear that the BNK was very important to bridging this gap. 
Around the mid-sixteenth century, Jīva wrote his influential Ṣaṭsandarbha, a six-volume 
compendium of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava philosophy. In the opening to the Tattvasandarbha, the first 
book of the six volumes, Jīva lays out his argument for the Vedic status of the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa.322 But is it his argument? In order to explain that purāṇa is nothing but Veda, Jīva 
reconstructs the argument of the BNK, almost verbatim.323 The presence of Lakṣmīdhara in the 
Development of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Movement (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 118: bhāṣyarūpā 
tadvyākhyā tu samprati madhyadeśādau vyāptān advaitavādino nūnaṃ bhagavanmahimānam avagāhayituṃ 
tadvādena karvuritalipīnāṃ paramavaiṣṇavānāṃ śrīdharasvāmicaraṇānāṃ śuddhavaiṣṇavasiddhāntānugatā cet 
tarhi yathāvad eva vilikhyate.
319 Ibid., 110.
320 The classical definition of madhyadeśa was simply the country lying between the Himālayas and Vindhyas.
321 See Gupta, The Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta of Jīva Gosvāmin, 16: “'Caitanya is an illiterate sanny sā ī who 
doesn’t know his own duty,' Prak nanda āśā concluded. 'Thus he has become a sentimentalist (bh vukaā ), 
wandering in the company of other sentimentalists.” Gupta (Ibid., 31) notes that the term used as a derogatory 
epithet, bhāvuka, may hark to the third verse of the BhP.
322 See David Buchta, “Defining Categories in Hindu Literature: The Purāṇas as Śruti in Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa 
and Jīva Gosvāmi,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 15.1 (2006): 91-94.
323 Ibid., 92. Cf. Elkman, Jīva Gosvāmin's Tattvasandarbha, 78: tathā hi mahābhārate mānavīye ca – 
“itihāsapurāṇābhyāṃ vedaṃ samupabṛṃhayet” iti | pūraṇāt purāṇam iti ca anyatra | na ca avedena vedasya 
bṛṃhaṇaṃ sambhavati | na hy aparipūrṇasya kanakavalayasya trapuṇā pūraṇaṃ yujyate | nanu yadi vedaśabdaḥ 
purāṇam itihāsaṃ ca upādatte tarhi purāṇam anyad anveṣaṇīyam | yadi tu na, na tarhi itihāsapurāṇayor abhedo 
vedena | ucyate – viśiṣṭaikārthapratipādakapadakadambasya apauruṣeyatvād abhede 'pi svarakramabhedād 
bhedanirdeśo 'py upapadyate |
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broader Gauḍīya literature preceded Jīva by a generation. Four of his poetic verses in the BNK 
found their way into the Padyāvalī (16, 29, 33, 34), an anthology of Sanskrit poetry compiled by 
Jīva's uncle Rūpa Gosvāmin. And as a perusal of the broader Gauḍīya archive demonstrates, the 
BNK clearly held a favorable place in it, a fact due to the work's geographical proximity, 
theological stance, and perhaps the efforts of Mādhavendra and Co.324
324 I am grateful to Rembert Lutjeharms for providing me with a comprehensive list of explicit references to 
Lakṣmīdhara in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava literature, which I reproduce here, minus the four verses in the Padyāvalī. The 
abbreviation “HS” refers to the edition by Haridāsa Śāstrī cited in the bibliography.
Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu 3.2.1: ratisthāyitayā nāmakaumudīkṛdbhir apy asau | śāntatvenāyam evāddhā 
sudevādyaiś ca varṇitaḥ ||
Tattvasandarbha 47: āhuś ca nāmakaumudīkārāḥ — “kṛṣṇaśabdasya tamālaśyāmalatviṣi yaśodāyāḥ 
stanandhaye parabrahmaṇi rūḍhiḥ” iti | Also cited in Kṛṣṇasandarbha 57 (HS, 112), Jīva's commentary on 
Brahmasaṃhitā, and Rādhākṛṣṇa Gosvāmī's Daśaślokībhāṣya on Caitanyacaritāmṛta 3.7.86.
Bhagavatsandarbha 86 (HS, 214): “siddher jñānāt mukter vā” iti śrībhagavannāmakaumudī |
 
Bhaktisandarbha 128 (HS, 250): evaṃ prārabdhahetuvyādhyādiharatvaṃ ca skānde — “ādhayo vyādhayo yasya 
smaraṇān nāmakīrtanāt | tad eva vilayaṃ yānti tam anantaṃ namāmy aham || ” iti | uktaṃ ca nāmakaumudyām 
“prārabdhapāpaharatvaṃ ca kvacid upāsakecchāvaśād” iti |
Bhaktisandarbha 153 (HS, 298): tad īdṛśaṃ māhātmyavṛndaṃ na praśaṃsāmātram ajāmilādau prasiddhatvāt | 
darśitāś ca nyāyāḥ śrībhagavannāmakaumudyādau |
Bhaktisandarbha 161 (HS, 316): nāmakaumudīkāraiś ca “antimapratyayo ’bhyarhita” ity uktam | [Ed. I do not 
find this in citation in the edition of the BNK I possess.]
Bhaktisandarbha 263 (HS, 530): ata eva “bhaktiḥ pareśānubhavo viraktiḥ” [BhP 11.2.40] ityādy uttarapadye 
ṭīkācūrṇikā: “nanv iyam ārūḍhayoginām api bahujanmabhir durlabhā gatiḥ kathaṃ nāmakīrtanamātreṇaikāsmin 
janmani bhaved ity āśaṅkya sadṛṣṭāntam āha bhaktir iti” ity eṣā | ittham utthāpitaṃ ca 
śrībhagavannāmakaumudyāṃ sahasranāmabhāṣye ca purāṇāntaravacanam — “naktaṃ divā ca gatabhīr 
jitanidra eko | nirviṇṇa īkṣitapatho mitabhuk praśāntaḥ || yady acyute bhagavati sa mano na sajjen | nāmāni 
tadratikarāṇi paṭhed vilajjaḥ ||” iti |
Bhaktisandarbha 265 (HS, 543): uktaṃ ca nāmakaumudyām “mahadaparādhasya bhoga eva nivartakaḥ 
tadanugraho vā” iti |
Prītisandarbha 110 (HS, 341): kiṃ cālaukikarasavidāṃ prācīnānām api matānusāreṇa sidhyaty asau rasaḥ | tatra 
sāmānyataḥ śrībhagavannāmakaumudīkārair darśitaḥ | tasya viśeṣatas tu śāntādiṣu pañcasu bhedeṣu 
vaktavyeṣu śrīsvāmicaraṇair “mallānām aśanir” [BhP 10.43.17] ity ādau te pañcaiva darśitāḥ |
Sarvasaṃvādinī on Tattvasandarbha (HS, 24): tad uktam — “tasmān mantrārthavādayor anyaparatve 'pi svārthe 
prāmāṇyaṃ bhavaty eva | tad yadi svarasata eva niṣpratibandham avadhāritarūpam anadhigataviṣayaṃ ca 
vijñānam utpadyate śabdāt tadantareṇāpi tātparyaṃ tasya prāmāṇyaṃ kiṃ na syāt? tatsaṅgānavigānayoḥ punar 
anuvādaguṇavādatve upaniṣadāṃ punarananyaśeṣatvād apāstasamastānartham anantānandaikarasam 
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But the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas were not the only group to lay claim to the BNK. Around the 
same time, not too far from where Jīva was writing in Brindavan, a family of Maharashtrian 
Brahmin migrants to Banaras, the Devas, began to express their shared interest in Advaita 
Vedānta and bhakti in a very different way.325 The patriarch of the family, Anantadeva, wrote a 
commentary on the BNK called the Prakāśa. Anantadeva's initial education was in Mīmāṃsā 
and Advaita Vedānta, under the tutelage of the Banarasi renunciate Rāmatīrtha, and he went on to 
write his own textbook on Vedānta, the Siddhāntatattva. In this textbook, Anantadeva is quite 
uncompromising about his Advaita affinities. He tells us in the Prakāśa that he composed it after 
his Advaita manual, but without any sense of ironic distance. He simply states, commenting on 
the passage cited earlier on the true referent of the name Kṛṣṇa: “I have elaborated that śravaṇa 
is an element [of liberating knowledge], and that nididhyāsana acts specifically as an auxiliary 
aid to effecting its result, in my Siddhāntatattva.”326 By and large, Anantadeva stays faithful to 
the text of the BNK, appearing to depart from the author's intention only once or twice.327 His 
anadhigatam ātmatattvaṃ gamayantīnāṃ pramānāntaravirodhe'pi tasyaivābhāsīkaraṇena ca svārtha eva 
prāmāṇyam” iti | (cf. Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 10).
Sarvasaṃvādinī on Kṛṣṇasandarbha (HS, 72-73 & 92-93): “samāhṛtānām uccāraṇam api nānārthakaṃ 
saṃskārapracayahetutvād ekasyaivoccārapracayavad” iti nāmakaumudīkārair aṅgīkṛtam | […] 
nāmakaumudyāṃ tu sarvānarthakṣaya eva jñānājñānaviśeṣo niṣiddhaḥ na tu premādiphalatāratamye |
325 See Anand Venkatkrishnan, “Ritual, Reflection, and Religion: The Devas of Banaras,” South Asian History and 
Culture 6.1 (2015): 147-171.
326 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 63, ll.3-4 (Prakāśa comm.): śravaṇasyāṅgatvaṃ nididhyāsanasya 
phalopakāryaṅgatvaṃ cāsmābhiḥ siddhāntatattve prapañcitam | Cf. Siddhāntatattva, ed. Tailanga Rama Sastri 
(Benares: Government Sanskrit College, 1901), 45: eteṣāṃ śravaṇaṃ pradhānaṃ, itare phalopakāryaṅge, 
śrotavyādivākyeṣu prāthamikatvāt |
327 See, e.g., Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 15, ll.13ff. (Prakāśa comm.). When Lakṣmīdhara cites what he calls the 
“puṣkarākṣa siddhānta,” perhaps referring to a specific interpretive tradition, Anantadeva labels it the brainchild 
of particular ekadeśī or “factional” Vedāntins. According to him, Lakṣmīdhara's own position only begins from a 
particular point, the operative adverb in the original text being “svarasataḥ,” which Anantadeva thinks indicates 
that the previous position was “not the one to which [the author] was inclined” (pūrvamate 
'svarasapradarśanam). He continues: “The verses cited in proof should be interpreted as saying that, directly or 
sequentially, the entire [content of the] Veda is auxiliary to the knowledge of the Supreme Self” (udāhṛtavākyāni  
tu sākṣātparamparayā paramātmavidyāyāṃ śeṣabhūtaḥ sarvo veda ity evaṃ vyākhyeyāni).
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was clearly the most popular commentary on the text, others only existing in fragments and one 
or two manuscripts.328 
Like the Gosvāmins, Anantadeva also composed devotional dramas on bhakti. However, 
they are very different from Rūpa Gosvāmin's attempt to use drama as a mode of religious 
realization,329 and contain none of the technical language of devotional poetics, or bhaktirasa. As 
I discuss in the next chapter, Anantadeva attempted to portray his life of bhakti as quite distinct 
from his scholarly ambitions, though he tried to convince his contemporaries in scholarly 
fashion. Apart from their shared interest in the BNK, there seems to be nothing whatsoever that 
connects the Devas to the Gosvāmins. Unlike Jīva, who tries scrupulously to avoid the ignominy 
of being classed with the māyāvādīs, the classic pejorative term for “illusionist” Advaitins, 
Anantadeva feels no need to apologize for his Advaita heritage. In his Siddhāntatattva, he even 
supports the dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, the controversial doctrine of subjective idealism which it is unlikely 
that the Gosvāmins would have ever defended.330 In an opening verse to his Prakāśa, he assures 
the prospective audience that his commentary “spreads the illumination of the BNK in a manner 
that does not contradict the meaning of the entire Vedānta.”331 “Vedānta” here probably means 
But is this indeed what Lakṣmīdhara is saying? “Svarasataḥ” in context appears simply to mean 
“spontaneously,” and the final clause of the root text seems to follow causally from the verses cited. One 
wonders who or what comprises this Vedānta “faction” from which Anantadeva believes Lakṣmīdhara needs 
protecting.
328 See Siniruddha Dash, ed., New Catalogus Catalogorum, Vol. XV (Madras: University of Madras, 2007), 251b.
329 Cf. Donna Wulff, Drama as a Mode of Religious Realization: The Vidagdhamādhava of Rupa Gosvāmī (Chico: 
Scholars Press, 1984).
330 See Siddhāntatattva, 57-60. Anantadeva says that the dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda “does not slip into a Buddhist idealism, for 
the substrate [i.e., Brahman] is a stable entity.” Ibid., 57: na ca bauddhamatapraveśaḥ | adhiṣṭhānasya sthāyitvāt |
331 Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 1 (Prakāśa comm., v.2):
namaskṛtya gurūn sarvavedāntārthāvirodhataḥ |
bhagavannāmakaumudyāḥ prakāśaḥ pravitanyate ||
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“The Upaniṣads” more than a particular system, although for Anantadeva the Upaniṣads 
fundamentally called for an Advaitic interpretation. That he even had to bring up the problem of 
the BNK's belonging suggests that this text was moving between and across communities that 
had very different philosophical commitments. Yet, as I show in the next chapter, nowhere does 
Anantadeva distance himself from Advaita per se, only other Advaitins, and their haughty, self-
involved talk about the self-sufficiency of jñāna, divorced from the rhythms of bhakti.
One is compelled to ask, then, whether we should see the Devas and Gosvāmins as 
fraternal twins, or as independent agents re-envisioning the legacy of Advaita Vedānta. Though 
remarkably similar in nature, their ideas seem to have moved in different, non-intersecting 
circles, both during and after their lifetime.332 The Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas exerted their influence 
across northern India to the courts of Jaipur, where the scholar Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa 
consolidated their canonical Vedānta status by connecting Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism to Mādhva 
theology.333 The works of the Devas, however, made their way south, as part of the Maratha 
conquest of Thanjavur.334 Not only do manuscripts of their works survive in the libraries of 
Madras and Mysore,335 but their intellectual interest in the divine name was also resuscitated and 
refashioned by theologians of the Tamil South. 
332 See Norvin Hein, “Caitanya's Ecstasies and the Theology of the Name,” In Hinduism: New Essays in the History 
of Religions, ed. Bardwell L. Smith (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 15-32; Neal Delmonico, “Chaitanya Vaishnavism and 
the Holy Names,” in Krishna: A Sourcebook, ed. Edwin F. Bryant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 549-
575; Barbara Holdrege, “From Nāma-Avatāra to Nāma-Saṃkīrtana: Gauḍīya Perspectives on the Name,” 
Journal of Vaishnava Studies 17.2 (2009): 3-36.
333 See Kiyokazu Okita, Hindu Theology in Early Modern South Asia: The Rise of Devotionalism and the Politics of  
Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
334 See Venkatkrishnan, “Ritual, Reflection, and Religion,” 159-161.
335 For the full record of the Devas' manuscript locations, see V. Raghavan, ed., New Catalogus Catalogorum, 
Volume 1, Revised Edition (Madras: University of Madras, 1968), 164-167; V. Raghavan, ed., New Catalogus 
Catalogorum, Volume 2 (Madras: University of Madras, 1966), 124.
118
The Sacred Name in the South
According to the Sanskrit literary scholar V. Raghavan, the Nāmasiddhānta found clearest 
shape among the saints of the Kaveri delta in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who 
flourished under the rule of the Thanjavur Marathas: Śrīdhara Veṅkaṭeśa Ayyāvāḷ, 
Bhagavannāma Bodhendra, Sadgurusvāmin, Sadāśiva Brahmendra, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, and 
Tyāgarāja. We know these names today as progenitors of the present-day musical-performative 
tradition of purāṇic storytelling (harikathā) and devotional singing (nāmasaṃkīrtana) known as 
the bhajana sampradāya.336 In response to Raghavan's account, Davesh Soneji contextualizes the 
bhajana sampradāya within the polyglot literary and musical environment of Thanjavur as “the 
very real result of the workings of a highly local, albeit caste- and class-bound culture of public 
multilingualism.”337 Both historical reconstructions demonstrate that the Smārta participants in 
the bhajana sampradāya were at once members of a self-professedly “cosmopolitan” 
socioreligious community, with strong ties to South Indian Śaiva and Advaita monastic 
institutions,338 as well as vernacular-language performers of the BhP's Vaiṣṇava theology. And the 
text that emerges as a major link between these two identities is the BNK.
The BNK makes a significant cameo in the story of Bhagavannāma Bodhendra. The 
provenance of the story is unclear,339 but Bodhendra himself belonged to the seventeenth century. 
336 See Singer, “The Rādhā-Krishna Bhajanas of Madras City,” in Krishna: Myths, Rites, Attitudes, ed. Milton 
Singer (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), 90-138. Cf. Venkateswaran, “Rādhā-Krishna Bhajanas of 
South India,” in Krishna: Myths, Rites, Attitudes, ed. Milton Singer (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), 
139-172. Cf. Soneji, “The Powers of Polyglossia.”
337 Soneji, “The Powers of Polyglossia,” 342. Cf. Indira Viswanathan Peterson, “Multilingual Dramas at the 
Tanjavur Maratha Court and Literary Cultures in Early Modern South India,” Journal of Medieval History 14.2 
(2011): 285-321.
338 See Elaine Fisher, “A New Public Theology: Sanskrit and Society in Seventeenth-century South India” (PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 2013).
339 See R. Krishnamurthy, The Saints of the Cauvery Delta (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1979), 49-55. The 
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The story goes that after being told by his Advaita guru to learn about the power of God's name, 
Bodhendra traveled to Puri, where he met Lakṣmīdhara's son Jagannātha. A miraculous event 
that exhibits a communalism of sorts—a Hindu woman who had been abducted by a Muslim is 
“purified” by repeating God's name while plunging into the temple tank—convinced Bodhendra 
that Lakṣmīdhara, author of the BNK, was right to say that the name of God is supremely 
purifying. Bodhendra returned south and, in addition to performing devotional music, proceeded 
to write his own Sanskrit books on the subject of God's name. Actually, it is more likely that the 
BNK reached Bodhendra through the network of Rāmadāsī maṭhas that were established in the 
Thanjavur region between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. As Davesh Soneji 
demonstrates, these institutions were instrumental in transporting the performance of Marathi 
kīrtan to the Tamil South, and possessed their own local performative traditions recently 
appropriated by the Carnatic musical establishment.340 I will have occasion in the next chapter to 
reflect on the centrality of Rāma devotional cults, and the Rāmadāsīs in particular, to the 
preservation and propagation of the Nāmasiddhānta.341
Only one of Bhagavannāma Bodhendra's works has been printed: The 
contemporary harikathā exponent Visakha Hari, now very popular in the mostly middle-class, upper-caste 
Carnatic music circuit, recounts this story in a recent performance in Tamil, which centers on the repetition of 
God's name in the life of a variety of bhakti poets. See Visakha Hari, “The Power of Rāma's Name” 
(Rāmanāmaprabhāvam), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbavoiwvXcU. Accessed July 12, 2015.
340 See Soneji, “The Powers of Polyglossia,” 344ff., esp. 365, n.27: “The performance of Marathi abhaṅg-kīrtans as 
part of 'classical' Karnatak music performances is a distinctly twentieth-century phenomenon and has much to do 
with the urban scripting of the history of Karnatak music as inextricably intertwined with not only the South 
Indian, but pan-Indian bhakti tradition. Marathi kīrtan thus becomes integrated, not because of its distinctly local 
historical connection to the making of this music, but rather because it represents a regional bhakti tradition that 
must be connected, performatively speaking, to Karnatak music’s uppercaste, Neo-Advaitic bhakti universalism. 
It is in this process, I would argue, that the local histories of Marathi kīrtan in Tanjore become obfuscated.”
341 Bodhendra himself writes a series of ten benedictory verses to Rāma in the opening to the Nāmāmṛtarasāyana 
(1-3). Only after these verses does he invoke other, more general and particular gods and gurus: in order, 
Dakṣiṇāmūrti, his teacher Viśvādhik[endra Sarasvatī], Sarasvatī (Bhāratī), and Śaṅkarācārya.
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Nāmāmṛtarasāyana, or “Ambrosial Elixir of the Name.”342 A book that reads stylistically like a 
series of longwinded, repetitive lecture notes, the Nāmāmṛtarasāyana is a gloss on a 
commentary on the Viṣṇusahasranāma, which Bodhendra attributes to Śaṅkara, whom he 
describes as an incarnation of Śiva.343 Bodhendra asserts that
because singing the name requires no general rule of observance, it is shown [in this 
commentary] that the act of singing the name, done in whatever way possible, leads to the 
dissolution of all sins and liberation—whether performed by a woman, a man, eunuch, or 
any kind of person whosoever; whether helplessly or out of madness; whether with faith 
or without faith; whether to ward off the pain induced by thieves or tigers or disease; or 
whether for the purpose of achieving non-lasting results like dharma, artha, and kāma, or 
any other purpose.344
Although this is similar to the view of Śrīvaiṣṇava commentators on the Viṣṇusahasranāma 
discussed earlier, Bodhendra explicitly refers to “the [Bhagavan]nāmakaumudī...and 
Anantadeva's works” among the inspirations for his own interpretive efforts.345 That Bodhendra 
possessed a specifically Advaitic pedigree and recognized a broader tradition at intersection of 
bhakti and Advaita Vedānta is evident from his mention of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as “author of 
the Advaitasiddhi,” his use of Madhusūdana's commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā (“which 
follows Śaṅkara's commentary”) to corroborate his interpretive claims, and his positive citation 
of other recognizably “classical” Advaitins.346 Moreover, he analogizes the defense of singing 
342 Nāmāmṛtarasāyanam, ed. Deva Śaṅkara Śarmā (Tanjore: Poornachandrodayam Press, 1926).
343 Ibid., 1: bhagavāñ śivaḥ...śaṅkaranāmakaparamahaṃsamahāmunirūpo 'bhavat |
344 Ibid., 17-8: evaṃ nāmakīrtanasya niyamasāmānyānapekṣatvapratipādanāt strīpuṃnapuṃsakānyatamena 
yenakenacij janenāvaśena vonmādena vā śraddhayā vā śraddhāṃ vinā vā coravyāghrarogādikṛtārtināśāya vā 
dharmārthakāmānyatamātmakānityaphalāya vānyaprayojanāya vā yathākathaṃcitkṛtanāmakīrtanena 
sakalapāpakṣayo muktiś ca bhavaty evety artho darśitaḥ |
345 Ibid., 71: [nāmamāhātmya]śāstrāṇi svārthaparāṇy eva ityarthapratipādakānāṃ 
sahasranāmabhāṣyanāmakaumudīpuruṣārtharatnākarānantadevīyabahugranthānāṃ […]
346 Ibid., 18: ayam arthaḥ sarvo 'py advaitasiddhināmakagranthakārair madhusūdanānandasarasvatīśrīcaraṇair 
bhagavatpādīyabhāṣyānusāriṇyāṃ gītāgūḍhārthadīpikāyāṃ kaṇṭharaveṇoktaḥ | Other Advaitins cited are: 
Nṛsiṃhāśrama (45), Ānandagiri (45), and Vidyāraṇya (48).
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God's name against its naysayers to defending the truth of Advaita Vedānta against its 
philosophical opponents, singling out his closest southern rivals, the followers of Rāmānuja and 
Madhva.347 Bodhendra is sometimes identified with the 59th pontiff of the Śaṅkara maṭha in 
Kāñcīpuram, Bodhendra Sarasvatī, author of such works as the Hariharādvaitabhūṣaṇa, or 
“Adorning the Non-Difference Between Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Śiva).”348 I think it is quite 
possible that the two were the same. In the opening to the Nāmāmṛtarasāyana, Bodhendra says 
that Śaṅkara began his commentary on the Viṣṇusahasranāma in order to show the glory of 
“either Viṣṇu's or Śiva's name,” which, whether heard or sung or simply remembered, could 
bestow all the goals of human life upon all beings.349 Furthermore, the benedictory verses 
between the two works show significant overlap.350
347 Ibid., 47: nāmakīrtanasya sādhanatvam apalapantīti tadanusāreṇa nāmakīrtanaśāstrasyānyathānayanam 
asaṅgatam eva, sarveṣāṃ śāstroktasādhanānām asādhanatvābhidhānena nindakā bahavo janāḥ santy eveti 
sakalālaukikaśreyaḥsādhanānām asādhanatvāṅgīkārāpatteḥ | […] dṛśyante cādvitīyabrahmajñānasya muktiṃ 
praty asādhanatvābhidhānena tannindakā gautamakāṇādajaiminipātañjalakāpilatantrābhimānino 
mādhvarāmānujaśaivaśāktahairaṇyagarbhāś ceti vedāntyekadeśinas tu bahavaḥ |
348 Hariharādvaitabhūṣaṇam by Bodhendrasarasvatī, ed. T. Chandrasekharan (Madras: Superintendent Government 
Press, 1954).
349 Cf. Nāmāṃrtarasāyana, 1-2: sthāvarajaṅgamātmakasakalaprāṇinām 
dharmārthakāmamokṣākhyasakalapuruṣārthapradaṃ viṣṇuśivayor nāmnāṃ madhye anyatamanāmaiva, tac ca 
smṛtaṃ vā kīrtitaṃ vā śrutaṃ vā sarveṣām iṣṭadaṃ bhavaty eveti niścitya tannāmamāhātmyaṃ vaktuṃ 
sahasranāmabhāṣyam ārabdhavantaḥ...
350 Both works a) mention his guru, Viśvādhikendra Sarasvatī, b) invoke Śaṅkara in very similar fashion, and c) 
celebrate Rāma as the embodiment of the unity between Viṣṇu and Śiva.
See Hariharādvaitabhūṣaṇam, 1:
śrīśagaurīśvarābhinnarūpaṃ rāmam ahaṃ bhaje |
sakṛtprapannasantrāṇe dīkṣitaṃ sītayā śritam || 2 ||
yasya nāmāpi sarvasmād utkarṣaṃ khyāpayaty aho |
viśvādhikaguroḥ pādapadmaṃ vande mudā sadā || 3 ||
vedāntārthābhidhānena sarvānugrahakāriṇam |
yatirūpadharaṃ vande śaṅkaraṃ lokaśaṅkaram || 5 ||
Cf. Nāmāmṛtarasāyana, 1-3:
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Bodhendra's contemporaries also seem to have displayed affinities for both “classical” 
Advaita and nāmasaṃkīrtana. Most intriguing in this connection is one Upaniṣad Brahmayogin, 
alias Rāmacandrendra Sarasvatī, who is said to have been initiated into monastic life at 
Kāñcīpuram, and went on to found his own Advaita maṭha nearby.351 He received his nickname 
by writing commentaries on 108 Upaniṣads. He also wrote a fascinating work called the 
Upeyanāmaviveka, “Analyzing the Name of the One to be Attained.”352 In the introduction to his 
edition of the Upeyanāmaviveka, V. Raghavan asserted that it falls in the line of such works as 
the BNK.353 This is true, but only in part. The Upeyanāmaviveka affirms the universally 
redemptive power of God's name, irrespective of one's caste or social status. But the author is not 
exclusively concerned with literature on nāmamāhātmya, the glory of the name. Instead, he 
quotes profusely from Śaṅkara's canonical works, such as his commentary on Gauḍapāda's 
sarvasya lokasya sadā suguptyai nāmātmako bhāti harīśayor yaḥ |
dayāsudhābdhiḥ sa tadātmako me rāmaḥ sadā vaktrasaroruhe 'stu || 4 ||
vijñānavairāgyaparātmabhaktiśamādibhir yo 'dhikatāṃ prapannaḥ |
viśvādhikākhyām agamac ca tena gurūttamaṃ taṃ praṇamāmi mūrdhnā || 13 ||
śāstrārthaṃ suvinirṇetuṃ iṣṭadaṃ sarvadehinām |
yatirūpadharaṃ vande śaṅkaraṃ lokaśaṅkaram || 16 ||
In the Hariharādvaitabhūṣaṇa, Bodhendra also mentions his preceptor Gīrvāṇendra Sarasvatī, who was “both a 
highly celebrated and influential figure among renunciant scholars of Advaita and most likely the pontiff of a 
monastic order centered in Kancipuram, one which bears some historical relationship to the lineages now most 
commonly associated with the city.” See Fisher, “A New Public Theology,” 58-59.
351 See V. Raghavan, “Upanishad Brahma Yogin, His Life and Works,” Journal of the Madras Music Academy 
XXVII (1956): 113-150. See also Raghavan, ed., New Catalogus Catalogorum, Volume 2, 363-367. The 
historical relationship between Rāmacandrendra's lineage and that of Bodhendra, via the Kāñcī Kāmakoṭī Pīṭha, 
is difficult to determine with certainty, even given the distinctive appellation “-Indra Sarasvatī” and their shared 
interest in the expounding on the name of God. See Fisher, “A New Public Theology,” 59.
352 Cf. Klaus Klostermaier, “Calling God Names: Reflections on Divine Names in Hindu and Buddhist Traditions,” 
Journal of Vaishnava Studies 2.2 (1994): 66-68.
353 Upeya-Nāma-Viveka (Nāmārthaviveka) of Upaniṣad Brahmayogin, ed. V. Raghavan (Madras: The Adyar Library 
and Research Centre, 1967), 3.
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Māṇḍūkyakārikā, and from late Upaniṣads like the Rāmatāpanīya. In doing so, he departs 
significantly from the BNK's focus on eradicating sins. God's name is not merely the object of 
kīrtana or anusmaraṇa, but bhāvanā: absorption, immersion, identification.354 For Brahmayogin, 
the name “Rāma” actually does equal Brahman, unlike Lakṣmīdhara's insistence that the name 
“Kṛṣṇa” could not be subsumed under Brahman. In the Upeyanāmaviveka, one does not invoke 
the name to save oneself (he rāma), one becomes the name (rāmo 'ham).355 Bodhendra's 
Nāmāmṛtarasāyana also argues at length that renunciates who would otherwise be engaged in 
the standard Advaitic practice of “hearing, reflecting, and meditating” on the words of the 
Upaniṣads (śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana), can achieve their aim of unobstructed, immediate 
self-knowledge (apratibaddhāparokṣātmajñāna) much more easily by singing the name of 
God.356 Although the BNK also saw kīrtana as an intermediary step leading to liberating self-
knowledge, its emphasis was on the ability of God's name to remove sins, not as an object of 
Advaitic identification. Both of these texts move us far afield from the relatively limited 
354 For more on the concept of bhāvanā (imagination) in early modern South India, see David Shulman, More Than 
Real: A History of the Imagination in South India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
355 Klostermaier (“Calling God Names,” 68) notes that “Upaniṣadbrahmayogin attributes special significance to the 
name of RĀMA,” treating it as the essence of both the Nārāyaṇa and Śiva mantras. As we have seen, Bodhendra 
also centered his devotion to Rāma across his works. And, as it turns out, so did Lakṣmīdhara. Although the 
majority of the BNK extols the names and virtues of Kṛṣṇa, Lakṣmīdhara gave his teacher the appellation 
Raghunātha, and in his concluding verses he invokes Rāma's name first. See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, 133:
ākṛṣṭiḥ kṛtacetasāṃ sumahatām uccāṭanaṃ cāṃhasām
ācāṇḍālam amūkalokasulabho vaśyaś ca muktiśriyaḥ |
no dīkṣāṃ na ca dakṣiṇāṃ na ca puraścaryāṃ manāg īkṣate
mantro ‘yaṃ rasanāspṛg eva phalati śrīrāmanāmātmakaḥ ||
“It draws you in if your heart is pure, and eradicates even the greatest sins. It’s easy for anyone, no matter how 
marginalized; so long as you can utter it, then freedom is yours. You don’t need any initiation, no gift-giving or 
preparation. This mantra flowers the moment it touches your tongue: Rāma’s name.”
356 See Nāmāmṛtarasāyana, 24: paramahaṃsayativariṣṭheṇa 
samyakkṛtavedāntaśravaṇamanananididhyāsanādisakaladharmebhyaḥ sakṛnnāmakīrtanam atyantotkṛṣṭam ity 
arthaḥ siddha eva ity ata eva sakṛnnāmakīrtanam apratibaddhāparokṣātmajñānajanakam ity arthaḥ siddhaḥ |
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concerns of the BNK, embedded as they were in the very different context of the Tamil South.357
Their Advaita twist, however, does not imply distance from personalized devotional 
bhakti. In the course of his research, Raghavan noticed an autographed letter from Upaniṣad 
Brahmayogin to Tyāgarāja, asking the latter to visit Kāñcī.358 Raghavan is compelling in his 
attempts to link the content of Tyāgarāja's popular-courtly Telugu songs to Brahmayogin's 
forbidding Sanskrit scholarship.359 Perhaps we should not overplay their relationship; after all, 
Tyāgaraja was a man who asked: dvaitamu sukhamā, advaitamu sukhamā, “Is there more joy in 
duality or nonduality?” Still, the connection raises questions about the spaces in which the BNK 
may have circulated in the South: between Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava communities, monastic centers 
and performative stages, bhakti poetry and Advaita prose.
Conclusion
The modern incarnations of the BNK continue to raise questions about its multiple 
affiliations. Lakṣmīdhara appears to share an intellectual milieu with Śrīdhara, and both engaged 
with Advaita Vedānta, as did later commentators on the text. But the BNK manuscript in the 
Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library (No. 8237) is listed under “Caitanya Thought,” no doubt due to 
357 Bodhendra provides a humorous cultural reference to illustrate his point that those who do not have a taste for 
singing the name of God are welcome to perform their own, more difficult rituals. “It is just like all those 
Tamilians,” he says, “who will not deign to eat wheat laḍḍūs made with the best ghee and sugar, or even 
sweetened cow's milk, but will relish chewing bitter neem leaves, praising it as the tastiest thing in the world.” 
See Ibid., 52: tathā nāmakīrtane 'rucyā atyantagurubhūtadharmeṣv eva rucyā bahūnāṃ viduṣām aviduṣāṃ ca 
pravṛtteś copapannatvaṃ darśitam | sitaśarkarānvitātyantottamagokṣīre uttamasitaśarkarāgoghṛtābhyāṃ vinirmite 
godhūmapiṣṭavikārarūpalaḍḍukottame cārucyā keṣāṃcit tadbhojanapravṛttyabhāvasya darśanāt bahūnāṃ 
draviḍadeśasthānāṃ nimbapatracūrṇe rucivaśād atyantāruciharam idaṃ cūrṇam iti ślāghanapūrvakaṃ tatra 
pravṛtter darśanāt |
358 Upeya-Nāma-Viveka, 6.
359 V. Raghavan, The Spiritual Heritage of Tyāgarāja (Madras: The Ramakrishna Mission Students' Home, 1957), 
99-124.
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its popularity among the Gosvāmins.360 In his initial catalogue of the Tanjore manuscripts, 
however, A.C. Burnell listed it as a work of Viśiṣṭādvaita.361 And Gosvāmi Dāmodar Śāstrī, editor 
of the first printed edition of the BNK (1927), was quite explicit about his Mādhva background 
and the importance of this text to it.362 While it is tempting simply to locate the BNK at the 
intersection of philosophical, sectarian, and religious boundaries, this chapter has shown that the 
text circulated within particular communities of Brahmanical interpreters, albeit spread out 
across the subcontinent, each with their own interests in the text. The BNK's own concerns, 
moreover, are firmly located in the Sanskrit scholastic world. Whether its scholastic interests 
were provoked by more local, vernacular (I also use the word in the sense of “everyday”) 
developments is a question for which a fixed answer is still elusive. After all, it is well known to 
scholars of the “bhakti movement” that many Indic religious cultures exhorted their adherents to 
recite the name of God. What could have been the precise relationship of this Sanskrit ideal from 
the BhP with vernacular devotional literatures, or Tantric practices of mantra repetition, or Sufi 
notions of the divine presence in language? How might the BNK have participated in a broader 
“cult of the divine name” that moved between communities: Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava, Sanskrit and 
vernacular, Hindu and Muslim?363 Can we revisit Raghavan's idea of the Nāmasiddhānta as a 
360 P.P.S. Sastri, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji's Sarasvatī  
Mahāl Library, Vol. XIV (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1932), 6383-6385.
361 A.C. Burnell, A Classified Index to the Sanskrit Mss. In the Palace at Tanjore (London: Trübner & Co., 1880), 
98.
362 His official title, provided at the end of his editorial introduction, includes his affiliation to the Mādhva 
sampradāya. See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, Editor's Note (sampādakīyaṃ vaktavyam), 8: 
śrīmanmādhvasampradāyācāryyadārśanikasārvabhaumasāhityadarśanādyācāryatarkaratnanyāyaratna—
gosvāmīdāmodaraśāstrī
363 See Hans Bakker, Ayodhyā, Part I (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1986), 67-78, 119-124. See also Charlotte 
Vaudeville, “The Cult of the Divine Name in the Haripāṭh of Dñāndev,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde 
Sudasiens 12-13 (1968-9): 395-406.
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transregional phenomenon, even as we resist its cultural-nationalist implications?
One way to approach this problematic is to attend to the social history of text-traditions in 
addition to their intellectual history. The BNK's reception history offers some clues, but its own 
intellectual context remains opaque. I have reconstructed its arguments that address different 
issues of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta out of order, rather than following the progression of the text, 
because those arguments are interspersed within larger topics. Disentangling the logic of the text 
proper from its fascinating internal debates is an important task, but awaits a more 
comprehensive study. In the following chapter, I study the intersections between Mīmāṃsā, 
Vedānta, and bhakti with greater specificity by following the career of the BNK commentator 
Anantadeva, and that of his family, who lived in Banaras in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Situating these traditions in a particular setting allows us to understand the changes in 
their contours and fortunes in light of the social changes of the early modern world.
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Chapter 4: Vedānta in the Moonlight
Jñāna, Karma, and Bhakti:
Three ways to reach you.
The first for the disenchanted,
to apply themselves to study.
The second for the rapacious,
to devote their actions to you.
But the third for those
neither here nor there,
to hold on tight to your love.
-Melputtūr Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (1587 CE), Nārāyaṇīya 96.4364
In a lecture I attended at Union Theological Seminary in April 2013, the prominent public 
intellectual Amartya Sen described a distinction he believed could be found in “early Indian 
religious texts” between three ways to enlightenment or salvation: karma, work; jñāna, 
knowledge; and bhakti, faith and devotion. Like any good secular thinker, Sen explained that he 
found the first two appealing, but the third rather difficult to accept. Surprising though it may 
seem, Sen might have found kindred spirits in early modern Banaras, the pre-eminent center of 
Brahmanical learning. Here, bhakti was still an intrusive newcomer, and could be found jostling 
for attention with karma and jñāna in the Sanskrit scholarly milieu, one in which intellectual life 
364 The Nārāyaṇīya of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, ed. T. Ganapati Śāstrī (Trivandrum: Travancore Government Press, 1912), 
348:
jñānaṃ karmāpi bhaktis tritayam iha bhavatprāpakaṃ tatra tāvat
nirviṇṇānām aśeṣe viṣaya iha bhaved jñānayoge 'dhikāraḥ  |
saktānāṃ karmayogas tvayi ca vinihito ye tu nātyantasaktā
nāpy atyantaṃ viraktās tvayi ca dhṛtarasā bhaktiyogo hy amīṣām ||
The verse was referring to Bhāgavata Purāṇa 11.20.7-8, which provides the same rationale:
nirviṇṇānām jñānayogo nyāsinām iha karmasu |
teṣv anirviṇṇacittānāṃ karmayogas tu kāminām ||
yadṛcchayā matkathādau jātaśraddhas tu yaḥ pumān |
na nirviṇṇo nātisakto bhaktiyogo 'sya siddhidaḥ ||
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was perceived by some as largely directed toward this-worldly, material self-interest. That we 
may find this surprising at all is indicative of the ubiquity of these three “paths” (mārgas) or 
“methods” (yogas) in the self-definition of modern Hinduism. But how early, really, is this 
threefold analytic? When did karma, jñāna, and bhakti become hypostatized as such? Is there an 
unbroken link between their earliest formulations and their modern manifestations? Or have 
particular historical agents and social conditions given different shapes to their relation? These 
should be instinctive scholarly questions, but part of the difficulty of premodern Indian 
intellectual history is in figuring out which questions still need asking.365
Let me clarify what I mean by these three terms. Although they are typically defined as 
“ritual action” (or “action” more broadly) and “philosophical gnosis,” in this chapter, karma and 
jñāna refer to their representative intellectual discourses: Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Karma and 
jñāna, of course, have a much wider and intersecting range of referents in Indian intellectual 
history, but by this heuristic marker I intend to reflect the way they were used in the scholarly 
settings I describe in this chapter. Among the many schools of Vedāntic exegesis, I focus on 
Advaita Vedānta, given both its popularity among scholars in early modern Banaras and its 
ambivalent relationship to the other two discourses. These knowledge-systems, whose 
intellectual history “on the eve of colonialism” has been the subject of sustained study over the 
365 These three terms are frequently traced to the Bhagavad Gītā. However, the very analysis of the Gītā in terms of 
“three yogas” was a later innovation, and the authors of the Gītā likely had in mind only two yogas, jñāna and 
karma; later theistic doctrine was interpolated into a layer that originally presented a doctrine of “detached 
action” without propagating a “highest Lord.” See Angelika Malinar, The Bhagavadgītā: Doctrines and Contexts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 93-94. At the same time, the “three yogas” scheme was a 
premodern, not a modern development. The sixteenth-century Banarasi scholar Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
famously used this scheme in his commentary on the Gītā, and the “three yogas” formula itself is clearly 
articulated in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (11.20.6) around the turn of the second millennium. The poet cited in the 
epigraph, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, was a close contemporary of Madhusūdana, albeit a native of Kerala, and evokes the 
scheme in this verse from the Nārāyaṇīya, his lyrical condensation of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. See Francis 
Zimmermann, “Patterns of Truthfulness.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36.5 (2008): 643-650.
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last decade, tended to be the prerogative of an educated elite. Bhakti, or religious devotion to an 
embodied god, however, occupied a space between the “high” textual world and that of everyday 
“popular” practice and performance. On the one hand, texts such as the Bhagavad Gītā and the 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa gave clearest shape to the Sanskrit ideal of bhakti, which, especially in the 
latter, at once supplements and supplants its ritual and philosophical counterparts.366 On the other 
hand, the many communities of local, vernacular, subaltern religious practice which sprang up 
across the subcontinent in the second millennium, and which have come to be narrativized as 
constituting the “bhakti movement,” seemed to affect distance from highbrow scholarly activity, 
especially in Sanskrit. This dichotomy between the popular and elite modes of bhakti—one with 
radical egalitarian impulses, and the other making concessions to dominant forms of religious 
authority and political power—persists in much present scholarship on the subject.367 While this 
is a useful distinction, it foregrounds the view “from below” by locating bhakti primarily in the 
vernacular-subaltern domain rather than suspended between elite and popular worlds. For others, 
even this is too much. They consider the gap between these worlds to be so wide that even the 
textualization of subaltern bhakti traditions is only evidence of their being, as it were, always-
366 The Gītā, for its part, clearly presents a top-down concept of bhakti. See Malinar, The Bhagavadgītā, 13: “[T]he 
idea of bhakti is not presented as a practice of lower-status, illiterate people or as a ‘folk’ religion that priests and 
aristocrats had to concede in order to remain in power, as some interpreters would have it, but as ‘secret’ 
knowledge and a rather demanding practice of transforming attachment to oneself into detachment, which is in 
turn based on attachment to god. In its highest form, it amounts to asceticism in terms of turning one’s life into a 
sacrificial activity to god.”
367 See, e.g., David Lorenzen, “Bhakti,” in The Hindu World, ed. Sushil Mittal and Gene Thursby, 185-209 (London: 
Routledge, 2005), which makes a sharp distinction between varṇadharmī and avarṇadharmī movements: those 
that supported the hierarchical caste system, and those that rejected it. Some, going even further, contend that 
bhakti itself is an “ideology of subordination par excellence.” See Ranajit Guha, “Dominance without Hegemony 
and its Historiography,” in Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Ranajit Guha 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 259. Cf. Tracy Coleman, “Viraha-Bhakti and Strīdharma: Re-
Reading the Story of Kṛṣṇa and the Gopīs in the Harivaṃśa and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 130.3 (2010): 385-412.
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already interpellated,368 unable to discard the normative influence of Sanskrit and Brahmanical 
dominance. At least one scholar has intimated that this textualizing process, in the context of 
Marathi bhakti traditions, went all but unrecognized in the Sanskrit intellectual world:
The varkari sampradaya generated its own textual tradition comprising of the 
Dnyaneswari, Eknathi Bhagvat and the Tukaram Gatha. However, the “high” 
brahmanical traditions showed little inclination, at least at the textual level, to take 
serious note of these developments. Similarly, it may be argued that attempts to include 
bhakti as one of the rasas, as seen, for example, in the work of Madhusudan Saraswati, a 
contemporary of Tulsidas, attest to the impact of bhakti on the “high” aesthetic tradition. 
However, such efforts to appropriate the bhakti tradition as an aesthetic experience, 
without any substantive engagement with its subversive critique, would merely reinforce 
the broader argument offered here.369
Such assertions, however, obscure the ways in which the relationship between karma, 
jñāna, and bhakti was negotiated by Sanskrit intellectuals differently at different times, and with 
reference to both Sanskrit and vernacular worlds. Is it really true that the subversive 
undercurrents of bhakti as the idiom of social and religious dissent were simply overwhelmed by 
the vast Brahmanical ocean? Or did the very incorporation of bhakti as an object of systematic 
theoretical inquiry alongside jñāna and karma signal a shift in the way it was possible to 
conceive of intellectual and religious life, and of what it meant to be a Brahmin in the first place? 
Rather than concentrate exclusively on vernacular bhakti traditions, and pass judgment on their 
relative abilities to maintain a critical edge, I would like to flip the script, and discern the impact 
of bhakti on the Sanskrit intellectual sphere. I think it is quite possible to demonstrate changes at 
the textual level within and across Sanskrit knowledge-systems that were motivated by local 
devotional practices, by investigating: a) the relationship between popular religious movements 
368 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 176.
369 Veena Naregal, “Language and power in pre-colonial western India: Textual hierarchies, literate audiences, and 
colonial philology,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 37.3 (2000): 271, n.40.
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and the rarefied realm of scholarly pedagogy; b) the challenges that bhakti religiosity posed to 
normative scholastic traditions; and c) how personal religious commitments prompted Sanskrit 
intellectuals to think innovatively about the intellectual traditions they inherited. The demotic 
registers of bhakti, I suggest, filtered back into the forbidding world of scriptural hermeneutics, 
ultimately pushing through the glass ceiling of Sanskrit intellectuality. Transmuted and translated 
into the idioms of Brahmanical culture, they nevertheless left a trace in the changing self-
presentation of Brahmin elites. When and how this process occurred has been a peripheral 
subject in the last two chapters, but now the time has come to address the subject head-on. A 
useful place to start is the academic center of Banaras, as we find it in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.
Recent scholarship has focused on early modern Banaras as a site of significant 
intellectual innovation and social contestation, whose outcomes exerted their influence well into 
Indian modernity. While it has been noted that Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta represented a kind 
of philosophical orthodoxy for that city's intellectual elite,370 much work needs to be done in 
order to contextualize this claim within the social and intellectual history of both traditions. In 
this chapter, I will discuss the mutual intersections between karma, jñāna, and bhakti as they 
appear in the corpus of a single family of intellectuals who traced their origins to Maharashtra: 
the Devas of Banaras. In particular, I will describe the ways in which the Devas, across three 
generations, situated their pedagogical commitment to Mīmāṃsā (karma) against their 
philosophical interest in Advaita Vedānta (jñāna), and the relationship of both to their religious 
devotion to a personal god (bhakti). I will conclude with some thoughts on the social history of 
370 See Sheldon Pollock, “New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-Century India,” The Indian Economic and Social  
History Review 38.1 (2001): 21-22; Christopher Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern History,” South 
Asian History and Culture 2:2 (2011): 217.
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these intellectual transitions.
In a set of articles on the social history of early modern India, Rosalind O'Hanlon has 
discussed the migration of Maratha Brahmins into Banaras from the sixteenth century onward.371 
She describes their domination of the intellectual life of that city, and their ability to adjudicate 
public disputes of social hierarchy. O'Hanlon attempts to understand how the changing social 
environment for Maratha Brahmins opened up “the question of what it meant to be a 
Brahman...and what Brahman community could signify amid the social turbulence of the age.”372 
While O'Hanlon's essays primarily address the broadening social function of these Banarasi 
intellectuals within the context of the Mughal imperial order, they also acknowledge as a 
necessary complement the study of the new intellectual trends of those scholars.373 O'Hanlon's 
insightful study invites a salutary alliance between social history and intellectual history, and 
while she addresses the former side of the equation, I hope to contribute here to the latter.
Although the family's patriarch was one Āpadeva I, the Devas' literary activity in Banaras 
can be traced first to Anantadeva I (fl. 1600 CE), followed by his son Āpadeva II (fl. 1625 CE), 
and grandson Anantadeva II (fl. 1650 CE). The last of these was a prominent participant in 
Banaras' dharmasabhās, assemblies of religious experts convened to decide a question of ritual 
rights.374 He provides us with the intellectual lineage of the Deva family in his voluminous 
371 See Rosalind O'Hanlon and Christopher Minkowski, “What makes people who they are? Pandit networks and 
the problem of livelihoods in early modern Western India,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 45.3 
(2008): 383, 395; Rosalind O'Hanlon, “Letters Home: Banaras Pandits and the Maratha Regions in early modern 
India,” Modern Asian Studies 44.2 (2010): 203-204; Rosalind O'Hanlon, “Speaking from Siva's temple, Banaras 
scholar households and the Brahman 'ecumene' of Mughal India,” South Asian History and Culture 2.2 (2011): 
256.
372 O'Hanlon, “Letters Home,” 238-239.
373 Ibid., 202-203.
374 See O'Hanlon and Minkowski, “What makes people who they are,” 382. Cf. O'Hanlon, “Letters Home,” 231-
232, 235. It is likely that the Devas followed a narrative of migration in the mid-sixteenth century similar to that 
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compendium on dharmaśāstra, called the Smṛtikaustubha375:
There was, on the banks of the Godavari,
a brahmin trained in the Vedic sciences,
a devotee of Krishna: Ekanātha by name.
He had a son, who inherited his qualities,
and understood the essence of all scriptures:
Āpadeva [I], the one who obtained from God
every heavenly station.
He had a son, in turn:
a prolific Mīmāṃsā scholar;
ever attached to the worship of Madhu's enemy (Krishna);
made famous by his pedagogical career (vidyādāna);
whose name, Ananta[deva I], achieved its own meaning
by virtue of his countless virtues;
and who composed the “Essence of the Doctrines” of the Vedānta
for the delight of debaters.
His son was Āpadeva [II],
author of the [Mīmāṃsā]nyāyaprakāśa,
learned in both Mīmāṃsās and the science of ethics (naya),
always generous with the infinite nectar of his wisdom.376
elaborated by Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa in the Gādhivaṃśavarṇana. See James Benson, “Śaṃkarabhaṭṭa's Family 
Chronicle: The Gādhivaṃśavarṇana,” in The Pandit: Traditional Scholarship in India, ed. Axel Michaels (New 
Delhi: Manohar, 2001), 105-118.
375 See Pollock, “New Intellectuals,” 8, n.7, on the genre of the kaustubha, and 18-19 on the text's content and 
location.
376 The Smṛiti Kaustubha of Anant Deva, ed. Vasudev Laxman Sastri Pansikar (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1931), 2-3:
āsīd godāvarītīre vedavedīsamanvitaḥ |
śrīkṛṣnabhaktimān eka ekanāthābhidho dvijaḥ || 15 ||
tatsutas tadguṇair yuktaḥ sarvaśāstrārthatattvavit |
āpadevo 'bhavad devāt prāpa yaḥ sakalān manūn || 16 ||
mīmāṃsānayakovido madhuripoḥ sevāsu nityodyataḥ
vidyādānavibhāvitottamayaśā āsīt tadīyātmajaḥ |
yasyānantaguṇair ananta iti san nāmārthavattāṃ gataṃ
yenāvādi ca vādināṃ śrutiśiraḥsiddhāntatattvaṃ mude || 17 ||
nyāyaprakāśakartā niravadhividyāmṛtapradaḥ satatam |
mīmāṃsādvayanayavit tanayas tasyāpadevo 'bhūt || 18 ||
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Undoubtedly the most striking claim here is that of direct descent from the Maharashtrian 
poet-saint Eknāth (1533-1599). While some scholars have accepted the historical accuracy of this 
claim, others have disputed its veracity, citing its chronological difficulty, its scant historical 
evidence, and its intellectual improbability.377 The last of these criticisms points to the 
unlikelihood that a family committed to the social hierarchies of dharmaśāstra and the 
intellectual elitism of Sanskrit discourse would have been connected to Eknāth, who never 
composed in Sanskrit and was notorious for transgressing some of the very laws governing social 
interaction that they so actively promoted.378 This comment on intellectual incongruity, however, 
only goes so far. For the Devas exhibited not only a kind of scholarly orthodoxy—that is, by 
writing books in Sanskrit on Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, and dharmaśāstra—but also a 
committed religious devotion to the god Kṛṣṇa, which featured explicitly in their intellectual 
corpus. I will return to Eknāth later, but first I examine the Devas' attempts to navigate the 
intellectual space between jñāna and bhakti.
Jñāna and Bhakti
We do not have any extant works by the elder Āpadeva, so let us begin with the patriarch 
Anantadeva I. He studied Advaita Vedānta with a renunciate (yati) named Rāmatīrtha, who 
probably lived in Banaras. P.V. Sivarama Dikshitar has discussed the life and works of 
Rāmatīrtha, who cites inspiration from two teachers: a śikṣāguru (instructor) and a dīkṣāguru 
377 For a positive view, see Pollock, “New Intellectuals,” 18, 30; O'Hanlon, “Letters Home,” 203; P.V. Kane, A 
History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. 1 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930): 450-452. For the 
negative, see Jon Keune, “Eknāth Remembered and Reformed: Bhakti, Brahmans, and Untouchables in Marathi 
Historiography” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2011), 184ff.; Franklin Edgerton, The Mīmāṅsā Nyāya 
Prakāśa or Āpadevī (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986 [1929]), 17-18. There is, of course, a third possibility 
that none of our authors entertain: that this could have referred to an entirely different Eknāth altogether. But that 
Anantadeva II bothered to raise this Eknath to the starting point of the genealogy suggests that he was known 
well-enough—famously or infamously—to serve as a proper introduction to the whole family.
378 See Keune, “Eknāth Remembered,” 188.
135
(initiator).379 In the colophons to each of his works, Rāmatīrtha tells us that he is “a bee to the 
blessed lotus feet of the holy Kṛṣṇatīrtha,” and in his Tattvacandrikā, a commentary on 
Ānandagiri's Pañcīkaraṇavivaraṇasaṃgraha, he mentions his guru as being Jagannāthāśrama, 
who was also the teacher of the South Indian Advaitin Nṛsiṃhāśrama.380 Indeed, the connections 
between Rāmatīrtha and Nṛsiṃhāśrama, their geographical distribution notwithstanding, could 
be further evidenced by the fact that both also wrote commentaries on the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka of 
Sarvajñātman (1027 CE), which attracted commentarial attention for the first time in the early 
modern period.381
Whatever may be the historical extent of that relationship, Rāmatīrtha did exert explicit 
influence on Anantadeva I. In the family tree I have provided above, Anantadeva is said to have 
written a textbook on Vedānta called the Siddhāntatattva, or “Essence of the Doctrines,” which 
was accompanied by the autocommentary Sampradāyanirūpaṇa thereon.382 At the beginning of 
379 See P.V. Sivarama Dikshitar, “Rāmatīrtha,” in Preceptors of Advaita, ed. T.M.P. Mahadevan (Secunderabad: Sri 
Kanchi Kamakoti Shankara Mandir, 1968), 221-225.
380 Dikshitar interprets this to mean that Kṛṣṇatīrtha was Rāmatīrtha's dīkṣāguru, probably given the shared -tīrtha 
appellation, and Jagannāthāśrama his śikṣāguru. Ibid., 222. Cf. Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern 
India,” 214.
381 Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern India,” 211. There appears to have been one earlier commentary 
on the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, the Siddhāntadīpa of one Viśvaveda, which is no longer extant but which Rāmatīrtha 
was able to consult prior to writing his Anvayārthaprakāśikā. See Saṃkṣepaśārīrakam, Vol. 2, ed. Hari Narayan 
Apte (Pune: Ānandāśrama Press, 1918), 853:
siddhāntadīpaṃ purato nidhāya vedāntamantargṛhasaṃniviṣṭam |
saṃkṣepaśārīrakaratnapuñjaṃ prakāśamādāya mayā viviktam ||
Incidentally, the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka was also commented upon by the rather more famous Banarasi scholar 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who will return in Chapter 5.
382 Siddhāntatattva, ed. Tailanga Rama Sastri (Benares: Government Sanskrit College, 1901). Cf. Minkowski, 
“Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern India,” 214-215. The editor, however (i, vi), assigns the work to Āpadeva's 
son, Anantadeva II. This seems to be clearly mistaken, as Āpadeva, Anantadeva I's son, himself quotes from the 
work in his commentary on the Vedāntasāra, which I will discuss later. There is a long scholarly history of 
misidentifying Anantadevas I and II.
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the Siddhāntatattva, Anantadeva announces: “What has been received through the traditional 
lineage (saṃpradāya) from the blessed Rāmatīrtha—according to scripture and accompanied by 
sound logic—is being analytically described here.”383 And again at the end, he emphasizes: 
“Thus from the grace earned by following the venerable renunciate Rāmatīrtha, Anantadeva has, 
with delight, presented the 'Essence of the Doctrines,' freed of further disputation.”384 I will 
discuss the work itself in more detail later, but suffice it to note here that Anantadeva's textbook 
has a rather uncompromisingly Advaita flavor, even to the extent of defending the dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, 
the controversial doctrine of subjective idealism which earned many of his contemporaries the 
pejorative epithet “crypto-Buddhist” (pracchannabauddha).385
But Advaita Vedānta did not entirely absorb Anantadeva's attention; indeed, he came to be 
quite critical of the Advaita world. In an important yet virtually ignored treatise called the 
Bhaktinirṇaya (BN), “The Final Say on Bhakti,” Anantadeva I engaged in polemic against 
precisely such promulgators of a radically illusionist Advaita Vedānta. Here is an example of his 
typically belligerent (and, at times, shockingly accusatory) style:
Here some introspective types, only skilled at spinning yarns about Brahman-knowledge 
383 Siddhāntatattva, 1:
yac chrīmadrāmatīrthebhyaḥ sampradāyasamāgatam |
śrutaṃ sattarkasacivaṃ vivicya tad ihocyate  ||
384 Ibid., 60:
itthaṃ parivrājakapūjyapādaśrīrāmatīrthānusṛtiprasādāt  |
siddhāntatattvaṃ gatavāgvivādam anantadevena mudā nyarūpi ||
Note that the instrumental inflection on mudā in this verse is deftly changed into a dative (mude) in the 
corresponding verse (17) by his grandson Anantadeva II in the Smṛtikaustubha. See note 376 above.
385 See Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta,” 213. Cf. Andrew Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in  
Indian Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 63. On the dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, see 
Sthaneshwar Timalsina, Seeing and Appearance: History of the Advaita Doctrine of Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi (Aachen: Shaker 
Verlag, 2006).
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(brahmajñāna), thinking that they have it all figured out just by talking about it, and 
bereft of devotion to the Lord, blabber on as follows: “What purpose is there in honoring 
God who is just Brahman conditioned by māyā, or his playful incarnation (līlāvigraha), 
controller of the illusion? There is nothing to be obtained [by it], the agent himself is 
nothing but Brahman, and so-called agency is illusory anyway. One bathes and performs 
twilight rituals and the like only to maintain social propriety (lokavyavahāra), not that 
there is anything to be gained by it. So also, prohibited activity is avoided for the same 
reason, since there is no such thing as hell.”
Such people should be considered deniers (nāstika386) in disguise. “How so,” you might 
ask, “since they accept the Vedānta as a reliable authority with regard to Brahman?” Well 
then, how can one deny that the performance of merit and sin leads to heaven and hell—
does the Veda not instruct us about that as well? You might argue: “When 
brahmajñāna arises, there is no attainment of heaven or hell.” Tell me: how can one 
achieve brahmajñāna without the prerequisites (sādhana) of disenchantment and so 
forth? If you deny these practices in the first place, you are effectively denying the 
validity of such Vedic statements on the topic as “The Brahmin should become 
disenchanted” (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1.2.12). That makes you as good as a nāstika.387
Anantadeva clearly made a sharp distinction between himself and other Vedāntins, 
exemplified by accusations of heresy (nāstikatva) that resemble the most virulent anti-Advaita 
critiques, many of which emerged from groups committed to the religious worship of a personal 
god. Scholarly discussions on the relationship between jñāna and bhakti have tended to revolve 
around the philosophical implications of Advaita monism for theologies of personal devotion, 
and vice versa. But the Bhaktinirṇaya has little to do with “philosophical” problems between 
386 On affirmers (āstika) and deniers (nāstika) in Indian history, see Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 166-184.
387 Śrīmadanantadevaviracitaḥ Bhaktinirṇayaḥ (henceforth cited as Bhaktinirṇaya), ed. Ananta Shastri Phadke 
(Benares: Sanskrit College, 1937): 27:
atra kecid antarviṣayapravaṇā brahmajñānavārtāmātranirvartananipuṇāḥ tanmātreṇa eva kṛtārthaṃmanyā 
bhagavadbhaktiśūnyāḥ pralapanti māyopahite brahmaṇi bhagavati tad līlāvigrahe vā māyini kim ity ādaraḥ 
kriyate prāpyābhāvāt svayaṃ kartur eva brahmarūpatvāt kartṛtvasya mithyātvāt | snānasandhyādikaṃ tu 
lokavyavahārārthaṃ kriyate na tu tenāpi kiṃcit labdhavyam asti | evaṃ niṣiddhavarjanam api narakābhāvāt 
lokavyavahārārtham eva | ta ete nāmāntareṇa nāstikā ity upekṣyāḥ | kathaṃ nāstikāḥ vedāntānāṃ brahmaṇi 
prāmāṇyābhyupagamād iti cet | hanta tarhi (kathaṃ) svarganarakādyabhāvaḥ puṇyapāpānuṣṭhāne | vedena eva 
brahmapratipādanavat puṇyapāpānuṣṭhātṝṇāṃ svarganarakādipratipādanāt | jāte brahmajñāne nāsti 
svarganarakaprāptir iti cet | kathaṃ vairāgyādisādhanābhāve brahmajñānāvāptir bhavatām | vairāgyādisādhanam 
eva na bhavati iti cet tatpratipādakasya “brāhmaṇo nirvedam āyād” ityādivedavacanasya 
aprāmāṇyābhyupagamena nāstikatvāt |
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jñāna and bhakti at all. Instead, the text is mostly concerned with the social consequences of 
proper methods of interpretation. One fear for Anantadeva, for example, is that the Advaitin's 
radical disavowal of ritual obligations and devotional sentiments could lead to a total nihilism. 
What are the implications of choosing one over the other? What does it mean to challenge the 
Vedānta consensus, or question who the true Vedāntin is? Who is the subject in need of 
reformation? One example of this attention to the social component of intellectual disagreement, 
germane to the conflict between Anantadeva and other Advaitins, opens the second chapter of the 
BN. Here Anantadeva engages an opponent who fears that valorizing practices of bhakti would 
invalidate the tradition of Vedānta study entirely. He responds with a detailed account of how 
they are different but equivalent ways to liberation. When pressed to defend this claim in the face 
of exegetical precedent, he offers both a scriptural and a worldly justification:
Objection: Now if you say that bhakti, by giving rise to the knowledge of truth, is a 
means to liberation, the whole system of studying the Brahma Sūtras becomes 
meaningless.
Reply: So what if it's worthless? What's it to me? I would also say that it is 
inappropriate to call the system meaningless. Since it is comprised of inquiry into 
Vedānta, it is an activity enjoined by such Vedic statements as “One should listen [to the 
teachings on the Self],” which are directed toward achieving the knowledge that leads to 
liberation. At the very least, there is an option [between bhakti and Vedānta] since they 
have the same end. […] They just have different ways of going about the same thing 
(dvārabheda). One works as follows:
First, you study Vedānta (vedāntavicāra) to get rid of any doubts regarding the validity of 
the scripture which would have you understand that the purport of Vedānta is nondual 
Brahman. Second, you reflect on this teaching (manana) to remove doubts about the 
object of knowledge itself, that make you think your mind is incapable of uniting with it. 
Finally, through meditation (nididhyāsana) you get rid of your contrary experience [of 
plurality in everyday life], and achieve liberation upon the direct experience of the truth.
However, in the topic under consideration (bhakti), first you undertake the practices 
of bhakti-as-means (sādhanabhakti), hearing God's glories, singing them, etc., and then 
you come upon both bhakti-as-result (phalabhakti), which is essentially a total love 
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for God, as well as the sudden display of God who is the abode of supreme love. Then, 
when you become detached from your body, house, etc., you realize the truth through 
God's grace, and then achieve liberation.388
Objection: But surely it is only the first of these methods that the authors of scriptural 
treatises have explicated, and not the latter.
Reply: What's your point? Not everyone is going to discuss everything. And this second 
method has good reasoning behind it. It is a matter of universal experience that when you 
start hearing or singing the glories of God, you begin to feel a sense of delight 
(praharṣa). This is all the more the case for those who have developed a faith (śraddhā) 
by performing sacrifices and other [Brahmanical] activities. And when someone is 
delighted with something, they develop a love (anurāga) for that thing, just like the 
cakora bird's love for the moon. When you fall in love, that object starts to pulsate in 
your heart, and any attachment to other things simply slips away—just as it does for a 
young girl intent on her paramour. And when that complete love for God called 
phalabhakti comes to fruition, as a result of the practices of sādhanabhakti, then almighty 
God bestows his grace, and one achieves liberation upon knowing the truth.389
388 The distinction between bhakti-as-means and bhakti-as-end has an old precedent in Vaiṣṇava writings. In the 
Yatīndramatadīpikā (Ch. 7), the Śrīvaiṣṇava theologian Śrīnivāsa describes the former as generated by human 
effort and the latter as the grace of God. This maps onto the Śrīvaiṣṇava distinction between acts of worship and 
surrender (prapatti). There, however, bhakti is equated to nididhyāsana, or meditation, the third Vedāntic act 
prescribed above.
This paragraph as a whole alludes to Śrīdhara Svāmī's commentary on Bhāgavata Purāṇa 11.2.42: “Love, 
experience of God, and disdain for other things—these three occur at the same time, just like one who eats is at 
once happy, nourished, and filled with each bite.”
bhaktiḥ pareśānubhavo viraktir
anyatra caiṣa trika ekakālaḥ |
prapadyamānasya yathā'śnataḥ syus
tuṣṭiḥ puṣṭiḥ kṣudapāyo 'nughāsam ||
Śrīdhara defines the experience of God as “the sudden flashing-forth of the form of God who is the abode of 
love” (premāspadabhagavadrūpasphūrti), and specifies that one becomes “detached towards the household, and 
so forth” (gṛhādiṣu viraktir). See Bhāgavata Purāṇa of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa With Sanskrit Commentary  
Bhāvārthabodhinī of Śrīdhara Svāmin, ed. J.L. Shastri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 628. Anantadeva 
explicates this verse further on in the Bhaktinirṇaya (37-38), and we find the same verse and commentarial 
passage cited toward the end of Jīva Gosvāmin's Bhaktisandarbha, ed. Haridāsa Śāstrī (Vrindavan: Gadadhar 
Gaurahari Press, 1985).
389 Bhaktinirṇaya, 33-35: nanv evaṃ bhaktes tattvajñānadvārā mokṣasādhanatve caturlakṣaṇī śāstram anarthakam 
āpadyate | anarthakam evāstu kā no hāniḥ | yad vā tasya vedāntavicārātmakatvāt tasya 
mokṣasādhanajñānoddeśena “śrotavya” ityādivākyavihitatvād ānarthakyānupapatteḥ (kintu) tulyārthatvena 
vrīhiyavavad vikalpaḥ | […] dvārabheda eva | tathā hi | vedāntavicāreṇādvitīye brahmaṇi tātparyāvadhāraṇe 
pramāṇāsambhāvanānivṛttau, mananena ca prameyāsambhāvanāyāṃ cittasya tadaikāgryāyogyatārūpāyāṃ 
nivṛttāyāṃ, nididhyāsanena ca viparītabhāvanāyāṃ nivṛttāyāṃ tattvasākṣātkārodaye muktiḥ | prakṛte tu 
śravaṇakīrtanādisādhanabhakter anuvṛttau bhagavati parapremalakṣaṇānurāgātmikā phalabhaktiḥ 
parapremāspadabhagavanmūrtisphūrtiś ca jāyate | tataś ca dehagehādau viraktasya bhagavatprasādāt 
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Three things stand out about this passage. First, Anantadeva accuses the Vedāntin of 
undervaluing his own scriptural tradition—a classic case of “You said it, not me.” Second, he 
holds up the Brahmin practitioner of Vedic sacrifices as the ideal candidate for bhakti. Not only 
does he say that taking delight in God's stories is “especially” (viśeṣato) true of those who 
perform sacrifices and other Brahmanical rites, he asserts that such sādhanabhakti is only fruitful 
for those who have the requisite faith, which emerges from the same Brahmanical practices 
(yajñādyanuṣṭḥāna) as does the desire to study Vedānta.390 Third, in response to the Vedāntin's 
critique that the path he proposes is unsupported by the majority of traditional teachers 
(śāstrakāra), Anantadeva foregrounds an “everyday experience” that is nevertheless informed by 
scriptural authority—the dialectic of theory and practice that pervaded Sanskrit intellectual 
culture.391 We all know, as he says, that hearing the glories of God gives you happiness and 
fulfillment; after all, we've been told to think that by the Bhagavad Gītā (11.36) and Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa. If your experience doesn't match, it means you're doing something wrong. Just because a 
sick man doesn't enjoy drinking milk, that doesn't mean milk is not in itself a source of delight.392 
tattvasākṣātkārodaye muktir iti | nanu pūrvā praṇālikā nirūpitā śāstrakārair nottarā | kim etāvatā | na hi sarve 
sarvaṃ nirūpayanti | yuktā ceyaṃ pranālikā | tathā hi | bhagavataḥ śravaṇakīrtanādyanuṣṭhāne praharṣaḥ 
sakalajanānām anubhavasiddhaḥ | viśeṣato yajñādyanuṣṭhānajanyaśraddhāviśeṣavatām | yadanubandhena ca 
praharṣo yasya tasya tatrānurāgaḥ sampadyate | cakorāder iva candrādau | anurāge ca sampadyamāne 
tatsphuraṇaṃ tadanyaviṣayeṣu cittānubandhaśaithilyañ ca | navataruṇyā iva vallabhaviṣaye | tataś ca 
śravaṇakīrtanādinā 'bhyastena bhagavati pūrṇānurāgātmakaphalabhaktiparipāke sakalaśaktiyukto bhagavān 
prasīdatīti tasya tattvajñāne muktir iti |
390 Ibid., 33: yathā hi yajñādyanuṣṭhānasādhyavividiṣāvataḥ puruṣasya vedāntavicāraḥ phalavān evaṃ 
yajñādyanuṣṭhānasādhyaśraddhasya śravaṇādibhaktiḥ phalavatī |
391 See Sheldon Pollock, “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History,” Journal 
of the American Oriental Society 105.3 (1985): 499-519.
392 Bhaktinirṇaya, 35: na caitad arthavādamātram, tadarthapratipādakānāṃ purāṇavacanānām upalambhāt | tatra 
bhaktyā sādhanātmikayā 'nurāgātmakabhaktyudaye kṛtārthatā bhavatīty uktaṃ bhagavadgītāsu –
sthāne hṛṣīkeśa tava prakīrtyā
jagat prahṛṣyaty anurajyate ca |
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You have to be the right kind of Brahmin to get what I mean, Anantadeva says, the kind I am 
telling you to be.
Debates in the BN over what constitutes bhakti, who God is, and what scriptural texts 
support which claim, in turn reveal debates over who should undertake bhakti, how they should 
read their texts, and why they should come to terms with a shifting scriptural canon. The 
injunctive modality is central; the first chapter is titled “An Investigation into the Necessity of 
Devotion to God” (haribhaktikartavyatānirūpaṇam). The word “necessity” or “requirement” 
(kartavyatā) implies the regulation of behavioral standards and not just apologetics. In other 
words, it is not simply Advaita Vedānta or Mīmāṃsā with which Anantadeva takes issue at 
various points, it is Advaitins and Mīmāṃsakas. This may seem banal; Sanskrit intellectuals 
always reconstructed arguments with representative opponents. But in Anantadeva's context, we 
can glean that these opponents were real, not more-than-real.393 By giving his work the subtitle 
rakṣāṃsi bhītāni diśo dravanti
sarve manasyanti ca siddhasaṅkhyāḥ ||
[…] nanu keṣāñcit bhagavacchravaṇakīrtanādināpi na praharṣo dṛśyate, natarāṃ bhagavaty anurāgaḥ | satyam | 
naitāvatā kācit kṣatir vacanānubhavayoḥ | na hi jvaritānāṃ dugdhapāne harṣo na dṛśyata iti tan na harṣahetuḥ |
This last example is classic Anantadeva. He uses it repeatedly in a benedictory verse we find across his works to 
defend their value against the criticisms of jealous scholars: “If wicked people of limited intellect, out of envy in 
their heart, disrespect this well-written work, then so what? Just because sick people do not have a taste for it, 
pure sweet milk is never at fault.” See Bhagavannāmakaumudī, ed. Govinda Damodar Sastri (Kāśī: 
Acyutagranthamālā, 1927), 1, Prakāśa comm:
samyaṅnirūpitam idaṃ yadi nādriyante
duṣṭā nikṛṣṭamatayo hṛdi matsareṇa |
kiṃ tāvatā jvaravatām arucer na jātu
dugdhasya śuddhamadhurasya vidūṣaṇaṃ syāt || 3 ||
The same verse is found in Anantadeva's Sampradāyanirūpaṇa, an unpublished autocommentary on his 
aforementioned Siddhāntatattva. The manuscript is erroneously catalogued as the Siddhāntatattva itself in the 
archives of the BORI (No. 309 of 1895-98). Cf. P. Peterson, A Sixth Report in Search of Sanscrit Mss. In the  
Bombay Circle (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1899), 23-24.
393 I allude to David Shulman, More Than Real: A History of the Imagination in South India (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).
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nirṇaya—a deliberation, determination, or judgment—Anantadeva was perhaps alluding to the 
very public debates over normative social, ritual, and moral codes for which the Brahmin paṇḍits 
of early modern Banaras were known.394 As we will see in more detail in the subsequent section, 
many of Anantadeva's critiques in the BN are addressed not at the level of metaphysical 
reconciliation, such as we find in the work of his more famous contemporary Madhusūdana 
Sarasvatī,395 but that of social identity and practice. For Anantadeva, bhakti is not just a religion 
of the heart, but one of the body and mind as well.
In order to understand better the social context in which Anantadeva's works circulated, 
let us explore his brief forays into literature, a genre which allowed him to provide a more 
colorful picture of the contested intellectual terrain he adumbrates in the BN. Of particular 
interest is his Kṛṣṇabhakticandrikānāṭaka (KBCN), discussed long ago by the renowned Sanskrit 
scholar and literary historian Baldev Upadhyaya as “A Devotional Drama in Sanskrit.”396 
394 Cf. O'Hanlon and Minkowski, “What makes people who they are?”
395 Cf. Chapter 5.
396 Baldev Upadhyaya, “A Devotional Drama in Sanskrit,” Indian Historical Quarterly XII (1936): 721-729. 
Upadhyaya attributes the drama to the junior Anantadeva II, but comparisons with the senior Anantadeva's works 
make it clear that it was composed by the latter. Except for the superlatively meticulous P.K. Gode, many early 
twentieth-century scholars confused the two. See P.K. Gode, “Āpadeva, the Author of the 
Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa and Mahāmahopādhyāya Āpadeva, the Author of the Adhikaraṇacandrikā and 
Smṛticandrikā – are they identical?” in Studies in Indian Literary History Vol. II (Bombay: Singhi Jain Śāstra 
Śikshāpīth, 1954), 39-48.
The KBCN was printed twice, both times in long-defunct journals: the Kāvyetihāsasaṅgraha (Pune, 1881) and 
the Grantharatnamālā (Bombay, 1892). The first is in the British Library, though unavailable to me at the time 
of writing, while the latter still escapes me. These printed editions were probably based on the (four) manuscripts 
available in the BORI archives in Pune. Upadhyaya does not tell us what manuscript he looked at, thought it was 
probably the one deposited in the Benares Sanskrit College. My translations are based on a preliminary edition I 
have made from three additional manuscripts in the collections of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and two more in 
Houghton Library, Harvard University. Despite the availability of a printed edition, this philological exercise has 
served to illuminate interesting features of the material history of the text. The Chandra Shum Shere collection is 
in the Bodleian, while the last two are in Harvard's Houghton Library. Abbreviations are my own.
1. CSS₁: MS Chandra Shum Shere d. 671(1). Dated Wed. Dec. 4, 1647 CE. Devanāgari, Paper, 15 folios, 16 
lines per page (ff. 1-2v in a different hand). Scribe: Ekanātha, s/o Ananta Bhaṭa Tāmaṇ. Owners: Ekanātha 
(probably same as scribe), and Ramānātha Dīkṣita. This may be one of the oldest extant manuscripts of the text, 
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Upadhyaya provides a useful synopsis of the play, in which many characters of different 
philosophical persuasions are progressively conquered in debate (though, it must be said, with 
little resistance) by two protagonists of bhakti to Krishna.397 The first is a “great Vaiṣṇava” 
(mahāvaiṣṇava), who convinces two sectarians, a Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava, of the non-difference 
between Śiva and Viṣṇu. The second is a devotee of Krishna (kṛṣṇabhakta), who takes on a 
series of prideful pedants: a grammarian, logician, Mīmāṃsaka, and Advaita Vedāntin. These are 
two separate sections. One hero is dispatched to deal with the problem of religious divides, and 
the other attends to philosophical squabbles between partisan scholars. The kṛṣṇabhakta, much 
like the author Anantadeva, is himself a former scholar, accustomed to the ego-driven arena of 
academic activity. His new life, in the search of artless religious devotion, is pitted against what 
he considers the self-serving scholarship of his immodest colleagues. It is worth noting that the 
final character to be convinced of (indeed, converted to) the supremacy of bhakti is an Advaita 
Vedāntin, Anantadeva's own alter ego. It quickly emerges that this particular dramatis persona 
displays a striking similarity to the Advaitin opponent in Anantadeva's Bhaktinirṇaya. A 
polemical exchange between that haughty Vedāntin (V) and a Mīmāṃsaka (M) who has already 
since it circulated in Banaras itself until becoming part of the as-yet incompletely catalogued Chandra Shum 
Shere collection.
2. CSS₂: MS Chandra Shum Shere e. 122. Dated 1775 CE. Incomplete. Devanāgari, Paper, 21 folios, 12 lines 
per page.
3. K: MS Sansk. d. 88. Dated 1693-4 CE. Description in Moriz Winternitz and A.B. Keith, Catalogue of Sanskrit  
Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905), 174-176. There is an interesting 
orthographic note about this manuscript: because it was written in the Śāradā script, the text likely circulated 
among Kashmiri Brahmins in Banaras—not just Maharashtrians like the Devas.
4. H₁: MS Indic 1094. Not dated. Devanāgari, Paper, 20 folios, 11 lines per page.
5. H₂: MS Indic 1095. Dated Wed. Apr. 9, 1822 CE. Devanāgari, Paper, 18 folios, 11 lines per page. Scribe: 
Kāmarūpa Śarmā. Patron: Raghunātha Śarmā. Location: Pāṭalīputra (present-day Patna).
397 Upadhyaya, “A Devotional Drama in Sanskrit,” 724.
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been transformed by the kṛṣṇabhakta (KB) takes place as soon as the Vedāntin enters the scene:
V (to the kṛṣṇabhakta): Hey, why are you trying to convert people who have no 
grounding in systematic study of the Upaniṣads? How does the name “Krishna” or 
devotion to him have anything to do with liberation? When it comes to the highest reality, 
nothing truly exists, not even your “Krishna.”
M: You prattle on about how things are “constructed,” and won't let it go in the least. 
Some scholarship that is: you only deconstruct the ideas of others.
V: I am that Brahman described by the Upaniṣads, no doubt about it. You've got to 
understand: the sense-objects you see in me are like a mirage. You can only reach the self 
when there is neither dharma nor adharma, neither heaven nor hell. There can't possibly 
be bhakti to Krishna at that point.
M: Enough! This is blasphemous drivel (nāstikapralapanam)!
The harangue goes on a little further, until the kṛṣṇabhakta (KB) gets fed up with the debaters:
KB: You all can go ahead and raise a big hubbub about scriptural analysis, day in and day 
out, since that's where you feel the need to ply your trade: in service of the quest for ever-
increasing eminence. I used to do the same, but not anymore, for now I have the 
uninterrupted joy of constant worship of the blessed Lord of Cowherds (Krishna).398
398 vedāntī (śrīkṛṣṇabhaktaṃ prati) - katham are upaniṣatpariśīlanaśūnyān pratārayasi ? kveyaṃ kṛṣṇasamākhyā 
kva ca tadbhaktiḥ kva vā pumartho 'sau ? kalpitam eva samastaṃ brahmaṇi nāsty eva vāstavaṃ kiṃcit |
mīmāṃsakaḥ -
kalpitam iti khalu jalpasi jahāsi naivālpam apy etat |
buddhiṃ parasya bhettuṃ kevalam etad hi pāṇḍityam || 93 ||
vedāntī -
āgamaśironirūpyaṃ brahmaivāhaṃ na saṃśayas tatra |
yān mayi paśyasi viṣayān mṛgajalam iva tān avaihi tvam || 94 ||
ataś ca -
yatra na dharmādharmau svargo narakaś ca dūrato 'pāstau |
tatrātmānaṃ labhatāṃ kutra śrīkṛṣṇagocarā bhaktiḥ || 95 ||
mīmāṃsakaḥ - alam etan nāstikapralapanam | […]
śrīkṛṣṇabhaktaḥ -
yuṣmābhiḥ pariśīlyatāṃ pratidinaṃ śāstrārthakolāhalas
tatraivāniśavardhamānaśubhatādhyāsānuvṛtter vaśāt |
prāg aṅgīkṛta eva so 'yam adhunā nāsmābhir ādrīyate
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While the kṛṣṇabhakta is set up to win from the outset, the apparent contrast between the 
intellectual elitism of scholarly pedagogues and the simple piety of religious devotion is not quite 
thoroughgoing. Anantadeva seems to disown pointless scholarly debate in favor of spontaneous 
spiritual fervor, but this belies the firmly intellectual context of his entire oeuvre, to which he 
refers frequently, and not always with a sense of remorse. In the autobiographical sketch he 
provides in the prologue to another drama, the Mano'nurañjananāṭaka, Anantadeva celebrates 
the co-existence of scholarly accomplishment and bhakti religiosity:
Stage-Manager: The poet Anantadeva's knowledge, which has given rise to this 
composition, also delights the mind:
He was given over to the study of the “prior” and “latter” Mīmāṃsās,
and generally spent his days instructing others in those disciplines. (8)
Actor: What could the guru of this distinguished person be like?
Stage-Manager: One should rather say “gurus.” First of all, his very own father:
Whose name, Āpadeva, reached every ear,
whose vast knowledge was desired by every heart,
whose character was unparalleled on this earth,
and who served with his very mind
the god as dark as the Tamāla [tree]. (9)
śrīgopālapates trikālabhajanānandānubandhād iha || 96 ||
kva vā° - kvāyam artho 'sau (CSS ); ₁ °alpam - °alam (CSS ); ₂ °nirūpyaṃ - °nirūpa (CSS ); ₂ brahmaivāhaṃ – 
brahmaivāyaṃ (H ); ₂ yān  (emen.) - Mss. read yan; yatra na – yavana (H ); ₂ dharmādharmau - dharmo 
(CSS ); ₂ alam etan° - Omitted in H₂; anuvṛtter – anuvarter (CSS , K, CSS ); ₁ ₂ iha - ihaḥ (CSS ).₂
The final verse mirrors a sentiment expressed in the opening to the Bhaktinirṇaya, 1: “Go ahead, get an 
education, and become rich and famous, tossing your pearls before swine. For my part, I'm content to worship 
the lotus feet of Govinda—there you find eternal bliss.”
abhyasya vidyāṃ dhanam arjayantu
khyātiṃ ca mūrkhān prati sādhayantu |
vayaṃ tu govindapadāravinda-
dvayaṃ sadānandamayaṃ bhajāmaḥ || 2 ||
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And yet another:
Mind ripened by worship to the feet of Rāmacandra,
devoted to the constant memory of Lord Rāma's name,
with an intellect as firm and strong as Rāmacandra's own,
the one renowned to the world as the blessed Rāmatīrtha. (10)
Actor: We've all heard of this world-teacher's great philosophical exercises 
(darśanābhyāsa), and yet he remains absorbed in the name of God (parameśvaranāma). 
Ah, what a wonder!
Stage-Manager: What is there to wonder? What cannot one gain when Lord Viṣṇu is 
pleased? Look—
True scripture is the entire milky ocean,
its daily study is Mount Mandara,
and analytical reflection is the churning.
But that pure nectar, the blessed name of Hari,
even among devotees who exhaust their efforts,
only reaches the lips of a select few,
through the grace of Śrī's Beloved. (11)399
399 The Manonurañjana Nāṭaka, ed. Dr. Mangal Deva Shastri (Allahabad: The Superintendent Printing and 
Stationery, 1938), 3-4:
sūtradhāraḥ – etannibandhanahetubhūtam asya kaver anantadevābhidhasya jñānam api mano'nurañjanam |
yaḥ pūrvottaramīmāṃsāpariśīlanaśīlavān |
tadīyādhyāpanenaiva samayaṃ khalu nītavān || 8 ||
naṭaḥ - asya mahābhāgasya kīdṛśo guruḥ syāt ?
sūtradhāraḥ - gurava iti vaktavyam | ekas tāvat pitaiva |
yasyāpadeva iti nāma na kasya karṇe
vidyācayasya hṛdi kasya na kāṅkṣitaṃ syāt |
śīlaṃ ca yasya manasaiva tamālanīlaṃ





śrīrāmatīrtha iti yo jagati prasiddhaḥ || 10 ||
naṭaḥ - asya kila jagadguror mahān darśanābhyāsaḥ śrūyate punarapi parameśvaranāmaniṣṭhatvam | aho mahad 
āścaryam !
sūtradhāraḥ - kim āścaryaṃ kim alabhyaṃ bhagavati prasanne śrīniketane ? paśya -
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A third teacher, though not mentioned in Anantadeva's other works, appears clearly in the 
next verse from the autobiography.400 This was Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (b. 1513 CE), a name that 
probably refers to the famous dharmaśāstra scholar of Banaras who, like the Devas, came from a 
family of migrant Maharashtrian Brahmins and prominently participated in Banaras' public 
debates.401 Rāmatīrtha's simultaneous devotion to jñāna and bhakti no doubt provided a model for 
Anantadeva's own. But for all these lofty sentiments, and even though he established a household 
in which academic success was consistent for three generations, Anantadeva was still 
uncomfortable with the context of his scholarly accomplishments. He concludes the drama with a 
rueful verse reminiscent of the kṛṣṇabhakta in the KBCN:
Through studying scriptures, teaching students, and writing books for fame and renown 
[my] mind became proud of its accomplishments.
But now, through [my] merit alone, in each word
that praises Govinda and his qualities,
in the billows of the milky ocean of joy
it obtains felicity.402
sacchāstraṃ nikhilaṃ payombudhir ayaṃ tasyātha dainaṃdinā-
bhyāso mandaraparvato nayacayair ālocanaṃ manthanam |
tatra śrī harināma śuddham amṛtaṃ śrānteṣv ananyeṣv api
śrīkāntasya kṛpāvaśena tu mukhe keṣāṃcid evāñcati ||11||
400 Ibid., 4: “The goddess of speech used to make the lotus-seated (Brahmā) jealous by moving from the lotus face 
of one learned man to the next. But only when she reached Nārāyaṇa's did she find fulfillment at once.”
īṛṣyāṃ sarojāsanam ādadhānā
sthitā budhānāṃ mukhapaṅkajeṣu |
nārāyaṇasyaiva tu saṃśrayeṇa
sadyaḥ kṛtārthatvam avāpa vāṇī || 12 ||
401 On Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's life, see Benson, “Śaṃkarabhaṭṭa's Family Chronicle, 111-4. Cf. Haraprasad Shastri, 
“Dakshini Pandits at Benares,” Indian Antiquary 41: 7-12.
402 The Mano'nurañjana Nāṭaka, 102:
śāstrāṇāṃ pariśīlanair bhṛśam aho śiṣyeṣu cādhyāpanaiḥ
khyātyuddeśakṛtair babhūva tu mahākṛtyābhimānaṃ manaḥ |
puṇyair eva tu samprati pratipadaṃ govindatattadguṇa-
ślāghyaṃ saukhyapayodhivīcinicayeṣv ānandam āvindati || 98 ||
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What do these passages tell us about the intellectual space which Anantadeva inhabited, 
and which he attempted to fashion through both his literary and philosophical writing? Baldev 
Upadhyaya reads the KBCN rather straightforwardly as “a noble embodiment of the firm 
conviction of the author in the supremacy of the Bhakti-mārga.”403 No doubt, there is an almost 
evangelical, starry-eyed quality to the rhetoric of bhakti's protagonists, complete with stage 
directions that portray the reformed characters speaking “with deep love, stripped of the desire to 
cause rifts” (śithilīkṛtabhedābhiniveśaḥ svānurāgeṇa). More interesting, however, is the colorful 
way in which Anantadeva depicts the scholarly agōn, not only as a literary representation of his 
philosophical polemic, but as a mirror to the social atmosphere of the Banarasi scholarly 
conferences (paṇḍitasabhā) in which he likely participated. When the stage-manager of the 
KBCN walks out onto the set, he is directed to stand before an “audience of scholars” 
(paṇḍitamaṇḍalīm), which the author compares to “the halls of Indra, lined with thousands of 
glittering eyes” (ākhaṇḍalasabhām iva vilokanacaṭulasahasranayanāvalīm). However lofty the 
description of this ideal audience,404 elsewhere in the KBCN is evidence of a serious ethical 
unease with these settings. In such passages, scholarly sophistication is perceived as sophistry in 
disguise, a competitive power-grab where victory means both prestige and patronage. Take, for 
403 Upadhyaya, “A Devotional Drama in Sanskrit,” 728.
404 That Anantadeva sought to construct his audience as much through his literary as his polemical writings can be 
demonstrated in a surprising cameo that the audience itself makes, somewhat like a Greek chorus, in the 
prologue to the Mano'nurañjananāṭaka. Upon listening to the stage manager and lead actor discuss the 
worthlessness of a life without listening to the glories of God, the audience members murmur among themselves: 
“Wow, their dialogue really is pregnant with meaning—so much so that we want this saṃsāra to cease 
altogether! Now let's listen to all those stories connected with the Lord of Yadus.” See The Manonurañjana 
Nāṭaka, 6:
sabhyāḥ (svagataṃ) – aho paramārthagarbhā evānayor vācaḥ | yadvayaṃ saṃsṛtinirvṛtikāmāḥ | saṃprati sarvaṃ 
yadupatyanubandhinibandhanaṃ śroṣyāmaḥ |
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example, the following disgruntled complaint from the grammarian (śābdika) regarding an 
upstart logician (tārkika), whose irreverent ilk is beginning to dominate local intellectual circles:
They study the new logic (navyaṃ nyāyam),405 attend academic conferences puffed with 
conceit, boldly criticize even the revered elders, and take their seats at the head of 
the table. If anyone starts to speak of scripture, they give each other meaningful glances, 
roll their eyes sarcastically, and abuse that person to no end.406
Similarly, the following cynical comment from a Śaiva partisan lays bare this mercenary attitude 
to scholarly debate:
Knowledge is only useful if you can make someone else look silly. Cleverness only lives 
up to its name if you get someone else's money with it. Therefore, you must study 
everything you can, conquer others in debate, gain professorial recognition, and build a 
great portfolio.407
405 On the prominence of Navya Nyāya in early modern India, see Jonardon Ganeri, The Lost Age of Reason:  
Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450-1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
406 navyaṃ nyāyam adhītya saṃsadam upāgatya smayāveśataḥ
śiṣṭān apy avamatya dhṛṣṭamatayaḥ prauḍhāsaneṣv āsate |
śāstre vakti yadaiva kaścana tadā te 'nyonyam udvīkṣitair
bhrūkṣepair hasitais tathopahasitair enaṃ tiraskurvate || 72 ||
navyaṃ° - navyanyāyam (K); śāstre - śāstraṃ (K – a later correction for original śāstre); enaṃ - evaṃ (CSS ).₂
407 nāsau vidyā bhavati prabhavati na yayā parābhavo 'nyasya |
bhavati ca na nipuṇatā sā na yayā paradhanam upānayati || 37 ||
tasmāt -
adhyetavyākhilā vidyā nirjetavyāś ca vādinaḥ |
ānetavyā pratiṣṭhā ca saṃcetavyāś ca sampadaḥ || 38 ||
bhavati – omitted in K, CSS ; ₂ ca na  - ca (CSS ), omitted in K₂ ; ānetavyā - anetavyā (CSS ).₂
These concerns were reflected in contemporary South India as well by the satirist and scholar Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita 
(Kaliviḍambana 1.5-6), writing in Madurai at the court of Tirumala Nāyaka (r. 1623-1659 CE). See The Minor 
Poems of Nilakantha Dikshita (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1911), 3-4:
abhyāsyaṃ lajjamānena tattvaṃ jijñāsunā ciram |
jigīṣuṇā hriyaṃ tyaktvā kāryaḥ kolāhalo mahān ||
pāṭhanair granthanirmāṇaiḥ pratiṣṭhā tāvad āpyate |
evaṃ ca tathyavyutpattir āyuṣo 'nte bhaven na vā ||
“A humble seeker of truth must study for a long time. [But] if you want to win in debate, shamelessly raise a big 
commotion. You get tenure by teaching and writing books. Who knows? Maybe, in this way, you'll gain true 
erudition by the time you die!”
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As is clear from previous passages, Anantadeva I was no slouch when it came to 
intellectual confrontation. Yet the context of his confessional statements (“I used to want fame, 
but not anymore”) suggests that bhakti was not simply a public expression of personal devotion, 
in abstract philosophical conflict with jñāna, but a means to counteract the corrupting effects of 
new economic demands.408 There is a deep ambivalence in Anantadeva's writing toward the new 
intellectual marketplace of early modern Banaras; the very systems of patronage and intellectual 
networks that made immigrants like himself so successful are the ones he criticizes for their 
materialistic excess. In this semi-fictional world, then, Anantadeva's bhaktimārga comes to be 
less a path to salvation from the torment of worldly life than a way to come to terms with it. 
Scholarship is still important, and you can still make money, but only in the service of God. And 
if even a supposedly detached Vedāntin can be seduced by the pride of knowledge, so much more 
Mīmāṃsakas and dharmaśāstrīs, those in the business of determining scriptural authority and 
enforcing ritual and ethical norms.409 For even if the former exercised his intellectual ambitions 
within a discipline that was ostensibly unconcerned with the world of everyday life,410 the latter's 
scholarly efforts carried significant social consequences. This takes us to the second part of our 
inquiry, on the relationship between bhakti and karma.
408 On the new economic opportunities and intellectual networks available to scholars in early modern Banaras, see 
Christopher Minkowski et al., “Social History in the Study of Indian Intellectual Cultures?”, South Asian History  
and Culture 6.1 (2015): 1-9.
409 On the changing nature of the division of scholastic labor between Mīmāṃsakas and dharmaśāstrīs from 
classical to early modern India, see Lawrence McCrea, “Hindu Jurisprudence and Scriptural Hermeneutics,” in 
Hinduism and Law, ed. Timothy Lubin et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 123-137.
410 See Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern India,” 205: “Can this unworldly philosophy, which 
propounded the doctrine of undivided Being, have been changed through its involvement with the world of 




The previous chapter briefly noted that Anantadeva wrote a commentary on the 
Bhagavannāmakaumudī of Lakṣmīdhara. The BNK had set the stage for several later discourses 
on the superiority of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. It emphasized that the practice of singing God's 
name (nāmasaṃkīrtana) was an effective means to expiate sins and, ultimately, led to liberation. 
It also challenged orthodox Mīmāṃsā concepts by arguing for the independent authority of 
purāṇic language. These arguments had significantly influenced Anantadeva's Bhaktinirṇaya, 
and were in some cases adopted wholesale. For example, in the following passage, Anantadeva 
responds to a Mīmāṃsaka opponent who takes issue with a purāṇic quotation which sanctions 
singing the name of God. The opponent finds no place or precedent for this form of religiosity. 
Anantadeva takes umbrage:
On this point, we find some people who fancy themselves Mīmāṃsakas—who are devoid 
of the Lord's worship, who can't stand singing the name of God, and are only gearing up 
to fall into the pit of hell—prattling on as follows: “There is no such dharma as 'singing' 
(saṃkīrtana) which is available to us in the śruti or smṛti. In particular, Brahmins who are 
qualified for rites like the agnihotra cannot possibly engage in 'singing.' The verse cited 
above, however, is nothing but an arthavāda.”
All of that is total nonsense. What does it mean to say that it is “just an arthavāda”? Do 
you mean that it is simply not a valid source of knowledge (apramāṇa), or invalid insofar 
as it does not form a single unit with an attendant injunction? You can't possibly mean the 
first, since the purāṇa is just as authoritative as the śruti and smṛti […] Nor does the 
second [possible objection] hold water; since purāṇic verses like the one above are 
authoritative irrespective of their connection with an injunction, this contradicts your 
charge of their being “mere arthavāda.”411
Two salient points emerge from this passage. One is the claim being advanced not just for 
411 Bhaktinirṇaya, 6: atra kecid bhagavadbhajanaśūnyā mīmāṃsakaṃmanyāḥ parameśvarasaṃkīrtanāsahiṣṇavaḥ 
kevalaṃ narake patiṣṇavaḥ pralapanti | saṃkīrtanaṃ nāma na kaścid dharmaḥ śrutiṣu smṛtiṣu vā prasiddhaḥ | 
viśeṣato brāhmaṇānām agnihotrādyadhikāriṇāṃ saṃkīrtanaṃ na saṃbhavati | “dhyāyan kṛte” ityādivākyaṃ tv 
arthavādamātram iti | tad atyantam asādhu | arthavādamātram iti ko 'rthaḥ | kim apramāṇam eva kiṃ vā 
vidhyekavākyatām antareṇaiva apramāṇam | nādyaḥ | śrutismṛtivat purāṇānām api prāmāṇyāt | […] na dvitīyaḥ | 
“dhyāyan kṛte” ityāder vidhyekavākyatām antareṇa prāmāṇye 'rthavādatvoktivirodhaḥ |
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the validity of purāṇic knowledge, but for its virtual independence from the Veda in matters of 
injunction. This line of argument is familiar to us by now from the BNK, as is the defense of 
purāṇic language as being more than “mere arthavāda.” The other, perhaps more prominent 
feature, is the apparent social location of the debate: on the one side is bhakti (“singing”), and on 
the other, the caricature of a dry, heartless Mīmāṃsaka. Once again, the personalized form and 
tone of the debate is important. Anantadeva expropriates the primarily conceptual concerns of the 
BNK's response to Mīmāṃsā and resituates them in the social world of early modern Banaras. 
He foregrounds matters of social propriety and caste identity, as in the following passage, which 
reconstructs an opponent's view of which social groups should be required to take up the activity 
of singing:
On this point, there are some self-styled scholars who say: [Singing] is the prerogative of 
those who do not belong to the three upper caste-classes, on account of the fact that the 
latter are constantly engaged in obligatory duties (nityakarma) from dawn to dusk, and 
have no time for singing. Moreover, from the verse—
The Rg, Yajur, Sāma, and Atharva Veda
are [all] studied by the one who utters
the two-syllable word, Hari,
we are given to understand that since an uneducated person becomes learned by singing 
the name [of God], it is the uneducated Śūdra who is entitled [to that activity]. So too, in 
the verse (Bhāgavata Purāṇa 1.4.25)—
Women, Śūdras, and Brahmins-in-name-only
are not qualified to study the Three [Vedas].
Thus the sage [Vyāsa], out of compassion,
composed the story of the [Mahā]bhārata—
since the Bhārata was composed for the sake of women and Śūdras and so forth, and it 
stands here as a synecdoche for the purāṇa pure-and-simple, and since singing is a 
purāṇic activity, that must only apply to women, Śūdras, and the like. For we do not hear 
anywhere in the Veda the injunction “One must sing about Keśava.” Alternatively, it 
could be that Kṣatriyas and others, since they are not engaged in teaching, etc., may be 
qualified for singing. But Brahmins, who are occupied by their teaching and other 
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responsibilities, cannot find the time for it, so singing must be the prerogative of those 
other than Brahmins.412
The opponent here concedes that the public act of devotional singing may be accorded 
scriptural sanction, but only for those who do not belong to the three self-appointed “upper” 
caste-classes. Bhakti, in the opponent's eyes, is not an activity suited to the serious, scholarly 
lifestyle of the Brahmin. Anantadeva proceeds to defend his own position by pointing out: a) that 
if Brahmins have time to perform soma sacrifices, then they can surely find the time for some 
devotional singing;413 b) that just because the purāṇa is accessible to “lower” classes does not 
mean that it is not also a Brahmin prerogative; and c) that among the six karmas associated with 
full Brahmin status, three of them, including teaching, serve merely as the source of one's 
livelihood, and are therefore not absolutely required.414 In sum, singing the name of God is open 
412 Ibid., 8-9: tatra kecit paṇḍitaṃmanyā manyante | atraivarṇādhikāram iti | traivarṇikānāṃ 
brāhmamuhūrtopakramapradoṣaparisamāpanīyanityakarmavyagrāṇāṃ saṃkīrtane kālābhāvāt | kiṃca  - 
ṛgvedo 'tha yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo hy atharvaṇaḥ |
adhītās tena yenoktaṃ harir ity akṣaradvayam ||
ity anadhītasya nāmasaṃkīrtanena adhītasaṃpattiśravaṇād anadhītaśūdrādhikāratvaṃ nirṇīyate | api ca -
strīśūdradvijabandhūnāṃ trayī na śrutigocarā |
iti bhāratam ākhyānaṃ kṛpayā muninā kṛtam ||
iti strīśūdrādīnām arthe bhāratanirmāṇād bhāratasya ca purāṇamātropalakṣaṇatvāt saṃkīrtanasya ca paurāṇatvāt 
strīśūdrādhikāratvaṃ nirṇīyate | na hi keśavasaṃkīrtanaṃ kuryād iti kvacid vede śrūyate | athavā kṣatriyādīnām 
adhyāpanādivyāpārābhāvāt syāt kathaṃcit saṃkīrtanādhikāraḥ | brāhmaṇānāṃ tv adhyāpanādivyāpṛtānāṃ na 
kathaṃcit saṃkīrtanakālo labhyata iti brāhmaṇetarādhikāraṃ saṃkīrtanam iti |
413 The implicit critique here is that ceremonies like the jyotiṣṭoma are not obligatory (nitya) but prompted by a 
desire for personal gain (kāmya), hence susceptible to the accusation of frivolity.
414 Anantadeva quotes Manu Smṛti 10.76 as his source:
ṣaṇṇāṃ tu karmaṇām asya trīṇi karmāṇi jīvikā |
yājanādhyāpane caiva viśuddhāt ca pratigrahaḥ ||
But among the [Brahmin's] six karmas, three are for making a living:
Procuring sacrifice for another, teaching, and accepting gifts from a pure one.
As O'Hanlon notes (“Letters Home,” 224, n.94), the topic of the six karmas became a particular point of 
contention in determining Brahmin status in early modern India. A so-called “full” Brahmin was a ṣaṭkarmī, 
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to all, and not only can but should become a marker of Brahmin identity.
Perhaps more significant than his response is the fact that Anantadeva raises such an issue 
in the first place. Once again, far from engaging in metaphysical reflection on the nature of God, 
Anantadeva situates his “deliberation” (nirṇaya) on bhakti in the context of particular social 
issues: namely, the ways in which the public performance of popular devotion intersects with the 
self-image of the Brahmins of Banaras. Another example of Anantadeva's broader social 
concerns is his defense of praising God in vernacular languages:
One should not object by saying that the prohibitions “[A Brahmin] is not to barbarize” 
and “This 'barbarian' is none other than incorrect speech”415 mean that one should not 
even mention the glories of God in the vernacular (bhāṣā). For since the latter is enjoined, 
those prohibitions do not apply. It is also incorrect to suggest that the aforementioned 
prohibitions place a restriction on the injunction regarding the necessity to sing the names 
and virtues of God, such that one may only sing in grammatical language (sādhuśabda). 
For those prohibitions can be understood to refer to activities (such as speaking) that 
generally arise from the desire of the people who perform them [rather than to activities 
such as singing the names of God, that arise directly from injunctions that tell us to 
perform them].416 It is not as though we directly hear [the injunction] “One must sing the 
names and glories of God exclusively in grammatical speech.”417
entitled to perform six karmas: adhyayana and adhyāpana (studying the Vedas for oneself and teaching them to 
others), yajana and yājana (conducting a sacrifice and procuring sacrifice through another), and dāna and 
pratigraha (giving gifts and accepting gifts). The lesser trikarmī Brahmin was only entitled to adhyayana, 
yājana, and pratigraha. However, Anantadeva seems to suggest here that adhyāpana is not quite so important in 
the larger scheme of things, even though the citation from Manu does not appear to have such evaluative force.
415 mleccho vā yad apaśabdaḥ. An early discussion of this term can be found in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, which 
famously links linguistic and moral propriety: “Therefore, a Brahmin is not to barbarize […] in fact, this 
barbarian is none other than that incorrect speech” (tasmād brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavai...mleccho ha vā eṣa 
yad apaśabdaḥ). See S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, eds., Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Paspaśāhnika 
(Pune: University of Poona, 1986), 37-38. Issues of grammatical speech are discussed repeatedly in Mīmāṃsā. 
Cf. Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in  
Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 66, n.53.
416 Anantadeva's argument here is that the prohibition (niṣedha) against ungrammaticality should have to do in this 
case with limiting an activity generally taken for granted (prāptaviṣayatvaniyama)—viz. speaking in any way 
one likes—rather than with restricting the force of a particular injunction.
417 Bhaktinirṇaya, 26: na ca “na mlecchitavai” “mleccho vā yad apaśabdaḥ” iti niṣiddhatvād bhāṣayā 
bhagavadguṇānuvādo 'py akartavya iti vācyam | tasya vihitatvena niṣedhāpravṛtteḥ | na ca 
bhagavadguṇanāmakīrtanakartavyatāvidher uktaniṣedhānurodhena saṃkoco yuktaḥ sādhuśabdena eva 
bhagavadguṇanāmakīrtanaṃ iti vācyam | niṣedhasya rāgaprāptaviṣayakatvenāpy upapatteḥ | na ca evaṃ sākṣāt 
śrūyate sādhuśabdena eva bhagavadguṇanāmakīrtanaṃ kartavyam iti |
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In this seemingly innocuous passage about the grammaticality of speech, Anantadeva 
engages with a long tradition of arguments about the ethical implications of language use in 
Sanskrit intellectual history. In brief, these arguments concern the propriety of using Sanskrit 
versus using vernacular languages, and in what situations either is acceptable. Anantadeva 
argues, in the technical vocabulary of Mīmāṃsā, that general prohibitions against using the 
vernacular do not override specific injunctions that require one to sing God's names. Sheldon 
Pollock has noted that the issue of whether grammaticality was a general moral principle or one 
restricted to the ritual domain formed a significant point of contention between early modern 
Mīmāṃsakas.418 In his Mīmāṃsākaustubha, the mid-seventeenth century scholar Khaṇḍadeva (d. 
1675 CE), who may have been a relative of the Deva family,419 took his contemporary Dinakara 
Bhaṭṭa to task for ignoring the liturgical context of a particular prohibition against incorrect 
speech. Although he ultimately vindicated Dinakara's view that there existed a prohibition of a 
general moral scope against learning foreign languages, Khaṇḍadeva distinguished carefully 
418 Sheldon Pollock, The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 2005), 54-57.
419 See Pollock, “New Intellectuals,” 18. However, family reunions must have been awkward affairs. Khaṇḍadeva 
repeatedly criticizes Anantadeva II's Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra, discussed further below, in his own Bhāṭṭadīpikā. At least, 
according to his student Śambhu Bhaṭṭa, who meticulously identified Khaṇḍadeva's opponents in his Prabhāvalī 
commentary on the Bhāṭṭadīpikā. Then again, Śambhu Bhaṭṭa wasn't beyond criticizing his own teacher, albeit 
apologetically. See his final benedictory verse in The Bhattadipika of Khandadeva with Prabhavali Commentary  
of Sambhu Bhatta: Vol. 1, ed. N.S. Ananta Krishna Sastri (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1922), 1: “Even if I've 
pointed out some deficiencies in my teacher's work here, I haven't foregrounded them in this elaboration. Rather, 
I hope that those men of sharp intellect who adorn the earth, devoted to the traditional teaching, will set aside my 
words and decorate his work.”
yady apy atra guroḥ kṛtāv api mayāpy udbhāvyate kācanā-
saṃbhūtis tadapi pracāracature naiṣā purobhāgitā |
kintu kṣmātilakāḥ kuśāgradhiṣaṇāḥ siddhāntabaddhādarā
madvākyaṃ parihṛtya tatkṛtim alaṅkurvantv iyaṃ me matiḥ || 4 ||
On Śambhu Bhaṭṭa, see Lawrence McCrea, “Playing with the System: Fragmentation and Individualization in 
Late Pre-colonial Mīmāṃsā,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36.5 (2008): 581-582.
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between barbarian languages (barbarādibhāṣā) and the vernaculars (bhāṣāśabda) used by “all 
vernacular intellectuals in their everyday activities as well as in chanting the name and virtues of  
Hari.”420 Khaṇḍadeva appears to speak of such vernacular activity as commonly accepted, but in 
Anantadeva we find the matter still unresolved, still part of an ongoing debate between bhakti 
and karma.
We can follow this debate elsewhere within the family as well. Anantadeva's son Āpadeva 
is well known for his primer on Mīmāṃsā, the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa (MNP). At the end of the 
book, Āpadeva makes a significant claim about the nature of dharma, which Mīmāṃsā had long 
defined as that which is enjoined by the Veda for some specific purpose:
This dharma, when performed with reference to the particular thing for which it has been 
enjoined, [generally] becomes the cause of that thing. But when it is performed with the 
attitude of offering (arpaṇa) to Lord Govinda, it becomes the cause of the highest good. 
And there is no dearth of reliable warrants to support such performance with the attitude 
of surrender to Him. As the Bhagavad Gītā (9.17) states: “Whatever you do, eat, 
sacrifice, donate, or perform as penance, O son of Kunti—do that as an offering to me.”421
The account provided here closely follows the Vedāntic inflection given to the teaching of 
karmayoga by the eighth-century Advaitin Śaṅkara in the introduction to his commentary on the 
Bhagavad Gītā. I will explore the links between Āpadeva's Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta writings in the 
next section, but here I attend to a verse that highlights the problem of Mīmāṃsā and theism:
Where am I, of dull intellect,
and where this chapter that
conforms to the Bhāṭṭa [school of Mīmāṃsā]?
420 Quoted in and trans. Pollock, The Ends of Man, 55, 56, n.92 (my italics).
421 See Mīmāṃsā-Nyāyā-Prakāśa by Āpadeva, ed. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental 
Research Institute, 1972), 277-278: so 'yaṃ dharmo yaduddeśena vihitas taduddeśena kriyamāṇas taddhetuḥ 
śrīgovindārpaṇabuddhyā kriyamāṇas tu niḥśreyasahetuḥ | na ca tadarpaṇabuddhyānuṣṭhāne pramāṇābhāvaḥ |
yat karoṣi yad aśnāsi yaj juhoṣi dadāsi yat | 
yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kuruṣva madarpaṇam || iti smṛteḥ |
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Therefore, this is but a play of bhakti
to the feet of Govinda and my guru.
While talk of devotional bhakti may appear incongruous in a work of Mīmāṃsā, Āpadeva seems 
to find multiple precedents for his devotional piety. For example, we find here echoes to a verse 
from the introduction of Śrīdhara Svāmin's commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa:
Where am I, of dull intellect
And where this churning of the milky ocean?
What place has a tiny atom
Where Mount Mandara itself sinks?422
It is tempting to think (though by no means definitive)423 that Āpadeva's verse alludes 
directly to Śrīdhara and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,424 invoking a text tradition that had not only 
422 Ibid., 278:
kvāhaṃ mandamatiḥ kveyaṃ prakriyā bhāṭṭasammatā |
iti bhakter vilāso 'yaṃ govindagurupādayoḥ ||
Cf. Bhāgavata Purāṇa...With the Bhāvārthabodhinī Commentary of Śrīdhara Svāmin, 13:
kvāhaṃ mandamatiḥ kvedaṃ manthanaṃ kṣīravāridheḥ |
kiṃ tatra paramāṇur vai yatra majjati mandaraḥ || 5 ||
423 The motif of self-deprecating comparison, of course, is an old one in Sanskrit literature. See The Raghuvaṃśa of  
Kālidāsa, ed. M.R. Kale (Bombay: Gopal Narayan & Co., 1922), 2:
kva sūryaprabhavo vaṃśaḥ kva cālpaviṣayā matiḥ |
titīrṣur dustaraṃ mohād uḍupenāsmi sāgaram || 1.2 ||
Where is the dynasty that issued from the Sun?
And where is my mind with its limited scope?
How stupid I am, trying to cross on a raft
an ocean that cannot be traversed!
424 Āpadeva may have wanted to link the Gītā's concept of arpaṇa to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa precisely because 
Śrīdhara himself had done so earlier. BhP 11.2.36 is a virtual restatement of BG 9.17, and has become a prayer 
that would be immediately recognizable to many present-day Hindus: “One should offer to the Supreme 
Nārāyaṇa whatever one does: be it in deed, word, or thought, or with the senses, ego, or out of habit.”
kāyena vācā manasendriyair vā
buddhyātmanā vānusṛtasvabhāvāt |
karoti yadyat sakalaṃ parasmai
nārāyaṇayeti samarpayet tat ||
Commenting on this verse, Śrīdhara explains: “What are those dharmas one defines as 'bhāgavata'? They are to 
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become among the most influential in the formation of religious communities in early modern 
North India, but also, if we are to take Anantadeva II's genealogy at face value, the very one to 
which the family's saintly ancestor had made a famous vernacular contribution.425 We might also 
try to situate Āpadeva's sentiment within the larger intellectual trend of theistic Mīmāṃsā. This 
significant shift from the atheistic commitments of the discipline's foundational figures can 
perhaps be traced to the thirteenth-century Viśiṣṭādvaita theologian Vedānta Deśika and his 
Seśvaramīmāṃsā.426 But for Āpadeva, a likelier source would have been none other than 
Lakṣmīdhara's Bhagavannāmakaumudī. As already noted, the senior Anantadeva wrote a 
commentary on the BNK, and Āpadeva's own (still unedited) Bhaktikalpataru attests to the 
influence of his father's work.
We have little understanding of how such an idea entered the discourse, why 
Mīmāṃsakas began to perceive themselves differently, and what any of this may have to do with 
the broader “play of bhakti” taking shape in early modern North India. Although Āpadeva's 
navigation of the terrain that lies between Mīmāṃsā and bhakti seems inchoate, and the rise of 
theistic Mīmāṃsā, according to Sheldon Pollock, “produced no systemwide change,”427 the 
offer all actions to God....[A]s it says in the Bhagavad Gītā, 'Whatever you do, eat, sacrifice, donate, or perform 
as penance, O son of Kunti—do that as an offering to me.' […] The idea is that if you do so, then every activity 
becomes a bhāgavata dharma.”
See Bhāgavata Purāṇa...With Sanskrit Commentary Bhāvārthabodhinī, 627: nanu ke te bhāgavatā dharmāḥ | 
īśvarārpitāni sarvakarmāṇy api ity […] tathā ca bhagavadgītāsu—“yat karoṣi yad aśnāsi yaj juhoṣi dadāsi yat | 
yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kuruṣva madarpaṇam ||” iti […] tathā sati sakalam api karma bhāgavato dharma 
bhavati iti bhāvaḥ |
425 According to the colophon of the Eknāthī Bhāgavat, Eknāth's voluminous Marathi commentary on the eleventh 
canto of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the author began his writing in Paithan and completed it in Banaras. See Keune, 
“Eknāth Remembered,” 31-32.
426 See Elisa Freschi, “Between Theism and Atheism: A Journey from Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā,” in 
Puṣpikā: Tracing Ancient India Through Texts and Traditions, Vol. 4, ed. Robert Leach (Oxford: Oxbow Books 
Press, forthcoming).
427 Pollock, The Ends of Man, 62.
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attempt to reconcile the two was by no means an isolated phenomenon. By the time of 
Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa in the late seventeenth century, for example, it seems to have become 
commonplace to assert a defense of Mīmāṃsā theism as something eternally present in the 
system.428 Like Anantadeva, Kamalākara was concerned to present himself as a proponent of 
bhakti, unlike those “other” Mīmāṃsakas, as he asserts in his Mīmāṃsākutūhala: “Some 
reproach the mīmāṃsaka with being an atheist and so having no business talking about the 'Way 
of Faith.' This slur may apply to some, but as for me, I believe in God.”429 Khaṇḍadeva, too, felt 
uncomfortable with the uncompromising atheism of classical Mīmāṃsā, especially the position 
that the deities invoked in the Veda were no more than words—the so-called concept of 
śabdadevatā.430 After reconstructing Jaimini's rather deconstructionist view, Khaṇḍadeva 
immediately feels disgusted, saying: “This is the essence of Jaimini's point of view. But even in 
the act of explaining it thus, my lips feel unclean. My only recourse is to remember God!”431 
Commenting on this surprising twist, Francis Clooney perceptively notes that “The discourse on 
īśvara—the one truly effective and real devatā—and the discourse on the myriad devatās are not 
entirely distinct; they have permeable boundaries, even in the minds of Mīmāṃsakas, who think 
about both.”432 Clooney's comment is prescient, given that we are only beginning to arrive at the 
428 See Pollock, “New Intellectuals,” 13-14. 
429 See Mīmāṃsākutūhala, ed. P.N. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1987), 44: 
nanu nirīśvaravādinas te ko 'yaṃ bhaktimārgapraveśaḥ? patatv ayaṃ pravādāśanir ekadeśiṣu | asmākan tv asty 
eva īśvaraḥ | Quoted in and trans. Pollock, The Ends of Man, 62.
430 See Francis X. Clooney, “What's a god? The quest for the right understanding of devatā in Brāhmaṇical ritual 
theory (mīmāṃsā),” International Journal of Hindu Studies 1.2 (1997): 337-385.
431 See The Bhattadipika of Khandadeva with Prabhavali Commentary of Sambhu Bhatta: Vol. IV, ed. S. 
Subrahmanya Sastri (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1987 [Madras, 1952]), 202: iti jaiminimataniṣkarṣaḥ | 
mama tv evaṃ vadato 'pi vāṇī duṣyatīti harismaraṇam eva śaraṇam |
432 Clooney, “What's a god?”, 354. The commentator Śambhu Bhaṭṭa notes that Khaṇḍadeva (like Kamalākara 
above) is responding to the possible criticism that if one were to deny the materiality of gods altogether, it would 
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context in which to be a Mīmāṃsaka theist seemed not only desirable but necessary.
Elsewhere within the Deva family, Āpadeva's own nephew, Bābādeva, though not 
mentioned in the Smṛtikaustubha genealogy, wrote a fascinating work called the 
Arpaṇamīmāṃsā.433 As its title portends, the Arpaṇamīmāṃsā used the language of Mīmāṃsā to 
explicate the concept of arpaṇa, or surrendering one's actions to God, as expressed in the 
Bhagavad Gītā verse (9.17) cited by Āpadeva at the end of his MNP. In his opening remarks, 
Bābādeva explains the purpose of this verse for Mīmāṃsā:
As we all know, in this twelve-chapter Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system, the great sage Jaimini 
analyzed several principles connected with the performance of every dharma (i.e., yajña, 
ritual sacrifice), including: the different means of valid knowledge, the application of 
subordinate rites, the sequence of performance, eligibility for ritual activity, analogical 
extension, and the relevant adjustments and restrictions on the elements to be extended. 
But even after having carefully studied and performed these dharmas, people experience 
significant suffering, such as having to return to the mortal world after enjoying the 
pleasures of heaven. Seeing this state of affairs and unable to tolerate it, God, the very 
embodiment of compassion, under the pretense of teaching Arjuna, explained the means 
to liberation in the following verse: “Whatever you do, eat, sacrifice, donate, or perform 
as penance, O son of Kunti—do that as an offering to me.”434
be tantamount to admitting unbelief (nāstikatva). Cf. Ibid., 381, n.17. In his Sanskrit introduction to the edition 
of Kamalākara's Mīmāṃsākutūhala, P.N. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī offered up a distinction between yājñika and 
dārśanika Mīmāṃsakas, mapping onto their respective attitudes toward God (īśvara). The former invoke him at 
the beginning and end of rites, and worship an embodied deity (saguṇa), while the latter find no purchase in such 
invocations, but do acknowledge a formless God (nirguṇa). See Mīmāṃsākutūhala (upodghāta), 6.
433 See V. Krishnamacharya, “Adhikaraṇādarśa of Bābādeva,” Adyar Library Bulletin 14.1 (1950): 49-55. In the 
colophons to both his works, the Adhikaraṇādarśa and Arpaṇamīmāṃsā, Bābādeva says that he is the son of 
Bāladeva, son of Anantadeva (sometimes written Ānandadeva). Krishnamacharya points out that two verses 
cited by Bābādeva in the Arpaṇamīmāṃsā as being his grandfather's correspond to verses in Anantadeva I's 
Mano'nurañjananāṭaka. Indeed, one of the manuscripts of the Mano'nurañjananāṭaka used for the printed 
edition appears to have stayed in the family, as it belonged to Bābādeva's son Jagannāthadeva. See The 
Manonurañjana Nāṭaka (Sanskrit introduction), 3: etatpustakaṃ devakulagṛhasthitam eva yato 
granthamukhapṛṣṭhe “idaṃ pustakaṃ bābājīdevātmajajagannāthadevasya” iti likhitam upalabhyate |
434 Arpaṇamīmāṃsā, MS 40 C.5, Adyar Library, 3-4: iha khalu jaiminimaharṣiṇā athāto dharmajijñāsetyādi 
prabhutvādāv ijyaṃ sarvavarṇānāṃ syād ityantādhikaraṇair dvādaśalakṣaṇapūrvamīmāṃsāyāṃ sarvadharmeṣu 
pramāṇabhedaśeṣaprayuktikramādhikārātideśohabādhatantraprasaṅgā vicāritāḥ | tatraivaṃvidhavicāritair api 
dharmair anuṣṭhitair janasya svargādibhogottarakālikamartyalokapraveśādirūpaduḥkhātiśayadarśanāt 
tadasahiṣṇur bhagavān karuṇāmūrtir arjunopadeśakaitavena muktyupāyaṃ kathayāmāsa -
yatkaroṣi yadaśnāsi yajjuhoṣi dadāsi yat |
yattapasyasi kaunteya tatkuruṣva madarpaṇam || iti |
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Bābādeva proceeds to go into exhaustive detail about the grammatical composition of the words 
in the sentence, in order to understand how exactly the injunction in the verse works, as he would 
with any other Vedic injunction. This is fundamentally a work of Mīmāṃsā, replete with 
arguments that draw upon properly Mīmāṃsā discursive topics. If Āpadeva's citation of the 
arpaṇa verse was ancillary to the primary focus of the MNP, the Arpaṇamīmāṃsā seeks to make 
the Gītā an essential part of Mīmāṃsā intellectual production. In some ways it is an elaboration 
of Āpadeva's citation into a full-fledged theistic hermeneutics. We might understand the MNP as 
a textbook for students, “How To Do Mīmāṃsā (and Get Rich Trying),” and the 
Arpaṇamīmāṃsā as a supplement, “How To Do Mīmāṃsā (and Feel Good About It).”
The inspiration here is not entirely Vedāntic in character, despite the mention of cycles of 
rebirth and the search for liberation. Whereas the Arpaṇamīmāṃsā urges that the Gītā is 
primarily a text that instructs us in karmayoga, and the bhakti that is attendant on it, the Vedānta 
teaching on karmayoga would have it serve as a preparatory stage for achieving knowledge. At 
least, this is the Advaita view of the matter, and the Devas were Advaitins. Or were they? There 
seems to have been no small amount of disagreement within the family about their Vedānta 
identity, and how they understood their Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta selves. Now that we have 
investigated the Devas' efforts to relate jñāna with bhakti and bhakti with karma, it only remains 
to complete the triangle.
Jñāna and Karma
A comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta on 
the eve of colonialism remains a desideratum for the intellectual-historical study of early modern 
162
India. Recent studies by Sheldon Pollock and Johannes Bronkhorst have shed valuable light on 
these polemics at various historical moments.435 The former demonstrates that the sixteenth-
century South Indian polymath Appayya Dīkṣita's “Discourse on the Refutation of a Unified 
Knowledge System” between the so-called “prior” and “posterior” Mīmāṃsās adumbrates a 
larger polemical debate between the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita schools of Vedānta. The latter 
volume engages with the classical relationship between the two systems, reiterating more 
thoroughly that not only were several early Vedāntins not Mīmāṃsakas, but that their 
relationship as hermeneutical brethren was constructed multifariously by different Vedānta 
commentators.436 However, for the majority of Indian intellectual history, the line of influence 
seems to have been more or less unidirectional: while Vedāntins of all stripes tried, with varying 
degrees of success, to transform an originally non-institutional tradition of metaphysical 
speculation into a systematic exegetical theology, Mīmāṃsakas took little interest in their self-
proclaimed hermeneutical successors.437
The situation appears to have changed considerably in the early modern period. Not only 
was there an upsurge in explicit theism among Mīmāṃsakas, as we have just witnessed, but 
authors of Mīmāṃsā works also wrote, independently as well as exegetically, on Vedānta. More 
435 See Sheldon Pollock, “The Meaning of Dharma: and the Relationship of the Two Mīmāṃsās: Appayya Dīkṣita's 
'Discourse on the Refutation of a Unified Knowledge System of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā,'” Journal 
of Indian Philosophy 32.6 (2004): 769-811; Johannes Bronkhorst, “Vedānta as Mīmāṃsā,” in Mīmāṃsā and 
Vedānta: Interaction and Continuity, ed. Johannes Bronkhorst (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007), 1-91.
436 Bronkhorst, “Vedānta as Mīmāṃsā,” 33-57.
437 Even where the influences on Mīmāṃsā from Vedānta are explicit, such as the concept of liberation, the two 
remain at metaphysical cross-purposes with regard to: a) their specific conceptions of the term, given their 
respective epistemological commitments to the reality or unreality of the world, and b) the way they believe 
ritual action can effect soteriological ends. See Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, “Knowledge and Action I: Means to 
the Human End in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 28.1 (2000): 1-24; 
Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, “Knowledge and Action II: Attaining Liberation in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita 
Vedānta,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 28.1 (2000): 25-41.
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precisely, several works on Mīmāṃsā of the period were authored by people who had clear 
commitments to Vedāntic exposition. This phenomenon was nowhere more evident than in the 
works of Anantadeva and Āpadeva, who both engaged with the Vedāntasāra (VS) of Sadānanda. 
Āpadeva wrote a direct commentary titled the Bālabodhinī or the Tattvadīpikā,438 while his father 
Anantadeva wrote his Siddhāntatattva under the influence of the Advaita teacher Rāmatīrtha, 
who also wrote a commentary on the VS.
The VS itself, though long heralded as “one of the most popular and well-read 
syncretistic works on Vedānta,”439 remains relatively obscure in terms of its origin and early 
distribution. Assigned approximately to the turn of the sixteenth century, the text's first extant 
commentaries appear in the latter half of the same, authored by Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī (Banaras, 1588 
CE) and Rāmatīrtha (late sixteenth century) respectively.440 Its popularity thenceforth was 
438 The editors append the former name to the commentary. The concluding verse, however, which precedes the 
colophon, leaves it ambiguous; bālabodhinī could simply mean “for the enlightenment of students.” See 
Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda with the Commentary ‘Bālabodhinī’ of Āpadeva (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1911), 
110 (henceforth cited as Bālabodhinī):
anantāṅghriyugaṃ smṛtvā racitā bālabodhinī |
āpadevena vedāntasāratattvasya dīpikā ||
439 See Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1952), 55. The term “syncretistic,” however, should be critically examined, inasmuch as it carries a pejorative 
tone in much of modern Advaita Vedānta scholarship. Cf. Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern 
History,” 212, 216.
440 Minkowski (“Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern History,” 207) incorrectly attributes the first commentary to the 
mid-sixteenth century Advaitin Nṛsiṃhāśrama. For the precise date of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī's Subodhinīṭīkā, see the 
final verse of his VS commentary. See The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, together with the commentaries of  
Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha, Fifth Edition, Revised, ed. Col. G.A. Jacob (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1934), 
59:
jāte pañcaśatādhike daśaśate saṃvatsarāṇāṃ punaḥ
sañjāte daśavatsare prabhuvaraśrīśālivāhe śake  |
prāpte durmukhavatsare śubhaśucau māse 'numatyāṃ tithau
prāpte bhārgavavāsare narahariṣṭīkāṃ cakārojjvalām  ||
Rāmatīrtha's date remains a point of contention. Minkowski (“Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern History,” 208), 
following Karl Potter, provides a date of 1610 CE. For an earlier assignation, based on an unpublished 1574 CE 
manuscript of Rāmatīrtha's commentary on the Mānasollāsa of Sureśvara, see Mahadevan, ed., Preceptors of  
Advaita, 223.
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widespread. Manuscripts of the work proliferated from Banaras to South India, and it even made 
its way into the studious hands of the Jesuit missionary Father Heinrich Roth, who procured and 
annotated a copy during his study of Sanskrit in Agra from 1654-1660.441 Moreover, not only was 
the VS one of the earliest Advaita Vedānta texts to be printed for a Western audience,442 it 
continues to be an important teaching manual in the contemporary Advaita world.443 But apart 
from its evident use as a pedagogical resource, there has been little historical examination of the 
text's direct commentarial tradition.
From the outset of his Bālabodhinī, it is clear that Āpadeva is writing within a particular 
intellectual heritage, “in accordance with the established doctrine (siddhānta) and received 
lineage (sampradāya).”444 These two terms reflect those used by Anantadeva in his 
Siddhāntatattva, with the autocommentary Saṃpradāyanirūpaṇa. This is no coincidence, for the 
441 For its presence in seventeenth-century Benares, see R. Ananta Krishna Sastry, Kavindracharya List, Gaekwad's 
Oriental Series No. XVII (Baroda: Central Library, 1921), 5. For the south, see P.P.S. Sastri, A Descriptive  
Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji's Sarasvatī Mahāl Library (Srirangam: 
Vani Vilas Press, 1931), xi. On Heinrich Roth, see Arnulf Camps and Jean-Claude Muller, eds., The Sanskrit  
Grammar and Manuscripts of Fr. Heinrich Roth [1620-1668] (Leiden: J.R. Brill, 1988), 6, 18-19.
442 The text was known to H.T. Colebrooke through the translation of the Serampore missionary William Ward in 
1822. See H.T. Colebrooke, Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1858), 214-5. It is also worth noting that Rammohun Roy published a Bengali tract in 1815 titled 
Vedantasara, which was often confused with Sadānanda's work (Potter lists it as a translation), though it was a 
wholly unrelated, original monograph, containing paraphrases of and expositions on selected aphorisms from the 
Brahmasūtra. He would “translate” the work (albeit not literally) into English the following year as The 
Abridgment of the Vedant. For a detailed look at this fascinating treatise, see Bruce Carlisle Robertson, Raja 
Rammohan Ray: The Father of Modern India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 74-96.
443 The Chinmaya Mission, a modern Hindu organization, uses this “Prakarana-grantha” (introductory text) by 
“Swami Sadananda” for its two-and-a-half year Vedānta course at Sandeepany Sadhanalaya in Mumbai. See 
“Course Syllabus,” http://sandeepany.chinmayamission.com/vedanta-course-syllabus/. Accessed July 27, 2015.
444 Bālabodhinī, 1 (v.2cd):
āpadevena vedāntasāratattvasya dīpikā |
siddhāntasaṃpradāyānurodhena kriyate śubhā ||
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influence of his father's treatise permeates the commentary, at times explicitly445 and at times 
embedded in the discussion at hand. It is also reasonable to think that Āpadeva saw the two as 
distinct; while the siddhānta was a general understanding of Advaita Vedānta as presented in the 
VS, the sampradāya was something specific to his family, a particular discursive language. What 
is distinctive about these Vedānta works is that both Anantadeva and Āpadeva take great pains to 
engage with Mīmāṃsā arguments in addition to intra-Advaita debates on certain topics. In a 
brilliant essay on the Bālabodhinī, Patrick Cummins demonstrates how Āpadeva and his father 
“think with Mīmāṃsā when writing on Advaita...they draw parallels and illustrations from 
Mīmāṃsā case studies and use Mīmāṃsā principles of interpretation to support their Advaitin 
positions.”446 Importantly, Cummins claims, this does not entail new interpretations of key issues; 
Mīmāṃsā is a language that allows them to critically examine Advaita topics, but the Devas 
maintain a strong commitment to Advaita when writing “in Advaita.”447 Similarly, Lawrence 
McCrea suggests that the remarkable variety of attitudes and objectives in late Mīmāṃsā urges 
us to consider it not so much a “coherent system,” but rather “a kind of language—a rich and 
complex language, in which one can say many things...but which seems to have no longer any 
inherent meaning or purpose to it [...]”448 I would endorse this claim insofar as it warns us against 
applying uncritical labels to early modern Sanskrit intellectuals, and complicates the very idea of 
the “system” as a “basic category of analysis.”449 However, these functionalist explanations of 
445 For example, he quotes Anantadeva I's definition of virāga (disenchantment), one of the four classical “spiritual 
prerequisites” (sādhanacatuṣṭaya) for a student of Vedānta. See Bālabodhinī, 25: taduktaṃ tātacaraṇaiḥ— 
“aihikapāralaukikaphalecchāvirodhicetovṛttiviśeṣātmako virāgaḥ” iti |  Cf. Siddhāntatattva, 30.
446 Patrick Cummins, “Āpadeva the Family Man,” (unpublished paper, University of Toronto, 2013), 7.
447 Ibid., 8.
448 McCrea, “Playing with the System,” 584-585.
449 Ibid., 585.
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Mīmāṃsā qua technical jargon do not fully account for what is going on in the texts at hand. I do 
think that there is purchase in considering Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta to be more than mere 
languages in the Devas' works. There seems to be something almost schizophrenic, or 
intermediary, about the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta positions being taken by Āpadeva and his father
—something which does not fit neatly within one hermeneutical camp or the other, and certainly 
not within our conventional understanding of the distinctions between those disciplines.450
For an example of the tension between these Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta selves, let us 
consider Āpadeva's treatment of the adhyayanavidhi, the so-called “injunction to study [the 
Veda].”451 The injunction svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ, “One's own [recension of the] Veda is to be 
studied,” was central to the discipline of Mīmāṃsā, since it meant that study of the Veda had as 
its purpose an understanding of the Veda's meaning (arthāvabodha), without which the 
performance of sacrificial ritual would be ineffective. And in order to understand the meaning, 
one was required to study Mīmāṃsā, which was by definition the settled interpretive discipline 
of the Veda. This is the position Āpadeva supports in the MNP, while discussing the rules 
450 It is also worth recalling, in this context, a verse from the Vyavahāramayūkha (v.3) of Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa (1640 
CE). Nīlakaṇṭha celebrates his own father, Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, as having accepted, in his very person, the 
“nonduality between the Mīmāṃsakas” Śaṅkara and [Kumārila] Bhaṭṭa. Note the explicit division, and 
subsequent fusion, being portrayed between “the two contradictory systems.” I believe it would not be undue to 
draw the Banaras connection between the Devas and Bhaṭṭas here. See The Vyavahāramayūkha of Bhaṭṭa  
Nīlakaṇṭha, ed. P.V. Kane (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1926), 1:
virodhimārgadvayadarśanārthaṃ
dvedhā babhūvātra paraḥ pumān yaḥ |
śrīśaṅkaro bhaṭṭa ihaikarūpo
mīmāṃsakādvaitam urīcakāra  ||
451 The Mīmāṃsā/Vedānta debate over the adhyayanavidhi formed the content of Chapter 20 of Appayya Dīkṣita's 
Vādanakṣatramālā, titled “A Refutation of the Position that the Injunction to Study [the Veda] Results in 
Knowledge of its Meaning” (adhyayanavidher arthajñānaphalakatvanirākaraṇavāda). This chapter immediately 
succeeds the one translated in Pollock, “The Meaning of Dharma.” Cf. Purvottaramimamsa Vadanakshatramala 
(Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1912), 12, 259-280.
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governing eligibility for the Vedic sacrifice: “There are, however, also characteristics of the 
eligible person that, while not explicitly enunciated, must be stated as qualifications of the 
individual [concerned in the specific rite]. These include knowledge derived from the injunction 
to study the Veda […]”452 However, Āpadeva undercuts this very position in his VS commentary: 
“Mīmāṃsakas say that the result of the injunction to study [the Veda] is the knowledge of its 
meaning, since it is a visible result. The established position (viz. Vedānta) is negative [on this 
point].”453 He goes on to mobilize reasons for why the result of the adhyayanavidhi cannot be 
anything but recitational acquisition (avāpti). His ultimate aim is to defend the Vedāntins' 
insistence that mere study of the Veda cannot be sufficient qualification for brahmajijñāsā, the 
pursuit of Brahman-knowledge. Thus his father, Anantadeva, says in the Siddhāntatattva:
As for what you have said as to the result [of Vedic study] being the understanding of the 
meaning, that is not supported by Vedāntins. For if that were the case, then it would leave 
us with the undesirable consequence that such [study] alone would be qualification 
enough for investigative analysis of Vedānta, as it is for the analysis of the prior subject 
matter (pūrvakīyārthavicāra, i.e., Mīmāṃsā.). [And in that case] the separate injunctions, 
such as the one to “listen [to the Upaniṣad],” that deal with the qualifications relating to 
being endowed with the fourfold spiritual attainments, would be inappropriate.454
Both citations betray an interesting sense of self-referentiality in their use of eponymous forms—
Mīmāṃsaka, Vedāntin, the siddhānta—drawing boundaries and providing markers of intellectual 
alliance. Elsewhere in his commentary, Āpadeva closes out arguments with the seemingly 
innocuous but indicative phrases: “so say the authorities of our tradition,” and “so says my 
452 Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa, 194: kiṃcit tu puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvenāśrutam apy adhikāriviśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati | 
yathādhyayanavidhisiddhā vidyā […]
453 Bālabodhinī, 12: adhyayanavidhiphalam arthāvabodhaḥ dṛṣṭatvād iti mīmāṃsakāḥ | na iti siddhāntaḥ |
454 Siddhāntatattva, 23: yaccoktam arthāvabodhaḥ phalam iti tan na sahante vedāntinaḥ | tathā sati hi 
pūrvakīyārthavicārasyeva vedāntavicāre 'pi tanmātrādhikāratvaprasaktau 
sādhanacatuṣṭayasampannādhikārikapṛthakśravaṇavidhyādyanupapattiḥ |
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teacher.”455 These terms further testify to the text's composition within a particular teaching 
tradition, one that was apparently continuing to negotiate its multiple intellectual identities.
We may attend to this last point by charting the intellectual history of a particular topic in 
the commentarial lineage between Rāmatīrtha, Anantadeva, and Āpadeva: on the relationship of 
nityakarmas, the obligatory rites, with Vedāntic knowledge. The early Advaitins Śaṅkara and his 
disciple Sureśvara both accept the utility of such rituals, but only up to a point. They must be 
given up if one is committed to knowledge alone, since jñāna and karma (qua religious 
disciplines) operate with fundamentally different metaphysical understandings of selfhood and 
agency. Sureśvara provides a clear hierarchy, by which ritual action purifies the mind, giving one 
insight into the ephemerality of the phenomenal world, thence on to disenchantment and the 
desire for liberation—and their logical eventuation in the renunciation of all ritual action—and 
so on along the line until one's abidance in self-knowledge.456 In conformity with this standard 
Advaita position, the VS relegates to most ritual actions the role of effecting mental purification 
(buddhiśuddhi) in order to acquire the eligibility for Vedāntic knowledge. Specifically, these are 
the obligatory (nitya), occasional (naimittika), and expiatory (prāyaścitta) karmas. The VS 
defines nityakarmas as “[actions] such as the twilight worship, which have no outcome other 
than avoiding the sin of omission if not performed.”457 In his commentary, Rāmatīrtha interprets 
455 Bālabodhinī, 22: iti sāṃpradāyikāḥ (line 3), ity asmadguravaḥ (line 11).
456 Cf. Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 1.52, as quoted by Rāmatīrtha. See The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, together with the  
commentaries of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha, ed. Col. G.A. Jacob (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar, 1934), 74, 
ll.11-15: nityakarmānuṣṭhānād dharmotpattir dharmotpatteḥ pāpahānis tatas cittaśuddhis tataḥ 
saṃsārayāthātmyāvabodhas tato vairāgyaṃ tato mumukṣutvaṃ tatas tadupāyaparyeṣaṇaṃ tataḥ 
sarvakarma[tatsādhana]saṃnyāsas tato yogābhyāsas tatas cittasya pratyakpravaṇatā tatas 
tattvamasyādivākyārthaparijñānaṃ tato 'vidyocchedas tataḥ svātmany[ev]avasthānam. Words in brackets are 
found in modern editions of the text. Cf. The Naishkarmyasiddhi of Sureśvaracharya with the Chandrika of  
Jnanottama, ed. Col. G.A. Jacob (Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, 1891), 34.
457 See The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, together with the commentaries of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha, 4: 
nityāny akaraṇe pratyavāyasādhanāni sandhyāvandanādīni |
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this sentence to mean that non-performance of these actions is an indicator (lakṣaṇa) of the sin of 
omission, and not its direct cause (hetu) per se:
The definition of a nityakarma is that which has as its purpose the dissolution of sins 
acquired without particular occasion, not that which, if not performed, produces the sin of 
omission (pratyavāya).
Objection: But surely, from the use of the present participle in this verse from the 
traditional authority: “Not performing the enjoined action, engaging in objectionable 
ones, and miring himself in sensual pleasures, a man falls into decline,”458 we are to 
understand that the non-performance [of nityakarma] is the cause (hetu) of pratyavāya. 
Then how can you suggest that non-performance does not produce that sin?
Reply: That is not so, for the grammarian Pāṇini, in the aphorism which reads “[The 
present participle suffix can replace the indicative] in expressing a characteristic or cause 
of another act,” has also given the present participle the meaning of “characteristic” 
(lakṣaṇa).459 It is for this reason that the wise, on seeing a man who is overcome by sleep 
and torpor while he performs nityakarmas, indicate (lakṣyate) that if he should perform 
nitya and naimittika karmas in the right way, then his accumulated sins would dissolve—
not that “Such-and-such did not perform the enjoined action, and therefore will incur 
pratyavāya.”460
458 Mānava Dharmaśāstra 11.44:
akurvan vihitaṃ karma ninditaṃ ca samācaran |
prasajjañś cendriyārtheṣu naraḥ patanam ṛcchati ||
459 Aṣṭādhyāyī 3.2.126: lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ. The stock example for the former is the sentence śayānā bhuñjate  
yavanāḥ: “The Ionians eat while lying down” (i.e., the Ionians' eating is characterized by their lying down); for 
the latter, it is adhīyāno vasati: “He stays for the purpose of studying” (i.e., studying is the cause of his stay). The 
idea expressed above means that the non-performance of nityakarma does not cause the sin of omission, but may 
simply be indicative, or characteristic, of moral decline. See Ram Nath Sharma, The Astadhyayi of Panini, Vol. 3 
(New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1995), 429-430.
460 The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, together with the commentaries of Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha, 71, ll.8-
16: nirnimittam upāttaduritakṣayārthāni nityānīti nityakarmalakṣaṇaṃ na tv akaraṇe pratyavāyotpādakāni 
nityānīti | nanu “akurvan”...iti smṛtau śatṛpratyayād akaraṇasya pratyavāyahetutvam avagamyate tat katham 
akaraṇasya pratyavāyānutpādakatvam iti cen na | “lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ” iti pāṇininā śatur lakṣaṇārthe 'pi 
vidhānāt | ata eva nityādyanuṣṭhānakāle nidrālasyaparavaśaṃ naram ālokya śiṣṭair lakṣyate yady asya 
yathāvannityanaimittikānuṣṭhānam abhaviṣyat tadā sañcitaduritakṣayo 'bhaviṣyat na cāyaṃ [conj. nāyaṃ?] 
vihitam akārṣīd ataḥ pratyavāyī bhaviṣyatīti |
Unless I am misreading this passage, there seems to be a textual problem here, as the current reading of the last 
clause would give us a contradictory message: “He did perform enjoined action, and therefore will incur the sin 
of omission.” ca and na are orthographically similar enough in Nāgari to justify the emendation above.
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Rāmatīrtha builds on an argument made earlier by Sureśvara461 to the effect that the authors of 
smṛti such as Manu, quoted here, could not have intended that a really existing thing (the sin of 
omission) could arise from a non-existent source (the non-performance of action).462 Therefore, 
nityakarmas must be defined positively, as technologies of purification which, if unattended to, 
could be indicative, but only secondarily, of moral degeneration—a move which at once 
neutralizes their obligatory force and subordinates them to a kind of spiritual cultivation 
preceding the attainment of knowledge. Such a move, of course, legitimates the institution of 
monastic renunciation (saṃnyāsa), which is predicated on the abandonment of ritual action as 
inferior, distracting, and ultimately contradictory to the pursuit of Vedāntic knowledge.463
In his commentary on the same VS passage, Āpadeva provides a virtually identical 
reconstruction, down to the grammatical detail, of Rāmatīrtha's argument, more or less in defense 
of the idea that performing nityakarma serves as a preparatory discipline for knowledge. 
461 See Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttikaṃ Sureśvarācāryakṛtam, ed. Hari Narayan Apte (Pune: Ānandāśrama Press, 
1911), 8:
nityānām akriyā yasmāt lakṣayitvaiva satvarā |
pratyavāyakriyāṃ tasmāt lakṣaṇārthe śatā bhavet || 1.21 ||
462 The Vedāntic logic here refers to Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.2, katham asataḥ saj jāyeta: “How could existence 
emerge from the non-existent?”
463 The concept of pratyavāya itself has an interesting intellectual history in Advaita Vedānta. It seems to have been 
Śaṅkara's general attitude that no such faults of non-performance, especially the pratyavāya, applied to the 
renunciate, whose only obligation was a negative one: to give up ritual action. In his commentary on Śaṅkara's 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (3.4.38), however, the thirteenth-century Advaitin Anubhūtisvarūpācārya urged that the 
study of Vedānta was an obligatory duty, a nityakarma for renunciates, who would incur pratyavāya if they were 
not to perform it. See Prakaṭārthavivaraṇam, Volume II, ed. T.R. Chintamani (Madras: University of Madras, 
1989 [1939]), 977: saṃnyāsināṃ śravaṇādividhir nitya eva akaraṇe pratyavāyaśravaṇāt |
His later contemporary Vidyāraṇya (ca. 1350 CE) corroborated this claim in his Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha: “So 
we have a traditional authority on pratyavāya: 'The renunciate who gives up obligatory rituals, and doesn't 
engage in study of the Vedānta, is as good as a sinner—no doubt about it.'” See The Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha 
of Vidyāraṇya, ed. Rāmaśāstrī Tailaṅga (Benares: E.J.. Lazarus & Co., 1893), 4:
nityaṃ karma parityajya vedāntaśravaṇaṃ vinā |
vartamānas tu saṃnyāsī pataty eva na saṃśayaḥ || iti pratyavāyasmaraṇāt |
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However, he includes one or two elements, absent from Rāmatīrtha's discussion but present in 
Anantadeva's Siddhāntatattva, which add a Mīmāṃsā twist to the issue at hand. Both Āpadeva 
and his father embed within this larger discussion—namely, that the performance of nityakarmas 
leads to the purification of the mind—an intra-Mīmāṃsā debate on the fruit of nityakarma. I 
paraphrase Anantadeva's comments as follows, with some notes from Āpadeva:
Settled Opinion: So one who has a basic awareness of Vedāntic teaching can develop a 
pure mind by performing ritual actions either in this life or in several lives, and obtain the 
requisite qualities for a student of Vedānta. Now you might be wondering: How do 
nityakarmas like performing the daily evening worship contribute to inner mental purity? 
The answer is that they do so because performing them results in the dissolution of sins.
Prima Facie  Objection  : But isn't the point of nityakarma to maintain the prior non-
existence (prāgabhāva) of the pratyavāya, the sin of omission obtained when one doesn't 
perform an enjoined ritual action? Isn't that what it should produce?
Settled Opinion: This cannot be the case. Let us consider the thing that is “to be 
produced” (bhāvya) by the nityakarma. That thing cannot be heaven, as posited by the 
axiomatic viśvajit principle,464 for not everyone desires heaven all the time, and these 
actions are by definition enjoined on a daily basis. Now, even if we were to perform such 
a nityakarma everyday, a pratyavāya could either arise or not arise. In the former case, it 
makes no sense to maintain its prior non-existence, and in the latter case there would be 
no prior non-existence in the first place. (That is, you can't talk about the “prior non-
existence of the form of wind” if wind has no form to begin with).
Amicus Curiae: Well, let's say that what one really means to say by “prior non-existence” 
is “total non-existence” (atyantābhāva).
Settled Opinion: It makes even less sense to posit that as the fruit of nityakarma. Since 
“total non-existence” always exists, it would be pointless to perform the nityakarma at 
all. But nityakarmas are not fruitless! Everybody has sins, whether done out of ignorance 
or with full knowledge, and everyone—at least, every affirmer (āstika) of the Vedic way 
of life—always wants to get rid of them and the hateful suffering they bring. So it makes 
perfect sense to posit the dissolution of sins as the result, the bhāvya, of nityakarma. Once 
we have done so, if some traditional authority comes around and says that not performing 
it can result in pratyavāya, then that's all very fine. But the direct definition of the 
464 The viśvajit-nyāya forms the discursive topic of Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 4.3.7. Since every Vedic injunction, according 
to Mīmāṃsā, must produce some result, through the syntactic analysis and semantic power of bhāvanā, this 
principle maintains that we must posit that result as “heaven” for those injunctions which do not explicitly 
enunciate their fruit.
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nityakarma must be the dissolution of sins.465
The larger Mīmāṃsā issue at stake here is the insistence that the nityakarma, like all 
actions enjoined by the Veda, must be purposeful. If the nityakarma were exclusively to be 
negatively constituted, then it would cease to serve as an itikartavya, an obligatory, “how-to-do-
it” component of the ritual universe. Anantadeva imported this debate wholesale from a 
disagreement between two influential Mīmāṃsakas of approximately the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, Someśvara Bhaṭṭa and Pārthasārathi Miśra. As Lawrence McCrea has pointed out, the 
middle of the sixteenth century saw a profusion of Mīmāṃsā literature that engaged with both 
these classic authors. Moreover, authors felt the need to structure the discussion of central issues 
in their works by juxtaposing the doctrinal splits between the two.466 The particular issue of the 
nityakarma found expression in Pārthasārathi's Tantraratna (on Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ṭupṭīkā 6.3.2), 
and in Someśvara's Nyāyasudhā (2.4.1).467 The former asserted the principle held by Anantadeva 
465 Siddhāntatattva, 25-26: tad ayam āpātajñānavān iha janmani janmāntare vā 'nuṣṭhitakarmabhir 
viśuddhā'ntaḥkaraṇo nityānityavivekādikaṃ labhate | nanu kathaṃ karmaṇāṃ tattatphalasādhanām 
antaḥkaraṇaśuddhihetutvam ? ucyate | nityānāṃ tāvat karmaṇāṃ pāpakṣayaphalakatvaṃ parair apy abhyupeyate 
tathā hy “ahar ahaḥ sandhyām upāsīta” ityādīnāṃ viśvajinnyāyena svargo na bhāvyatayā kalpayitavyaḥ | 
svargakāmanāyāḥ sarvadā sarveṣām asattvena ahar ahaḥ kartavyā'vabodhe bādhaprasaṅgāt | […] nāpi 
vihitākaraṇapratyavāyaprāgabhāvaparipālanaṃ bhāvyam | sandhyopāsanānuṣṭhāne 'pi kadācit pratyavāyotpattau 
prāgabhāvaparipālanānupapatteḥ | anutpattau prāgabhāvatvāsiddheḥ | na hi vāyau rūpā'nutpattau rūpaprāgabhāvo 
vaktuṃ śakyaḥ | atha prāgabhāvapālanagirā 'tyantābhāvo 'bhidhīyate | na tarhi tasya nityakarmaphalatvaṃ 
yuktaṃ kalpayitum | tasya sarvadā vidyamānatvena sandhyopāsanāder vaiyyarthyāpatteḥ | […] nāpy 
aphalavattvaṃ nityānāṃ vaktuṃ śakyam | [...] jñānā'jñānakṛtānāṃ sarvapāpānāṃ puruṣeṣu sattvāt tatkṣayasya ca 
sarvadā sarvā'bhīpsitatvād duḥkhavat pāpasyāpi dveṣyatayā tannivṛtteḥ kāmyatvāt | […] siddhe ca 
pāpakṣayaphalakalpane yadi nāma tadakaraṇe pratyavāyaḥ smṛtivaśāt pratīyate astu nāma tathā iti |
For the use of the term āstika, see Āpadeva's Bālabodhinī, 22, ll.16-17: pāpakṣayas tu sarvadā āstikānām 
abhīpsita iti tasya yuktam phalatvam |
466 See McCrea, “Playing with the System,” 577-578. McCrea calls this the “scholastic turn” in Mīmāṃsā, and cites 
Āpadeva's MNP as an example. Āpadeva is generally held to support Pārthasārathi's position when it gets down 
to brass tacks. See Edgerton, The Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa, 7.
467 See Mīmāṃsākoṣaḥ, Part IV, ed. Kevalānanda Saraswatī (Wai: Prajña Pāṭhashālā Maṇḍala Grantha Mālā, 1956), 
2338, col. 1: nityakarmaṇaḥ vihitākaraṇapratyavāyajanyaprāgabhāvaparipālanārthatvaṃ nirasya vidhibalāt 
pāpakṣaya eva phalaṃ kalpyate iti vyavasthāpitaṃ sarvaśaktyadhikaraṇe (MS 6.3.2) ṭupṭīkātantraratnayoḥ | 
nyāyasudhākṛtas tu nityakarmaṇaḥ pāpakṣayo na phalam, kintu vihitākaraṇapratyavāyaprāgabhāvaparipālanam 
eva phalam ity āhuḥ | (Nyāyasudhā 2.4.1).
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and Āpadeva, while the latter represented the prima facie argument.468
What did the Devas achieve by embedding this Mīmāṃsā debate in their ostensibly 
Advaita Vedānta works? Cummins and McCrea might argue that this is another instance of 
Mīmāṃsā as a discursive language, but the social consequences of the nityakarmas raises a red 
flag. Neither Pārthasārathi nor Someśvara disowns the nityakarmas altogether, as would the 
Advaita Vedāntin at his most uncompromising, for that implies monastic renunciation. 
Renunciation must of necessity be eschewed by the Mīmāṃsaka, inasmuch as the nityakarmas 
are by definition “eternal” or “lifelong.” Pārthasārathi, as we will remember from the previous 
chapter, singled out Advaita Vedāntins for their supercessionist attitude toward Mīmāṃsā and the 
majority of the Vedic corpus, as well as what he considered their faulty reading practices. Yet 
both Āpadeva and his father accept, as a rule, that renunciation is a sine qua non for the 
eligibility to Vedāntic study, even though there was significant disagreement on this matter 
among early modern Advaitins.469 If anything, it is Vedānta that is a “language” here, as much an 
academic as a soteriological discipline, while it is properly Mīmāṃsā topics that occupy the 
Devas' attention. Were they, then, so thoroughly “committed” to Advaita Vedānta? What was the 
468 Anantadeva concludes his reconstruction by referring to Pārthasārathi. See Siddhāntatattva, 26: iti 
tantraratnādau nityānāṃ pāpakṣayahetutvam abhihitam | Cf. Tantraratna, Vol. 3, ed. T.V. Ramachandra 
Dikshita (Varanasi: Vārāṇaseya Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyālaya, 1963), 495-510.
469 See Bālabodhinī, 25-26: na gṛhasthasya śravaṇe 'dhikāraḥ adhikāriviśeṣaṇasya saṃnyāsasya abhāvāt | Cf. 
Siddhāntatattva, 33ff.
This is a much-contested principle in Advaita Vedānta history, which hinges largely on the disparate 
interpretations of the word uparati (withdrawal) as one of the qualifications of a student of Vedānta. Cf. Roger 
Marcaurelle, Freedom Through Inner Renunciation: Śaṅkara's Philosophy in a New Light (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2000), 165-208. The contemporary South Indian Advaitin Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarī came out with a “most virulent 
and personal denunciation of those who hold physical renunciation as a sine qua non” (Ibid., 208). His criticism 
was directed toward renunciates themselves, whom he accused of extorting prostrations from their followers. 
The Devas, however, were married householders who did not renounce, as far as we can tell, and seem to have 
had no such agonistic relationship with the renunciate Rāmatīrtha.
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nature of such commitment? To which side did their eternal obligations draw them?
This apparent struggle for reconciliation between two historically adversarial intellectual 
identities can be most clearly witnessed in the conclusion to the Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra, the junior 
Anantadeva (II)'s commentary on his father's MNP. Āpadeva, as we have seen, offered a 
Vedānticized reading of the work of dharma at the end of his Mīmāṃsā primer. But Anantadeva 
II turns out to be a very different Vedāntin from his father. Classical Advaita Vedānta exalted 
jñāna—the immediate apprehension of one's identity with Brahman—as the sole method of 
liberation, independent of all association with karma, ritual activity. But in a long excursus on 
that arpaṇa passage in the MNP, Anantadeva II appears to deviate radically from a purely 
Advaitic, hierarchical interpretation of karma in relation to jñāna:
None of this is contradictory to the citations from the Upaniṣads which say “By 
performing karma [one goes to the world of the ancestors]” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 
1.5.16) or “Knowing him alone [does one reach beyond death]” (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 
3.8; 6.15). The first citation is a general statement, and it makes sense to circumscribe its 
subject matter to action which is performed without the attitude of offering being 
described above. As for the second, we accept that self-knowledge accompanied by 
the performance of ritual action has the capacity to produce liberation. As the 
Bṛhaddīpikā says:
“Surely the highest good arises from knowledge, not from action, that cause of bondage.”
“No. It arises not from one [of these two], but from a synthesis of knowledge and action.”
[…]
“One who is destroying sin by obligatory and occasional rites (nityanaimittika), 
purifying his knowledge, and bringing it to fruition by means of practice—such a person, 
whose knowledge is ripened as a result of detachment, experiences liberation.”470
470 See Mimansā Nyāya Prakāsa by Apadeva with a commentary called Bhattalankar by Pandit Ananta Deva, ed. 
M.M. Sri Lakshmana Sastri (Benares: Vidya Vilas Press, 1921), 490 (henceforth cited as Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra): na ca 
“karmaṇā” ityādi śrutivirodhaḥ | sāmānyapravṛttāyās tasyās tādṛśārpaṇabuddhiśūnyakarmaviṣayatvopapatteḥ | 
nāpi “tameva viditvā” iti śrutivirodhaḥ | karmānuṣṭhānasahitasya ātmajñānasya asmābhir 
mokṣajanakatvābhyupagamāt | yathoktaṃ bṛhaddīpikāyām:
nanu niḥśreyasaṃ jñānād bandhahetor na karmaṇaḥ |
naikasmād api tatkiṃ tu jñānakarmasamuccayāt || […]
nityanaimittikair eva kurvāṇo duritakṣayam | 
jñānaṃ ca vimalīkurvann abhyāsena ca pācayan | 
vairāgyāt pakvavijñānaḥ kaivalyaṃ bhajate naraḥ ||
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The verses above, which Anantadeva II attributes to the Bṛhaddīpikā, are in fact 
fragments from the (now-lost) Bṛhaṭṭīkā of the famous seventh-century Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila 
Bhaṭṭa, as discussed by John Taber and Roque Mesquita.471 Mesquita has argued that there was a 
progression in Kumārila's thought toward a position more favorable to Vedānta, but Taber 
suggests that such a thesis remains to be proven, inasmuch as this promulgation of a 
jñānakarmasamuccayavāda—the doctrine that liberation can be achieved through a synthesis 
between knowledge and ritual action—is not only far removed from Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, 
but even from that of his contemporary Maṇḍana Miśra in the Brahmasiddhi, which favors the 
position.472 This doctrine is usually presented as belonging to Bhedābheda Vedānta, a tradition of 
interpretation that comes up for stringent critique in the writings of Śaṅkara and his disciples, 
and that survives residually in different schools of Vedānta until its sudden renaissance in the 
work of the sixteenth-century polymath Vijñānabhikṣu.473 Anantadeva II connected his support 
for the jñānakarmasamuccaya directly to the study of Mīmāṃsā itself:
What I'm trying to say is this: Whether jñāna and karma share an equal role in bringing 
about liberation, or whether karma leads to liberation by way of jñāna, the fact remains 
that, because karma does give rise to liberation, the intellectual system dedicated to 
analyzing karma (i.e., Mīmāṃsā) can culminate in liberation.474
471 See John Taber, “Kumārila the Vedāntin?” in Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta: Interaction and Continuity, ed. Johannes 
Bronkhorst (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007), 159-184. Cf. Roque Mesquita, “Die Idee der Erlösung bei 
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa [The Concept of Liberation According to Kumārilabhaṭṭa],” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde  
Südasiens 38 (1994): 451-484. The alternate title given by Anantadeva II here may simply be a scribal error, but 
it is possible that he knew the verses only from their citation in the Nyāyasudhā of Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, a text to 
which he refers often later in the excursus. Mesquita (“Die Idee der Erlosung,” 465) translates the first half of the 
first verse as follows: “doch die Erlösung auf Grund der Erkenntnis von der Ursache der Bindung entsteht (und) 
nicht auf Grund der Ritualwerke,” which I think is erroneous. bandhahetor should construe as a tatpuruṣa 
compound in apposition with karmaṇaḥ, both in the ablative, rather than as the genitive object of jñāna.
472 Taber, “Kumārila the Vedāntin?”, 162.
473 See Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 24-38.
474 Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra, 497: tasmāt samaprādhānyenaiva jñānakarmaṇor muktihetutvam, yadi vā jñānadvārā karmaṇāṃ 
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The fact that Anantadeva II explicitly adheres to this position, one that had been 
summarily rejected by the Advaita tradition that his forefathers support, should give us pause in 
our consideration of intellectual identity and the anxiety of influence.475 One way to address this 
issue is to take account of the strategies used by early modern scholars to “disagree without 
disrespect,” as Madhav Deshpande has recently shown in the case of Sanskrit grammarians.476 
Patrick Cummins demonstrates the presence of this strategy in the writings of the Deva family. 
Āpadeva uses metatextual markers (e.g., “so says my father”) in some cases precisely to gloss 
over those places he departs from his father's positions.477 This simultaneously gives his work 
authority and originality; Āpadeva establishes a teaching lineage and his family name, while at 
the same time staking out his own positions. In doing so, he and his Banarasi contemporaries 
look very much like scholars of the present, at once trained by mentors in a particular discipline 
and obligated to produce new and unique research. Can we contextualize this desire to strike out, 
muktihetutvam, sarvathā 'pi karmaṇāṃ muktiphalatvāt karmavicārārthasya śāstrasya sambhavati muktau 
paryavasānam ity āśayaḥ |
 
475 Anantadeva proceeds to quote from the precise section of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika (Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, 
vv. 95-96, 105-108) that forms the subject of Mesquita's and Taber's articles. (Incidentally, I am inclined to agree 
with Taber's assessment regarding Kumārila, especially after seeing Anantadeva employ the verses in a sustained 
argument against the self-sufficiency of jñāna as a means to liberation). But a more elaborate defense of the 
jñānakarmasamuccaya was made by Anantadeva II's contemporary Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa in his Mīmāṃsākutūhala, 
33-44. It appears immediately prior to the section I have cited above, where Kamalākara, like Khaṇḍadeva, fends 
off the critique that Mīmāṃsakas should not talk about bhakti. The phenomenon of Mīmāṃsakas incorporating 
Vedānta into their writings thus stretched beyond the Devas. It was clearly a point of contention between Advaita 
Vedāntins, as Kamalākara cites Advaita authorities from Vācaspati Miśra to Prakāśātman, author of the 
Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. Developing a more thorough understanding of the place of Vedānta in early modern 
Mīmāṃsā could be helped by procuring Kamalākara's unpublished work of Vedānta, the Vedāntakautūhala, 
which he mentions at the end of his Śāntiratna. See K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, “The Vedāntakautūhala of 
Kamalākarabhaṭṭa,” Poona Orientalist 9.1-2 (1944): 70-72. A comparative study of these three close 
contemporaries and their works—Kamalākara's Mīmāṃsākutūhala, Anantadeva's Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra, and 
Khaṇḍadeva's Bhāṭṭadīpikā—awaits further research. 
476 Madhav Deshpande, “'Disagreement without disrespect': transitions in a lineage from Bhaṭṭoji to Nāgeśa,” South 
Asian History and Culture 6.1 (2015): 32-49.
477 Cummins, “Āpadeva the Family Man,” 4-6.
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figuratively and literally (if their polemics were any indication), in the social history of early 
modern intellectual life?
A Social History of Intellectual Change?
 One is compelled to envision the Devas among the scholarly intelligentsia of early 
modern Banaras, holding debates on just such topics in the Muktimaṇḍapa, the “Liberation 
Pavilion” of the Viśveśvara temple that figured so prominently in that city's religious and 
intellectual self-representation. Rosalind O'Hanlon and others have noted that the Muktimaṇḍapa 
was famed for being the site of a cosmopolitan assembly of paṇḍits, who engaged in public 
disputations and issued significant adjudications of social and religious law, on topics ranging 
from political intervention with the Mughal imperial order to the entitlements of upwardly 
mobile caste communities.478 In particular, these scholars of Banaras were pre-occupied with 
determining the nature of Brahmin identity, in response to the claims of various regional 
plaintiffs, especially from the Deccan. Their attempts at normative deliberation, however, were 
not always met with unanimous accord. As O'Hanlon and Minkowski have noted, the disputes 
speak of “parties” within the Banaras assembly of southern pandits, precisely the ones who 
contributed substantially to Sanskrit traditions of learning in this period.479
How might we read these internal family debates against the backdrop of this broader 
social contestation? The Devas were, after all, Brahmins from the south, at once revered for their 
scholarly acumen and suspected of partisan motivations. Moreover, Anantadeva II was 
conspicuously present among the signatories of several momentous letters of judgment 
478 O'Hanlon, “Letters Home,” 219ff.
479 O'Hanlon and Minkowski, “What makes people who they are?”, 410.
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(nirṇayapatras) to emerge from the Mukti Pavilion.480 It is not difficult to imagine a sense of 
continuity between the senior and junior Anantadevas' concerns with deliberation, determination, 
nirṇaya. The very word summons up the whole world of public-facing paṇḍit assemblies, who 
were, perhaps, reacting to the influence of the Islamic fatwa and the desirability of being able to 
produce definitive decisions. We may also see in the nirṇaya a greater public demand for 
unequivocal, authoritative information in matters of religious dispute for wider regional 
audiences, that were not only interested in the outcomes of these debates, but expected to see 
paper documents setting them out.481 The Devas' vigorous defense and propagation of an 
intellectually savvy bhakti tradition may thus reflect their particular geographical sensibilities, 
given their invocation of the Brahmin bhakta Eknāth, as well as their contribution to those 
percolating debates on what it meant to be a Brahmin in the sixteenth century and beyond.
But the question persists: To what extent do these intellectual shifts have identifiable 
social contexts? As I mentioned previously, the historical evidence linking the Devas to Eknāth is 
questionable, though the ideological connections may not be so farfetched. The Eknāthī  
Bhāgavat, Eknāth's Marathi commentary on the eleventh chapter of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, 
demonstrates familiarity with Sanskrit intellectual disciplines, draws heavily from the work of 
the exegete Śrīdhara Svāmin, and was completed in—where else?—Banaras in 1573 CE.482 
Moreover, judging by Eknāth's hagiographies, the Eknāthī Bhāgavat was met with rumblings of 
discontent from the city's establishment Brahmins, who, much like the Devas' intellectual 
480 Ibid., 395.
481 See, e.g., Rosalind O'Hanlon, “Performance in a World of Paper: Puranic Histories and Social Communication in 
Early Modern India,” Past and Present 219 (2013): 87-126. I thank Rosalind O'Hanlon for her very helpful 
comments here on the social implications of the nirṇaya as a genre.
482 See Justin Abbott, The Life of Eknāth (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), xvii-xxii.
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opponents, were upset that the saint profaned Vyāsa's sacred teaching by transmitting it in the 
“polluted” vernacular.483 While it seems as though none of the Devas wrote a word of Marathi, 
the space for vernacular communication among paṇḍit families was probably wider, and with 
greater intellectual as well as devotional content, than the extant written record may reveal.484 For 
more concrete evidence of the Devas' local connections, instead of turning to Eknāth, we might 
consider another Maharashtrian saint figure: Rāmdās.
Although Anantadeva II spent his life in Banaras and was patronized by Baj Bahadur 
Chandra of Almora, all the way out in Uttarkhand,485 he was also the preceptor of one 
Raghunātha Navahasta, a protégé of Queen Dīpābāi of Thanjavur who composed in both 
Sanskrit and Marathi.486 Raghunātha studied with Anantadeva II in Banaras, but returned to 
Maharashtra and, later, Thanjavur in various capacities. He expressed considerable gratitude to 
his teacher, frequently referring to himself in colophons as “Anantadeva's own” (anantadevīya) 
and “blessed by Anantadeva” (anantadevānugṛhīta).487 Raghunātha appears to have been on 
equally intimate terms with the influential saint Rāmdās, famous for his relationship with the 
483 Ibid., xx.
484 See, e.g., Madhav Deshpande, “On Vernacular Sanskrit,” in Sanskrit and Prakrit: Sociolinguistic Issues (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 33-51.
485 See Pollock, “New Intellectuals,” 18.
486 P.K. Gode, “Raghunātha, a Protégé of Queen Dīpābāi of Tanjore, and his Works—Between A.D. 1675-1712,” in 
Studies in Indian Literary History, Vol. II (Bombay: Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikshāpīth, 1954), 391-403; P.K. Gode, 
“The Identification of Raghunātha, the Protégé of Queen Dīpābāi of Tanjore and his Contact with Saint 
Rāmadāsa—Between A.D. 1648 and 1682,” in Studies in Indian Literary History, Vol. II (Bombay: Singhi Jain 
Śāstra Śikshāpīth, 1954), 404-415; P.K. Gode, “A Rare Manuscript of Janārdana-Mahodaya by Raghunātha 
Gaṇeśa Navahasta, Friend of Saint Rāmadāsa—Between A.D. 1640 & 1682,” in Studies in Indian Literary  
History. Vol. II (Bombay: Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikshāpīth, 1954), 416-424; K.V. Sarma, “Raghunātha Navahasta 
and his Contribution to Sanskrit and Marathi Literature,” Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal 7.1 (1969): 69-
82.
487 Gode, “A Rare Manuscript of Janārdana-Mahodaya,” 421.
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Maratha king Shivaji. Rāmdās wrote an autographed letter to Raghunātha in 1674 CE describing 
him as “all-knowing” (sarvajña), and went so far as to say that all the knowledge Raghunātha 
possessed was equivalent to Rāmdās' own (tumce je kāhī āhe te sakal mājheci āhe).488 If this 
seems an oddly lofty compliment for a saint to pay to a layman, we should remember that 
Raghunātha was described elsewhere as Rāmdās' personal instructor (śrīce upādhye) and 
specialist in ancient lore (purāṇik).489 In addition to these roles as scholar and storyteller, 
Raghunātha was appointed priest at the Raghupati temple of Chāfaḷ, in Satara district, where 
Rāmdās set up a large seminary (maṭha).490 According to P.K. Gode, this was a position 
Raghunātha occupied until 1683 CE, after which the political turmoil following Rāmdās' and 
Shivaji's deaths prompted him to settle in Thanjavur under the patronage of Queen Dīpābāi.491
The Raghunātha-Rāmdās nexus sheds light on precisely the antinomies we find in the 
Devas: language use (Sanskrit/vernacular), discursive modes (local/cosmopolitan), public 
identities (scholar/sermonizer), and intellectual domains (bhakti and jñāna/karma). Raghunātha 
appears to have moved easily between the world of “high” Brahmanical learning in Banaras and 
the very local responsibilities of a relatively small-town priest affiliated with a celebrated saint. 
Moreover, as a purāṇik, a scholar versed in the purāṇa tradition, Raghunātha would have been 
able to mediate between elite and popular worlds as part of his very profession.492 As P.K. Gode 
488 Ibid., 423.
489 Gode, “The Identification of Raghunātha,” 409.
490 Ibid., 412. The terminus post quem for this appointment is 1679 CE (Ibid., 408).
491 Ibid., 413-4.
492 See V. Narayana Rao, “Purāṇa,” in The Hindu World, ed. Sushil Mittal and Gene Thursby (New York: Routledge, 
2004), 114: “A typical paurāṇika...chooses a section of a Purāṇa for a discourse, reads out a portion of the text in 
Sanskrit or the regional language, and comments on it, incorporating material from other similar texts and 
expanding on their relevance to that specific place and point in time.”
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observes, Raghunātha's Janārdana-Mahodaya, a Sanskrit manual of Vaiṣṇava ritual, may owe its 
sections on Rāma and Hanumān worship to the influence of the saint's popular activities, and 
vice versa.493 In this connection, we should note that Raghunātha's revered teacher, Anantadeva 
II, also composed Vaiṣṇava ritual manuals, often for a particular localized audience. In the 
opening to his Mathurāsetu, Anantadeva II names his audience directly, by proposing to 
demonstrate the greatness of the environs of Mathurā “for those of who you are living there 
itself, singing the glories of and taking as your sole refuge the God who goes by the names Hari, 
Keśava, and Govinda.”494 The Mathurāsetu, perhaps modeled on the Tristhalīsetu of Nārāyaṇa 
Bhaṭṭa,495 provides a Brahmin pilgrim's guide to the city, detailing the glory of various holy sites 
and the appropriate rites to observe. It draws heavily upon a Tantric manual of Rāma worship, 
the Rāmārcanacandrikā by Ānandavana, even reproducing in the manuscript a diagram of 
syllables to be used for esoteric recitation by Vaiṣṇava initiates.496 Anantadeva II was also 
familiar with the discourse of bhaktirasa, thus blending together inspiration from the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa and the world of Rāma devotion.497
That Rāma was central to the ritual life of the Mathurāsetu, the overwhelming presence 
493 Gode, “A Rare Manuscript of Janārdana-Mahodaya,” 423-4.
494 Mathurāsetu, MS SAN 2638, India Office Library (British Library), 1r, ll. 3-4: tatraiva satāṃ 
harikeśavagovindanāmānam ananyaśaraṇatayā bhajatāṃ tatrabhavatāṃ […]
495 See Richard Salomon, ed., trans., The Bridge to the Three Holy Cities: The Sāmānya-praghaṭṭaka of Nārāyaṇa  
Bhaṭṭa's Tristhalīsetu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985).
496 For the diagram, see ibid., 30v, in the lower right corner. It appears immediately after Anantadeva's discussion of 
the appropriate times and customs of initiation (dīkṣākālaḥ). The Rāmārcanacandrikā probably belonged to the 
late fifteenth or early sixteenth century. See Hans Bakker, “Reflections on the Evolution of Rāma Devotion in the 
Light of Textual and Archeological Evidence,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 31 (1987): 24, and 
n.77.
497 Anantadeva details the foundational, stimulant, and aesthetic factors (vibhāvas) of bhaktirasa at the end of the 
Mathurāsetu, from ff.43v-46r.
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of Kṛṣṇa notwithstanding, dovetails nicely with the Devas' possible connection to Rāmdās. Hans 
Bakker has shown that Rāma devotion in the Banaras region dates from pre-Islamic times, and 
especially flourished in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when Sanskrit texts such as the 
Agastyasaṃhitā and Rāmapūrvatāpanīya Upaniṣad described a Rāma at once equated with an 
impersonal transcendent reality (nirguṇa), and the object of personal worship (saguṇa).498 The 
combination of Advaita Vedānta philosophy with bhakti was well-established in the Rāma 
devotional tradition. Subsequent texts like the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa represented the culmination 
of these efforts, combining narrative and philosophy to offer a Vedānticized Rāma that would 
exert significant influence on the North Indian Rāmānandī order and, most famously, Tulsīdās' 
Hindi-language Rāmcaritmānas.499 Ānandavana, author of the Rāmārcanacandrikā, claimed a 
direct lineage to Advaita authors from Gauḍapāda to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.500 And as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, these Rāma texts also proclaimed the salvific power of reciting the 
mantra of Rāma's name, in the process appropriating Śaiva formulas and overlapping with their 
Bhāgavata counterparts.501
The extent to which Rāmdās was aware of this literature is uncertain, since he did not 
498 Hans Bakker, Ayodhyā, Part I (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1986), 67-181. Cf. Hans Bakker, “An Old Text of the 
Rāma Devotion: The Agastyasaṃhitā,” in Navonmeṣaḥ: Mahamahopadhyaya Gopinath Kaviraj  
Commemoration Volume (Varanasi: M.M. Gopinah Kaviraj Centenary Celebration Committee, 1987), 300-306; 
Bakker, “Reflections on the Evolution of Rāma Devotion,” 9-42.
499 Bakker, Ayodhyā, 122-124. Cf. Michael Allen, “Sītā's Shadow: Vedāntic Symbolism in the Adhyātma-
Rāmāyaṇa,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 20.1 (2011): 81-102.
500 Bakker, Ayodhyā, 123, n.10.
501 Bakker, Ayodhyā, 119-124; Bakker, “An Old Text of the Rāma Devotion,” 302-303. Cf. Hans Bakker, “Rāma 
Devotion in a Śaiva Holy Place,” in Patronage and Popularisation, Pilgrimage and Procession: Channels of  
Transcultural Translation and Transmission in Early Modern South Asia, ed. Heidi Rika Maria Pauwels 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 67-79. It is possible that Anantadeva's guru Rāmatīrtha emerged from 
just such a devotional milieu.
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draw significantly from sources outside Maharashtra, but he certainly did know Sanskrit.502 For 
our purposes, Rāmdās represents the Devas' inverse: a charismatic preacher first, and a scriptural 
exegete second. His most famous Marathi composition, the Dāsbodh, mirrors many of the 
Rāmaite texts described above, in that it espouses a broadly Advaita Vedānta philosophy while 
foregrounding popular practices of bhakti, kīrtan in particular.503 It also provides a fascinating 
example of the local-cosmopolitan encounters we have attempted to study in the writings of the 
Devas. At the beginning of the eighth chapter, “A Description of the Audience” (sabhāvarṇana), 
Rāmdās first cites a famous Sanskrit verse on singing the name of God, and subsequently 
translates it into Marathi.504 He then recounts the reasons why the public assembly (sabhā) is a 
wonderful place, the very abode of God:
502 Wilbur S. Deming, Rāmdās and the Rāmdāsīs (New Delhi: Vintage Books, 1990 [Calcutta, 1928]), 31-32.
503 Ibid., 90-100, 120: “Like his predecessors, Rāmdās used the musical service (kīrtan or bhajan) in giving religious 
instruction to the people. He taught that the kīrtan-singer should be an attractive individual...dressed in clean 
clothes. His singing should be devotional, bringing peace and quiet to minds disturbed by quarrelling. The singer 
should be expert in composing metrical verses which would attract the attention of all listeners. Sincere kīrtan-
singers do not attempt to amuse their hearers, but confine their efforts to teaching the difference between reality 
and unreality. Concerning kīrtan subjects Rāmdās says, 'Each successive kīrtan should have a new subject, the 
singer prostrating himself before the idol and proclaiming God's name by the clapping of hands. The fame of one 
idol should not be sung in front of another idol, and if there be no idol present, then Vedānta truths may be 
expounded.”
504 Dāsbodh 1.8.1-2. See Śrīdāsbodh (Pune: Bhaṭ āṇi Maṇḍalī, 1915), 13:
Sanskrit
nāhaṃ vasāmi vaikuṇṭhe yogināṃ hṛdaye ravau |
madbhaktā yatra gāyanti tatra tiṣṭhāmi nārada ||
Marathi
nāhīṃ vaikuṇṭhīcyā ṭhāyī |
nāhīṃ yogiyāṃce hṛdayīṃ |
mājhe bhakta gātī je ṭhāīṃ |
tetheṃ mī tiṣṭhata nāradā ||
English
I do not dwell in Vaikuṇṭha,
or in the sun that is the yogis' heart.
O Nārada, I stay where my devotees sing.
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where there is the love-filled singing of bhaktas; God's sacred utterances; songs about 
God (harikīrtaneṃ); exegesis of the Vedas; stories from the Purāṇas; where God's glories 
are recounted; there are dialogues on all sorts of interpretive problems (nirūpaṇāṃce 
samvād); the science of the inner self (adhyātmavidyā) [is studied]; and debates rage 
over difference and non-difference (bhedābhed mathan).505
Not only is there a prominent place here for bhakti, but jñāna and karma also find a 
welcome home, just as the Devas would have wanted. The chapter goes on to list the motley 
crew that comprises the sabhā, ranging from “staff-wielders, dreadlocked ascetics, and Nāth 
yogis wearing earrings” (daṇḍadhārī jaṭādhārī nāthpanthī mudrādhārī) to “scholars and 
storytellers, virtuosos and Vedicists” (paṇḍit āṇi purāṇik vidvāṃs āṇi vaidik).506 If we juxtapose 
this vignette from the Dāsbodh alongside the “assemblies” we have seen so far, the 
dharmasabhā and paṇḍitasabhā, we find yet another non-courtly public space for intellectual 
and religious activity. This sabhā claims to have invited many different participants with 
different interests and capabilities, and at first blush its description may appear hyperreal, a mere 
literary exaggeration. Yet it could very well resemble the Devas' own multipurpose milieu of 
early modern Banaras. Far from being restricted to the self-professedly elite assembly of the 
Muktimaṇḍapa, the Devas' sabhā covered much more ground than that of top-down Brahmanical 
jurisprudence. At once public and provincial, didactic and devotional, it moved between social 
hierarchies, linguistic registers, intellectual disciplines, and religious worldviews.
I do not intend to overplay the Devas' “universality” here. When I referred to the 
“demotic” character of bhakti, I meant not that the Devas promoted the abolition of caste 
hierarchies (quite the opposite), but that their intellectual interests were sparked by texts and 
505 Dāsbodh 1.8.4-5. Ibid., 13: premaḷa bhaktāṃcī gāyaṇe | bhagavadvākyeṃ harikīrtaneṃ | vedavyākhyāna 
purāṇaśravaṇa | jethe nirantara || parameśvarāce guṇānuvād | nānā nirūpaṇāṃce saṃvād | adhyātmavidyā 
bhedābhed - | mathan jethe ||
506 Dāsbodh 1.8.10, 1.8.16. See Ibid., 14.
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traditions from a wider range than generally comprised the śāstric scope of the Brahmin elite of 
Banaras. I have tried to argue that in the writings of the Devas, the Sanskrit intellectual traditions 
of Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, often considered impervious to anything around them, 
underwent a change that reflected the Devas' attention to popular bhakti practices. In particular, I 
think that their interest in saṃkīrtana, public devotional singing, and the power of God's name, 
derived both from Sanskrit text-traditions as well as the vernacular-language religious 
movements dedicated to the same practice. This does not mean, however, that they danced in the 
streets, like Caitanya, or ate communally with members of caste backgrounds they considered 
beneath them; “Sanskrit” and “vernacular” do not so readily map onto “elite” and “everyday.” 
Theirs was a fundamentally Brahmin-dominated sabhā.
In this sense, the connection between Rāmdās and the Devas is quite easy to understand. 
Rāmdās is primarily remembered for his disputed role in the regime of the Maratha king Shivaji, 
a relationship that has been interpreted variously at different historical junctures by those with 
different political sensibilities.507 In terms of his basic social views, however, even sympathetic 
commentators acknowledge that “Rāmdās...was not a social reformer. He accepted the Hindu 
social system as he found it […] While the Svāmī was friendly with low castes, he did not make 
a definite place for them in the movement; and the low-caste element has never held the place of 
507 For an early twentieth-century valorization of the Shivaji-Rāmdās relationship, see M.G. Ranade, Rise of the  
Maratha Power (Bombay: Punalekar & Co., 1900), 143-144. The famous Marathi nationalist historiographer 
V.K. Rajwade (1864-1926) was also fascinated with Rāmdās, and drew from his writings “a specific political 
program that placed the ousting of Muslim invaders and the spread of Maharashtra dharma across all of India at 
the heart of the Maratha struggle.” See Prachi Deshpande, Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and Identity in  
Western India, 1700-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 131-132. Non-Brahmin 
contemporaries of Rajwade, however, reacted strongly to the Brahmin interpretation of Rāmdās, and not only 
criticized Brahmin political leaders for their narrowly casteist appropriation but also tried to distance Shivaji 
from any Brahmin influence (Ibid., 183-188). In more recent years, the notion of a Brahmin-led, militant Hindu 
community pitted against Muslim oppressors has made Rāmdās an important of the Shiv Sena’s political 
ideology. See Naregal, “Language and Power,” 264, n.15.
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honour among Rāmdāsīs that it has at Paṇḍharpūr.”508 As Anna Schultz notes in her work on 
Marathi devotional performance and Hindu nationalism, Rāmdās broke from the egalitarian 
vārkarī tradition, upheld Brahmanical hierarchies, encouraged involvement in politics, and laid 
“the musical and political foundations for rāṣṭrīya (nationalist) kīrtan in the seventeenth 
century.”509 If the Devas had given up their scholarly careers to become full-time musical 
performers, they would no doubt have found kindred spirits among the followers of Rāmdās. 
Maybe they already had. After all, Raghunātha Navahasta migrated to Thanjavur with the 
Marathas in the late seventeenth century, and likely took the Devas' writings with him, if they 
had not already passed through the Rāmdāsī maṭhas of the region, where Marathi kīrtan was 
performed.510
What should we make, then, of the Devas' self-proclaimed connection to Eknāth, a much 
more troublesome social figure, albeit no less Brahmin? Answers await further comparative 
study between their works, to see if there is indeed any overlap in their ideas. A provocative 
thesis by Christian Novetzke suggests a non-intellectual motive.511 Novetzke attempts to unearth 
508 Deming, Rāmdās and the Rāmdāsīs, 212. Much less sympathetic were those non-Brahmin writers of the early 
twentieth century who viewed Rāmdās as representative of the very Brahmin hegemony they were trying to 
dismantle. See Deshpande, Creative Pasts, 186-187. For some, Rāmdās remains the exemplary case of bhakti's 
inability to maintain a critical edge in early modernity, stamping out, perhaps, the possibility of Reformation. See 
Naregal, “Language and Power,” 264: “[Rāmdās'] prolific compositions reveal that by the late seventeenth 
century vernacular devotional expression was patently less anti-hierarchical and more inclined to uphold the 
benefits of institutional structures in the religious and political spheres.”
509 Anna Schultz, Singing A Hindu Nation: Marathi Devotional Performance and Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 26. Italics mine.
510 See T. N. Bhima Rao, “Samartha Ramdasi Maths in Tanjore,” The Journal of the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji's  
Sarasvati Mahal Library 17.3 (1964): 1-4. Cf. Davesh Soneji, “The Powers of Polyglossia: Marathi Kīrtan, 
Multilingualism, and the Making of a South Indian Devotional Tradition,” International Journal of Hindu 
Studies 17.3 (2013): 344-349. Several manuscripts of the Devas' works are available in the Tanjore Sarasvati 
Mahal Library, Anantadeva I's Siddhāntatattva, for example. See P.P.S. Sastri, A Descriptive Catalogue of the  
Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji's Sarasvatī Mahāl Library, Vol. XIII (Srirangam: Vani 
Vilas Press, 1931), 5621-5625, 5796-5799.
511 Christian Novetzke, “The Brahmin double: the Brahminical construction of anti-Brahminism and anti-caste 
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a genealogy of modern anti-Brahmin critique in precolonial negotiations of Brahmin identity in 
non-Brahmin contexts. By presenting a caricature of the greedy, foolish, orthodox Brahmin, 
Novetzke suggests, Brahmin performers of Marathi kīrtan tried to create a “Brahmin double” for 
their non-Brahmin audience, discursively separating “bad Brahmins” from “Brahminism” in 
general.512 It is debatable whether the rhetorical strategies of nineteenth-century Brahmin social 
reformers can be linked to the performative contexts of the seventeenth century, or whether 
discursive power operates the same way in each. Here I simply note that the Devas, too, spent 
quite a bit of time criticizing Brahmin intellectuals for their haughtiness, many of whom were 
probably their colleagues. Of course, that critique belonged to a very different social context; 
they were writing both against and to their Brahmin contemporaries, and probably did not (want 
to) interact much with non-Brahmins in Banaras. But given that Banaras, in so much Marathi 
bhakti literature, was painted as the stronghold of oppressive Brahmanical orthodoxy, perhaps 
the Devas were trying to refract the notion of the “Brahmin double” in a social world where 
upper-caste identity was being constantly threatened, renegotiated, and—that perennial Brahmin 
anxiety—corrupted. To be a “good” Brahmin, it was not enough to master a scholarly discipline. 
One had to show the appropriate comportments of humility and worship, and offer up (arpaṇa) 
one's accomplishments to God. Perhaps invoking Eknāth was the Devas' way of reminding 
themselves.513
sentiment in the religious cultures of precolonial Maharashtra,” South Asian History and Culture 2.2 (2011): 232-
252.
512 Ibid., 235.
513 Cf. Adheesh Sathaye, Crossing the Lines of Caste: Viśvāmitra and the Construction of Brahmin Power in Hindu  
Mythology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 143-144: “As Kunal Chakrabarti explains, purāṇic 
literature served as a 'cultural resource which enabled little communities to transform themselves into a regional 
community which could be culturally identified and territorially demarcated.' […] Brahmin paurāṇikas engaged 
in similar modes of identification, albeit in the elite register of Sanskrit, but nevertheless based on regionalized 
evaluations of the binary opposition between being Brahmin and becoming the Other kind of Brahmin.”
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The account I have attempted here of the Devas' intellectual innovations is a necessarily 
limited one, albeit richly suggestive. More sustained attention to developments on the periphery 
of the Devas' intellectual activity will elucidate the extent to which the Devas owed their 
religious and intellectual identities to the places of their emigration and immigration respectively. 
An even larger question, however, is how we should study the permeable boundaries between 
intellectual disciplines and religious motivations in early modern India. Perhaps the point is not 
to search for “systemwide change” (pace Pollock), but to note the gradual yet unmistakable 
shifts in an intellectual tradition's discursive registers. These do not take place at the level of 
doctrine, but are rather present in new hermeneutical concerns. In the case of the Devas, it is 
clear that the majority of their pedagogical activity was conducted in the realm of Mīmāṃsā and 
Vedānta, but their personal religious commitments had an equally significant effect on their 
scholarly careers. Only a further intellectual history and prosopographical study of the Devas and 
other major families of the period will reveal the extent to which their “formal and technical 
concerns,” as O'Hanlon and Minkowski suggest, “can be mapped onto the social changes of the 
early modern world.”514 One thing, however, is certain: bhakti was on the move in early modern 
India, and it moved scholars to think in new ways about their multiple intellectual inheritances.
 
514 O'Hanlon and Minkowski, “What makes people who they are?”, 410.
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Chapter 5: Bhakti in the Moonlight
Among all things that lead to liberation, bhakti holds most weight.
-“Śaṅkara,” Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 31ab515
Theists, Non-Theists, and Intellectual Historians
Accounts of the intersection between bhakti and Advaita Vedānta have tended to 
concentrate on their philosophical compatibility. Such accounts tend to fall along two major 
lines. One is that bhakti and Advaita are fundamentally opposed. In this account, a theology of 
religious devotion to an embodied god cannot be squared with a monist philosophy that does 
away with distinctions between the individual and God. Bhakti and the realist ontology it 
requires can only hold a subordinate place in such a system, as a preparatory stage for nondual 
knowledge. Theologies of bhakti, primarily Vaiṣṇava in character, are viewed as responses or 
challenges to the forbidding fortress of Advaita Vedānta in the history of Indian philosophy.516 
Another line of interpretation prefers to see no essential break between the two. Bhakti either 
exists primordially in Advaita Vedānta,517 or it is successfully reconciled in the work of certain 
major figures of the tradition.518 Proponents of this narrative also point to vernacular-language 
515 This was probably not a work of the historical Śaṅkara, but was popularly attached to him. The next half of the 
verse, interestingly, says that “bhakti is inquiry into one's own true nature.” Vivekachudamani of Sri  
Sankaracharya, ed. tr. Swami Madhavananda (Mayavati: The Advaita Ashrama, 1921), 12:
mokṣakāraṇasāmagryāṃ bhaktir eva garīyasī |
svasvarūpānusandhānaṃ bhaktir ity abhidhīyate ||
516 See, e.g., Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume IV: Indian Pluralism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1961).
517 See Adya Prasad Mishra, The Development and Place of Bhakti in Śāṅkara Vedānta (Allahabad: The University 
of Allahabad, 1967).
518 See Sanjukta Gupta, Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (London: 
Routledge, 2006). See also Shoun Hino, “The beginnings of bhakti's influence on Advaita doctrine in the 
teachings of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,” in Indian Philosophy and Text Science, ed. Toshihiro Wada (Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 2010), 101-114.
190
poetry of the nirguṇa variety, that refers to God “without attributes,” as being seamlessly co-
referential with Advaita Vedānta philosophy.519 While the history of these narratives would 
require another chapter to detail, suffice it to say here that for many modern commentators, 
discerning the proper relationship between bhakti and Advaita Vedānta involves questions of 
philosophical and political ethics.520
Among the most detailed and historically conscientious representatives of these two 
accounts are Adya Prasad Mishra's The Development and Place of Bhakti in Śāṅkara Vedānta 
and Lance Nelson's several publications on the Advaitin renunciate Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.521 
Mishra attempts to trace each discussion of the term bhakti in Vedānta intellectual history, as 
well as its incipient formulations in the Vedic corpus. Although he devotes significant attention to 
Śaṅkara's own writings, he periodizes the history of bhakti into pre- and post-Śaṅkara Vedānta, 
assigning a distinct place in the latter to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Advaitins 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. These two alone, Mishra claims, represented the 
final stage of the post-Śaṅkara “Neo-Bhakti,”522 since they accorded bhakti a space alongside 
519 See Krishna Sharma, Bhakti and the Bhakti Movement: A New Perspective (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 
1987).
520 See Paul Hacker, “Schopenhauer and Hindu Ethics,” in Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on  
Traditional and Modern Vedanta, ed. Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 
273-318; Andrew Nicholson, “Vivekananda's Non Dual Ethics in the History of Vedanta,” in Swami 
Vivekananda: New Reflections on His Life, Legacy, and Influence, eds. Rita D. Sherma and James McHugh 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), forthcoming.
521 Lance Nelson, “Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta: a translation and study of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Bhaktirasāyana” 
(PhD diss., McMaster University, 1986); Lance Nelson, “Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on the 'hidden meaning' of the 
Bhagavadgītā: bhakti for the Advaitin renunciate,” Journal of South Asian Literature 23.2 (1988): 73-89; Lance 
Nelson, “Bhakti Rasa for the Advaitin renunciate: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's theory of devotional sentiment,” 
Religious Traditions 12.1 (1989): 1-16; Lance Nelson, “Bhakti preempted: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on devotion 
for the Advaitin renouncer,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 7.2 (1998): 53-74; Lance Nelson, “The Ontology of 
Bhakti: Devotion as Paramapuruṣārtha in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,” Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 32.4 (2004): 345-392; Lance Nelson, “Theological politics and paradoxical spirituality in the life of 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,” Journal of Vaishnava Studies 15.2 (2007): 19-34.
522 The term can be found in Kshitimohan Sen, Medieval Mysticism of India (London: Luzac & Co, 1936), 46, 48, 
191
jñāna as an independent path to liberation. Mishra concludes that “the monistic ideal of Śāṅkara 
Vedānta is not only not against Bhakti, but, on the contrary, it preaches it in positive and assertive 
terms.”523 Nelson's assessment of the situation is rather less sanguine. In his studies of 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Bhaktirasāyana, the “Elixir of Bhakti,” Nelson finds an irreconcilable 
tension between Madhusūdana's orthodox non-dualism and devotional spirituality. For 
Madhusūdana to say that bhakti could be the highest goal of human life (paramapuruṣārtha) 
leaves a number of unresolved theoretical difficulties.524 The metaphysical paradox of being a 
simultaneous devotee of God and of nondual knowledge makes such a claim simply not 
50, to refer to the “cult” or “movement” connecting the ālvārs, Śrīvaiṣṇavas, and Caitanyaites. J.S. Hawley 
remarks that the popularity of the term owed to R.G. Bhandarkar's Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious  
Systems (1913), but the book does not mention the term, and Sen only cites Bhandarkar's work in a general 
sense. See John Stratton Hawley, A Storm of Songs: India and the Idea of the Bhakti Movement (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2015), 248. It is possible that "neo-bhakti" was a term floating around prior to Sen's 
work, but I have yet to trace it.
523 Mishra, The Development and Place, ii. Mishra's own intellectual history is worth a brief remark. His 
dissertation advisor in the Sanskrit Department at Allahabad University was the extremely prolific (and 
extremely conservative) Umesh Mishra. A Maithili Brahmin who received both a traditional Sanskrit and modern 
English education, Umesh Mishra studied in Varanasi with leading figures in Indology including Arthur Venis 
and Gopinath Kaviraj. He joined his contemporary Ganganath Jha at Allahabad in 1923, and over the next forty 
years produced scholarship on several traditions of Sanskrit philosophy. His magnum opus was the monumental 
and learned History of Indian Philosophy, of which he published two volumes, leaving the third in manuscript 
form. See Govinda Jha, Umesh Mishra, tr. Jayakanta Mishra (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1995).
In the first volume of the set, Umesh Mishra felt it was clear that bhakti was metaphysically and practically 
incompatible with “the Highest Aim of philosophy, that is, Absolute Monism which alone aims at Perfect Unity 
amid diversity.” Bhakti could only make one fit for the discipline of knowledge, or jñāna, and required that one 
maintain a degree of individuality in one's relationship with God. Therefore, “Dualism cannot be removed and 
Absolute Monism is never possible with Bhakti as the direct means of realizing the Ultimate Reality.” See 
Umesh Mishra, History of Indian Philosophy: Volume One (Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1957), 31-33. In 
writing a thesis that explicitly tried to contradict such statements, Adya Prasad Mishra must no doubt have 
clashed with his advisor. Indeed, in his otherwise encouraging foreword to The Development and Place, Umesh 
Mishra remarked that “The subject sounded to many apparently contradictory,” but signed off on the topic with 
the caveat that “Bhakti is really for the lower stage [...]”
524 Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 363: “[W]hile giving bhakti a central role, the author makes great efforts to 
remain within the doctrinal boundaries of classical Advaita. He stretches the limits here and there, but only 
oversteps them in limited, well-defined ways, especially...in the area of soteriology [...] Even as he does so, 
however, one would hesitate to judge that he has ceased to be an Advaitin, because his ontological and 
epistemological framework remains orthodox. The consequence is that Madhusūdana winds up trying to fit an 
elevated view of bhakti into the confines of a system not designed to support it. His endeavor becomes to that 
extent more problematic than that of the Gosvāmīs.”
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“justifiable in terms of Śaṃkara's Advaita.”525
Although sophisticated and thorough, and superb contributions to the history of ideas, 
both Mishra's and Nelson's works are open to methodological critique. Each is susceptible, 
respectively, to what Quentin Skinner calls the “mythology of doctrines” and the “mythology of 
coherence.”526 The mythology of doctrines assumes that each classic writer in a particular system
—in this case, of Advaita Vedānta philosophy—must articulate some doctrine constitutive of that 
system. “Besides the crude possibility of crediting a writer with a meaning they could not have 
intended to convey,” writes Skinner, “there is the more insidious danger of too readily finding 
expected doctrines in classic texts.”527 For all his impressive textual breadth, Mishra falls prey to 
precisely this fallacy: once he has held bhakti to be constitutive of Advaita Vedānta discourse, it 
is a small step to hold that the classic texts of the discipline proleptically gesture toward its full 
elaboration later within the tradition. This is, of course, what premodern scholars themselves did, 
an act that is historically interesting in its own right, but deserves greater scrutiny in the present.
Nelson points out this very difficulty with Mishra's work,528 but his own study is also 
informed by a search for consistency, albeit negatively defined. In pronouncing judgment on 
Madhusūdana's inability to account philosophically for his multiple affiliations, Nelson holds to 
the “mythology of coherence,” the idea that there is some inner coherence to a certain author's 
525 Nelson, “Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta,” 308. Cf. Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 386: “Still, the question of 
how all this can be justified in terms of Advaita remains. Indeed it is here, precisely where Madhusūdana’s 
glorification of bhakti reaches its zenith, that the conceptual problems of supporting bhakti as parama-
puruṣārtha within a nondualist horizon become most apparent....What Madhusūdana in the end completely fails 
to explain is how bhakti can, for the erstwhile jīvanmukta-bhakta, continue beyond death, in a state in which the 
mind, melted or otherwise, must have been left behind.”
526 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics Vol. 1: On Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 59-72.
527 Ibid., 61.
528 Nelson, “Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta,” 325ff.
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writing that it is the duty of the interpreter to reveal, despite the presence of contradictions and 
ambivalences.529 An author's failure in the matter of “resolving antinomies” requires the 
interpreter to do so on his behalf.530 Nelson's criticism, then, is prompted by a line of thinking in 
the history of ideas in which “writers are first classified according to a model to which they are 
then expected to aspire.”531 Since “bhakti” and “Advaita Vedānta” are fundamentally at odds in 
metaphysical terms, Madhusūdana must be a bad Advaitin, or a bad bhakta, or a conflicted soul 
in search of philosophical clarity.
These are not so much methodological “errors” as they are incomplete approaches to a 
historical problematic. Neither Mishra nor Nelson is quite off-base. The history of bhakti in 
Advaita Vedānta does take a turn with Madhusūdana, and he does present many philosophical 
problems that can and should be evaluated as to their success or failure. But what if, instead of 
searching for philosophical consistency, we attempted to understand what Advaitic bhaktas were 
doing in writing as they did? What if the context for their sometimes radical shifts in the history 
of ideas lay outside the “classic” texts of the genre—say, in minor commentaries or performance 
poetry? What if they called into question the very coherence of the philosophical tradition in 
which they operated? What if we did not assume the coherence of that tradition to begin with?
In this chapter, I explore these issues in four parts. First, I review Madhusūdana 
529 This is admittedly uncharitable; Nelson's own view is more nuanced. See Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 
390: “Certainly both the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas and Madhusūdana were seeking some kind of ontological 
certification of bhakti. And so were at least some elements of the Vallabha tradition. To be sure, Madhusūdana’s 
attempt is made much more complicated by his commitment to advaitic presuppositions, so much so that it is 
difficult to decide whether or not he was successful, even in his own terms. I would not presume to have worked 
out a final estimate in so short a compass; much depends on one’s guess as to what exactly Madhusūdana was 
trying to accomplish in the BhR. But I think I have at least demonstrated how even one considered among the 
greatest of Advaitin polemicists was caught up in this movement.”
530 Skinner, Visions of Politics, 71.
531 Ibid., 69.
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Sarasvatī's later writings on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (BhP) for what it may tell us about the 
intellectual world into which he was moving toward the end of his career. Second, I discuss the 
intellectual history of Śāṇḍilya's Bhakti Sūtras (SBS), or the “Aphorisms on Bhakti.” In modern 
times, this text is frequently cited in support of the view that bhakti, as an object of theoretical 
inquiry, is set in opposition to jñāna and karma, represented by the disciplines of Vedānta and 
Mīmāṃsā respectively. Although it is quite plain that the SBS model themselves on their 
Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta predecessors, there have been surprisingly few studies of their intellectual 
history. In order to understand better the relationship of the SBS to the disciplines they seemingly 
recover and resist, however, we must look not merely to philosophical but also to historical 
context, which may reveal what the author was doing in composing the aphorisms. I recapitulate 
that context, and question the accepted chronology of the SBS.
Third, in the bulk of this chapter, I propose to study the links between Advaita Vedānta 
and bhakti with greater historical specificity through a commentary on the SBS by Nārāyaṇa 
Tīrtha, a protégé of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. In his Bhakticandrikā, or “Moonlight of Bhakti,” 
Nārāyaṇa appears to have gone farther than his predecessor in following the SBS' argument that 
Vedānta study should be subordinate to attaining bhakti. While this radical departure from 
classical Advaita Vedānta doctrine has been noticed previously,532 the mechanics of the shift 
remain to be addressed. I will discuss the logic of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's exegesis, and the ways in 
which it complicates a straightforward account of the compatibility or incompatibility of bhakti 
with Advaita Vedānta. Fourth, I situate Nārāyaṇa's interest in bhakti in the intellectual context of 
his broader writings, and in the social worlds of which he was a part. I will explore how 
532 Mishra, The Development and Place, 235-254.
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Nārāyaṇa drew bhakti into becoming a constitutive part of Yoga traditions, and how the idea of 
bhakti as an independent sphere of theological inquiry made a surprising cameo in the writings 
of a Śākta Śrīvidyā practitioner in the Tamil South. Ultimately, I suggest that, as historians of 
Indian philosophy, we can better understand the relationship between bhakti and Advaita by 
paying attention not only to a wider range of texts, but to the historical interventions they 
attempted to make.
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and the BhP
In her study of Madhusūdana's philosophy, Sanjukta Gupta offers a tentative chronology 
of his total oeuvre, which she divides into “philosophical” and “devotional” works.533 The list of 
devotional works is as follows: a commentary on the Mahimnastotra of Puṣpadanta, the 
Bhaktirasāyana, the Gūḍhārthadīpikā commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā, a commentary on the 
first verse of the BhP, and a commentary on the Harilīlāmṛta of Vopadeva.534 While the first three 
533 Gupta, Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism, 11.
534 The Harilīlāvyākhyā is difficult to pin down, chronologically or conceptually, being more or less a list of the 
chapter contents of the BhP. Gupta voices concern over Madhusūdana's authorship of the text, saying that “[t]he 
editors of this book...declare it to be the work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi without putting forward any 
evidence whatsoever to confirm this statement” (Ibid., 9). However, she accepts his authorship on the grounds 
that he points to his own commentary on the first verse of the BhP (Paramahaṃsapriyā), and that certain 
features presuppose the understanding of bhakti developed in the Bhaktirasāyana. Another possible clue that 
could locate the author of this commentary is his citation of the Puruṣottama Stuti, that perhaps refers to an 
unpublished praise-poem by Balabhadra Miśra, father of one Godāvara Miśra of Puri. See P.K. Gode, 
“Godāvaramiśra, the Rājaguru and Mantri of Gajapati Pratāparudradeva of Orissa and his Works—Between A.D. 
1497-1539,” in Studies in Indian Literary History, Vol. 1 (Bombay: Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavan, 1953), 470-478.
Unfortunately, none of this either confirms nor denies the possibility that Madhusūdana could be the author. I, for 
my part, do not see the symmetry between Madhusūdana's comments on bhakti here and those elsewhere, except 
for stray references to rati, the aesthetic emotion corresponding to the rasa of bhakti. References to the 
Paramahaṃsapriyā point not to his own work, but rather to a much earlier (now-lost) text that belonged to the 
world of Vopadeva himself; his contemporary Hemādri cites the text in his commentary on the Muktāphala. In 
fact, the sole reason that we call Madhusūdana's commentary on the first verse of the BhP the 
Paramahaṃsapriyā is that the editors gave it this appellation while appending it to the Harilīlāmṛtavyākhyā. 
Moreover, Madhusūdana was eager to import Advaita Vedānta discussions into his bhakti works, and that is only 
marginally true here. In his commentary on verses 12-13 of the twelfth chapter, he briefly mentions the concept 
of māyā as inexplicable (anirvācya), definitions of jīva and īśvara as constrained by limiting adjuncts (upādhi), 
and as different kinds of reflected consciousness (pratibimba). While all these were classic Advaita topics, they 
are not imports, but follow the logic of Vopadeva's verses. It says that our author was an Advaitin—possibly even 
196
are reasonably well-known, the last two have mostly slipped under the radar. Whether or not this 
is an appropriate conceptual bifurcation, I believe that his “devotional” works form an incipient 
project that, in the wake of his Bhaktirasāyana, sought to foreground the BhP as a source-text for 
Advaita Vedāntins. Indeed, Gupta's organization suggests a progression that mirrors that of the 
Devas in the previous chapter—namely, career Advaitins who later took up bhakti topics.535 The 
major difference, of course, is that while the Devas were married householders, Madhusūdana 
belonged to and wrote for a renunciate audience.536 To be sure, Madhusūdana was a rising star in 
the intellectual scene of sixteenth-century Banaras, possibly even to the point of being 
recognized at the Mughal court by Akbar's own advisors.537 But he belonged to a different 
constellation than his contemporaries, showing surprisingly little overlap with the Devas' 
concerns, as I have discussed in the previous chapter.
This curious disjuncture points to the diversity of Advaita Vedāntins in early modern 
India, even within a close radius. Some of the differences between them revolved precisely 
Hemādri himself—but not much more.
535 We hear echoes of Anantadeva's frustration with academic quibbling in the second verse of Madhusūdana's 
commentary on the BhP: “Day after day, this life is frittered away without reason, in the constant company of 
no-good people, and with one affliction after another. But when it is sprinkled with the nectar of God's stories, 
even a moment is worth living. That's why I have made this effort.”
anudinam idam āyuḥ sarvadāsatprasaṅgair
bahuvidhaparitāpaiḥ kṣīyate vyartham eva |
haricaritasudhābhiḥ sicyamānaṃ tad etat
kṣaṇam api saphalaṃ syād ity ayaṃ me śramo 'tra || 2 ||
See The Harilīlāmṛtam by Śrī Bopadeva with a commentary by Śrī Madhusūdana Saraswatī and Śrīmad 
Bhāgavata (First Śloka) with the Paramahaṃsapriyā commentary by the same commentator, ed. Parajuli Pandit 
Devi Datta Upadhyaya (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1933), 58.
536 On Madhusūdana's assumption that physical renunciation was a sine qua non for liberating Self-knowledge, see 
Roger Marcaurelle, Freedom Through Inner Renunciation: Śaṅkara's Philosophy in a New Light (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2000), 194-202.
537 Gupta, Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism, 6.
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around the authority of the BhP. As Christopher Minkowski has shown, the canonicity of the 
Vaiṣṇava BhP was a contested topic in early modern Banaras.538 Polemical texts with colorful 
titles (e.g., Smack on the Mouth of the Wicked) were hurled back and forth between scholars 
about whether the BhP “should be considered to belong in the same category with the other 
Purāṇas; to be more specific, whether it should be considered to be, as it claimed, a work 
composed by Vyāsa.”539 Arguments for and against the inclusion of this text, Minkowski shows, 
were made in properly philological mode, appealing to available citations, the reliability of 
wording, and the possibility of historical change.540 Some participants in these debates invoked 
the authority of their learned contemporaries and recent predecessors, including but not limited 
to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who belonged to “a decidedly Advaitin” scholarly public sphere.541
Madhusūdana's commentary on the first three verses of the BhP, which has mostly eluded 
scholarly attention, offers some indication of the variety of interpretive communities jockeying 
for position.542 He begins by reconstructing three different lines of interpretations of the first 
538 Christopher Minkowski, “I'll Wash Out Your Mouth With My Boot: A Guide to Philological Argument in 
Mughal-era Banaras,” in Epic and Argument in Sanskrit Literary History: Essays in honor of Robert P. Goldman 




542 Until recently only his commentary on the first verse had existed in printed form. See P.M. Modi, Translation of  
Siddhānta Bindu, being Madhusūdana's commentary on the Daśaśloki of Śrī Śaṃkarācārya (Allahabad: Vohra 
Publishers & Distributors, 1985), 43-45; Śrīmadbhāgavatam anekavyākhyāsamalaṅkṛtam, ed. Krishna Shankar 
Shastri (Ahmedabad: Śrībhāgavatavidyāpīṭha, 1965); The Harilīlāmṛtam by Śrī Bopadeva with a commentary by  
Śrī Madhusūdana Saraswatī and Śrīmad Bhāgavata (First Śloka) with the Paramahaṃsapriyā commentary by 
the same commentator, ed. Parajuli Pandit Devi Datta Upadhyaya (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 
1933). Recent manuscript evidence has brought to light his commentary on an additional two verses:
J = Ms. 4186, Pothikhana, Jaipur. 




verse, which he calls the aupaniṣada, the sātvata, and the kevalabhaktirasika. He spends the 
most time on the interpretation that appeals to the first of these (aupaniṣadāya rocate), which 
turns out to be a more or less mainstream Advaita Vedāntin. According to the aupaniṣada, not 
only does the first verse encode several references to the Brahma Sūtras,543 but each word offers 
an opportunity to expostulate on Vedāntic concepts. The word “supreme” (para) is taken to refer 
to the nondual Brahman that underlies all illusions (sarvabhramādhiṣṭhāna); the word “let us 
meditate” (dhīmahi) refers to the process of Vedāntic meditation (nididhyāsana); the word 
“imbrication [of elements]” (vinimaya) leads to a debate over theories of creation (pariṇāma- vs. 
vivarta-vāda); and a casual mention of “confounding the learned” (muhyanti yat sūrayaḥ) allows 
the Vedāntin to rail against his classic philosophical opponents: logicians (tārkika), atomists 
(vaiśeṣika), yogins (pātañjala), Śaivas (pāśupata), Mīmāṃsakas, and Sāṃkhyas.544 Most striking 
is this interpreter's ability to read into the verse a reference to the great statement (mahāvākya) of 
Vedānta, tat tvam asi. He uses the skills of bitextual reading (śleṣālaṅkāra) to construe the 
compounds in such a way that the verse could either refer to tat, Brahman, the infinite reality, or 
tvam, the limited individual (jīva), and ultimately communicate their identity (aikya), which is 
the final subject of the scripture.545
543 BhP 1.1.1:
janmādyasya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ svarāṭ
tene brahma hṛdā ya ādikavaye muhyanti yatsūrayaḥ |
tejovārimṛdāṃ yathā vinimayo yatra trisargo 'mṛṣā
dhāmnā svena sadā nirastakuhakaṃ satyaṃ paraṃ dhīmahi ||
The aupaniṣada believes that the verse adumbrates the first four aphorisms of the Brahma Sūtra, its first four 
chapters, and the twelve chapters of the BhP.
544 Madhusūdana's doxographical efforts have been discussed in Andrew Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism: 
Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 163-165.
545 The Harilīlāmṛtam...and Śrīmad Bhāgavata (First Śloka) with the Paramahaṃsapriyā commentary by the same 
commentator, 67: etad eva tatpadārthatvampadārthatadaikyakathanadvāreṇa śāstrasya viṣayo darśitaḥ | 
(henceforth cited as Paramahaṃsapriyā)
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The sātvatas, on the other hand, put forth a modified form of Pāñcarātra, the Āgamic 
scriptural tradition that provided the source texts for several Vaiṣṇava schools of Vedānta. 
Pāñcarātra was very close to early Advaita, for some a little too close. Śaṅkara himself probably 
belonged to a Vaiṣṇava milieu, and in his commentary on the heresiological section of the 
Brahma Sūtras (2.2.42), reserved his mildest criticism for the Pāñcarātra tradition. In this 
interpretation, the four emanations of the supreme Lord Viṣṇu—Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, 
Pradyumna, and Aniruddha—are mapped onto sections of the BhP's first verse. However, the 
sātvata insists that this not be taken for a mere Pāñcarātra theory of creation (prakriyā), 
according to which they represent four distinct principles (God, soul, mind, ego). Rather, in a 
Vedāntic twist, it is the very same Supreme Self who is called Vāsudeva when unfettered by 
limiting adjuncts (anupahita), and the other three when mixed with gross, subtle, and causal 
elements (sthūla-, sūkṣma-, kāraṇa-bhutopahita). The sātvata thus circumvents the Āgamic 
tradition and goes straight to the epic sources of Pāñcarātra, which appeal to purāṇic interpreters, 
perhaps even storytellers (paurāṇika).546
If he were following the practice of his scholarly contemporaries, Madhusūdana may 
have thought that he was saving the best for last, the kevalabhaktirasikas, “those who take 
delight in pure bhakti,” or “those who exclusively take delight in bhakti.” Here the subject of the 
entire BhP is Kṛṣṇa alone, the beloved of all, the most compassionate, the locus of bhaktirasa.547 
546 Ibid., 71: vistaraś cāsyāḥ prakriyāyā mokṣadharme nārāyaṇīyopākhyāna iti | tad etad vyākhyānaṃ paurāṇikāya 
rocate | Cf. Vishwa Adluri, “Philosophical Aspects of Bhakti in the Nārāyaṇīya,” in Papers of the 15th World  
Sanskrit Conference, ed. Adam Bowles et al. (Delhi: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, 2014), 127-154. The sātvata 
also refers to the “latter part” (uttarabhāga) of the Nṛsiṃhatāpanīya Upaniṣad, which, as I suggested in Chapter 
3, was important to the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta milieu of Lakṣmīdhara.
547 Paramahaṃsapriyā, 73: evaṃ ca sarvapriyatvena paramānandarūpaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiḥ sarvamohanaḥ 
sarvasukhapradaḥ sarvāparādhasahiṣṇuḥ sarvātmā paramakāruṇiko vidagdhataraś ca śrīkṛṣṇo 
bhaktirasālambanatvena sampūrṇagranthapratipādya iti dhvanitam |
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Madhusūdana briefly mentions that he has delved into this topic in more detail in the 
Bhaktirasāyana, and claims that he will have more to say later on (although he does not in the 
fragments of the commentary we possess).548 The kevalabhaktirasikas foreground the literary 
style of the BhP. Even if Kṛṣṇa is not directly mentioned, being a secret subject that escapes 
ordinary understanding, describing him by way of his attributes would appeal to those of 
aesthetic sensibility (ālaṅkārika).549 In a creative misreading of the verse's first words, it is Kṛṣṇa 
from whom (or in whom) the primary aesthetic emotion, love, comes into being for everyone.550 
Much has been made of the relationship between Madhusūdana's concept of bhaktirasa and that 
developed by his Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava contemporaries, Rūpa and Jīva Gosvāmin, but without firm 
conclusions as to the extent of their mutual influence.551 Here I will only note that by giving the 
kevalabhaktirasikas their own interpretive space, in a commentary on the BhP itself and not just 
in an independent treatise, Madhusūdana seems to have recognized the importance and scope of 
this line of thinking. This suggests to me that he belonged to a wider community of Advaitin 
commentators, rather than being a singular exception, as most histories of Indian philosophy 
would portray him.552
That there was a complex genealogy for Advaitin interpreters of the BhP, and not a 
seamless continuity from Śrīdhara and Lakṣmīdhara, is borne out in Madhusūdana's commentary 
548 Ibid., 73: bhaktirasānubhavaprakāraś ca sarvo 'py asmābhir bhaktirasāyana abhihitaḥ | atrāpi kiyān vakṣyate |
549 Ibid., 73: viśeṣaṇadvārā viśeṣyopasthitiś cālaṅkārikāya rocatetarām | sākṣād anabhidhānaṃ cātirahasyatvāt |
550 Ibid., 71: janmādyasya yata iti | yataḥ śrīkṛṣnāt yasmin śrīkṛṣṇe vā ādyasya ratibhāvasya premākhyasya janma 
bhavati sarveṣām iti śeṣaḥ |
551 See Nelson, “Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta,” 115-194; Nelson, “Bhakti Rasa for the Advaitin Renunciate”; Gupta, 
Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism, 119-144.
552 Recall the abbreviated discussion of bhaktirasa at the conclusion of Anantadeva II's Mathurāsetu, which I noted 
in Chapter 4. See note 497 above.
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on the second and third verses.553 This section has only recently made available from manuscript 
evidence; the following is the first critical reading I know of on that material. He begins by 
asking the classic question of śāstrārambha,554 the problem of whether it makes sense at all for 
the BhP to exist qua scripture, if its subject matter—be it knowledge of dharma, knowledge of 
the self, or devotional worship—has been dealt with previously in such texts as the Viṣṇupurāṇa, 
Brahma Sūtras, and Nārada Pāñcarātra.555 It is in order to answer this doubt, Madhusūdana 
says, that the second verse begins by explaining that the BhP communicates the best of all 
dharmas, stripped of any intent to deceive (projjhitakaitava).556 For example, even if the 
Mahābhārata lays claim to being a repository of the goals of human life, it is full of deception 
and trickery, unlike the BhP, which is primarily devoted to the “bhāgavata dharma.”557 This 
dharma, says Madhusūdana, is very different from varṇāśrama dharma, the Brahmanical codes 
of conduct appropriate to caste-classes and stages of life. Texts like the Viṣṇupurāṇa (3.8.8) 
would still make such codes incumbent on a devotee, while the BhP does away with all 
553 In other ways, however, Madhusūdana was demonstrably influenced by Śrīdhara. See Nelson, “The Ontology of 
Bhakti,” 383, n.114: “It appears that Madhusūdana’s system of eleven stages represents an expansion of a 
scheme found in BhP 1.5, as interpreted by Śrīdhara in his commentary, the Bhāvārthabodhinī (BhAB). Under 
BhP 1.5.34, Śrīdhara lists nine stages of bhakti, of which 1–8 correspond almost exactly to the first eight of 
Madhusūdana’s eleven.”
554 Cf. Walter Slaje, ed., Śāstrārambha: Inquiries into the Preamble in Sanskrit (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 
2008).
555 See L2, 1; J fl. 10r; V 12r: nanv idaṃ purāṇaṃ nārambhaṇīyaṃ, gatārthatvāt | taddhi dharmajñānārthaṃ vā 
ātmatattvajñārthaṃ vā upāsanārthaṃ vā syāt | tatra na prathamaḥ kalpaḥ viṣṇupurāṇādinā gatārthatvāt | na 
dvitīyaḥ caturlakṣaṇamīmāṃsayā siddheḥ | na tṛtīyaḥ nāradapāñcarātrādinā gatārthatvāt |
556 BhP 1.1.2:
dharmaḥ projjhitakaitavo 'tra paramo nirmatsarāṇāṃ satāṃ
vedyaṃ vāstavam atra vastu śivadaṃ tāpatrayonmūlanam |
śrīmadbhāgavate mahāmunikṛte kiṃ vā parair īśvaraḥ
sadyo hṛdy avarudhyate 'tra kṛtibhiḥ śuśrūṣubhis tatkṣanāt ||
557 L2, 2: ata āha projjhitakaitava iti | kaitavaṃ kapaṭaṃ yudhiṣṭhirādicaritavyājaḥ | tad bhāgavatatātparyakatve 'pi 
mahābhārate 'sti | na ca atra kaścid vyājo 'sti |
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restrictions.558 Curiously, though, Madhusūdana then states that this section of the text has an 
alternative title, the Paramahaṃsa Saṃhitā or “Liturgy of the Renunciate.” This is because 
compassion for all beings, the most important bhāgavata dharma, is an essential characteristic of 
the renunciate—precisely also the person who could, in the words of the verse, be “unenvious” 
and “saintly” (nirmatsarāṇāṃ satāṃ).559 This suggests, once again, a renunciate readership, 
different from but overlapping with the Devas. Whatever the possibility of that relationship, no 
such questions were raised by Śrīdhara or Lakṣmīdhara, the Devas' primary source of inspiration.
Nevertheless, like the Devas, Madhusūdana was clear that the reason the BhP was 
superlative among scriptures was its accessibility to everyday people:
The Pure Brahman called Vāsudeva, the highest goal of human life, can somehow be 
understood only by renunciates of the highest order from the three (upper) caste-classes, 
in search of liberation, by means of their study of the Brahma Sūtras. That [Brahman] can 
also be known by women, Śūdras, etc., in and through this text—hence its extraordinary 
excellence. This is so because they are disqualified from studying the Brahma Sūtras by 
the sūtras themselves. Moreover, the less bright among the three caste-classes cannot 
enter into the difficult logical tangles therein. Here [in the BhP], however, that  
[Brahman] is described over and over again in lovely language, with words that make 
evident its joyous relish (rasa). Therefore, it is appropriate [for the BhP] to say that 
knowledge of Brahman is available to everyone: slow-witted, average, and highly 
qualified.560
558 Ibid., 3: praśabdena viṣṇupurāṇādibhir agatārthatvaṃ sūcayati | tatra hi sarvātmanā na kaitavaṃ projjhitaṃ 
“varṇāśramācāravatā puruṣeṇa paraḥ pumān | viṣṇur ārādhyate panthāḥ nānyat tattoṣakāraṇam ||” ityādinā 
bhāgavatadharmāṇām api varṇāśramasāpekṣatvakathanāt | atra tu...bhāgavatadharmāṇām 
anyanirapekṣatvapratipādanāt prakarṣeṇa kaitavam ujjhitam iti |
559 Ibid., 4: nirmatsarāṇām ity anena sarvabhūtānukampāyā bhāgavatadharmeṣv atiśayatvaṃ darśayati | [...] ata 
evāyaṃ granthaḥ paramahaṃsasaṃhitā iti samākhyāyate, sarvabhūtābhayadānaṃ vinā paramahaṃsatvābhāvāt | 
Madhusūdana was probably referring to BhP 1.4.31, in which Vyāsa wonders if he is depressed because he has 
failed to describe those bhāgavata dharmas that are so dear to paramahaṃsas, who are themselves dear to God:
kiṃ vā bhāgavatā dharmā na prāyeṇa nirūpitāḥ |
priyāḥ paramahaṃsānāṃ ta eva hy acyutapriyāḥ ||
560 L2, 5: evaṃ ca, yat paramapuruṣārthabhūtaṃ śuddhaṃ brahma vāsudevākhyaṃ caturlakṣaṇamīmāṃsayā vicārya 
mumukṣubhis traivarṇikaiḥ paramahaṃsaparivrājakair eva kathaṃcit vedanīyaṃ, tad atra strīśūdrādibhir api 
vedituṃ śakyam iti mahān atiśayaḥ | strīśūdrādīnāṃ caturlakṣaṇamīmāṃsāśravaṇe 'nadhikārasya tatraiva 
vyutpāditatvāt | mandamatīnāṃ ca traivarṇikānāṃ tādṛśadurūhatarkeṣv apraveśāt | iha tu tat tādṛśarasavyañjakair 
eva śabdaiḥ komaloktyā bhūyobhūyaḥ pratipādanāt mandamadhyamottamānāṃ sarveṣāṃ brahmavedanaṃ 
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Immediately after this concession, however, Madhusūdana raises a revealing problem:
One may doubt that if this were the case, then [the BhP] could be considered just the 
same as those works by modern-day poets (abhinavakavi) which talk about Brahman, 
since women, Śūdras, and the like, are able to listen to them. In response, the verse 
clarifies that [the BhP] was “composed by the great sage (Vyāsa).”561
The reader is compelled to wonder who these “newfangled poets” might be, if anything more 
than the generic straw-men that pepper Sanskrit intellectual writing. If their compositions were 
available to “women and Śūdras,” the classic formula for those outside the pale of Brahmanical 
discourse, it is unlikely that they would have been in Sanskrit, at least according to the language 
ideology that underpins the use of the term. Could they be the vernacular nirguṇi poet-saints of 
early modern Banaras, uttering absolute truths in direct, unmediated, confrontational style? Does 
Madhusūdana's re-centering of the BhP suggest an upper-caste anxiety about the proliferation of 
subaltern song? Or was it a more general resistance to vernacular versions of the BhP?562 Does 
the language of religion, at least in this case, bear directly on the problem of caste and gender? 
Perhaps it is farfetched to consider the motive counter-revolutionary, or even directly related to 
issues on the ground, but attempts to reassert caste hierarchy will resurface in Sanskrit scholastic 
writing on bhakti further on in this study.
My aim here has been to show the diversity of opinions in early modern Advaitic circles 
yuktam iti bhāvaḥ |
561 Ibid., 5: nanv evaṃ saty abhinavakavikāvyasyāpi brahmapratipādakasya strīśūdrādiśravaṇayogyatvena 
etattulyatā syād ity āsaṅkya āha mahāmunikṛte iti |
562 Cf. Hawley, A Storm of Songs, 71-2: “I can well imagine how this remarkable profusion of Bhāgavatas by the 
late seventeenth century in north India—and the performative mêlée that it implies—might have produced a 
certain anxiety in groups of Brahmins who understood the Bhāgavata Purāṇa to be their own special domain. 
And then there is the social component....A Gujarati named Keśav Kāyasth had composed a Kṛṣṇakrīḍākāvya in 
the late fifteenth century....Against this polyglot, poly-caste backdrop, did certain Brahmins want to reassert their 
own particular capacities and training—and thereby reassert the power of the original text?”
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regarding the BhP, as exemplified by some little-studied writings of a famous Advaitin 
philosopher. But the “great man” version of Indian philosophy often obscures more than it 
reveals. To see Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as the best and last Advaitic devotee is to prioritize 
philosophical popularity over historical understanding. For that we must turn not to the canonical 
works of major figures, but to those on the margins of the classical.
Ś  āṇḍilya's  Bhakti Sūtra  s  
In his essay attempting to prove the influence of Christianity on Hindu bhakti, the British 
scholar-administrator G.A. Grierson thought that the Śāṇḍilya Bhakti Sūtras (SBS) were 
important enough to merit an appendix with a summary of their contents.563 He brought up the 
SBS immediately after his famous turn of phrase regarding bhakti as the “flash of lightning” that 
came upon the darkness of Indian religion, that, when translated into Hindi by Hazariprasad 
Dvivedi, contributed to the idea of the “bhakti movement.”564 Grierson called this “official 
textbook” of bhakti a “modern Sanskrit treatise.” What he meant by “modern,” however, was 
anything that exhibited what he believed to be “decisively Christian” influences, such as the 
writings of Rāmānuja and Viṣṇusvāmī, which belonged to “the more modern phases of the 
doctrine.”565 To be sure, the SBS, together with the later Nārada Bhakti Sūtras, did become 
canonical—that is, representative of the doctrine of bhakti, just like the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta 
Sūtras before them—at a particular “modern” historical moment. But this was by and large a 
colonial modern, part of the interaction between Orientalist scholars, Christian missionaries, and 
563 G.A. Grierson, “Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the Nestorians,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 39.2 
(1907): 311-335.
564 See Hawley, A Storm of Songs, 51-52.
565 Grierson, “Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the Nestorians,” 314-317.
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Hindu apologists in British India.566 Understanding their full impact on Indian intellectual 
history, however, requires attention to their precolonial life. How popular were the SBS among 
Sanskrit exegetes? Who were they? In what context were the aphorisms composed, and what was 
their relationship with the sūtra traditions they invoked? And first and foremost, how old were 
the SBS, really?
Historians of Indian philosophy, whether writing in English, Hindi, or Sanskrit, have 
tended to place them around the turn of the first millennium CE.567 This claim, or rather, this 
guess, is largely based on three correlations: First, the SBS' conceptual proximity to the 
Bhagavata Purana; second, the name of Sandilya as a recognized authority on devotional worship 
(upasana) from the early Upanisads; and third, a supposed commentary on the aphorisms 
attributed to the eleventh-century Srīvaisnava theologian Ramanuja. Let us consider them one by 
566 Grierson himself relied on the edition of the sūtras produced by James Ballantyne (1861) and subsequent 
translation by E.B. Cowell (1878). Ballantyne's edition of the text was prompted by an earlier series of essays on 
Christianity contrasted with Hindu philosophy, in the preface to which he remarked: “There are some Sanskrit 
works, yet untranslated, which the writer must study before deciding upon his theological terminology for India. 
Among these works is the Aphorisms of Sāndilya. Sāndilya rejects the Hindū (gnostic) theory that knowledge is 
the one thing needful, and contends that knowledge is only the handmaiden of faith. Hence, however defective 
his views may be in other respects, his work seems to provide phraseology of which a Christian missionary may 
advantageously avail himself. This remark might form the text for an extended dissertation on the Christian's 
right to the theological language and the theological conceptions of his opponents.” See James Ballantyne, 
Christianity Contrasted with Hindu Philosophy (London: James Madden, 1858), iii-iv.
On Ballantyne's pedagogical attempts to employ Sanskrit-based education as a tool for the propagation of 
Christianity among the learned Hindu elite, see Michael Dodson, “Re-Presented for the Pandits: James 
Ballantyne, 'Useful Knowledge,' and Sanskrit Scholarship in Benares College during the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century,” Modern Asian Studies 36.2 (2002): 257-298.
567 See, e.g., Suvīrā Rainā, Nāradīya evaṃ Śāṇḍilya-bhaktisūtroṃ kā tulanātmaka adhyayana: bhakti ke  
ādyapravartaka ācāryoṃ ke bhakti-sūtroṃ tathā unase prabhāvita bhakti sampradāyoṃ kā prāmāṇika vivecana 
(Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1989); Śāṇḍilya Bhakti-Sūtra with Bhakticandrikā by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, ed. Baldev 
Upadhyaya (Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1967), 1-23.
However, cf. Gupta, Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism, 121: “There are two famous Bhakti-sūtras - the Śāṇḍilya-
bhakti-sūtra (ŚBhS) and the Nārada-bhakti-sūtra (NBhS). We can infer that the ŚBhS preceded the NBhS because 
while the latter refers to the former with some reverence a number of times, there is no mention of NBhS in the 
ŚBhS. Like the BhP and BhG, these two are sometimes taken as authoritative works on bhakti. I take up these 
two Bhakti-sūtras, not because of their antiquity, (they are obviously late and certainly later than BhP), but 
because they have made an attempt to introduce bhakti as a Śāstra in the model of the six Darśana.”
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one. The first is the easiest to substantiate; the sūtras do indeed exhibit significant inspiration 
from the BhP.568 But this does not make them co-eval. Śāṇḍilya, for his part, lives what Steven 
Lindquist calls a “literary life,”569 devotional worship being his leitmotif across different 
contexts. Even leaving aside the fact that Vedic upāsanā looks very different from Bhāgavata 
bhakti, it appears that attributing authorship of the Bhakti Sūtras to Śāṇḍilya fulfilled a narrative 
agenda. In other words, marshaling a figure known to be associated with devotional worship 
invested the concepts of the SBS with both antiquity and authority. This was a common practice 
of historical memory in premodern South Asia, and was likely employed here. As for Rāmānuja, 
the only evidence for his purported commentary comes courtesy of an indirect citation from a 
seventeenth century commentary on the text. I will discuss the relevant passage further on, but 
simply note here that is not at all clear that an actual text is being cited, nor can the lack of 
historical memory of such a work as the SBS within Śrīvaiṣṇava circles be attributed to sheer 
negligence.
In fact, one is hard-pressed to find any knowledge at all of the aphorisms for much of 
Sanskrit intellectual history. Even the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, probably the most significant 
proponents of bhakti as a sphere of independent theological inquiry, seem to have made no 
mention of the sūtras in any of their works.570 The most well-known commentator on the SBS, 
568 In his impressive précis of Indian religious literature, J.N. Farquhar suggested that the SBS may be of 
Nimbārkite origin, but provided hardly any evidence to back this up. See J.N. Farquhar, An Outline of the  
Religious Literature of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), 233-234, 240.
569 Steven Lindquist, “Literary Lives and a Literal Death: Yājñavalkya, Śākalya, and an Upaniṣadic Death 
Sentence,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 79.1 (2011): 33-57.
570 See S.K. De, Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal (Calcutta: Firma K.L. 
Mukhopadhyay, 1961), 111-165 (on the six Gosvāmins of Brindavan), 201-203 (on the works cited in Rūpa 
Gosvāmin's Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu), 220-221 (works cited in Rūpa's Ujjvalanīlamaṇi), and 413-421 (works cited 
in Jīva Gosvāmin's Ṣaṭsandarbha).
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the seventeenth-century scholar Svapneśvara, may have had a faint, if oblique, connection to the 
Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas. He presents himself as the grandson of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, a famous 
scholar whom Gauḍīya hagiographers claimed as a convert to Caitanya's movement. But 
Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma's writings are limited to the subjects of Navya Nyāya and Advaita 
Vedānta, and Svapneśvara's commentary betrays no affinity to Caitanya's theology whatsoever.571 
In fact, it is more probable that he belonged to an Advaita Vedānta milieu, though he departs 
significantly from Advaita doctrines in the course of his commentary.572
As far as I can tell, the first public appearance of the SBS coincides with their first extant 
commentaries in the seventeenth century—perhaps when the sūtras themselves were composed. 
In previous chapters, I have demonstrated the increasing influence of the BhP on writing in the 
disciplines of Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries 
CE. From Mīmāṃsaka arguments that the genre of purāṇa possessed Vedic scriptural authority 
to internecine polemic between theistic and non-theistic Advaitins, scholars in this period 
debated the appropriate scope of the BhP in the realm of hermeneutics and philosophical 
theology. They also made use of other theistic scriptures that accorded to themselves the 
571 Ibid., 89, n.1.
572 Svapneśvara is difficult to place in more ways than one. His father's name, Jaleśvara, suggests a Śaiva 
background, but he comments on a text that later became important to Vaiṣṇavas. He seems to be an Advaitin, 
referring in his commentary on SBS 1.2.14 to jñāna as “the unity between Ātman and Brahman” 
(brahmātmaikya), but never identifies himself as such and often runs contrary to Advaita orthodoxy. For 
example, he begins his commentary by saying that liberation is achieved when individuals (jīvāḥ) achieve 
Brahman, from whom they are totally non-different (atyantam abhinnā). The everyday experience of saṃsāra, 
therefore, is not inherent (sāhajika), but is created by the conditioning adjunct (upādhi) that is the inner faculties 
made of the three guṇas, just like a crystal is seen as “red” when a flower is placed next to it. So far, the account 
sounds Advaitin, to the point of referring to a simile used famously by Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī on 
Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras (1.1.1). However, he follows with some rather un-Advaitin claims. 
Since saṃsāra is conditional, it cannot be removed by ātmajñāna, but instead only by either removing the 
conditioning itself, the object of conditioning, or the relationship between them. That requires something else—
something called bhakti for God. After all, saṃsāra is quite real (satya), and cannot be wished away. How 
Svapneśvara fits into the larger history of the SBS is a topic that requires further research. See The Aphorisms of  
Śāṇḍilya with the Commentary of Swapneśwara, ed. J.R. Ballantyne (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1861), 1-3.
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authority and the sobriquet of Upaniṣad, the Gopāla-, Rāma-, and Nṛsiṃha-Tāpanīya, as well as 
the Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa. Taken together, these trends seem to have eventuated in the SBS: a 
new set of ancient aphorisms to rival the old guard, intrusive entrants into a scholastic field that 
bristled at the thought of bhakti occupying a theoretical space alongside jñāna and karma.
The SBS do more than simply find bhakti a seat at the table; they herald its supremacy. 
After having defined bhakti as “supreme love for God” (parānuraktir īśvare), SBS 1.1.3-5 claim 
that one who is absorbed (saṃstha) in love for God finds immortality; that absorption cannot 
mean jñāna, since one can know God's glory and still hate him; and finally, in no uncertain terms, 
that jñāna pales before bhakti.573 It does not even allow, like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, that jñāna 
and bhakti could be independent paths to liberation undertaken by differentially qualified people. 
According to SBS 1.2.7, there is simply no contest, no open option (vikalpa) between the two. 
Svapneśvara comments, without a trace of discomfort, that
Because it has been determined that jñāna is a subordinate element (aṅga), there is no 
scope for the position that there is an option between jñāna and bhakti. After all, there is 
no equal choice between two elements in hierarchical relation. The word “also” (api) 
indicates that a synthesis, too, [is inappropriate].574
But what seemed straightforward to Svapneśvara was not nearly so clear-cut to his rough 
contemporary, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. He reconstructed a salient objection, supported by several 
textual sources, that two routes (mārgadvaya) should be open to two different kinds of aspirants. 
His response suggests that he found it troubling that the author of the sūtras could dismiss the 
entirety of Vedānta study: “Even if it makes good sense to propose this option (vikalpa), the 
573 SBS 1.1.3-1.1.5: tatsaṃsthasyāmṛtopadeśatvāt. jñānam iti cen na dviṣato 'pi jñānasya tad asaṃsthiteḥ. 
tayopakṣayāc ca.
574 See The Aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya with the Commentary of Swapneśwara, 17: etena vikalpo 'pi pratyuktaḥ || etena 
jñānasyāṅgatvanirṇayena jñānabhaktyor atra vikalpapakṣo 'pi pratyuktaḥ, nirākṛta iti mantavyam | na hy 
aṅgāṅginor ekatra vikalpo bhavatīti | apiśabdāt samuccayo 'pīti |
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author of the sūtras doesn't see it that way [...] He will demonstrate everywhere that jñāna is 
totally unnecessary.”575 Here and elsewhere, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha brings his own unique concerns 
into his commentary on the SBS, which sometimes depart from the text, and sometimes 
refashion the very hermeneutical traditions in which he worked. In the following section, I 
explore what happens when a self-proclaimed Advaita Vedāntin reads the SBS, and what more it 
may reveal about the complex, shifting terrain of Advaita in early modern India.
Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and the Moonlight of Bhakti
There are a number of Nārāyaṇa Tīrthas in the seventeenth century. Ko Endo has 
attempted to distinguish at least two, based on the evidence of manuscript colophons and their 
teaching lineages.576 The first Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, pupil of Vāsudeva Tīrtha and Rāmagovinda 
Tīrtha, and author of the Bhakticandrikā commentary on the SBS, boasts an impressive 
scholastic resume and variety of disciplinary expertise, including the Yogasiddhāntacandrikā on 
the Yoga Sūtras, the Nyāyacandrikā on Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana's Bhāṣāpariccheda, and the 
Sāṃkhyacandrikā on Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikā. The other Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, pupil of 
Śivarāmatīrtha, composed the famous Kṛṣṇalīlātaraṅgiṇī, a Sanskrit dance-drama popular in the 
Tamil South, where he is supposed to have settled after moving from Andhra.577 While the two 
575 Śāṇḍilya Bhakti-Sūtra with Bhakticandrikā by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, ed. Baladeva Upādhyāya (Varanasi: Varanaseya 
Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1967), 84 (henceforth cited as Bhakticandrikā): yadyapi vikalpa ucitas tathā 'pi 
sūtrakṛtā nādṛtaḥ [...] sarvatra jñānānāvaśyakatāṃ vakṣyati sūtrakāraḥ |
He repeats this uncomfortable relationship to the author of the sūtras in his commentary on SBS 2.2.29, where 
he reiterates his support for the “two paths to liberation” theory, but concedes that the SBS exclusively prefers 
bhakti to jñāna, its subordinate (Ibid., 234-5): tasmāt siddhaṃ mokṣe mārgadvayam evety asmākīnaḥ panthāḥ | 
[...] sūtrakṛnmate tu bhaktiyoga evaiko mokṣamārgaḥ, jñānaṃ tu mokṣasādhanam eva, na mārgāntaram | He also 
spends a fair bit of time trying to reconcile the rather realist sūtras in SBS 2.1.5-16 with Advaita Vedānta 
doctrine. (Ibid., 124-9).
576 Ko Endo, “The works and flourishing period of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the author of the Yogasiddhāntacandrikā.” 
Sambhāṣā 14 (1993): 41-60.
577 See V. Raghavan, The Power of the Sacred Name (Bloomington: World Wisdom Press, 2011), 75-82; B. 
Natarajan, Sri Krishna Leela Tarangini by Narayana Tirtha, Volume I (Madras: Mudgala Trust, 1988), 56-169. It 
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seem to have been different, there remain some suspicious overlaps. First, and most obvious, 
both composed Sanskrit bhakti works, if in different genres. Second, both were Advaita 
Vedāntins with Śaiva ties. And third, both can be connected with the Sanskrit intellectual life of 
the Banaras region. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, pupil of Śivarāmatīrtha, wrote a primer on Mīmāṃsā, the 
Bhāṭṭabhāṣāprakāśikā, and is supposed to have been the Mīmāṃsā teacher of Nīlakaṇṭha 
Caturdhara, the Banaras-based commentator on the Mahābhārata. Moreover, manuscripts of the 
Kṛṣṇalīlātaraṅgiṇī, with Sanskrit commentaries in Grantha script, have also been found in 
Banaras.578 Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, pupil of Rāmagovinda Tīrtha, had a close relationship to none other 
than Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. He quoted liberally from Madhusūdana's Bhaktirasāyana in his 
Bhakticandrikā, referring to him fondly as “the old man” (vṛddha) and “the teacher” (ācārya). 
This Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha also wrote a commentary (Laghuvyākhyā) on Madhusūdana's 
Siddhāntabindu, which was expanded upon by his student Gauḍa Brahmānanda, who also 
commented on Madhusūdana's Advaitasiddhi, suggesting a kind of teaching lineage. None of this 
necessarily means that either Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha was based in Banaras. We know of the 
is also likely that he was the composer of a Telugu drama called the Pārijātaharaṇa Nāṭaka, since the 
Kṛṣṇalīlātaraṅgiṇī was especially popular among performance traditions centered around pārijāta narratives. 
See Davesh Soneji, “Performing Satyabhāmā: Text, Context, Memory and Mimesis in Telugu-speaking South 
India” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2004), 54-55. It is possible that this Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha also composed one or 
two Advaita works: the Pañcīkaraṇavārtikavivaraṇa (with the autocommentary Dīpikā), and the Subodhinī 
commentary on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the first four aphorisms of the Brahma Sūtras. According to Guruswamy 
Sastrigal's Tamil commentary on the Kṛṣṇalīlātaraṅgiṇī, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha invoked his preceptor Śivarāmatīrtha 
in the Subodhinī by each word in his name: “Śiva” signifying nonduality (advaitaṃ śivam), the sublation of 
difference; “Rāma” being the consciousness-self in which the liberated revel (ramante); and “Tīrtha” being the 
holy place/person to which others belonging to the monastic community attend (tīrthāgraṇīsevitam). See 
Natarajan, Sri Krishna Leela Tarangini, 105:
advaitaṃ śivam ity ataś śivapadaṃ saṃśāntabhedaṃ tu yat
yasmin rāmapade cidātmani sukhe siddhā ramante 'niśam |
tat tīrthaṃ paramārthatas suviditaṃ tīrthāgraṇīsevitaṃ
seve śrīśivarāmatīrtham atulaṃ kaivalyam asmadgurum ||
578 See Raghavan, The Power of the Sacred Name, 81.
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Kṛṣṇalīlātaraṅgiṇī's southern popularity, and by the time of the seventeenth century, 
Madhusūdana was well-known in the south for his Advaitasiddhi, written in riposte to the 
Mādhva Vyāsatīrtha's Nyāyāmṛta.579 Moreover, as I will demonstrate, the author of the 
Bhakticandrikā was very interested in responding to the challenge of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, but whether 
this was a particularly southern or northern problem is a debate I open up further on.
Whatever the final identity of this Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, it is his relationship with 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī that concerns me in this section, given their interests in the intersection 
of bhakti and Advaita Vedānta. At first blush it seems that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (henceforth, NT) 
simply rebroadcasts his predecessor's unique thinking on the subject, but the differences are 
enough to warrant further investigation. In the course of his Bhakticandrikā, or “Moonlight of 
Bhakti” commentary on SBS 1.1.2, NT raises a direct objection to the whole idea that bhakti is 
possible for Advaitins at all. If God is no different from the individual, says this opponent, it 
makes no sense for him to have bhakti towards himself. This is a common enough problem, but 
NT's response veers into uncharted territory:
Reply: You are confused. Advaitic knowledge offers no obstruction to the particular kind 
of love that is bhakti.
Objection: But isn't knowledge of [God's] grandeur (māhātmya) the cause of bhakti? If 
we cannot differentiate God, who always achieves his purpose, from the individual, who  
579 Recall Bodhendra's mention of “Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, author of the Advaitasiddhi,” in Chapter 3. In his 
Nyāyaratnāvalī, Gauḍa Brahmānanda also refers to the famous South Indian Advaitin Appayya Dīkṣita's 
Vedāntakalpataruparimala. See T.M.P. Mahadevan, ed., Preceptors of Advaita (Secunderabad: Sri Kanchi 
Kamakoti Sankara Mandir, 1968), 323. However, this is not conclusive evidence that Brahmānanda himself was 
a southerner, since Appayya was known in Banaras by the late seventeenth century, when Brahmānanda was 
writing. Cf. Minkowski, “I'll Wash Out Your Mouth With My Boot,” 124-125; Yigal Bronner, “South meets 
North: Banaras from the perspective of Appayya Dīkṣita,” South Asian History and Culture 6.1 (2015): 10-31. 
That there was a rapid circulation of manuscripts and communication between Sanskrit intellectuals north and 
south by this time has been amply demonstrated by Elaine Fisher, who points out that the Banarasi Mīmāṃsaka 
Ananta Bhaṭṭa personally sent a copy of his Śāstramālāvyākhyāna to Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita in Madurai. See Elaine 
Fisher, “A New Public Theology: Sanskrit and Society in Seventeenth-century South India” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 2013), 48-49.
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consistently misses the mark and possesses innumerable flaws, then to deny God's 
grandeur is to vitiate the possibility of bhakti predicated on one's understanding of it.
Reply: You've completely misunderstood the point. “Grandeur” means a weight of 
qualities, which in turn means truth, knowledge and bliss (as we understand from 
Brahma Sūtra 3.3.12). Advaita does not simply constitute the plenitude that is one's own 
nature. Therefore, Advaitic knowledge, by way of the knowledge of grandeur, is itself the 
cause of complete love for that undifferentiated object. So how can it obstruct bhakti? 
Even if these qualities are conceived of as empirical...knowledge of [God's] grandeur is 
still not annulled for Advaitins. Instead, that love which, assisted by the unseen traces [of 
previous lives], begins with desolation (hāni) and culminates in dissolution (galita),580
causes one to forget every creation of the phenomenal world. The only qualitative 
difference between pure awakening and bhakti is that in the former, the distractions of 
hunger and so forth remain, while in the latter, they too disappear.581
Until this point in his commentary, NT has been reconstructing almost verbatim a passage from 
Madhusūdana's Bhaktirasāyana (1.7). Here, however, he appears to import a completely 
different discussion, absent from Madhusūdana's treatise, about the knowledge of God's grandeur 
(māhātmya), a definition of bhakti found in the works of Vallabhācārya and in stray Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇava references.582 Most striking, he rereads Advaitic knowledge as being totally subordinate 
580 NT refers here to his previous breakdown of prema, or love, into fifteen stages: upta, patta, lalita, milita, kalita, 
chalita, calita, krānta, vikrānta, saṃkrānta, vihṛta, [saṃhṛta, which he inexplicably fails to discuss], galita, and 
saṃtṛpta. As far as I can tell this typology is unprecedented, and bears no resemblance to any other.
581 Bhakticandrikā, 27: nanv asmin mate kathaṃ paramātmani bhaktiḥ sambhavati ? jīvābhinne tasmin svasminn 
eva bhaktyayogāt | na hi svasminn eva bhaktir upapadyata iti cet | bhrānto 'si; snehaviśeṣarūpāyāṃ bhaktāv 
advaitajñānasyāpratibandhakatvāt | nanu māhātmyajñānaṃ bhaktau kāraṇam 
asatyasaṅkalpādyanekadoṣāśrayajīvābhede ca paramātmanas tatprasaktyā satyasaṅkalpatvādimāhātmyasya 
bādhena tadbhānapūrvā bhaktiḥ pratibadhyeta eva iti cet | abhiprāyam ajñātavān asi | yato māhātmyaṃ 
guṇagarimā guṇāś ca “ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya” iti nyāyena satyajñānānandāḥ, na tu pūrṇatvādayaḥ 
svarūpātmakā evādvaitaghaṭitā ity advaitajñānaṃ māhātmyajñānavidhayā'khaṇḍārthe santṛptapremṇi kāraṇam 
eva iti tat kathaṃ bhaktau pratibandhaṃ syāt | satyasaṅkalpādayas tu guṇāḥ sāttvikaprakṛtimūlatayā vyāvahārikā 
apy upādhinā jīvād bhinna eva īśe abhimatā iti, tatrāpi māhātmyasya bādho na sambhavaty advaitinām | api tu 
hānipūrvikā galitāntā prītiḥ saṃskārādṛṣṭasacivā yā punaḥ prapañcajātam eva vismārayati | iyāṃs tu viśeṣaḥ 
kevalabodhe 'śanādivikṣepo na nivartate, bhaktau so 'pi nivartata iti |
582 See Vallabha's Tattvārthadīpa, quoted in Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV, 347, n.1:
māhātmyajñānapūrvas tu sudṛḍhaḥ sarvato 'dhikaḥ |
sneho bhaktir iti proktaḥ tayā muktir na cānyathā ||
In his Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu (BRS), Rūpa Gosvāmin attributes this verse to the Nārada Pāñcarātra. See BRS 
1.4.12: a) for -pūrva read -yukta; d) for muktir na cānyathā read sāṛṣṭyādi nānyathā. Gianni Pellegrino claims 
that, based on his commentary on the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman (II.51, I.62, and I.220), Madhusūdana 
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to bhakti. Even Madhusūdana does not go this far, instead according analogous, non-intersecting 
spaces to jñāna and bhakti. There are those who prefer (and are capable of) attaining liberation 
through knowledge, while others prefer absorption in divine love. In this respect Madhusūdana is 
unorthodox and innovative, no doubt, but not as radical as some previous commentators have 
suggested.583 The source of this objection is also important. NT directs his response at “the 
knew of Vallabha's works. See Gianni Pellegrino, “'Old is Gold!' Madhusūdana's Way of Referring to Earlier 
Textual Tradition,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 43.2-3 (2015): 283, n.15. However, a brief perusal of the verses 
in question yields no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. In fact, that NT quoted this definition at all 
exemplifies his departure from Madhusūdana, who eschewed discussion of God's māhātmya entirely. See 
Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 382: “He must of course specify what he means here by ‘knowledge of the 
Lord’. Is it reverent awareness of God’s greatness (māhātmya-jñāna), as in Vallabha’s definition of bhakti? 
Although such an understanding of knowledge might be expected in a devotional treatise, it is not what 
Madhusūdana has in mind.”
583 See Nelson, “Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta,” 185-198, 504-506; Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 383-384. In my 
view, Nelson reads a little too much into Madhusūdana's valorizations of bhakti over jñāna. The first instance is 
Madhusūdana's commentary on Bhaktirasāyana 1.32-4, in the course of which Madhusūdana claims that bhakti 
is predicated on knowledge followed by disenchantment (jñānavairāgyapūrvikā). Nelson (“Bhakti in Advaita 
Vedānta,” 190) believes that his definition of jñāna is “clearly the Advaitins' direct realization of Brahman.” He 
adduces further proof from Madhusūdana's typology of the eleven “grounds” (bhūmikās) of bhakti, of which the 
“understanding of one's true nature” (svarūpādhigati) forms only the sixth (Ibid., 192ff.). Finally, he asserts that 
Madhusūdana's definition of the “knowledge of the Lord” that precedes the highest levels of devotion “retains all 
the characteristics of the Advaitins' realization of the Supreme” (Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 383).
However, it is not clear that what Madhusūdana means by jñāna, or “knowledge,” in these contexts is the 
immediate realization of the nondual Self that results in liberation. As for the first instance, his descriptions 
suggest that jñāna is an intellectual (or perhaps existential) understanding of the transient illusoriness of the 
phenomenal world, and the truth of God's nondual reality. This understanding in turn gives rise to 
disenchantment, and thereupon bhakti.
On a closer reading of Nelson's second point, the svarūpādhigati of the eleven stages of bhakti need not be 
“practically the same as the Brahma-vidyā of the Advaita school” (Cf. Gupta, Advaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism, 
132). Madhusūdana does use the word sākṣātkāra, the “direct apprehension” of the inner Self, in referring to this 
stage, but the term is qualified with the clause “as distinct from the gross and subtle bodies” 
(sthūlasūkṣmadehadvayātiriktatvena). This could very well be a propaedeutic technique, preparing the 
groundwork for, but not actually culminating in, nondual knowledge (abhedajñāna). His language is ambiguous 
enough to allow for a similar distinction between the existential understanding and phenomenological experience 
of nondual knowledge.
Third and finally, Madhusūdana defines “knowledge of the Lord” (bhagavatprabodha), the realization that must 
come prior to the highest levels of devotion, as follows (Trans. Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 383): 
“Everything other than Bhagavān, because it is transient, is false (māyika) like a dream. It is devoid of true 
significance, painful, and to be shunned. Bhagavān alone is real; He is the supreme Bliss, self-luminous, eternal, 
the one to be sought after. This is the kind of knowledge spoken of.” Once again, nothing in this definition 
necessitates that such prabodha is anything more than an intellectual awareness, that allows the devotee to attain 
true bhakti. This is not to say that it cannot be interpreted as an experiential awareness, but Madhusūdana seems 
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ideological claims of dualists and the rash judgments of certain Advaitins who say that bhakti is 
incompatible with Advaita.”584 According to NT, the challenge of bhakti was not only external, 
but internal to the Advaitin interpretive community. Notwithstanding the development of Advaita 
Vedānta as a “large-tent” system of philosophical theology in early modern India,585 the example 
of NT questions how coherent that community might have been.
NT continues to challenge orthodoxies further on. In his commentary on SBS 1.1.5, 
which asserts that jñāna is subordinate to bhakti, NT redefines the very character of liberation:
In truth (vastutas tu),586 even though ignorance is only destroyed by means of 
knowledge, that is not liberation, for insofar as [in Vedānta] it is a state other than the 
absence of joy and sorrow, it is not in and of itself the goal of human life. Rather, only 
love for God is, for it arrives at the very form of joy, inasmuch as it holds tightly to the 
self-luminous, blissful consciousness....[A]ttainment of Brahman defined by the 
destruction of ignorance is not human fulfillment, but rather only [when] characterized by 
a distinct type of love.587
Here NT argues that only the joyous consciousness of God—that is to say, love—is the final goal 
of human life, and moreover, that such love is the only thing that makes knowledge of nondual 
truth meaningful. Once again, NT differs from his predecessor. As Lance Nelson has shown, 
Madhusūdana is ready to argue the first—that bhakti is the highest goal of human life 
to describe it as a propositional truth.
Cf. Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, ed. Gosvami Damodar Shastri (Kāśī: Acyutagranthamālā, 1927), 41-60.
584 Bhakticandrikā, 28: tasmād advaite bhaktir na sambhavatīti dvaitinām abhiprayojaneti cādvaitināṃ keṣāṃcid 
vacanam sāhasamātram | Emphasis mine.
585 Minkowski, “Advaita Vedānta in Early Modern India,” 223.
586 Cf. Yigal Bronner and Gary Tubb, “Vastutas Tu: Methodology and the New School of Sanskrit Poetics,” Journal 
of Indian Philosophy 36.5 (2008): 619-632.
587 Bhakticandrikā, 57: vastutas tu jñānād evājñānanāśo yadyapi bhavati, tathāpi na sa mokṣaḥ, 
sukhaduḥkhābhāvānyatvena svato 'puruṣārthatvāt, kintu bhagavatprītir eva tasyāḥ 
svaprakāśanijasukhasaṃvidāliṅgitatvena sukharūpatvābhyupagamād [...] vastuto brahmāvāptir api 
nā'jñānanāśopalakṣitā pumarthaḥ, kintu vijātīyapremopalakṣitaiva |
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(paramapuruṣārtha), independent from the Advaitic search for liberation. But he is clear that 
though they may be equivalent, they are by no means the same thing, and do not intersect.588 
Moreover, equivalence is not hierarchy, which is precisely the force of NT's (and the Bhakti  
Sūtras') claim. He sums up his argument with a worldly comparison:
So it is proven that love alone—enveloped in God, a joyous consciousness, achieved 
through the knowledge of truth—represents human fulfillment, since it does not dissipate 
even at the time of liberation. For it even surpasses knowledge. For example, take a lover 
in the pangs of separation. Even when he experiences the thrill of his beloved's touch, it is 
only because he has longed for it that his joy becomes fulfillment. Joy does not become 
fulfillment simply by being “known.” That is why God became everything to the gopīs, 
but not to wicked people like Duryodhana.589
Needless to say, Śaṅkara would not be happy, nor hardly anyone else in the history of 
Advaita Vedānta. In fact, for someone who explicitly wants to defend the relationship between 
Advaita and bhakti, NT seems quite willing to import other Vedānta traditions into his 
commentary. In his commentary on SBS 2.1.7, NT introduces an interpretation that he attributes 
588 Bhakti is not simply “brahmavidyā by any other name,” argues Madhusūdana in the Bhaktirasāyana (1.1). They 
are totally different with respect to the form they take (svarūpa), their respective means (sādhana), their results 
(phala), and their eligible aspirants (adhikārin). The result of bhakti is total love for God, while the result of 
brahmavidyā is the total removal of ignorance, the root of all evil. This does not mean, however, that the former 
supersedes the latter, as NT seems to suggest in redefining liberation.
See Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, 10-11: nanu tarhi nāmāntareṇa brahmavidyaiva bhagavadbhaktir ity uktam 
[...] iti cen na, svarūpasādhanaphalādhikārivailakṣaṇyād bhaktibrahmavidyayoḥ | [...] 
bhagavadviṣayakapremaprakarṣo bhaktiphalam | sarvānarthamūlājñānanivṛttir brahmavidyāphalam |
See Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 379: “What Madhusūdana seems to be suggesting here is a homology, 
but not an identity, between the mental states associated with bhakti and brahma-vidyā. In orthodox Advaita, we 
have the akhaṇḍākāracittavṛtti, the ‘mental mode taking on the form of the Undivided’, that leads to realization 
of Brahman and destruction of ignorance (and of itself). There is, Madhusūdana wants us to understand, a 
parallel structure in bhakti....[B]oth brahma-vidyā and bhakti are evoked by scripture, Brahman-knowledge 
arising through the wellknown practice of the śravana (‘hearing’) of the great sayings of the Upaniṣads, bhakti  
through the ‘hearing of the glories of the Blessed Lord’ (bhagavad-guṇa-śravaṇa) from the scriptures of bhakti, 
preeminently the BhP.”
589 Bhakticandrikā, 59: tasmāt siddham - muktikāle 'py abādhāt tattvajñānasādhyaḥ sukhasaṃvidbhagavadāliṅgitaḥ 
premaiva pumartha iti | jñānād apy adhikatvāt | kāmukasya iva viraktasya api kāminīsaṃsparśajasukhānubhave 
'pi iṣyamāṇatayā tatsukhasya kāmukaṃ praty eva puruṣārthatvāt | jñāyamānatvamātreṇa sukhasya 
puruṣārthatvānabhyupagamāt | ata eva bhagavān api gopīnāṃ pumartha āsīt, na duṣṭaduryodhanādīnām |
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to śrīmadrāmānujācāryāḥ, referring to the Śrīvaiṣṇava philosopher Rāmānuja with both the 
customary honorific plural and an honorable appellation. As previously mentioned, this is the 
first historical mention of Rāmānuja in connection with the SBS. This passage focuses on the 
Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrinal defense of the plurality of individual souls (jīvas) and the singularity of 
God (īśvara). NT reconstructs the doctrine in great detail, complete with responses to objections, 
and concludes his own Advaita response with an interesting conciliatory note:
In reality (vastutaḥ), the Supreme Self defined as eternal knowledge, etc., i.e., the Lord, 
forever singular, abundantly furnished with characteristics such as compassion for his 
devotees, referred to by terms such as Brahma, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc., is the 
controller of all beings. The individual soul, for his part, who is part of Him as a son is 
part of his father, is bound by the fetters of beginningless ignorance. Somehow, due to the 
merits he accrued by performing all sorts of good deeds in past lives, with the desire to 
know truth, he takes refuge in a true teacher; and by worshipping the teacher as God 
Himself, through his grace he directly apprehends himself. Once the bonds of ignorance 
have been removed, he attains unity with him. In that state, there is not even a trace of 
phenomenal existence.
Nobody disputes any of this. All of these debates over the imbrication of bheda and 
abheda, and the relative reality of the phenomenal world, only serve to sow discord. All 
knowledgeable people should at least acknowledge that according to every school of 
thought, the world is not eternal, since it does not exist for the liberated one.590
This conclusion raises several questions beyond the immediate problem of whether the opponent 
in question is really Rāmānuja—an unlikely interlocutor, given the virtual absence of 
engagement with the SBS among his Śrīvaiṣṇava followers. Why does NT spend so much time 
on this issue?591 Why would he make appeal to the mukta, the liberated soul, in trying to 
590 Ibid., 119: vastutaḥ paramātmā nityajñānādilakṣaṇo bhagavān sadaikarūpo bhaktavātsalyādyanekaguṇolbaṇaḥ 
brahmaviṣṇuśivanārāyaṇarāmakṛṣnādiśabdaiś ca vyapadeśyaḥ sarvajīvaniyantā, jīvas tu pituḥ putra iva 
tadaṃśo'nādyajñānapāśanibaddhaḥ kathañcit prāktanā'nekaśubhādṛṣṭaphalād vividiṣayā 
sadgurvā''śrayaṇeneśabuddhyā tadbhajanena tatkṛpayā svasya sākṣātkārād ajñānapāśanivṛttyā tatsāyujyam 
āpnoti, na tatra prapañcagandho 'pīty atra na kasyāpi vivāda iti bhedābhedānyatarāvalambanavādaḥ 
prapañcasatyatvamithyātvavādaś ca saṃjñākalahamātram | sarvamate 'pi prapañcasyānityatā muktasya 
prapañcābhāvād iti sudhībhir vibhāvanīyam |
591 In a brief aside in his commentary on Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra 1.24, “God is a particular kind of person, untouched 
by suffering, actions, their results, and intentions” (kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ), 
NT also engages with Viśiṣṭādvaita opposition to the Advaitic theory that the difference between the individual 
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reconcile Advaita with Viśiṣṭādvaita, when the very experience of liberation was a contested 
concept between the two schools?592 Does it reveal concerns stemming from a particular South 
Indian geography? Or did the new prominence of Śrīvaiṣṇavas in the bhakti traditions of the 
north compel NT to respond with his form of Vaiṣṇava Advaita?593
Whatever the answers to these questions, NT was clearly aware of the other Vedānta 
options around him. Although he derives most of his rhetoric on bhaktirasa from 
Madhusūdana,594 he elaborates on the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava distinction between vaidhī and 
rāgānugā bhakti, and even quotes passages from Rūpa Gosvāmin's Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu 
(BRS), referring to him as yet another ancient authority (vṛddha).595 And in a stunning rejection 
of classical Advaita teaching, couched in his commentary on SBS 2.1.4, he argues that it is 
possible to have bhakti toward a God without attributes (nirguṇa), “because it is taught in the 
and God is only conditional, not essential. “These followers of Rāmānuja,” he says, “misunderstand the intention 
[of the author] as I have described it, simply latching on to the most obvious sense of words like 'particular' and 
giving it a completely different spin.” See Yogasiddhāntacandrikā of Srinarayanatirtha, ed. Vimala Karnatak 
(Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 2000), 32: kecit tu rāmānujānusāriṇa ittham abhiprāyam ajānanto 
viśeṣaśabdādisvārasyamātreṇānyathābhāvam upavarṇayanti | I revisit the Yogasiddhāntacandrikā in more detail 
below.
592 See Christopher Framarin, “The Problem with Pretending: Rāmānuja's Arguments Against Jīvanmukti,” Journal 
of Indian Philosophy 37.4 (2009): 399-414.
593 See Hawley, A Storm of Songs, 99-147, 224-225.
594 See his long extracts from the Bhaktirasāyana in Bhakticandrikā, 30-52, and his account of the aesthetic 
elements of bhaktirasa paired with his own illustrative verses on 63-68.
595 Ibid., 235-240. Cf. BRS 1.2.74-118. See The Bhaktirasamrtasindhu of Rupa Gosvamin, trans. David L. 
Haberman (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2003), 
34-45. These verses detail the aṅgas, or elements, of bhakti. Not all of them match between the two texts, but 
most interesting is the replacement of kṛṣṇa in the Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu with the more neutral word īśa in the 
Bhakticandrikā. E.g., BRS 1.2.82ab: “Inability to bear hatred or slander of Kṛṣṇa/Īśa or his devotees.”
One wonders if both, like the Devas and Gosvāmins in Chapter 3, were drawing from a similar set of sources. 
The degree of overlap suggests a continuity between text traditions and perhaps even interpretive communities. 
NT certainly knew of Lakṣmīdhara's Bhagavannāmakaumudī, as borne out by a long section in his commentary 
on SBS 2.2.20 that recaps many of the arguments therein. See Bhakticandrikā, 180ff.
218
Vedānta that even the undivided can be identified as both the attributes and the possessor of 
attributes, just like a snake and its coils.”596 The herpetological simile refers to Brahma Sūtra 
3.2.27, ubhayavyapadeśāt tv ahikuṇḍalavat. But of all prior Vedānta commentators, only 
Madhva takes this to refer to Brahman as both the qualities and possessor of qualities.597 For an 
ostensible Advaitin, this is simply not cricket.
NT saves his most drastic departure from Advaita tradition for the moment when he 
comments on SBS 3.1.7: “The fruits [of action] come from God, according to Bādarāyaṇa, 
because they are visible.”598 An opponent argues that only karma in the form of dharma and 
adharma gives people results; putting God into the equation is just explicative excess. A third 
party interjects, saying that it is actually karma from a previous birth that gives people their 
present results. Consider the disparity between Yudhiṣṭhira's and Duryodhana's experiences in the 
Mahābhārata, he urges, bad things happen to good people and vice versa. NT rejects each of 
these objections and asserts that God, independently, of his own volition, gives rise to all things. 
And in an extraordinary departure from virtually all classical Vedānta thought, he follows by 
saying that one need not even avoid the classic accusation that God may be regarded as partial or 
cruel (vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye syātām).599 In fact, says NT, imputing partiality to God is a desirable 
596 Bhakticandrikā, 78-79: abhede 'py ahikuṇḍalādivad guṇaguṇibhāvasya vedānte vyutpādanāt |
597 See Kiyokazu Okita, Hindu Theology in Early Modern South Asia: The Rise of Devotionalism and the Politics of  
Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 234-236.
598 Cf. Brahma Sūtra 3.2.37: phalam ata upapatteḥ
599 Cf. Brahma Sūtra 2.1.34. Madhva does make a case for God's partiality, but only in order to assert the hierarchy 
among devotees (tāratamya) that underpins his doctrine of the elect. This claim is later developed by Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇava commentators such as Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, but with very different justifications than NT's above. 
See David Buchta, “Dependent Agency and Hierarchical Determinism in the Theology of Madhva,” in Free Will,  
Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, eds. M.R. Dasti and E. F. Bryant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 264-275.
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consequence of this debate (iṣṭāpatti), because difference is the natural state of affairs. After all, 
individuals are not the same; some are independent and others are not. And a king who is partial 
does not stop being a king, unlike us, who presumably lose something of ourselves in the 
process. Nor does this mean that karma is meaningless, either a) because it operates within 
particular limits or b) because it prompts God either to be angry or pleased. NT concludes his 
argument for God's partiality by citing Draupadi's famous speech to Yudhiṣṭhira in the Vana 
Parvan of the Mahābhārata: “The arranger does not act towards beings, O king, like a mother or 
father. He is prompted as if by anger, just like everyone else.”600 Draupadi's withering, almost 
heretical critique of an absurd, fickle god is firmly shut down in the epic, even if it leaves 
unsettling questions.601 But here, it actually provides scriptural sanction for NT's radical re-
envisioning of Advaita Vedānta.602
600 MBh 3.31.37:
na mātṛpitṛvad rājan dhātā bhūteṣu vartate |
roṣād iva pravṛtto 'yaṃ yathā 'yam itaro janaḥ ||
601 See Angelika Malinar, “Arguments of a queen: Draupadī's views on kingship,” in Gender and Narrative in the  
Mahābhārata, eds. Simon Brodbeck and Brian Black (London: Routledge, 2007), 86-88.
602 The previous paragraph paraphrases Bhakticandrikā, 252-255. For NT, the Mahābhārata was contested territory 
in more than one way. SBS 2.2.23, “All qualify [for bhakti] including the despised, on account of it being passed 
down, just like universal [dharma],” brings up the issue of low-caste participation in bhakti. In NT's 
commentary, this raises questions regarding the very definition of caste. An opponent argues that the very notion 
of brāhmaṇatva, Brahmin-ness, cannot be determined based on birth (jāti), but rather is defined by one's 
qualities (guṇa). In support of this definition, he cites a dialogue between Yudhiṣṭhira and Nahuṣa in the same 
section of the MBh quoted above. In this dialogue, Yudhiṣṭhira tells Nahuṣa that caste (jāti) is very difficult to 
figure out, given the total intermixture of caste-classes (varṇasaṃkara); one had to foreground character (śīla) 
rather than birth. NT vehemently rejects this “empty claim” (riktaṃ vacanam), and mobilizes several normative 
Brahmanical texts to reassert that brāhmaṇatva is based on birth alone. (Ibid., 196-198).
The opponent's claim, of course, was not quite anti-essentialist. The MBh itself was obsessed with the problem 
of varṇasaṃkara, and with delimiting the boundaries of an ideal social order. But in the seventeenth century, 
when NT was writing, varṇasaṃkara seems to have provoked a different kind of anxiety. As I discussed in 
Chapter 4, the question “Who was a Brahmin?” could now be situated against the rise of subaltern castes in 
political orders under the Mughal aegis, their visibility in certain urban publics (such as Banaras), and the new 
social mobility afforded to heterogeneous scholarly and scribal communities that claimed upper-caste status. Cf. 
Rosalind O'Hanlon and Christopher Minkowski, “What makes people who they are? Pandit networks and the 
problem of livelihoods in early modern Western India,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 45.3 
(2008): 381-416.
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What are we to make of NT's repeated “transgressions”? One possibility is that he is 
taking his predecessor Madhusūdana to a logical extreme, opening the floodgates to submerge 
nondual philosophy in religious devotion. But beyond the writings of his student Gauḍa 
Brahmānanda, we find little more extant work by Advaitins in this vein, unless we have not 
looked hard enough. Such an interpretation also focuses exclusively on the philosophical issues 
at stake, instead of understanding their historical context. A more likely explanation is that NT 
belonged to a spectrum of early modern Vedāntins who lay claim to a history of scholastic 
engagement with the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and other Vaiṣṇava scriptures. This spectrum ranged 
between the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, who possessed an ambivalent relationship to Advaita Vedānta; 
the Vallabha Vedānta community, which called its Kṛṣṇaite theology a “pure Advaita” 
(śuddhādvaita); and, of course, Madhusūdana and his associates.603 We have already seen 
evidence from Madhusūdana's commentary on the BhP that there were many parties involved at 
this time in revisiting the relationship between bhakti and Advaita, and it is precisely this 
diversity that I have emphasized in this chapter.
NT was at once indebted to and distinct from that broader Advaita world. He was one of a 
number of early modern Advaitins who adopted creative exegetical tactics to read bhakti 
practices from the BhP back into canonical texts like the Veda.604 Like Anantadeva I, he took on 
603 Cf. Nelson, “The Ontology of Bhakti,” 390.
604 In his commentary on SBS 1.2.9 (missing from Svapneśvara's commentary), NT finds Ṛg Vedic precedents for 
each element of the “nine-fold devotion” (navavidhā bhakti). See Bhakticandrikā, 86-91. In doing so, he reflects 
similar previous efforts by Anantadeva in the Bhaktinirṇaya, ed. Ananta Shastri Phadke (Benares: Sanskrit 
College, 1937), 19-22. On the creative etymological approach adopted by NT's later contemporary and Advaitin 
Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara, to elucidate the “hidden meaning” (rahasya) of Vedic mantras and find in them stories 
from the epics and purāṇas, see Christopher Minkowski, “Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara's Mantrakāśīkhaṇḍa,” Journal  
of the American Oriental Society 122.2 (2002): 329-344, and Christopher Minkowski, “Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara 
and the Genre of Mantrarahasyaprakāśikā,” in Proceedings of the Second International Vedic Workshop, ed. Y. 
Ikari (Kyoto, forthcoming). Nīlakaṇtha also owed his creative Advaitic readings of the Vedastuti, embedded in 
BhP 10.87, to prior commentaries by Madhusūdana and NT. See Christopher Minkowski, “The Vedastuti and 
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the Mīmāṃsā orthodoxy of his day, quoting and dismissing a famous passage from Kumārila 
Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika that denies the existence of a creator God.605 And in his commentary on 
SBS 2.2.25, he even paraphrased Anantadeva's Bhaktinirṇaya, and used the language of 
Mīmāṃsā option-theory (vikalpa) to claim that either study of Vedānta or devotion to God could 
bring about the knowledge of truth, which would lead to liberation.606 NT was thus fully a 
participant in the theistic Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta of his day, while making his own 
unique intervention into that discursive array.
Bhakti,   Yoga, and the Beautiful Goddess 
Was NT's Bhakticandrikā simply an intellectual sidetrack, or did it reappear across his 
writings? What was the broader intellectual context in which such ideas may have circulated? 
And was he alone in giving the SBS such importance? As we saw in the previous chapter, a 
Vedic Studies: Nīlakaṇṭha on Bhāgavata Purāṇa X.87,” in The Vedas: Texts, Langauge, Ritual, eds. Arlo Griffiths 
and Jan E.M. Houben (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2004), 125-142.
605 To support SBS 1.2.22-3 and Brahma Sūtra 2.1.33, on God's compassion and creative potential, NT argues that 
God, as a grand magician (māyāvī) is capable of inhabiting his own illusion, and need not have a purpose for his 
activities. Even intelligent people in everyday life, he says, engage in play without reason—undercutting the 
Ślokavārttika's insistence that no one does anything without some purpose in mind (prayojanam anuddiśya). See 
Bhakticandrikā, 139-140: etena...mīmāṃsāvārtikakṛduktaṃ nirastam | prayojanam anuddiśyaiva buddhimatām 
api līlādau pravṛttidarśanāt |
606 See Ibid., 215-217. Cf. Bhaktinirṇaya, 38-46. Here are some examples of the overlap:
tattvajñānaṃ prati sādhanabhaktivedāntavicārayor vaikalpikahetutvena vedāntavicāraṃ vinā 'pi 
sādhanabhaktyaiva tattvajñānadvāra tat[mokṣa]prāptisambhavāt | (Bhakticandrikā, 215).
tad evaṃ mokṣahetutattvajñāne janayitavye vedāntavicārabhaktiyogayor dvārabhedaḥ siddhaḥ | (Bhaktinirṇaya, 
39).
nanv athāpi vikalpo na saṃbhavati, vicārasya iva bhaktes tātparyāvadhāraṇahetutvābhāvena dvāraikyābhāvāt | 
vrīhiyavayor dvāraikyād eva vikalpābhyupagamād iti cet, satyam | yady apy atra dvārabheda eva [...] tathā 'py 
atra haribhaktivedāntavicārayor ekaprayogavidhiparigṛhītatvābhāvād dvārabhede 'py udbhidbalabhidyāgayor iva 
vikalpo 'bhyupeyata ity āstāṃ vistaraḥ | (Bhakticandrikā, 215-217).
kathaṃ tarhi dvārabhede vikalpaḥ | yathā jyotiṣṭomodbhidādiyāgayoḥ paśuphalakayoḥ | [...] prayājāvaghātayos 
tv ekaprayogavidhiparigṛhītatvād avikalpaḥ | vrīhiyavayos tu saty apy ekavidhiparigṛhītatve dvāraikyād vikalpaḥ 
| haribhaktivedāntavicārayos tu naikaprayogavidhiparigrahaḥ, tasmād vikalpa eva | (Bhaktinirṇaya, 39-40).
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significant feature of early modern Sanskrit intellectual history was the blurring of disciplinary 
boundaries. While Sanskrit intellectuals had always written widely across knowledge-systems, 
without seeming preference for one over another, it was the very reinscription of disciplinary 
boundaries that characterized early modern doxographical writing that made their mutual 
imbrication distinctive.607 A scholar like Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, for example, found his penchant for 
Advaita Vedānta filtering into his works on grammar, and vice versa.608 The Deva family wrote 
on Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, at once recognizing and muting the different soteriological 
commitments of each discipline. Moreover, the sixteenth-century Bhedābheda Vedāntin 
Vijñānabhikṣu urged in his writing that Sāmkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta constituted a single 
teaching.609 It is in this context that we should understand NT's incorporation of bhakti into his 
commentary on the Yoga Sūtras, called the Yogasiddhāntacandrikā (YSC).
NT's main project in the YSC is to reread the discipline of Patañjali's eight-limbed Yoga 
as indispensable and subordinate to the teaching of Advaita Vedānta. Drawing on a long history 
of the Advaitic intersection with Yoga, NT identifies samādhi, or yogic absorption, with the 
Advaitic principle of nididhyāsana, repeated meditation on one's unity with Brahman. He then 
offers a set of fourteen “yogas” that sequentially enable the realization of the Self, beginning 
with Śaiva practices of ritual homologization and culminating in a Vaiṣṇava theology of loving 
devotion (premabhaktiyoga).610 The YSC as a whole clearly shows that NT was attuned to a 
607 See Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 144-164.
608 See Madhav Deshpande, “Appayya Dīkṣita and the Lineage of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 
online first (2014): 2-3.
609 See Nicholson, Unifying Hinduism, 108-123.
610 See Jason Schwartz, “Parabrahman among the Yogins,” International Journal of Hindu Studies, forthcoming, 41, 
and n.79. The full list is: kriyāyoga, caryāyoga, karmayoga, haṭhayoga, mantrayoga, jñānayoga, advaitayoga, 
lakṣyayoga, brahmayoga, śivayoga, siddhiyoga, vāsanāyoga, layayoga, dhyānayoga, and premabhaktiyoga. The 
manuscript from Mysore (labeled gha) contains glosses, perhaps added by a later copyist, that clarify what some 
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broader Yoga world that ranged from Śākta Tantric practitioners to Nāth yogis.611 But what 
concerns me here is how NT incorporates the theology of the Bhakticandrikā into the YSC, since 
it demonstrates that his attention to bhakti was not restricted to the genre of texts in which one 
may expect its appearance.
In YSC 1.23-32, NT offers several indications that the bhakti of the BhP impacts his 
understanding of the Yoga Sūtras' prescriptions. Commenting on Yoga Sūtra 1.23, which 
famously prescribes “devotion to God” (īśvarapraṇidhāna), NT says that the idea here is that 
“samādhi is available most effortlessly through bhaktiyoga, to be described further on: namely, 
the understanding that one should worship with mantras, recitation, etc., leading to that repeated 
process by which the heart is intensely fixed on him alone—in other words, love.”612 A long 
excursus in YSC 1.26, on a sūtra that says God was the teacher of the ancients (pūrveṣām api  
guruḥ), defends the concept of avatāras, accounting for the single Supreme God's manifestations 
on earth, and mirrors a discussion in his Bhakticandrikā on SBS 2.2.29.613 But NT's crucial 
of these yogas constitute: advaitayoga is understanding the purport of Vedāntic utterances regarding the nondual 
Supreme Self; brahmayoga is attention to the nāda, the Brahman-as-sound; śivayoga is the general feeling that 
one is one with God; siddhiyoga is purifying one's veinal channels, etc.; vāsanāyoga is the desire for liberation, 
to know the truth of the Self; layayoga is the samprajñāta samādhi described in Yoga Sūtra 1.17-18; dhyanayoga 
is reflecting on the embodied form of Śiva, Viṣṇu, and other gods; and premabhaktiyoga is the uninterrupted 
flow of love, an exclusive consciousness of God's lotus feet. See Yogasiddhāntacandrikā, 2.
611 Schwartz, “Parabrahman among the Yogins,” 43-45.
612 Yogasiddhāntacandrikā, 26: praṇidhānāt praṇidhīyate tadekamātraniṣṭhaṃ manaḥ kriyate 'neneti 
punaḥpunārūpaṃ prema tatsādhanamantrajapārādhyatvajñānādirūpād vakṣyamāṇād bhaktiyogād anāyāsena 
āsannatamaḥ samādhilābho bhavatītyarthaḥ |
613 See Yogasiddhāntacandrikā, 35-40. Cf. Bhakticandrikā, 143-151. With liberal use of late sectarian scriptures like 
the Rāma-, Gopāla-, and Nṛsiṃha-Tāpinīya Upaniṣad, NT argues at length that figures like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are 
not simply exalted individuals (jīvaviśeṣāḥ), but rather the playful incarnations of the one supreme God 
(parameśvarasya līlāvatārāḥ). Interestingly, and perhaps pointing to his association with charismatic gurus, NT 
also says that “great souls of the present-day should also be regarded as such.” See Yogasiddhāntacandrikā, 38: 
evam [...] ādhunikā api mahānubhāvā mantavyāḥ | He goes on to taxonomize the avatāras according to the 
Pāñcarātra Āgamas, but unlike other Vaiṣṇavas who adopt the same system, does not commit to the supremacy 
of Viṣṇu.
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discussion of bhaktiyoga, of bhakti as yoga, comes in his preface to Yoga Sūtra 1.32: “For the 
prevention of obstacles, practice [concentrating on] a single truth” (tatpratiṣedhārtham 
ekatattvābhyāsaḥ). I translate the passage in full:
Now ritual actions (karma) cannot be given a superlative status. They are extremely 
difficult to carry out, like agriculture and other activities. They only provide the 
appropriate result when done with the right auxiliary elements, and if done haphazardly, 
they only result in a litany of difficulties and wasted effort. Moreover, they prevent access 
to the highest good, since they originate within the strictures of varṇa and āśrama. Nor is 
it right that they should be accepted by the wise. Rather, it is only devotion to God 
(bhajana), “even a little bit of which,” in his own words (Bhagavad Gītā 2.40), “releases 
one from great fear,” that provides the greatest result. Just as a spark of fire, however tiny, 
becomes a blaze when fed by a clump of grass, and accomplishes every necessary [ritual] 
action, so too the acts of devotion (praṇidhāna), even such minor ones as inadvertently 
uttering the name of God, are capable of obliterating a host of sins, as they did for 
Ajāmila. And magnified by that very act of destruction, they become capable of  
accomplishing the heart's desire, when rounded out by faith and a longing for the object 
of devotion. Therefore, praṇidhāna alone is indispensable.614
It is of four types: pre-eminent (paramamukhya), principal (mukhya), subordinate  
(mukhyajātīya), and aspirational (mukhyakalpa). The first is love. This is akin to what the 
gopīs experienced: hearing and singing God's glories, their hearts melted like a porous 
copper pot, transforming into an intense stream that flowed only to him, and conformed 
to his shape. As the Bhagavad Gītā (12.8) says “Place your heart in me alone; make 
your mind enter into me.” This describes premabhaktiyoga, which we define as the 
uninterrupted flow of extreme, exclusive love directed to the Supreme Lord's lotus feet.
For those unable to achieve that, there is a second option, a practice called nididhyāsana. 
This means repeatedly fixing the mind in God as the Self, by withdrawing it from its 
natural inclination toward the outside world. As it has been said (BG 12.9): “Say you 
cannot firmly fix your mind in me, then practice this practice (abhyāsayoga) and form a 
desire to reach me.”
The third is for people incapable of even that practice: actions such as reciting his name, 
undertaking the eleventh-day fast, and so forth, which result in an awareness of him. As 
he says (BG 12.10): “If you cannot practice either, then at least do things devoted to me.”
The fourth, for one incapable of that, is to abandon any desire for the result of even 
614 Interestingly, NT gives a much wider scope to praṇidhāna here than in his Bhakticandrikā. SBS 1.2.12-13 say 
that yoga leads to both bhakti and jñāna, and that only “secondary” (gauṇī) bhakti contributes to yogic 
absorption (samādhi). In his commentary transitioning from sūtra 12 to 13, NT says “You might ask: Doesn't this 
contradict Yoga Sūtra 1.23, '[Samādhi is accessible] through devotion to God,' which tells us that bhakti is the 
predominant means to yoga? In response is SBS 1.2.13, Samādhi, however, is attainable through secondary 
[bhakti]. There [in the Yoga Sūtras], the word 'devotion' signifies secondary bhakti, not the primary kind.”
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actions done out of habit, and instead offer them to the Supreme Lord, the great guru. 
This resolve looks something like: “Whatever I have done, be it good or bad, I have 
offered it all to you, and do it because of you.” The Bhagavad Gītā has said as much in 
the twelfth chapter (12.11): “If you are incapable of acting with recourse to my yoga, 
then act within yourself and leave aside all results.” Here, the word praṇidhāna is used to 
describe this. [...] Therefore, since the pre-eminent bhaktiyoga is itself the result of every 
other method, [the author of the sūtras] proceeds to describe the practice called love, 
which results in both [God's grace and the removal of obstacles].615
It is an open question how integral God was to the early Yoga tradition. Yoga Sūtras 1.23-
26 suggest that God could be worshipped, embodied, and perhaps even capable of bestowing 
grace, having an active role in the world even if he was not its creator. For NT, there is no doubt 
whatsoever, because his primary sources are the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the bhaktiyoga of the 
Bhagavad Gītā, and several late theistic “Upaniṣads.” By foregrounding the “melted hearts” of 
the gopīs of the BhP, NT once again invokes Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Bhaktirasāyana, which 
615 Yogasiddhāntacandrikā, 49-51: atha kṛṣyādivad bahvāyāsasādhyānāṃ karmaṇāṃ sāṅgānām eva 
yathocitaphaladātṛtvena yathākathañcit kriyamāṇānāṃ phaladātṛtvābhāvāc 
chramādyanekaduḥkhaphalakatvadarśanād varṇāśramābhimānādinibandhanatvena paramaśreyo'paghātitvāc ca 
nātiprāśastyaṃ, na vā vidvadupādeyatvaṃ yuktam | kintu bhagavadbhajanasyaivāgnivādapūrṇasyāpy asya 
“svalpam apy asya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt” iti vadatā bhagavatā mahāphalapratipādanāt | yathā 
'gnikoṇo 'tisvalpo 'pi tṛṇarāśiṃ jvalayaṃs tenaiva varddhitaḥ pūrṇaḥ sarvāṇi sūcitāni kāryāṇi janayati | tathā 
bhagavato yathākathañcinnāmoccāraṇādirūpam api praṇidhānam ajāmilāder iva pāparāśiṃ nāśayat tena 
nāśenaivādhikaṃ sampādyamānaṃ śraddhādinā pūrṇaṃ bhajanīya icchāsahakṛtaṃ sarvābhilaṣitaṃ sādhayati | 
tasmāt praṇidhānam evāvaśyakam |
tac ca caturvidham - paramamukhyaṃ, mukhyaṃ, mukhyajātīyaṃ, mukhyakalpañ ceti | tatrādyaṃ gopīnām iva 
tadguṇagaṇaśravaṇādinā drutacetaso drutatāmrasyeva dṛḍhatadākāratātadviṣayakavṛttipravāharūpaṃ prema 
“mayy eva mana ādhatsva mayi buddhiṃ niveśaya” ityādinoktam | anena premabhaktiyogo darśitaḥ | sa ca 
parameśvaracaraṇāravindaviṣayaikāntikātyantikapremapravāho 'navacchinna ityarthaḥ |
dvitīyaṃ tadasāmarthye bahiḥpravṛttisvabhāvasya manasaḥ pratyāhāreṇa punaḥ punar bhagavaty ātmani 
niveśanarūpo 'bhyāso nididhyāsanākhyaḥ “atha cittaṃ samādhātuṃ na śaknoṣi mayi sthiram | abhyāsayogena 
tato mām icchāptuṃ dhanañjaya ||” ityādyuktam |
tṛtīyan tu tadasāmarthye 'pi tatpratītiphalakanāmoccāraṇaikādaśyupavāsādirūpaṃ karma “abhyāse 'py asamartho 
'si matkarmaparamo bhava” ityādinoktam |
caturthaṃ tatrā 'py asāmarthye svabhāvata eva kṛtānām api karmaṇāṃ phalecchāṃ tyaktvā parameśvare 
paramagurāv arpaṇam “sādhu vā 'sādhu vā karma yad yad ācaritaṃ mayā | tat sarvaṃ tvayi saṃnyastaṃ 
tvatprayuktaḥ karomy aham ||” iti saṃkalpaviśeṣarūpam | “athaitad apy aśakto 'si kartuṃ madyogam āśritaḥ | 
sarvakarmaphalatyāgaṃ tataḥ kuru yatātmavān ||” ityādinoktaṃ bhagavadgītādvādaśādhyāye | atra ca 
praṇidhānaśabdenoktam | [...] tasmāt paramaṃ mukhyaṃ bhaktiyogaṃ sarvopāyaphalabhūtamayam ata eva 
tadubhayaphalakaṃ premākhyam āha - tatpratiṣedhārtham ekatattvābhyāsaḥ || 1.32 ||
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defines bhakti as the “transformation of a mind melted by devotion into a constant stream that 
flows toward the Lord of all.”616 But instead of according it a separate conceptual or generic 
space, he places it at the center, the pre-eminent place, of yogic practice, making bhakti 
constitutive of an entirely different philosophical system.
If NT's religious sensibilities complicate the binary between Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava, we may 
attribute it to his inclination, shared by many of his contemporary Advaitins, to play down 
sectarian conflict.617 Curiously, however, the SBS's idea of bhakti as an independent disciplinary 
sphere was not confined to Vedāntins inspired by Vaiṣṇava scriptures. One of the handful of 
precolonial scholars to refer to the SBS was Bhāskararāya (ca. 1700-1775 CE), a Śākta 
intellectual of Maharashtrian extraction who spent much of his life in the Tamil South under the 
patronage of the Thanjavur Marathas. Bhāskararāya is famous for his writings on the Śrīvidyā 
Tantric tradition of goddess worship. His main works include the Saubhāgyabhāskara 
commentary on the Lalitāsahasranāmastotra (Thousand Names of the Beautiful Goddess), the 
616 Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, 13:
drutasya bhagavaddharmād dharāvāhikatāṃ gatā |
sarveśe manaso vṛttir bhaktir ity abhidhīyate || 1.3 ||
617 Even in his note concerning the avatāras that follows a Vaiṣṇava Āgamic model, NT is concerned to emphasize 
that Śiva and Viṣṇu are on the same footing. In this he joined other early modern Smārta Advaitins including 
Anantadeva I, who expressed the sentiment, continuous across his literary and polemical writing, that “Those 
who zealously put down either Śiva or Viṣṇu by elevating the other should not be considered devotees at all.” 
See Bhaktinirṇaya, 46: ye tu viṣṇor utkarṣeṇa śivāpakarṣābhiniveśinaḥ, ye ca śivotkarṣeṇa viṣṇor 
apakarṣābhiniveśinas te ubhaye 'pi na bhaktā iti mantavyam | Also see Christopher Minkowski, “Nīlakaṇṭha's 
Mahābhārata,” Seminar 608 (2010): 32-38, on the contemporary Advaitin Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara's assertion of 
why “partisan quarreling about the hierarchy of particular forms of the deity was misguided and harmful.”
Such efforts were consistent between northern and southern Advaitins. As we saw in Chapter 3, the one-time 
head of the Śaṅkara maṭha at Kanchipuram, Bodhendra Sarasvatī, wrote a tract that sought to abolish the 
hierarchy between Śiva and Viṣṇu, the Hariharādvaitabhūṣaṇa. And he built on previous work by figures like 
Appayya Dīkṣita, who composed hymns on multiple deities at the behest of religiously diverse patrons. See 
Yigal Bronner, “Singing to God, Educating the People: Appayya Dīkṣita and the Function of Stotras,” Journal of  
the American Oriental Society 127.2 (2007): 113-130.
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Setubandha commentary on the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava Tantra, and the Varivasyā Rahasya, an 
important Śrīvidyā ritual manual. In a biography of his teacher, Bhāskararāya's student 
Umānandanātha describes how he began his career in Gujarat, vanquishing adherents of the 
Vallabha and Mādhva communities, before moving to the banks of the Kaveri river.618 Perhaps 
this claim was motivated by sectarian discontent; Puruṣottama Pītāmbara, a Vallabhite Vedāntin 
of Surat, had written a tract denouncing the Śaiva ideology of Appayya Dīkṣita's 
Śivatattvaviveka. Whether or not Bhāskararāya actually participated in such debates, he was most 
certainly in the Śaiva-Śākta camp.
Bhāskararāya mentions the SBS a handful of times across the Saubhāgyabhāskara and 
Setubandha.619 Although many of these references are perfunctory, a few stand out. In the 
“Thousand Names,” the goddess Lalitā is called a “lover of bhakti, attainable by bhakti, and won 
over by bhakti” (bhaktipriyā bhaktigamyā bhaktivaśyā). Commenting on these names in the 
Saubhāgyabhāskara, Bhāskararāya says:
Bhakti is of two kinds: primary and secondary. Primary bhakti is a particular modification 
of the mind called “love” that has God as its object. As the Bhaktisūtra (1.1.2) says: “That 
[bhakti] is supreme love for God.” The definite article signifies bhakti, as we understand 
from the first sūtra: “Now, therefore, an inquiry into bhakti.” The adjective “supreme” 
indicates its most intense form. The idea is that with reference to this supreme, primary 
type of bhakti, “love” is enjoined as pointing to it. It is for that very reason, say earlier 
commentators, that “the word 'supreme' excludes the secondary [bhakti].” A later sūtra 
(1.2.13) explains that secondary bhakti consists of service...whose types are many, e.g., 
remembering God, singing his glories, etc.620
618 See Varivasyārahasya by Śrī Bhāskararāya Makhin, ed. S. Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī (Madras: Adyar Library and 
Research Centre, 1968 [1934]), xxv-xxvii.
619 See Śrīlalitāsahasranāmastotram with 'Saubhāgyabhāskara' by Bhāskararāya, ed. Batukanathashastri Khiste 
and Shitala Prasada Upadhyaya (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 2003), 10, 88-9, 96, 181, 332. 
Also see Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇavaḥ with the commentary 'Setubandha' by Bhāskararāya, ed. Shitala Pradasa 
Upadhyaya (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 2005), 3, 61, 271, 308.
620 See Saubhāgyabhāskara, 88: bhaktir dvividhā mukhyā gauṇī ceti | tatreśvaraviṣayako 'nurāgākhyaś 
cittavṛttiviśeso mukhyabhaktiḥ | tathā ca bhaktimīmāṃsāsūtram “sā parānuraktir īśvare” iti | “athāto 
bhaktijijñāsā” iti sūtropāttā bhaktis tatpadārthaḥ | tasyāḥ pareti viśeṣaṇam | parāṃ mukhyāṃ bhaktiviśeṣam 
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Bhāskararāya is clearly familiar not only with the SBS, but with the practices of bhakti 
prescribed in the BhP, as well as in other complementary texts. He goes on to explain that apart 
from the “ninefold” (navadhā) bhakti of the BhP that he refers to here, the Garuḍa Purāṇa talks 
about eight kinds, while the Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa, a darling of the Gosvāmins, discusses ten.621 
He also refers to the commentarial tradition on the SBS, although at times it appears as though he 
is cognizant of an alternative source apart from the work of Svapneśvara and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha.622 
It is even possible that he was responding to some of his own Śaiva contemporaries, such as 
Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, who defined bhakti a little differently.623
uddiśyānuraktir lakṣaṇatvena vidhīyata iti tadarthaḥ | ata eva pareti gauṇīṃ vyāvartayatīti bhāṣyam | “gauṇyā tu 
samādhisiddhir” iti sūtre gauṇī bhaktiḥ sevārūpā kathitā...tadbhedāḥ smaraṇakīrtanādayo bahavaḥ |
621 Ibid., 88: “bhaktir aṣṭavidhā hy eṣā”...ityādityagaruḍapurāṇayor vacanam | “bhaktir navavidhā rājan” ityādi 
bhāgavataṃ vacanam | “bhaktir daśavidhā jñeyā pāpāraṇyadavopamā” iti daśavidhatvapratipādakaṃ 
bṛhannāradīyavacanam |
622 See, e.g., Saubhāgyabhāskara, 332, where Bhāskararāya comments on the half-verse (252cd): “How can 
someone who does not sing this hymn become a devotee?” He interprets the different ways in which “singing” 
(kīrtana) works for different kinds of devotees, according to the taxonomy provided in Bhagavad Gītā 7.16. He 
attributes this interpretation to the “commentarial section beginning with SBS 2.2.27,” which says that “great 
sinners [qualify for bhakti] when in great pain” (mahāpātakināṃ tv ārtau). I do not find this mode of explication, 
nor even a contextual reference to BG 7.16, in either Svapneśvara's or Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's commentary.
akīrtayann idaṃ stotraṃ kathaṃ bhakto bhaviṣyati | [...] ayaṃ bhāvaḥ - “caturvidhā bhajante māṃ janāḥ 
sukṛtino 'rjuna | ārto jijñāsur arthārthī jñānī ca bharatarṣabha ||” iti smṛtyuktānāṃ caturvidhānāṃ bhaktānāṃ 
madhye ārtānāṃ pāpanivṛttyartham, jijñāsubhaktānāṃ niṣkāmānām api cittaśuddhyartham, arthārthibhaktānām 
arthasiddhyartham, jñānibhaktānāṃ lokasaṃgrahārtham, kīrtanasyāvaśyakatvād 
bhajakatāvacchedakaśarīraghaṭakaṃ nāmakīrtanam | tad idaṃ “mahāpātakināṃ tv ārtāv” ityādyadhikaraṇeṣu 
bhaktimīmāṃsābhāṣye spaṣṭam iti ||
623 See Fisher, “A New Public Theology,” 78: “What is called for is the path of devotion, or bhakti—but with a twist 
that sets Nīlakaṇṭha's argument distinctly apart from what the word bhakti typically calls to mind: bhakti, he tells 
us, is a synonym of upāsanā, the esoteric ritual worship of a particular deity. As a result, devotional sentiment 
alone does not suffice, but must be accompanied by the ritual techniques prescribed by the Āgamas...”
Bhāskararāya seems to critique this definition of bhakti as upāsanā—or rather, upāsanā as bhakti—using the 
SBS to bolster his position: “Some say that worship (upāsanā) is simply love (anurāga) whose object is the 
deity. That is incorrect. Otherwise, the act of distinguishing bhakti from upāsanā in such injunctions as 'One 
infused with bhakti should perform worship' would make no sense. It is only anurāga that should be the 
definition of the word bhakti. As it is said in SBS 1.1.1-2: 'Now, therefore, an inquiry into bhakti. It is supreme 
love for the Lord.' Therefore, upāsanā must be defined as an act that is other than anurāga.”
See Setubandha, 61: devatāviṣayako 'nurāga evopāsaneti kecit | tan na | bhaktimān upāsītetyādividhau bhakter 
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Undoubtedly, Bhāskararāya's most striking recognition of bhakti as a full-fledged system 
comes in the introduction to the Setubandha. He begins with a taxonomy of the vidyās, or 
knowledge-systems, that God transmitted to people for the purpose of accomplishing the goals of 
human life. Each of these vidyās were intended for differentially qualified people, but were also 
hierarchically structured. In brief, this educational sequence is as follows: Once a (male, twice-
born) child is past the age of play, he should learn to read and recite (akṣarābhyāsa). In order to 
learn grammar (chandas), he is taught belles lettres (kāvya). Then comes the science of logic and 
epistemology (nyāya), which teaches him that the self is distinct from the body, mind, etc. To 
understand what constitutes his ritual and moral duty, dharma, he then studies the “prior” 
tradition of Vedic hermeneutics (pūrvamīmāṃsā). Bhāskararāya calls these knowledge-systems 
“grounded in non-knowing” (ajñānabhūmikā), as opposed to the disciplines that offer realization 
of Brahman and liberation. For this purpose, says Bhāskararāya, it helps to study the Upaniṣads 
and the Brahma Sūtras (uttaramīmāṃsā). According to the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, the latter systems of 
actual knowledge (jñānabhūmikā) are divided into seven: desire to know (vividiṣā), rumination 
(vicāraṇā), subtlety (tanumānasā), clarity (sattvāpatti), detachment (asaṃsakti), experiencing 
the object (padārthabhāvinī), and the sublime (turyag). Between the second and third, however, 
and lasting until the fifth stage, appears an extremely important intermediary stage called bhakti, 
at which time one studies the SBS (bhaktimīmāṃsā). Only upon achieving that does one directly 
experience Brahman (aparokṣānubhava), and attain the finality of liberation after leaving the 
body (videhakaivalya). Progressive access to each of these states, however, is only gained after 
upāsanāto bhedena nirdeśānupapatteḥ | anurāgasyaiva bhaktipadavācyatvāt | “athāto bhaktijijñāsā” “sā 
parānuraktir īśvare” iti śāṇḍilyasūtrāt | tasmāt anurāgavyāvṛttā kriyaivopāsanā |
I am grateful to Eric Steinschneider for drawing my attention to this passage.
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several lifetimes.624 Here Bhāskararāya pauses to analyze the system he has termed bhakti:
Thus after serious effort put in over innumerable births, one is well suited to gradually 
climb up to the stage of understanding the verbal truth of the Supreme Brahman. At this 
point, one develops a distinct degree of mental purity that takes the shape of being neither 
excessively attached to nor utterly disdainful of saṃsāra. Such a person is qualified for 
the path of bhakti, as adumbrated in BhP 11.20.8: “Neither disgusted nor extremely 
attached, he achieves perfection through bhaktiyoga.” That bhakti is of two kinds: 
secondary and primary. The former includes meditation, worship, recitation, and singing 
the names of the embodied (saguṇa) Brahman, practices that can be combined wherever 
possible. Primary bhakti, however, is a particular kind of love that arises from that. The 
first (i.e., secondary bhakti) also has several intermediate stages: a kind of identification 
(bhāvanā), enjoined worship (vihitopāsti), and worship of God (īśvaropāsti). And there 
are as many different varieties of this worship as there are varieties of gods: e.g., Sūrya, 
Gaṇeśa, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Great Śiva, and Śakti (who herself has countless forms). After 
progressing through each of these stages over several lifetimes, one develops secondary 
bhakti for the Beautiful Goddess of the Three Cities (tripurasundarī), and when well-
established therein, finally attains supreme bhakti for her.625
We find here another clear elaboration of the bhaktimārga so treasured by the BhP and its 
interpreters, but repurposed to fit a particular Śākta intellectual and soteriological project. In fact 
it is this rather uncontroversial, almost universalized discussion of bhakti that immediately leads 
into Bhāskararāya's defense of the validity and efficacy of more specifically Śrīvidyā scriptural 
traditions and ritual practices. He goes on to specify the methods of worshipping the goddess 
(sundaryupāsti), in both internal and external formats (antaryāga and bahiryāga), which 
constitutes the subject matter of the Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava. Bhāskararāya also saw an intellectual 
624 See Setubandha, 2-3.
625 Ibid., 3-4: tad evam aparimitair janmabhir mahatā prayatnena parabrahmaṇaḥ 
śābdatattvaniścayabhūmikāparyantaṃ krameṇa samyagārūḍhasya saṃsāre nātyantam āsaktir nāpi dṛḍho nirveda 
ityākārikā vilakṣaṇā cittaśuddhiḥ sampadyate | so 'yaṃ bhaktimārge 'dhikārī | “na nirviṇṇo na cā''sakto 
bhaktiyogo 'sya siddhidaḥ” iti vacanāt | sā ca bhaktir dvividhā - gauṇī parā ceti | tatrādyā saguṇasya brahmaṇo 
dhyānārcanajapanāmakīrtanādirūpā sambhavatsamuccayikā | parabhaktis tv etajjanyānurāgaviśeṣarūpā | ādyāyā 
api bahavo 'vāntarabhūmikāḥ | tāsu prathamā...bhāvanāsiddhiḥ | dvitīyā...vihitopāstiḥ | tṛtīyā tv īśvaropāstiḥ | 
īśvarasyāpi sūryagaṇeśaviṣṇurudraparaśivaśaktibhedena bahuvidhatvāt tattadupāstayo 'pi bhinnā eva bhūmikāḥ | 
śaktir api chāyāvallabhālakṣmyādibhedenānantavidhaiva | anena krameṇaitā bhūmikā anantair janmabhir 
ārūḍhasya paścāt tripurasundaryāṃ gauṇabhaktyudayas tatra samyaṅnirūḍhasya tasyāṃ parabhaktyudayā iti 
sthitiḥ |
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continuity between his works; he refers often to the Saubhāgyabhāskara in his Setubandha. If 
not the culmination of all religious activity, bhakti was nevertheless integral to Bhāskararāya's 
Tantric worldview. Far away from the northern obsession with the beauty of Kṛṣṇa, Bhāskararāya 
was captivated by a different dazzling deity, the beautiful goddess of the South, Lalitā 
Tripurasundarī. So did bhakti find its way back south, and like A.K. Ramanujan's famous story 
about Aristotle's knife, it had changed hands and points a few times, but, at least to itself, stayed 
more or less the same.626
Conclusion
The intersections between bhakti and Advaita in early modern India, at least in the 
Sanskrit scholastic world, were much more complex than mainstream histories of Indian 
philosophy and religion suggest. Beginning with the little-known writings of a well-known 
scholar, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, I trace the contours of an Advaitin reading community that 
offered competing interpretations of an increasingly canonical scripture in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. 
I then focus on a text only recently made canonical, the Bhakti Sūtras of Śāṇḍilya, and show that 
its hostility to Advaitic soteriology notwithstanding, the SBS became the object of study 
primarily among Advaitins themselves. I follow the career of one such commentator, Nārāyaṇa 
Tīrtha, and situate his often radical claims about the primacy of bhakti in the context of both the 
broader Advaita world, and across his other intellectual writings. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha appears to 
show affinity in turn for Advaita Vedānta, Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, and Śaiva Yoga—or maybe these 
626 See A.K. Ramanujan, “Three Hundred Rāmāyaṇas: Five Example and Three Thoughts on Translation,” in The 
Collected Essays of A.K. Ramanujan, ed. Vinay Dharwadker (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 156: 
“Now, is there a common core to the Rāma stories, except the most skeletal set of relations like that of Rāma, his 
brother, his wife and the antagonist Rāvaṇa who abducts her? Are the stories bound together only by certain 
family resemblances, at Wittgenstein might say? Or is it like Aristotle's jack-knife? When the philosopher asked 
an old carpenter how long he had had his knife, the latter said, 'Oh, I've had it for thirty years. I've changed the 
blade a few times and the handle a few times, but it's the same knife.'”
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labels themselves have led us astray.627 Finally, I demonstrate that these very same discourses on 
bhakti became central to the South Indian Śrīvidyā practitioner Bhāskararāya. Here was another 
Advaita that, as Elaine Fisher has shown, was embedded and embodied in the Śākta intellectual 
and ritual world of the Tamil South.628 Bhāskararāya presents yet another genealogy of Advaita 
and bhakti that has escaped historiographical attention.
Thus there were many Advaitas, many Advaitins, and many bhaktas even within the 
Sanskrit scholastic sphere in the seventeenth century and beyond. How their deliberations may 
have impacted or even been influenced by vernacular cultural and intellectual production is a 
question that deserves further investigation. Although it is difficult to substantiate hagiographical 
narratives about the relationship between Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Tulsīdās, author of the 
Avadhi Rāmcaritmānas, it seems that at least a prominent member of the Rām Rasik vernacular 
devotional community, Mahant Rāmcaraṇdās (1760-1831 CE), was well-acquainted with these 
Sanskrit discussions about bhakti. As Vasudha Paramasivan has shown, this early nineteenth-
century exegete, with the help of Ayodhya's paṇḍits, offered a theology of bhakti in his Ānand 
Laharī, a Hindi commentary on the Rāmcaritmānas, that bears close resemblance to the concerns 
of Madhusūdana and Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha.629 He recapitulated a distinction we find in their and 
627 Cf. Lawrence McCrea, “Playing with the System: Fragmentation and Individualization in Late Pre-colonial 
Mīmāṃsā,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36.5 (2008): 576-577: “[T]he nature of the disciplinary and doctrinal 
commitments entailed by the choice to write within a particular 'system', the range of variation in these 
commitments, and the way they changed over time, need to be seriously explored. It is really not at all clear, for 
our period or any other, what it means...to 'be' a Naiyāyika or a Mīmāṃsaka—what it implies about one's beliefs, 
one's writing and reading practices, and one's social, religious, and intellectual affiliations.”
628 See Fisher, “A New Public Theology”; Elaine Fisher, “'Just Like Kālidāsa': The Śākta Intellectuals of 
Seventeenth-century South India,” Journal of Hindu Studies 5.2 (2012): 172-192; Elaine Fisher, “Public 
philology: text criticism and the sectarianization of Hinduism in early modern South India,” South Asian History  
and Culture 6.1 (2015): 50-69; Elaine Fisher, “'A Śākta in the Heart': Śrīvidyā and Advaita Vedānta in the 
Theology of Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita,” Journal of Hindu Studies 8.1 (2015): 124-138.
629 See Vasudha Paramasivan, “Between Text and Sect: Early Nineteenth Century Shifts in the Theology of Ram” 
(PhD diss., University of California Berkeley, 2010), 93-125.
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Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava works between the BhP's “ninefold” bhakti and the more particular bhakti of 
supreme love (premalakṣaṇā or premāparā). Like his Sanskrit predecessors, he distinguished 
this latter bhakti from those that were “mixed with action” (karmamiśra) and “mixed with 
knowledge and action” (karmajñānamiśra).630 And although he used the familiar pejorative 
“illusionist” (māyāvādī) to refer to certain Advaita factions, he referenced many Sanskrit Advaita 
texts and may have even considered Advaita to be a Vaiṣṇava school of philosophy.631 Writing on 
the cusp of a time when other Vaiṣṇava intellectuals tried to exclude Advaita from among the 
representatives of a big-tent Hinduism, by pointing to bhakti as “the only real religion of the 
Hindus,” Rāmcaraṇdās occupies an interesting place indeed in the history of ideas both religious 
and political.632
This brief exploration of intellectual history on the margins of the classical returns us to 
our initial questions about historical method itself. My reading too has been philosophical, like 
those of my predecessors, inasmuch as it focuses on the content of these intellectuals' unique and 
often unprecedented arguments. However, my aim is not to account for either their consistency 
or inconsistency, but to understand their writing in context. That context proves to be more 
complex and wide-ranging than the frame of philosophical “schools” allows us to comprehend. 
630 Ibid., 119. Cf. Bhakticandrikā, 162-163. This typology is first articulated in the Bhāgavatamuktāphala by 
Vopadeva in the thirteenth century.
631 Paramasivan, “Between Text and Sect,” 116. Similarly, the Bhaktamāl of Nābhādās (1600 CE) a text which by 
the late nineteenth century, as James Hare writes, “had become a key ingredient in the nationalist-tinged Hindu 
devotionalism that would come to define modern Hinduism,” pays obeisance not only to vernacular bhakti 
saints, but also to famous exegetes of the Advaita Vedānta tradition: Śaṅkara, Citsukha, Nṛsiṃhāraṇya, and 
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, among others. See James Hare, “Contested communities and the re-imagination of 
Nābhādās' Bhaktamāl,” in Time, History and the Religious Imaginary in South Asia, ed. Anne Murphy (London: 
Routledge: 2011), 162. Cf. Mishra, The Development and Place of Bhakti in Śāṅkara Vedānta, 6-7.
632 See Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bhāratendu Hariśchandra and Nineteenth-
century Banaras (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 338ff.
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Perhaps a more genealogical approach to the history of Advaita would require us to revisit the 
very systematicity of the system. Instead of assuming the coherence of Advaita Vedānta as a 
school of philosophy, and singling out individual authors for their deviations from a norm, we 
might instead consider the tradition itself fragmented and fractured. Whether this means paying 
closer attention to premodern schisms between “Smārta” and “Bhāgavata” Advaitins,633 
understanding the relationship, or lack thereof, between Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva Advaitins north and 
south, or offering our own analytical distinctions between “classical” and “greater” Advaita 
Vedānta, we need to become more expansive with the kinds of texts we are reading, and the ways 
in which we read them. “In a splintered world,” to invoke Clifford Geertz, “we must address the 
splinters.”634
633 See Nelson, “Bhakti in Advaita Vedānta,” 119, 422-423, n.15. In his eighteenth-century commentary on Jīva 
Gosvāmin's Tattvasandarbha, Rādhāmohana claims that there arose a split early on in Śaṅkara's school between 
those who did or did not follow his teachings on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. It is this purported split that Friedhelm 
Hardy explored in a tantalizing article on the ascetic Mādhavendra Purī, which I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
634 Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 221.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
History can never be free from a mixture, an undecided tension
between what happened and what ought to have happened.
-Sudipta Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness635
In nineteenth-century Bengal, polemical exchanges between Christian missionaries and 
Hindu religious intellectuals frequently featured criticisms and defenses of Vedānta, transforming 
it from one scholastic tradition among several into a representative of modern Hinduism.636 
While the Bhagavad Gītā and the Upaniṣads attracted the most attention, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa 
also emerged as a contested text, at once revered by the Vaiṣṇava traditions of Bengal and 
incompatible with the attempt to remake Hinduism in the image of rational religion.637 The 
famous writer Bankimchandra Chatterjee, for example, was troubled by the BhP, and in his 
Kṛṣṇacaritra (1886) sought to recuperate Kṛṣṇa as an exemplar of the divine life from the erotic 
and fantastic accretions of later poetic and devotional texts.638 At the same time, he did not go to 
the other extreme and adopt the Unitarian Advaita Vedānta of his earlier Bengali bourgeois 
contemporaries, such as Rammohan Roy.639 Both Bankimchandra and his famous contemporary 
Swami Vivekananda continued to negotiate the terms of jñāna, bhakti, and karma, at once 
635 Sudipta Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist  
Discourse in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 104.
636 See Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, and the 'Mystic East' (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 119-142; Brian A. Hatcher, Bourgeois Hinduism, or the Faith of the Modern Vedantists: Rare  
Discourses from Early Colonial Bengal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Amiya P. Sen, Explorations in 
Modern Bengal, c. 1800-1900: Essays on Religion, History and Culture (Delhi: Primus Books, 2010).
637 Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness, 72-106.
638 Ibid., 77ff.
639 See Sen, Explorations in Modern Bengal, 74: “Between 1886 when the work was first published as a book and 
the time it was reprinted (1892), Bankimchandra may have come to realize that the search for a sanitized God, 
when taken too far, obliterated poetic talent and imagination. In a larger sense, Bankimchandra's greater 
willingness to admit the Bhagavata, is also an indication of his distinct leaning towards bhakti.”
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continuing the old controversies and refashioning the very meaning of the terms.640 In doing so, 
they created the discursive space for a recognizably modernist, middle-class Hinduism.641
Whether one interprets these discourses as representative of a total rupture with 
premodern hermeneutics, influenced by “a disenchanted view of the world constructed by 
science,”642 or as evidence of a methodological continuity with regard to traditional sources of 
authority,643 largely depends on one's understanding of agency, colonized consciousness, and 
640 Ibid., 96-97: “In the context of Vivekananda's religious and philosophical thought, it is important not to lose sight 
of two significant developments. First, there is the change from an initial rejection of Vedanta to a constructive 
acceptance....It is reasonable to assume that Vivekananda's interest in Vedanta, more specifically in Advaita 
Vedanta, intensified only after the passing away of the Master. […] In the aforesaid letter, Vivekananda appears 
to put faith before argument, enthralled by Mitra's ability to reconcile the paths of gyan and bhakti.”
Cf. Ibid., 152-153: “In the Dharmatattwa, gyan is expected to dispel agyan (ignorance) and the meaning which 
Bankimchandra attaches to the latter term comes very close to what the Advaita school would associate with 
Maya....[W]e have to allow for the fact that he did not comprehend the term karma in the way vedantins did. And 
gyan in Bankimchandra's lexicon, was not confined to esoteric knowledge that a typical non-dualist would take it 
to be. If at all, Bankimchandra attempted the revival that we have spoken of, it would have been with a 
considerable extension of the meaning of both terms gyan and karma.”
Cf. Ibid., 208: “Vivekananda rejected political praxis but also often admitted that patriotic considerations had 
determined his choice of strategies and paths: 'I am always trying to keep down the rush of bhakti welling within 
me...trying to bind myself with the iron chain of jnan for still my work for my motherland is unfinished and my 
message to the world not yet fully delivered....' Here, it is difficult to exactly recapture Vivekananda's thoughts 
and intentions for surely, bhakti, in this instance, is not simply the adoration of a personal god. Perhaps gyan and 
bhakti in Vivekananda's lexicon also represented the universal and the local.”
641 See Hatcher, Bourgeois Hinduism, 83: “[W]e do well to consider how this moment of theological reflection 
contributed to the emergence of what might today be called middle-class Hinduism. In the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, this bourgeois ethic would reappear in a variety of modernist guises, whether it be Swami 
Vivekananda’s 'Practical Vedanta' or Bankim Chatterjee’s vision of a Hindu humanism. This quest to harmonize 
the spiritual truths of Vedānta with modes of worldly activity, even worldly success, remains a vital factor even 
in today’s manifold expressions of postcolonial and diasporic Hinduism.”
642 Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness, 92. Cf. Jyotirmaya Sharma, A Restatement of Religion: Swami 
Vivekananda and the Making of Hindu Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
643 See Sen, Explorations in Modern Bengal, 143: “In the Dharmatattwa itself, there is a repeated use of the 
Bhagavat Gita, Bhagavat Purana, Vishnu Purana, Vajseniyasamhitapanishad (Isopanishad), Chandogya 
Upanishad, Sandilya Bhakti Sutra (and Swapneswar's commentary on the same), the Mahabharata, 
Vrihadgautamiya Samhita, Kulluk Bhatt's commentary on Manu and a Vedantic text, Vedantasara by the 
fifteenth century scholar, Sadananda....Under the circumstances, it would be more accurate to say that what 
Bankimchandra's hermeneutics represented is not an outright rejection of traditional sources of authority but 
their selective use.”
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epistemic shifts. Either way, it is clear that the problems internal to Advaita Vedānta that we have 
studied in this thesis were themselves continuous in a later period, for those intellectuals 
confronted with the new systems of Western education and Christian political theology. The 
Vedānta of precolonial India, however drastically re-engineered, survived well beyond colonial 
modernity into the neo-liberal postmodern. One might argue that, like other Sanskrit knowledge-
systems confronted with the order of colonial power-knowledge, Vedānta no longer had the 
capacity to make theory, to speak in a living language, to be anything but, in short, an inauthentic 
shadow of its precolonial self.644 But the problem, if we even acknowledge it as such, is only 
especially acute if we study Vedānta as a primarily philosophical tradition, instead of a 
fundamentally hermeneutical one that consistently responded to new historical situations. 
Vedānta qua philosophy after Indian independence was primarily the prerogative of academics 
trained in Western philosophy and philology, and of popular gurus, who attempted to re-present 
“religion” both to an (upper-caste) Hindu middle-class fed on a steady diet of Nehruvian 
secularism, and to a Western audience in the thrall of the New Age.645 Vedānta as a tradition of 
historical memory, however, regarded the old scholastic controversies as current and vital; in this 
world, new challenges elicited new responses, and jñāna, karma, and bhakti were reconciled time 
and again, in different ways. For Bankimchandra and Vivekananda, they were instrumental to 
anticolonial nationalism; for many in the middle-class diaspora, they are spiritual guides in a 
material world.
What I have emphasized here, however, is that it was not at all inevitable that Advaita 
644 Cf. Wilhelm Halbfass, Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedanta (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995), 229-252.
645 Cf. Brian A. Hatcher, Eclecticism and Modern Hindu Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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Vedānta would come to dominate colonial encounters with and constructions of Hinduism. On 
the eve of colonialism, Advaita Vedānta was in competition both with other philosophical 
schools and with itself. Its rise to modern prominence was no doubt a result of older processes, 
but that history was plural, fragmented, and contingent. It is perhaps the singular burden of 
premodernists to have to situate their work with reference to a modern telos, as though being 
historically rigorous simply meant that one tell a single story in more detail. The history of 
Advaita Vedānta, however, is not only not linear, but far from complete. A more comprehensive 
conclusion—indeed, another book-length project—would go on to address Advaita's social life 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and how its transformations refracted the debates of 
the precolonial past. But there are enough questions about that past that punctuate the present 
thesis: What should we make of the fraternal yet fractured relationship between Gauḍīya 
Vaiṣṇavas and their Advaita contemporaries, given the common set of intellectual resources upon 
which they drew? How might these Sanskrit intellectual debates have been recast in, or perhaps 
themselves formed by, their vernacular counterparts? Of what sort were the links between 
Advaitins north and south of the Vindhyas? And what more might we say about the regional 
variations of Advaita Vedānta, even as it aspired to universality?
In this dissertation, I have called upon the insights of intellectual and social historians to 
provincialize the self-professed universality of premodern Sanskrit intellectuals, while at the 
same time attending to the reach of their ideas across regions and time periods. In Chapter 2, I 
investigated some fragmentary clues as to the whereabouts of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa between the 
time of its composition and its emergence into the world of Sanskrit exegesis and poetry. I 
suggested that the text was especially influential for a scattered community of scholars affiliated 
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with Advaita Vedānta—some more loosely than others. On the evidence of both material and 
literary culture, I located these scholars at the nexus of a number of religious and philosophical 
currents often at odds in the historiography of Indian religion and philosophy. I suggested that 
the flimsy connection between these individuals pointed to the diverse transmission of the BhP, 
at once complicating and confirming its later self-presentation as a text that migrated from south 
to north.
In Chapter 3, I explored the BhP's entry into the world of śāstra, of Sanskrit 
intellectuality. Although the BhP presented itself as the culmination of all Brahmanical scripture, 
this claim was not elaborated in scholastic fashion until the fifteenth century, in a text called the 
Bhagavannāmakaumudī (BNK), or the “Moonlight of God's Name.” I discussed the early history 
of how Mīmāṃsā, the arbiter of scriptural canonicity par excellence, determined the relative 
degrees of authority distributed between the Veda (śruti) and the set of “remembered” traditional 
texts (smṛti). I showed how the BNK posed a challenge to this discourse of scriptural orthodoxy 
by using the language of Mīmāṃsā not only to legitimize the independent authority of the 
purāṇa, but also to rank it above the genre of smṛti. In particular, the BNK critiqued the 
normative practices of expiation prescribed by dharmaśāstra, replacing them with the singular 
act of uttering God's name. I argued that the BNK's attempt to expand and, in fact, supplant parts 
of the Sanskrit scriptural canon reflected a scholastic elaboration of the BhP's own claims to 
Vedic status. I further contextualized the BNK in the world of Vedānta, and demonstrated that it 
served as the inspiration for different schools of Vedānta in later centuries. I also connected the 
BNK to traditions of musical performance in the early modern Tamil South, raising still further 
questions about the circles through which the text may have passed. Ultimately, I suggested that 
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these plural histories of the BNK pointed to the fragmentary character of a bhakti practice—
singing God's name, which some called the Nāmasiddhānta—often valorized for its universality.
In Chapter 4, I focused on the social and intellectual history of a family of Maharashtrian 
Brahmin migrants to Banaras, the Devas, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I attempted 
to discern the tensions between their philosophical interest in scriptural study (jñāna), their 
pedagogical commitment to ritual hermeneutics (karma), and their religious devotion to an 
embodied god (bhakti). I showed that in both their polemical and literary writings, the Devas not 
only championed the public expression of personal devotion, but made their commitments to 
bhakti constitutive of the Sanskrit intellectual disciplines within which they worked. I situated 
these shifting registers of intellectual discourse against the social changes of the early modern 
world, paying particular attention to the reconstitution of Brahmin identity in a world that 
challenged its hegemony. By exploring the connections that the Devas had with popular Marathi 
saints, I emphasized the participation of the margins in the center, and the local context of the 
universality that Sanskrit systems of knowledge accorded to themselves.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I questioned the coherence of Advaita Vedānta as a “system” in its 
early modern incarnations, by exploring several writings that attempted to reconcile bhakti with 
Advaita in philosophical fashion. First, I looked at some understudied writings of the famous 
Advaitin Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in order to understand the diversity of interpretive options 
around the BhP, all of which may have been contained within Advaitic circles. I studied the 
identification of bhakti as an object of theoretical inquiry in the Bhakti Sūtras of Śāṇḍilya, and, 
through Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's commentary on the text, showed that Advaitic interpreters were 
themselves divided over its meaning. I then followed the ways in which bhakti became 
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constitutive of entirely different religious and philosophical disciplines: first, in Nārāyaṇa 
Tīrtha's commentary on the Yoga Sūtras, and second, in the Śākta Tantric writings of 
Bhāskararāya. In the end, I suggested that understanding the relationship between bhakti and 
Advaita might be better served by a focus on their multiple and varied historical intersections 
rather than simply the metaphysical issues at stake.
Throughout these chapters, I have tried both to contribute original research to the history 
of Indian religion and philosophy, and to examine some of the historiographical narratives of that 
field itself. In doing so, I hoped to show that the work of intellectual history itself questions the 
binary between philosophy and history.646 How we have come to understand Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, 
and the “bhakti movement” is as much a part of their meaning as is the content of these subjects. 
In this practical way, at least, academics who study these topics are continuous with the scholars 
studied in this dissertation. They, too, consistently re-assessed the value of their intellectual 
inheritances, sometimes to criticize and sometimes to celebrate them. They offered historical (if 
not historicist) explanations for the rise and fall of religious and philosophical trends. And they 
participated in a wide-ranging discursive sphere, constrained on the one hand by technical 
scholarly language and boundaries of caste and class, and on the other hand aspiring to reach a 
broader, less initiated public. Thus, instead of speculating on the alternative modernities of a 
different historical world, or wondering how history might (should) have been, I simply state that 
the past, neither a foreign country nor a comfortable home, remains constitutive of our present.
646 See Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 125: “[S]uch investigations enable us to question the appropriateness of any strong distinction between 
matters of 'merely historical' and of 'genuinely philosophical' interest, since they enable us to recognise that our 
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